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Abstract 
Numerous international development agencies and researchers advocate 
the use of dedicated transport authorities in urban areas as a means for 
strengthening the institutional frameworks needed to improve transport 
services in cities. While such bodies are widespread in developed countries, 
little is known about the benefits and drawbacks of their use in developing 
Asian cities. The very different institutional contexts into which such 
management would be integrated raise some interesting questions as to 
how effective such models could be in these cities. This thesis examines 
two transport authorities that have been created to improve the coordination 
of urban transport in the Asian region – the Land Public Transport 
Commission (SPAD) in Malaysia, and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land 
Transport Authority (BMLTA) in Bangalore, India. The aim is to explore the 
motivations underpinning the reforms and the creation of these two bodies, 
as well as to understand how the reforms have subsequently unfolded in 
terms of their implementation, these agencies’ abilities to implement their 
plans, the outcomes they have achieved and the problems they experience.  
This research utilises a qualitative approach to undertake a cross-national 
case study through semi-structured interviews of stakeholders in the urban 
transport sector, including civil servants, politicians, private sector workers 
and academics. The data from these interviews was augmented by 
assessment of written materials. The findings show how the creation and 
empowerment of SPAD and the BMLTA have been influenced by contextual 
factors and constraints that arose during their implementation. These 
findings also provide insights into factors that determine the performance of 
these authorities. The creation of SPAD and BMLTA which aimed to change 
the way urban transport was governed in their contexts, has only provided a 
partial degree of success. The reforms have been successful in Malaysia to 
a certain extent as it has a clear operational mandate. By contrast, in 
Bangalore, the reforms have achieved only weak coordination. The reforms 
were dominated by the existing institutional landscape and power struggles. 
With strong political leadership, some aspects of this can be overcome, but 
not to the extent that these bodies have control over the range of policy 
tools needed to deliver a truly integrated transport strategies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
This research aims to contribute to the understanding of governance 
reforms on urban transport in developing Asian countries. In particular, it 
examines the use of transport authorities as a means of improving 
coordination in urban transport by studying two such authorities in Malaysia 
and Bangalore (India) respectively. The aims are to explore the stated 
motivations behind the reform and creation of new transport bodies, and to 
understand how the reforms have subsequently unfolded in terms of 
implementation and where possible the outcomes. The importance of 
context is a key feature of the study. To achieve this, qualitative methods 
using cross-national case studies were adopted. 
1.2 Rationale for the study  
International development agencies and a number of researchers advocate 
the use of transport authorities in urban areas as a means for strengthening 
the institutional frameworks needed to improve transport in cities in 
developing countries (Imran, 2009; Jemali, 2009; World Bank, 2007a, 
2005a). A transport authority is generally understood to be a public or 
publicly owned organisation with vested authority that operates in a specified 
territory to manage public transport services (see section 2.3 for definitions). 
Key examples of such authorities are Transport for London (TfL) and Land 
Transport Authority (LTA), Singapore. Under this definition, the 
organisations that provide the case studies for this research – the Land 
Public Transport Commission (SPAD) in Malaysia and the Bangalore 
Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) in India – can be considered 
to be transport authorities. 
It is believed that transport policy requires a package of measures to be 
effective, and that these measures are more likely to be implemented 
concurrently when the relevant powers are vested in a single organisation 
(ADB, 2009). While such organisations are widely spread in developed 
countries, little is known about the benefits, drawbacks and challenges that 
exist for changing the way transport is managed and coordinated in 
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developing Asian cities. The different institutional contexts into which such 
approaches would be integrated raise some interesting questions about the 
effectiveness of applying such models in these cities (see Dimitriou, 2006). 
Looking at transport authorities in developed cities reveals that they can 
take many forms, utilising different models and performing varying functions. 
Although transport authorities may all have been launched with the goal of 
improving coordination between agencies and transport modes, many of 
these authorities have evolved from coordination mechanisms to area-wide, 
multimodal transport authorities, with roles ranging from planning, regulation, 
budget control, provision of infrastructure, to traffic management and road 
construction (World Bank, 2008). Development agencies often hold the 
belief that policy reforms that have proved successful in developed countries 
should be implemented more widely across the developing region (Marsden 
and Stead, 2011), and hence that transport authorities are one such policy. 
Urban transport challenges in developing countries1 are unique, differing 
from those in developed cities. Thus, care has to be taken when copying 
models that have worked elsewhere to ensure that they are applied correctly 
in these different contexts. Many Asian cities are vast in size and typically 
grow much faster in terms of both their populations and their rates of 
urbanisation than European cities do (Emberger et al., 2008). This creates 
jurisdictional and functional fragmentation, such as overlaps among the 
responsibilities and activities of different organisations and the creation of 
vested interest in protecting and expanding revenue resources (World Bank, 
2000a). A popular solution has been to create metropolitan-regional 
development authorities (such as the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional 
Development Authority and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) that 
also take care of transport issues (ibid). However, integrated authorities are 
complex to manage as the regional authority has to deal with other pressing 
issues such as housing and sanitation. Hence, creating a dedicated 
transport authority is seen as a good way to champion the urban transport 
sector.  
                                            
1    Developing countries, according to the World Bank are countries which are classified as 
low-income and middle-income economies. Low income economies has gross national 
income (GNI) per capita of $1,025 or less and middle income economies has GNI per 
capita between $1,026 - $12,475 
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The creation of transport authorities has been heavily advocated by 
international development agencies in many cities in Asia, either through 
technical studies or by direct involvement in the creation of such bodies 
under the name of institutional strengthening, which forms part of 
development agencies’ urban transport improvement programmes. The 
latter usually comes with funding and technical advice (mostly undertaken by 
the World Bank). Despite the heavy promotion of these authorities, only a 
few cities have been willing to undertake such reforms, including Dhaka in 
Bangladesh and a number of cities in India.  
Dhaka is the capital city of Bangladesh with population of 8.5 million people 
in 2001, covering an area of 815.8km
2
.2 In Dhaka, the creation of the 
Greater Dhaka Transport Planning and Coordination Board (GDTPCB) in 
1999 was part of the Dhaka Urban Transport Programme funded by the 
World Bank to improve urban transport infrastructure and services in the 
Dhaka metropolitan area and to strengthen the institutional framework there 
(World Bank, 2000a). The project took from 1999 to 2005 to implement, and 
the GDTPCB was created to play a leading role in transport planning as well 
as to assist in policy formulation and the coordination of major urban 
transport operational and investment decisions. However, the World Bank’s 
appraisal of the programme in 2007 found that the GDTPCB did not function 
as well as it had been expected to, with the board lacking steady and strong 
leadership as well as the administrative and financial authority over the 
implementing agencies that it required to perform its coordinating function 
(World Bank, 2007a). The World Bank began a similar programme in Hanoi 
in 2010, although to-date there is no evidence that the proposed Public 
Transport Authority has been created.  
International development agencies did not fund the creation of transport 
authorities in Malaysia or India, although they have exerted some pressure 
on the authorities in these countries to create such bodies. In Malaysia, the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) proposed that a transport 
authority be established on the basis of a study on Integrated Urban 
Transportation Strategies for Environmental Improvement in Kuala Lumpur 
completed in 1999, which concluded that a new body was needed to look at 
transport issues from a regional perspective as none of the existing 
agencies were doing so. A similar proposal was put forward by the World 
                                            
2 http://www.bbs.gov.bd/DistrictWisePopulation/  accessed on 12th June 2013 
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Bank, which prepared a study on urban rail concessions in three cities 
including Kuala Lumpur. The World Bank proposed the creation of an Urban 
Transport Authority with “political legitimacy and revenue-raising powers 
responsible for determining and implementing strategy and regulating the 
sector, combined with a mechanism for coordinating decision-making with 
other agencies and levels of government” (World Bank, 2004:29). 
In India, the World Bank’s study on India’s Transport Sector in 2002 led to a 
proposal for a Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA) for large 
metropolitan areas (World Bank, 2002a). In 2005, it made a stronger 
proposal on the basis of a study that it conducted on urban transport in 
Chennai and Bangalore, recommending the creation of an authority for 
public transport in these cities to function as a policy-making and regulatory 
body, with technical support to be provided by a separate unit (World Bank, 
2005a). 
Researchers urged caution, however, in terms of both the ‘appropriateness 
and effectiveness’ of transferring such policy solutions from one part of the 
world to another (Marsden and Stead, 2011:499). To-date, there remains a 
lack of empirical research on whether transport authorities work in the 
context of developing countries. The World Bank’s proposals are also 
contestable, as there is still no evidence that an effective and workable 
transport authority has been created in the developing Asian cities. 
Moreover, in places where transport authority reforms have failed – such as 
in Dhaka – the reasons for their failures are not fully understood. 
This research aims to fill these gaps in knowledge by taking two case 
studies; institutional reforms in Malaysia and Bangalore (India) with the aim 
of providing empirical evidence and theoretical insights on why the 
authorities were established in the ways they were and how the reform 
subsequently unfolded. The findings of this research will provide lessons for 
policy-makers in other developing Asian countries regarding the critical 
factors and institutional contexts that should be taken into consideration 
when seeking to create an effective transport authority. 
1.3 The research questions 
As mentioned in the previous section, this research addresses the limited 
presence of case studies on transport authorities in developing Asian 
countries. It provides new insights on such authorities through two cross-
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national case studies – SPAD and BMLTA. To achieve this, the following 
research questions were constructed: 
Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of the 
transport authorities? 
Previous studies contend that the motivations for governance reforms are 
surrounding several factors such as inadequacy in the existing institutional 
arrangements, impact of best practice reform models, expenditure control 
and to improve public service delivery (Peters, 2010; Cheema, 2005; Grindle 
and Thomas,1989). Particularly, in the transport sector, the international 
development agencies strongly advocate creation of transport authorities to 
improve coordination among agencies, to promote integrated planning and 
strengthen the regulation of the public transport system (ADB, 2009, World 
Bank, 2002b, 2005a). 
This question aims to discover the motivations behind the creation of SPAD 
and the BMLTA by identifying the key events that led to the reforms, 
including political changes, public transport issues, perceived inadequacies 
in institutional structures, the presence of key personalities, push factors 
from international development agencies, and policy shifts. It will also 
attempt to capture the views and observations of respondents regarding 
existing transport issues and problems and their opinions about how these 
issues can be resolved. A good understanding of the key factors would help 
in understanding the rhetoric and rationale for reform. Understanding the 
rationale for reform will allow a clearer interpretation of how the different 
actors perceived the outcomes. 
Question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the transport 
authorities? 
Bauckaert and Pollitt (2011) suggest that greater autonomy for agencies 
leads to improvements in economy, productivity and user responsiveness. In 
the same vein, researchers and international development agencies stress 
that in order for transport authorities to be effective, they must be 
decentralised, given legislative support, have control over transport budget 
and have the ability to drive the implementation of their decisions 
(Naniopoulous, 2012; ADB, 2009; World Bank, 2005b; GTZ, 2004).  
The reforms studied differed in their natures and in relation to the settings in 
which they were enacted, and this question is thus designed to explore the 
natures of these two transport authorities and the rationale for the models 
adopted in the reforms. It also explores the power and autonomy that these 
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two transport authorities were provided with in order to carry out their 
delegated functions, examining the constraints that they face and the 
arguments for empowering them further. Finally, this question also examines 
their capacities, the resources they have been allocated and the 
mechanisms through which they exercise their powers. 
Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in 
policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects? 
The importance of having the right decisions making powers has been 
contended as an important element for transport authorities (Masi, 2009; 
Leach and Wilson, 2004) and this also an important element in successful 
decentralisation (Ebinger et al., 2007; Smoke, 2003; Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999). The basic idea behind improving coordination among agencies is 
also to promote joint decision-making (Camerer and Knez, 1997) and 
Bauckaert and Pollitt (2011) found that decision-making process could be 
used as the basis to assess reform progress – as changes in process 
improvement is said to have an impact on output and outcomes.  
This research question has been designed to explore how the reform has 
affected the decision-making process - in particular and the extent to which 
the transport authorities have control over decisions for policy-making and 
transport projects. Particular focus was given to identifying the range of 
actors that are involved in the decision-making process. The extent of these 
transport authorities’ powers to implement decisions or provide resources to 
steer other agencies was examined. Other outcomes – such as 
improvements in coordination between agencies or changes in planning 
practices – were investigated to discover the extent to which these transport 
authorities can justify their existences. 
Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms? 
The final research question provides space for overarching reflections on 
why SPAD and the BMLTA were (not) able to do what they were set out to 
do, and involves examining the key factors that affect their performance and 
what this means more generally for such reforms. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on transport issues in 
developing countries, and of transport authorities in both developing and 
developed countries. It outlines and explains the key concepts used in this 
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thesis, and then describes issues relating to institutional complexity and 
institutional reform, paying particular attention to the public sector reforms 
from which transport authorities are created. This provides the analytical 
framework used in the analysis of the case studies, which attempt to 
understand the motivations, power relations, outputs, and other factors that 
determine the success of the transport authorities.    
Chapter 3 presents a description of the case studies, focusing on SPAD and 
the BMLTA. It explains the institutional structure and arrangements before 
and after the transport authorities were created and sets the framework for 
interpretation.  
Chapter 4 addresses issues relating to the research methods. The key 
methodological decisions are described, including the research paradigm 
and the rationale for using cross-national case studies. This includes details 
of the data-gathering methods, particularly in relation to interviews and the 
challenges and assumptions associated with them. This chapter then moves 
on to examine issues of validity and reliability, and the limitations of the 
methods that were adopted. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates how the data was analysed through both an 
inductive and a deductive approach. It establishes how the data was 
synthesised and transformed into the findings, beginning by explaining how 
the interviews were transcribed and outlining the use of coding within case 
analysis. Finally, it provides a cross-case analysis by identifying similar 
themes, taking into consideration context-based differences in the two 
cases. 
Chapters 6 and 7 present the findings of the study by interpreting the 
generated data. The case study analysis of SPAD and the BMLTA is 
presented in the order of the research questions. As the intention was to 
capture the findings that emerged from the data, the respondents’ views 
were presented first, followed by a reflective section at the end of each set 
of data responding to the individual research questions. The reflective 
sections provide the researcher’s interpretations, which are related back to 
the extant literature. 
Chapter 8 then discusses the determinant factors that have emerged from 
the research in relation to the themes identified in chapters 6 and 7 
concerning the creation and functioning of the transport authorities in 
Malaysia and Bangalore. The discussion focuses around the similarities and 
differences observed in the case studies, using relevant examples from the 
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key events, actors, processes, and activities in order to inform it. This 
chapter also uses the findings of the case studies to provide advice for 
policy-makers in other developing countries who wish to create transport 
authorities and presents the policy recommendations for SPAD and the 
BMLTA. 
Finally, chapter 9 draws together some of the findings and themes 
discussed throughout the thesis, addresses limitations of this research, 
makes suggestions for future research, and ends with the researcher’s 
personal reflections. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1  Introduction  
This chapter explores the governance reforms that created SPAD and the 
BMLTA, utilising academic literature to more tightly construct the research 
questions and to underpin the thesis’ theoretical framework. It begins with a 
brief overview of transport issues in the cities of developing Asian countries, 
showing the need for greater institutional interactions. This is followed in 
section 2.3 by a discussion of the debate on the need for transport 
authorities, both by international development agencies and between 
researchers. Section 2.4 outlines the transport authority models that have 
been adopted in developed cities together with their best practices, with 
particular attention being given to the Land Transport Authority (LTA), 
Singapore and Transport for London (TfL). Having drawn out the key factors 
that are critical for the good performance of transport authorities, section 2.5 
then goes on to discuss these factors (decentralisation, coordination, 
decision-making, power and accountability). It is noted that these factors are 
also key components of good governance, and section 2.6 then proceeds to 
discuss issues on governance. The reform process involved in the creation 
of the transport authorities in the selected case studies is addressed, and in 
an attempt to better understand it, section 2.7 highlights matters related to 
institutional complexity and public sector reforms, mainly relating to factors 
influencing the reform exercise and its outcomes. This chapter ends with 
section 2.8 which summarises critical findings in literature and relate them to 
the research questions of this study. 
2.2   Transport challenges in developing countries  
The majority of cities in developing countries have experienced rapid 
economic development and urbanisation, which in turn has resulted in a 
significant increase in the mobility of people and goods, together with a 
growing dependence on private cars. According to the World Bank, 
developing countries are referred to those countries which  
In many developing Asian cities, the average annual percentage increase in 
car ownership has reached as high as 10% annually (Rameshwar et al., 
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2011) and motorcycle ownership has increased between 10% and 15% (see 
Gwilliam, 2013). This has adversely affected traffic safety, air quality and 
public health. A unique characteristic of the demand for transport is the need 
to provide door-to-door service and this is provided partly by para-transit 
modes such as auto-rickshaws in India and tuktuks in Bangkok (Morita et 
al., 2004). The failure of public transport services to fulfil the growing travel 
demand due to urbanisation and to provide door-to-door service encourage 
a further switch to private vehicles, especially cars (ibid). For those who 
cannot afford cars, motorcycles have offered an excellent substitute—both 
in rich and poor Asian cities, including Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, Hanoi, 
Bangkok, Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh. Whilst this mode of transport provides 
greater speed and flexibility of movement, it also poses its own problems, 
mainly surrounding safety issues, and in the long-run, when the income level 
of motorcyclists improves, they are likely to graduate to cars (Gwilliam, 
2013). This is not to imply that everyone enjoys the benefits of economic 
growth and urbanisation with higher incomes and a better quality of life - 
poverty remains a serious issue with urban poverty plaguing many cities in 
the region. Most of the urban poor are forced to live in the urban periphery, 
and they can barely afford to use any kind of motorised transport, and are 
therefore heavily dependent on walking (Pucher et al., 2007). However, a 
drastic increase of motorisation has led to more street space being 
dedicated to motor vehicles, with less space remaining for the non-
motorised transport on which the poor depend (ibid). 
For Vasconcellos (2001), this unbalanced growth is linked to economic 
development, which does not presuppose the search for equity. There is 
also the emergence of middle-class families who view motorisation as 
mandatory (ibid). Some researchers view this situation as a matter of the 
government’s failing to restrain car usage and maintain an adequate level of 
public transport service (Kasipillai and Chan, 2008; Barter et al., 2003; 
Rujopakarn, 2003). The failure to develop public transport system can be 
attributed to several factors. Kiggundu (2009), based on his research on 
public transport system in Kuala Lumpur, revealed that poor financial 
strategies were one of the main reasons for the implementation failure of 
privatised rail projects. Other factors included the poor control of land use 
with the absence of land use and transport integration, a lack of 
enforcement and a poor user discipline (Verma et al., 2011; ADB, 2009). 
Importantly, all of these factors can be attributed to poor governance and 
weak transport institutional arrangements. 
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There seems to be a consensus amongst researchers as to the importance 
of good governance and institutional structure as the backbone to support 
and develop an efficient and integrated transport service (Macario and 
Spandou, 2010; Imran, 2009; Stough and Rietveld, 2006, 1997). However, 
these researchers cautioned that there are a number of fundamental issues 
pertinent to many developing countries, that need to be tackled before a 
good transport system can be put in place. Dimitriou (2006) acknowledges 
the fragmentation and duplication of roles and functions of agencies, as well 
as the absence of an overall leadership by one agency. Sohail et al. (2006) 
contend that the development of transport in developing cities is not being 
tailored to local needs - this is attributed to the absence of a platform for the 
public to participate or to the reluctance of the public to get involved. This 
lack of public participation could also be attributed to the ‘centralised’ nature 
of many developing countries without the devolvement of necessary powers 
to the local bodies to manage the transport matters in their area (Agarwal, 
2006; Gwilliam, 2003, 1997). Whilst these countries are associated with 
highly centralised governance systems, they ironically have to contend with 
legislative and institutional barriers in dealing with the public transport 
sector, which is often attributed to the split responsibilities between multiple 
agencies (Vasconcellos, 2001). Whilst calls for decentralisation are strong, it 
would still not provide a panacea, as decentralisation in developing countries 
has only the devolvement of administrative responsibilities without the 
accompanying financial resources needed for effective management 
(Gwilliam, 2003). This is particularly evident in India (Mohan and Mercier, 
2012), Thailand (Rujopakarn, 2003), Africa (Kwayke, 1992), Indonesia 
(Munawar, 2006) and Malaysia (Jemali, 2009).  
In addition to the fragmented regulatory framework and a lack of public 
consultation, other issues, such as a lack of funding and expertise, red tape 
and corruption, as well as the absence of clear policy objectives have made 
the planning and development of public transport services a rather difficult 
task (Fujita, 2012; Dimitriou, 2006). This is aggravated by a constant 
struggle between politicians and bureaucrats -  the former favouring short-
term benefits that enhance electoral prospects, with the latter valuing long-
term benefits (Agarwal and Zimmerman, 2008). Although many developing 
countries adopt a master-plan approach, the main challenge is to transform 
the plans into action as over time they are often aborted or not implemented 
due to interferences from political leaders, which Flyvbjerg describes as 
power rule rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
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Several solutions for overcoming these problems have been proposed in the 
literature, including the decentralisation of responsibilities to local levels, 
strengthening local authorities, creating open decision-making processes 
(Vanconcellos, 2001), creating strong central planning bodies (Padilla and 
Autheurs, 2000, cited in Kane, 2002) and establishing single transport 
authorities (Imran, 2009; Gwilliam, 2003; Kane, 2002). These proposals all 
agree that some kind of good and efficient institutional arrangement is 
important, although it remains unclear what kind of institutional arrangement 
will work for a given issue and context. There appears to be no ‘one size fits 
all’ formula for policy-makers in developing countries to resolve the problems 
they face in the transport sector. 
2.3  Transport authorities in developing countries  
As the previous section noted, the creation of a transport authority is 
believed to be a key solution for overcoming the transport issues that 
developing countries experience. The creation of transport authorities was a 
popular trend in Western Europe in the 1990s, and centred on achieving 
service coordination and integration within the public transport service as 
well as managing competition between operators (Costa, 1996). Gwilliam 
(1997) stressed that many of these authorities had clear and explicit 
objectives, with adequate systems of accountability and incentives for 
efficient performance. These models quickly gained recognition from the 
international development agencies, and subsequently spawned a popular 
debate amongst researchers. However, there remains no evidence to 
pinpoint the creation of a transport authority as being the key factor in 
developing an efficient and reliable public transport service.  
There is no uniform definition of a transport authority and no fixed model 
that is universally accepted. It is perhaps useful therefore to try to 
understand what transport authorities generally represents. ‘Transport’ is 
viewed as the movement of people or goods via one or more mode, such as 
roads, railroads, waterways and airways (Stough and Rietveld, 1997). The 
term ‘authority’ refers to the right to give an order, with those to whom it is 
addressed being required to obey it (Robertson, 2002; and see section 
2.5.3.1). Thus, a transport authority is an entity with legitimate power to 
manage processes involving the movement of people and goods. Whilst not 
specified in the above definitions, this may involve planning, regulation, 
enforcement, providing information/education, funding, procurement, traffic 
management,  infrastructure development and maintenance.  
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International transport bodies have also devised their own definitions for the 
notion of a transport authority. European Union Regulation 1370/2007 for 
public service obligations in inland transport (Regulations EC, 2007:6) 
defines a ‘competent authority’ as “any public authority or group of public 
authorities of a Member State or Member States which has the power to 
intervene in public passenger transport in a given geographical area or 
anybody vested with such an authority”. This is a very wide definition which 
may include any possible type and form of body. The International 
Organisation of Public Transport (UiTP) uses the term ‘organising 
authorities’, which it takes to be “public or public-owned organisations with a 
legal responsibility to plan or regulate public transport services in a specified 
geographic area”.3 It is envisaged that an organising authority should be 
able to plan and control the operations of public transport and have the 
responsibility for managing transport budgets (Masi, 2009). These 
definitions suggest that a transport authority has to be a public or publicly 
owned organisation with vested authority operating in a specified territory to 
manage public transport services. 
2.3.1  Proposals by International Development Agencies  
Studies conducted by international development agencies identify 
institutional weaknesses as one of the main sources of failure for urban 
transport in developing cities, and strongly advocate the use of dedicated 
transport coordination agencies at the metropolitan/city level (ADB, 2009; 
World Bank, 2007b, 2005a, 2000a). They argue that transport authorities or 
coordinating bodies are needed to streamline the regulatory framework and 
to plan, coordinate as well as regulate the public transport systems in 
developing Asian cities. Simultaneously, the World Bank discourages public 
sector monopolies in the transport sector, and pushes for market-based 
arrangements in which regulatory and planning functions for the provision of 
operations are separated, with the latter being chosen through the medium 
of competitively awarded service contracts (World Bank, 2005b). In order to 
do this, developing countries are encouraged to establish an enabling 
framework by creating or strengthening their regulatory institutions and 
performance standards to ensure fair competition (World Bank, 1996). The 
establishment of transport authorities could help to facilitate the realisation 
of this agenda. 
                                            
3 http://www.uitp.org/Public-Transport accessed 16 February 2013 
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According to Cities on the Move, published by the World Bank in 2002, 
managing public transport is not an easy task as it consists of many modes 
operating over the boundaries of autonomous municipalities, with the 
services being offered by both private and public sectors. It is important that 
the responsibility “to ensure the coordination of physical infrastructure, 
service systems, fares and finances are clearly allocated” (World Bank, 
2002:156). It also proposes the establishment of coordinating committees 
for transport, with these bodies taking one of several forms including (i) 
regional coordinating committees (ii) regional coordinating authorities (iii) 
regional mixed coordinating authorities (iv) two-tier arrangements or (v) 
legally established independent authorities.  
From the review of the documents that the World Bank prepared for 
individual countries, such as India and Thailand, they seem to favour a 
legally established independent authority, incorporating a decentralised 
model. For example, in Chennai and Bangalore, the creation of a 
Metropolitan Transport Regulatory Authority was proposed to strengthen the 
institutional framework (World Bank, 2005a), and in Bangkok, an Integrated 
Transit Authority is suggested to facilitate the strategic management of 
public transport (World Bank, 2005b). The World Bank has been directly 
involved in assisting the Urban Transport Development Programme in Hanoi 
since 2007, which involves the creation of a Public Transport Authority 
(World Bank, 2007c). To-date, however, there is no evidence that such an 
authority has been established.  
Asian Development Bank (ADB), whilst still pushing for city-level transport 
authorities to provide policy direction and improve coordination, adopts a 
slightly different approach. This agency believes that the “political institutions 
which decide on transport projects must have the authority to drive those 
decisions”, and thus advocates the creation of city authorities with self-
financing powers and the responsibility for strategic land use planning, 
transport, and environmental protection in its commuter catchment area 
(ADB, 2009:12). However, it is not clear whether it intends city authorities to 
be responsible for other urban management services, or whether it thinks 
those roles should be delegated to local authorities.  
On the other hand, the German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) in its report 
Sustainable transport: A Source Book for Policy Makers in Developing 
Countries (2004) suggests that the establishment of public transport 
authorities must be defined by law and in developing countries, such models 
have the advantage of isolating the authority from resource constraints as 
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they are eligible for dedicated resources under their statutes. However, this 
report undermines its own proposal when it claims that it is also possible to 
achieve policy integration without institutional integration, like that seen in 
Hong Kong, where the Transport Department effectively integrates a broad 
range of regulatory and enforcement roles with support from the Transport 
and Housing Bureau which is in charge of policy-making.  
2.3.2  Proposals by researchers  
Several researchers have argued that copying models that have worked in 
developed cities, and transposing them to developing cities may not be 
feasible owing to differences that exist in political, social and cultural 
contexts, and that such an approach could in fact aggravate existing 
problems (Stead, 2008; Pierre and Peters, 2005; Dimitriou, 1990). 
Vasconcellos (2001) contends that the type of transport authorities found in 
Europe are not suited to the political cultures of developing cities and 
instead proposes a variety of models that are based on the size of a city. He 
reasons that, in small and medium-sized cities, the single public agency that 
deals with urban and transport issues is effective in terms of coordinating 
policies. In large metropolitan areas, where mayors often hold substantial 
power, he argues that open decision-making (which includes the general 
public) is required. In a nutshell, he points out that establishing a single 
transport authority is not necessary. Rather, coordination can be improved 
by strengthening local authorities and giving them the necessary autonomy 
to act based on broad goals set out by central government. Pollitt and 
Bauckaert (1999) share a similar view, and go on to state that centralised 
government provide a potential for  good co-ordination that is often not taken 
advantage of, and thus a clear framework on performance targets and 
accountability should obviate fragmentation and steer agencies to the right 
directions. 
However, other researchers have expressed their support for transport 
authorities. This is based on the theory that the number of authorities 
involved in transport is best kept to a minimum, and should preferably all be 
brought under the administration of a single government institution in order 
to minimise problems with liaising and policy conflicts (Iles, 2005). Kane 
(2002) stressed that transport authorities in developing countries are needed 
to promote greater coordination between agencies, and responsibilities need 
to be decentralized in order for local needs to be addressed. The need for 
coordination was also emphasised by Jemali (2009) on the basis of her 
research on the decision-making process for urban transport policy in 
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Malaysia. She concluded that a weak institutional framework that is 
fragmented with overlapping responsibilities is a barrier to the successful 
development of integrated transport strategies. In this case, distinct privately 
financed public transport systems were lacking operational integration. A 
structured institutional framework is required, and she recommends a single 
Urban Public Transport Authority to overcome coordination issues and 
improve integration in the planning process. Imran (2009), based on his 
research on transport governance in Pakistan, recommends a National 
Transit Authority for integrated planning in Pakistan to overcome the 
fragmented planning between sectors and thus deliver a better public 
transport service. However, these recommendations reflect dissatisfaction 
with existing arrangements rather than any demonstration that other 
approaches would work better.  
Researchers who support the creation of transport authorities have 
attempted to envision suitable models. For example, Williams (1998) and 
Walters (1998) believe that authorities should have separate political and 
executive bodies, with the political body being responsible for policy 
directions and the executive body managing the implementation of these 
policies. However, this is probably difficult to achieve, considering that the 
relationship between bureaucrats and politicians is very strong in many 
developing countries, especially in the South Asian region (Dwivedi, 2003). 
The success of transport authorities has been hypothesised as very much 
dependent on the autonomy they are given, and in this vein Pollitt and 
Bauckaert (1999) reveal that there is evidence to suggest that greater 
autonomy leads to financial improvements in their management, greater 
productivity and increased user responsiveness.  
According to Kane (2002), institutional fragmentation and the lack of 
coordination and integration between transport agencies in developing 
countries is a major problem, with some countries having tried a range of 
coordination mechanisms to address these problems. What is lacking, 
however, is a range of case studies on strong coordinating agencies in the 
developing world that can be used to learn from. Although there is much 
discussion on the need for the coordination and integration of public 
transport in developing cities, there are also further factors that must be 
considered if good transport services are going to be created in these 
contexts, such as the development of holistic policy objectives supported by 
evidence-based planning approach, the need to increase social inclusion, 
and good financial management (PROSPECTS, 2003). 
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2.4  Transport authorities in developed countries 
This section highlights some of the characteristics of transport authorities in 
developed cities, with specific attention being given to LTA Singapore and 
TfL. Much of the emphasis is on creating authorities that mirror these 
approaches. In general, transport authorities vary widely in the scope of their 
jurisdictions, the degree of their autonomy, and the contents of their 
constitutions. They go under different names in different countries, mostly 
developed under different historical circumstances and local conditions 
(Naniopoulos et al., 2012). Even in developed cities, there is not one simple 
model that every city can adopt due to differences in local contexts and 
national government policies, with individual countries having to implement 
the framework that is anticipated to work best for them (EMTA, 2008a). This 
is important as it suggests that, whilst the international development 
agencies may propose a model or a local actor may cite some key 
examples, they are likely to differ quite significantly. Table 2.1 shows a 
summary of several existing structures of transport authorities in developed 
cities.  
Table 2.1: Types of transport authorities in several developed cities 
Structure  Countries  
State owned corporations 
Bologna - SRM 
Athens - OASA 
*Singapore - LTA 
City owned corporations 
Milan- ATM 
London – TFL  
Region or county acting as 
transport authority 
 
Madrid- CRTM 
Valencia- eTM 
Stockholm – AB Strostockholms Lokaltrafik 
Amsterdam – Stadsregio Amsterdam 
Lisbon-Grande Area Metropolitana de Lisboa 
Region/s and/ or County/ies 
(or local government/s) and 
local authorities  
Barcelona –ATM – 7 regions, 164 municipalities 
Lyon – SYTRAL – urban and suburb of Lyon 
Torino – AMMT – Torino metropolitan area -31 
municipalities 
Berlin – VBB – two states and several counties 
Hamburg – HVV GmbH- 3 regional states, 7 counties 
Frankfurt – RMV – 15 regional authorities, 7 cities 
South Yorkshire – SYPTE – 4 local authorities  
Two regions Copenhagen – Movia Public Transport  
An adhoc body under the 
control of a region 
Paris - STIF 
         *All the transport authorities except Singapore LTA cover only public transport    
Source: adapted from Naniopoulos et al. (2012) 
18 
 
 
Naniopoulos et al. (2012) and Masi (2009) believe that these transport 
authorities are needed in order to fulfil the requirements for coordination as 
follows: 
 The need for a holistic approach in public transport provision, mainly 
to ensure integration with urban/regional and land use planning. 
 To increase social inclusion in order to enhance mobility and 
accessibility by designing special fares and facilities for vulnerable 
and physically challenged groups. 
 To improve integration between various modes, services, sectoral 
policies, public authorities and stakeholders. 
Although the main motive for the creation of transport authorities has been 
centred towards improving coordination, most of these authorities are 
decentralised with the spatial scale ranging from city levels to multiple 
municipalities and regions (see GTZ, 2004 for discussion). They also take 
various forms and diverse ranges of responsibilities, ranging from powers to 
set overall objectives for transport policy (long-term), managing the supply of 
public transport through the planning of networks and coordination (medium-
term) to operating services (short-term) (Naniopoulous et al., 2012). 
Interestingly, it was found that although decentralization has been observed 
as a key trend in the creation of transport authorities, the decreasing 
authority of central government has also been accompanied by a decrease 
in state funding (EMTA, 2008b).  
The general characteristics of these authorities are their involvement in 
planning, integrating and financing public transport services with the aim of 
increasing the provision of quality services to meet mobility needs (EMTA, 
2011). Several authorities, such as Barcelona Metropolitan Transport 
Authority (ATM)4, Berlin-Brandenburg Transport Authority (VBB)5 and 
Singapore Land Transport Authority (LTA)6, are guided by policy objectives 
that require a high-quality service to make public transport attractive. In 
order to achieve this goal, significant subsiding of public transport services is 
provided by the government, and these authorities are required to ensure 
that subsidies are allocated effectively, and that they are made accountable 
for this (GTZ, 2004). One way is through contractual agreements between 
transport authorities and the operators of transport services (EMTA, 2010). 
                                            
4 http://www.atm.cat/web/en/veure.php?pdf=en/memoria2011 accessed on 20 March 2013 
5 http://www.vbb.de/en/article/about-vbb/the-company-vbb/7677.html accessed on 20 March 
2013 
6 http://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/about-lta.html accessed on 20 March 2013 
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Many of these authorities are also set up as statutory bodies, with  
legislative backing and access to funds (although none of these authorities 
have been able to achieve full cost recovery), supported by continuous 
initiatives to improve transport performance to meet the growing demands 
and expectations of the public (Noniopoulos et al., 2012; GTZ, 2004). The 
presence of political champions and city leadership was also found to be a 
contributing factor to the success of transport authorities, as observed in 
London, Singapore, Bogota and Stockholm (Leach and Wilson, 2004; 
Cervero, 1998). These characteristics can rarely be observed in developing 
cities. Often, the cities suffer from a lack of clear policy objectives and a 
limited emphasis on public transport. In addition, funding is a stumbling 
block as there is hardly any subsidising of transport operators (Kiggundu, 
2009; Iles, 2005). Hence, service quality can only be maintained at a level 
that permits cost-recovery, which is often poor (Iles, 2005).  
TfL and LTA Singapore – which are both often held up as exemplars of best 
practice in reports by international development agencies (ADB, 2009; GTZ, 
2004; World Bank, 2002b) - will now be examined further. It is important to 
note that these authorities operate at different geographical scales: LTA 
Singapore is a national body whereas TfL is run by London city government 
and this epitomises the variation that exists under the umbrella of single 
transport authorities. The discussion here focuses on the institutional 
structure, functions and autonomy granted to these bodies. Literature 
regarding these authorities was abundant before and immediately after their 
creation, but there is little several years down the line. Although they are 
often held as effective agencies, there is a lack of evidence concerning their 
real successes. Furthermore, these two authorities have gone through 
several changes in terms of their functions, powers and processes to make 
them more effective, which makes the assessment of outcomes only 
relevant at a particular point in time. Hence, the perception that these 
authorities are successful and that they should be emulated - as 
international development agencies suggest - is most likely based on the 
efficient public transport services in these cities rather than on robust 
empirical evidence about these agencies contributions to transport 
management.  
Land Public Transport Authority, Singapore  
LTA Singapore was created in 1995 under the Ministry of Transport through 
the amalgamation of four entities - the Registry of Vehicles, the Mass Rapid 
Transit Corporation, the Road and Transportation Division of the Public 
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Works Department, and the Land Transportation Division of the Ministry of 
Communications7. This structural reform led to all land transport functions 
being brought under a single agency. The nature of Singapore as a city 
state with a single tier of government creates an unusual context for policy 
integration and the successful implementation of the strategies (Jemali, 
2009; Nguyen, 1999).  
LTA is supported by the Land Transport Authority of Singapore Act (1996) 
and is entrusted with a wide range of functions, including planning, the 
construction and maintenance of roads, road pricing, vehicle and transit 
licensing, traffic management, and the development of the mass rapid 
transport system. Although the majority of land transport responsibilities rest 
with the LTA, it still has to work closely with three other parties: the Public 
Transport Council, which sets the fares for buses and trains, and regulates 
bus service levels and licenses for bus operations; three private companies 
that run the bus and metro service; and the Traffic Police, who are 
responsible for traffic enforcement and driver licensing (Lam and Toan, 
2006). In 2010, in an attempt to better streamline its functions, the LTA took 
over some functions of the Traffic Police’s jobs, such as gazetting speed 
limits, managing road closures, and parking enforcement.8 
Although LTA is answerable to the Minister of Transport, many decisions are 
delegated to the LTA board. The status of single-tier government simplifies 
the decision-making process, and provides the LTA with wider 
responsibilities for implementing decisions at the local level (May, 2004). 
This does not mean that the LTA dominates decision-making without 
consultation with stakeholders; it actively engages local politicians and 
members of the public, although this is mainly for local implementation 
rather than in relation to broad policy formulations (ibid). Another key point is 
that land use and transport are well integrated in Singapore, and the LTA’s 
plans are followed closely when they are implemented, which allows the LTA 
to control the demand for transport (Cervero, 1998). The set of tools for 
managing the demands for road usage are amongst the most extensive in 
the world with vehicle license rationing and area road pricing implemented 
as early as 1975. 9 
                                            
7 (http://www.lta.gov.sg, accessed on 26 January 2013) 
8 (http://www.spf.gov.sg accessed on 26 January 2013) 
9 (http://www.lta.gov.sg, accessed on 26 January 2013) 
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Finance is not seen to be a major constraint for the LTA as the government 
meets the costs for all road infrastructure, assets and management 
schemes (Lam and Toan, 2006). The LTA meets the costs for traffic 
management and road maintenance from its agency fees, derived mainly 
from demand management measures, such as congestion pricing and tax. 
The operators have been able to remain profitable by having only to invest 
for their operation, maintenance and service improvement costs, with transit 
fares reviewed annually to allow operators to keep up with inflation (ibid).  
There are invaluable lessons that can be garnered from LTA Singapore, 
although Nguyen (1999) argues that Singapore’s case is unique given its 
single-tier government status, which makes a lot of things possible. 
Singapore was led by a visionary Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who 
wanted to build a world class transport system (Richmond, 2008). The 
ingredients for success could include, long-term land use - transport plans 
and adherence to these plans, the presence of legal backing, good financial 
support, effective regulation of fares and services, strong political will, 
decision-making autonomy, intensive application of information technology 
and the active participation of the public - are possible lessons to be 
pursued elsewhere. However, the relative importance of these factors is 
unclear. 
Transport for London (TfL)  
TfL was established in 2000 under the supervision of the Greater London 
Authority (GLA).  The creation of GLA took place in the light of the abolition 
of the Greater London Council, which was dissolved in 1986 and this left 
London as one of the few major cities in the world without metropolitan 
government (Travers, 2002). Subsequently in 1999, GLA was created by the 
Greater London Authority Act, and it acts as the local and regional 
government for the capital. The main aspiration for the creation of the GLA 
was the notion of policy integration, which involved integrating strategies for 
dealing with transport, spatial and economic development, air quality, waste, 
noise, biodiversity and culture (West et al., 2003). The GLA is headed by an 
elected Mayor who dominates the policy-making, with a clear distinction 
made between the executive (Mayor) and the Assembly (Sweeting, 2002). 
The Mayor proposes both policies (in the form of strategies) and the budget 
of the GLA, and makes appointments to various positions in the functional 
bodies, including TfL. Although the Assembly can make policy proposals to 
the Mayor, it cannot veto the Mayor’s policies.  
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TfL is governed by the GLA Act, which determines its powers and duties. It 
was established as a world-class professional delivery-focused organisation, 
which emphasised the importance of strong research and evidence-based 
decision-making, besides providing the Mayor with the authority to facilitate 
the accomplishment of tasks (Leach and Wilson, 2004). The main role of 
TfL is to implement the Mayor’s Transport Strategy for London, and 
transport services across the capital, such as London buses, the London 
Underground, the London Overground, and Victoria Coach Station. It also 
has other responsibilities, including managing congestion charges, road 
maintenance, traffic management, regulating taxis and private cars, and 
promoting walking and cycling. TfL also operates through three subsidiary 
companies incorporated within the Companies Act 2006: Transport Trading 
Limited, TfL Trustee Company Limited, and London Transport Insurance 
Guernsey Limited.10  
The creation of TfL made transport services more democratically 
accountable, by shifting accountability from the central government to an 
elected Mayor. In short, the Mayor enjoys decision-making power, and is 
accountable to the electorate. Although the Mayor has decision-making and 
operational powers over TfL, his financial freedom is limited and the budget 
remains largely constrained by central government grant funding. The Mayor 
has to present budget proposals, which are scrutinised by the Assembly 
before they are passed on to the central government for budget allocation, 
which is renewed on a three-yearly basis (Marsden and May, 2006). 
There are several important lessons that can be learned from London: there 
is a good combination of strategic political leadership and professional 
expertise there, which has proved important and TfL’s culture involves taking 
risks and aiming to lead the field (MacKinnon et al., 2008). It also believed 
that TfL has a combination of the right powers, the strategic capacity and the 
institutional arrangements necessary for, facilitating project delivery (ibid). 
This was supported by Marsden and May (2006), who contrasted TfL with 
West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive, and found that the bus-
franchising model operating in London delivered a much more effective 
service than the deregulated model in West Yorkshire.  
                                            
10 http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl accessed on 26 February 2013 
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2.5  Concepts related to transport authorities 
Based on the explanations on the public transport challenges in the 
developing countries and the proposals from international development 
agencies and researchers for the creation of transport authorities, there are 
several concepts and criteria that have been highlighted, which are 
perceived as critical for successful implementation. These concepts include 
decentralisation, power, authority, autonomy, accountability, coordination 
and decision-making. These concepts are subject to range of interpretations 
and are explained in greater detail below. 
2.5.1  Decentralisation 
There are many definitions and understandings of decentralisation, which 
draw on a variety of disciplines, the work of different authors and a wide 
range of characteristics. Because of this, limited progress has been made in 
developing an analytical framework and theory of decentralisation (Conyers, 
1984). However, it is generally understood to involve the transfer of powers, 
responsibilities and functions from the central government level to sub-
national government institutions (Nyendu, 2012). There are three main types 
of decentralisation: political, fiscal and administrative (Falleti, 2005; 
Schneider, 2003; Smoke, 2003), and it is worth noting that these dimensions 
do not exist in isolation, but are interrelated and often exist in combination 
with each other (Schneider, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Manor, 1999). 
According to Ebinger et al. (2007), political decentralisation takes place 
when legitimised bodies comprising publicly elected officials are given the 
authority to make autonomous decisions on planning, financing and 
administrative issues (Smoke, 2003). Fiscal decentralisation is the transfer 
of authority for “raising revenues or access to transfers and making 
decisions on current and investment expenditure” (Braun and Grote, 
2002:69). Administrative decentralisation, which is the most common form 
seen in developing countries (Rondinelli, 1983; UNDP, 1997), is defined by 
Rondinelli and Nellis (1986:5) as:  
The “transfer of responsibility and decision making powers for the 
planning, financing and management of certain public functions from 
the central government and its agencies to field units of government 
agencies, subordinate units, semi-autonomous public authorities or 
corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities (which 
include NGO’s and private firms)”.  
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This definition sees the creation of transport authorities as a form of 
decentralisation. The common theme running through these definitions is 
the transfer of decision-making powers to the devolved body.  
Numerous researchers have debated the relevance of decentralisation in 
developing countries, but the main understanding of it is that it is a way to 
facilitate development through encouraging public participation in the 
decision-making and implementation processes at the local government 
level. Consequently, it is expected to deliver greater efficiency in the 
provision of public goods and services, as well as greater economic growth 
(Nyendu, 2012; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). Multilateral institutions 
encouraged decentralisation as a solution for the stagnant economies and 
central bureaucracies in developing countries by including it as a component 
in many of their programmes. Part of the agenda of decentralisation is also 
to promote good governance and address issues of corruption, 
accountability and transparency (World Bank, 2000b). However, there is no 
concrete evidence that decentralisation has achieved these goals to date. In 
a quantitative study in twenty-one OECD countries, (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra, 2011), found a negative connection between fiscal decentralisation 
and economic performance, although they provide no explanation for this 
trend. Veron et al. (2006) studied the effect of decentralisation on corruption 
in Eastern India, and revealed that it had not produced the hoped-for 
improvements. It was pointed out that without proper upward vertical 
accountability – especially towards political parties – corruption can be 
decentralised when local communities are ready to join up with local 
bureaucrats and politicians, and thus become willing participants in corrupt 
networks.  
Whilst there is a strong argument for decentralisation, a number of 
researchers contend that it is important to strike a balance between 
centralisation and decentralisation. Smoke (2003), Bardhan (2002) and 
Wunsch (1991), and argue that large projects which involve other 
jurisdictions can benefit from national, hierarchical control, whilst projects 
with smaller economies of scale that require close supervision might benefit 
from a more decentralised approach. However, the researchers note that a 
mix of appropriate institutional form and a good networking system is 
necessary to reap the optimum benefits. This is demonstrated in the 
Philippines, where urban transport is under the purview of local authorities, 
but local authorities support the central government on its planning and 
implementing of mega projects like mass rapid transit system as the central 
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government has much greater resources (Olsson, 2004). Prud’homme 
(1995) states that the case for decentralisation in developing countries is 
weak, and if decentralisation is not planned and implemented properly it can 
lead to increases in overhead expenditure without compensatory benefits. 
Thus, in developing countries, particular attention must be directed towards 
choosing public services that are suitable for decentralisation, as some 
services may be better left under the jurisdiction of central government, such 
as highways, rail services, the control of pollution and the management of 
epidemics. In short, the central government must know ‘what to decentralise’ 
and what represents an appropriate level of decentralisation. 
Whilst decentralisation researchers report numerous stories of its failure, 
they have also attempted to pinpoint the factors that may lead to successful 
decentralisation. Table 2.2 highlights some of the critical factors identified in 
the literature.  
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Table 2.2: Summary of factors affecting success of decentralisation 
Authors  Factors 
Research 
Approach 
Location  
Theoretical 
Framework 
Rondinelli (1983) 
- Strength of central political and 
administrative support 
- Behavioural, attitudinal and 
cultural influences 
- Organisational factors 
Resources 
Comparative 
analysis 
8 Asian 
countries  
Not stated 
Agrawal and 
Ribot (1999) 
 
Actors with powers 
Types of Powers  
Accountability 
Comparative 
Case studies 
India, Nepal, 
Mali, 
Senegal 
Decentralisation  
Tang and Bloom 
(2000)  
-  
- Financial and management 
capacities 
Case study 
Donglan, 
China 
Not stated 
Larson (2003) 
- Legal structure 
- Decision making sphere 
- Role of central government 
- Economic incentives 
Case study 
Honduras, 
Bolivia, 
Brazil, 
Gueatemala 
Costa Rica  
Nicaragua 
Not stated 
Baviskar (2004) 
 
Political networks 
Collaboration between actors 
Accountability  
Strong organisation 
 
In-depth 
evaluation 
Madya 
Pradesh, 
India 
Not stated 
Falleti (2005) 
- Subnational share of revenues 
- and expenditure 
- Policy making authority  
- Appointment of subnational 
officials 
Territorial representation 
 
Comparative 
studies 
Colombia, 
Argentina, 
Brazil, 
Mexico 
Propose 
sequential 
theory of 
decentralisation 
based on path 
dependence 
Yamamoto 
(2006) 
Management autonomy 
- Resources 
- Operation  
- Organisation 
Financial autonomy 
Organisational behaviour 
Competition 
 
Questionnaire 
– mail survey, 
quantitative 
Semi-
autonomous 
bodies 
Japan 
Agency theory 
and Verhoest et 
al. (2004) 
classification on 
autonomy 
McCarten and 
Vyasulu (2006)  
Social capitals such as trust 
and participation  
Accountability  
Fiscal autonomy 
Political will 
 
In-depth 
evaluation 
Mahdya 
Pradesh, 
India 
Social capital 
theory 
 
Kaiser et al. 
(2006) 
Transparency 
Accountability 
Participation 
In depth 
evaluation 
Indonesia Governance 
Meyer and 
Hammerschmid 
(2010)  
National culture 
- Power distance  
- Individualism/collectivism 
Administrative traditions 
- -     Historical, culture, values 
Institutional arrangements 
- HR system 
Comparative 
HR study 
Questionnaire 
based 
electronic 
survey 
EU countries 
Framework 
developed by 
Hofstede (2001) 
on national 
culture 
Nyendu (2012) 
Transfer of real powers 
Commitment from central 
government  
Qualitative 
study  
Ghana  Not stated 
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Some of the common factors highlighted in the table above are 
accountability, funding, presence of the strong political leadership, 
organisational capacity and inter-governmental relationships. Based on their 
study of the impact of devolution on the formulation and delivery of transport 
policy in the United Kingdom, MacKinnon et al. (2008) highlighted the 
importance of two dimensions of strategic capacity for the devolved bodies: 
institutional strategic capacity, which centres on assets that are essential for 
delivering transport strategies (such as people, funding and technology); and 
process capacity, which involves the ability of those charged with 
implementing transport policy (such as politicians, civil servants and 
professionals) to work together within the institutional arrangements to 
translate strategies into policy outcomes.  
Decentralisation is centred on good governance and, with proper 
implementation, it can make governmental structures and processes more 
responsive to the pressures of rapidly changing environments (Brilliantes, 
2004). In theory, decentralisation brings important decisions closer to the 
people, and accordingly permits higher transparency and accountability, 
which eventually means better service for people (Kaiser et al., 2006). 
However, this argument assumes that all other factors, such as an efficient 
political process, real power transfer, excellent network of actors, sound 
institutional environment and effective organisations are present, which is 
often far from the reality in developing countries 
2.5.2  Coordination and integration 
As explained in section 2.2, one of the main transport challenges in 
developing countries is the lack of coordination amongst different agencies 
and operators. This directly affects the integration of transport services on 
the ground and Naniopoulos et al. (2012) believe that this also has a 
negative impact on the overall financial management. Transport authorities 
are proposed as solutions to this problem, and there are many mechanisms 
and strategies that these transport authorities can adopt in order to improve 
coordination. This is explored further below. 
The terms ‘coordination’ and ‘integration’ are often used interchangeably in 
the field of transport. For the purpose of this thesis, however, coordination 
will be understood as operating along a continuum, with integration being 
the highest level of the continuum,  and cooperation the lowest (DeVelde 
and Didier, 2005). Coordination is defined as the act of managing 
interdependencies between activities performed to achieve a goal or 
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common output (Malone and Crowston, 1990). The need for coordination 
increases if the organisation’s success depends on the decisions made by 
each group of actors (Camerer and Knez, 1997).  
Transport integration is often understood as being the physical and 
operational amalgamation of public transport services (which is also referred 
to as modal or functional integration) (Roumboutsos and Kapros, 2008; Hull, 
2005). It is challenging to achieve operational integration as it often entails 
big changes, requiring the operators to either be brought together by 
merging service designs and planning activities, or through regulatory 
mechanisms (DeVelde and Didier, 2005). May et al. (2006), move beyond 
operational integration to a more strategic form of integration. In addition 
to the operational integration of public transport, they propose a strategic 
integration between policy instruments of transport and land use, between 
policy instruments of transport and other sectors, and institutional 
integration. Some of these activities may extend beyond the roles of a 
transport authority, such as that of policy integration between transport 
and other sectors. They claim that the careful integration of different policy 
instruments will help to overcome financial and acceptability barriers, and 
may accordingly increase the chance of strategies being implemented. At 
the same time, however, they acknowledged that it is difficult to be certain of 
how each combination of instruments will interact, and thus to accurately 
predict their outcomes.  
Cooperation – on the other end of the continuum – is defined as the 
willingness of actors to work together to reach common objectives, and it is 
a mechanism that is only workable if the interests of the actors are not 
contradictory, and where good trust and personal relations are established 
(DeVelde and Didier, 2005). This happens when all members participate 
voluntarily, producing a win-win situation, perhaps through sharing resources 
without any changes to powers or functions. Examples include providing 
timetable information and route maps, or collaborating in planning 
processes. 
Transport is mostly coordinated through planning and regulatory functions 
(Banister, 2008; Iles, 2005; DeVelde and Didier, 2005). Transport planning 
is a process involving various transport systems, and links economic, 
environment and social issues together, which involves coordination (Jeon 
and Amekudzi, 2005). The adoption of a comprehensive planning for route 
networks, schedules, information for users and ticketing will facilitate 
integration within and between modes for seamless travel. This function can 
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be strengthened further by adopting a land use transport planning approach; 
as this will allow development activities to be directed towards locations well-
served by the transport service, thus supporting shorter travel distances 
(Banister, 2008). The regulatory role covers several aspects of transport, 
such as the licensing of vehicles, operators and drivers, safety standards, 
fares, the supply of services, the conduct of drivers, the administration of 
routes and the allocation of subsidies (Sohail et al., 2006; Iles, 2005). This 
role is intended to ensure that high standards are maintained through 
testing, monitoring and benchmarking transport provision (Sohail et al., 
2006). Given that this involves a wide range of different tasks, that may be 
undertaken by different agencies, Iles (2005) suggests that it is vital that the 
number of agencies involved in planning and regulation is either kept to a 
minimum or brought under the administration of a single agency.  
There are three ways in which coordination can be achieved using planning 
and regulatory functions. Firstly, by traditional hierarchical coordination, 
which is ensured by exercising authority from the top. Hierarchical 
coordination is characterised by passing down consistent and coherent 
orders from the top and lower levels, with proposals checked to ensure that 
they fit the overarching policy and strategy, and changes made when a new 
situation occurs (Bauckaert and Pollitt, 2011). Many transport authorities 
take this form, which allows them to have a better control of the standard of 
service provided by operators. Secondly, through market mechanisms by 
allowing the hidden hand of supply and demand to do the job or through the 
network (ibid). This form of coordination, which is through market forces, is 
debatable, especially in developing an efficient public transport system. 
Market forces may fail to achieve desired results without government 
intervention due to the nature of the monopolistic or oligopolistic structures 
in some parts of transport; but on the other hand, it is anticipated that 
irrational and misguided intervention from the bureaucrats could do more 
harm than good (Iles, 2005). Third, is the coordination through the network, 
which involve several interdependent actors in delivering services, and this 
is further discussed in section 2.6. 
2.5.3  Power 
As explained in section 2.3 and section 2.4, it is suggested that the success 
of transport authorities is closely related to the powers granted to these 
bodies. In order to make an impact, these authorities must have the power 
not only to make decisions but also to drive those decisions to 
implementation (ADB, 2009). 
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Power is understood as an entity, and those subjected to power acquire 
beliefs that result in their consent to domination through coercive or non-
coercive forms (Lukes, 2005). This reflects the fact that the powerful can 
transform the powerless in such a way that the latter behaves as the former 
wishes, and can happen with or without coercion or forcible constraint. 
Lukes (2005) sees power as a capacity that can be held, even when it is not 
used or needed. This implies that it does not have to be exercised. He also 
observes that the exercise of power by an individual or groups is not 
necessarily an observable action, and may be unconscious.  
Nye (2011), based on Lukes’ (2005) views on power, expands and clarifies 
the concept of power. Table 2.3 below shows the dimensions of power that 
he proposes. 
Table 2.3: Dimensions of Power 
Dimensions 
to relational 
power 
Description  
Types of 
power  
Resources  Behaviour  
Commanding 
change 
Ability to command 
others to change their 
behaviour against their 
initial preferences  
Hard  
Force and 
money 
Coercion – using 
threats and 
rewards 
Controlling 
agenda 
Ability to affect others 
preferences so that they 
want what you want and 
you need not command 
them to change 
Soft and 
hard power 
Institutions, 
ideas, values, 
culture 
 
Force and 
money 
Framing and 
agenda setting 
Establishing 
preferences 
Ability to affect 
behaviour by shaping 
their preferences in 
ways that produce what 
you want rather than 
relying on carrot and 
sticks to change their 
behaviour 
Soft  
Institutions, 
ideas, values, 
culture 
Persuasion and 
attraction to 
change belief, 
perception and 
preference  
Source: adapted from Nye (2011) 
Nye (2011) suggests that there are three dimensions of relational power - 
commanding changes, controlling preferences and establishing preferences 
-  which comprises soft and hard power, and both forms are believed to be 
essential for producing effective strategies. Nye (2011) does not explain the 
sources of hard power, but limits his interpretation to the resources that 
create the push factor such as money and force. The definition for hard 
power suggests that ‘authority’ - which is defined as the right to rule with 
legitimacy - can be classified as a source of hard power. Soft power, on the 
other hand refers to the ability to affect others through the co-optive means 
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of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to 
gain the desirable outcomes, and its sources include institutions, ideas and 
culture. He argues that power is context-specific and defines power 
resources as tangible and intangible raw materials that underlie power 
relationships and argues that whether or not a given set of resources 
produces outcomes depends upon behaviour in context (Nye 2011:9). This 
implies that power consists of resources that are transformed into outcomes 
through specific behaviour.  
Foucault (1982) on the other hand sees power not as an entity which can be 
possessed but rather as a process and holds that what really matters is how  
power is exercised. He points out that where there is power, there is 
resistance and resistance is a part of power. Like power, there are various 
definitions of resistance but for the purpose of this thesis, it is understood as 
“a reactive process where agents embedded in power relations actively 
oppose initiatives by other agents” (Jermier et al., 1993:9). Resistance exists 
throughout power distribution networks which means there is no single 
centre for resistance and to better understand power relations, one has to 
investigate the resistance that exists within those relations (ibid). Because of 
the co-existence of power and resistance, Flyvjberg (2001) argues that the 
state is often dependent on institutional consolidation and stable power 
relations for its operations. 
Flyvjberg (2001), building on Lukes and Foucault, proposes a number of key 
features of power. He suggests that powers should be seen as productive 
and positive, not only restrictive and negative, and that power is dynamic, 
meaning that it can be exercised through specific strategies. He suggests 
that, when analysing power, the focus should be directed towards the way in 
which power is exercised, as well as who are the winners and losers. In his 
rationality and power concept, (Flyvbjerg, 1998) provides a number of 
propositions concerning rationality and power. The central one is that 
although power should ideally only be used after one has enough 
knowledge about a problem – the rationality condition – in reality, power 
often ignores rationality and design knowledge at its convenience (Flyvbjerg, 
2001:143). Rationality is often the retreat for those who lack power 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998:37).  
In summary, researchers who seek to conceptualise power generally agree 
that power has to be exercised in a particular context, meaning that it is a 
‘process in context’, with the outcome dependent on resources, behaviours 
and resistance, all of which are relational to particular times and situations. 
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Power can produce observable outcomes or non-observable outcomes, and 
can, at times, lead to unintended consequences. Therefore, it requires well-
designed strategies and skilful leadership to produce the desired outcomes. 
2.5.3.1 Authority and autonomy 
Power, authority and autonomy are interrelated but distinct concepts in 
relation to institutions. Robertson (2002) defines authority as the right to 
give an order, which will be obeyed without question as to this right because 
its legitimacy is accepted by those to whom the order is addressed. The key 
elements in the definition are the right to give orders and legitimacy or, in 
other words, the moral obligation to obey. Authority is often granted to those 
who occupy official positions, such as public servants, where such an 
authority is defined by certain bureaucratic regulations. Legitimacy is a 
general perception or assumption that the actions of an individual or 
organisation are desirable, proper and appropriate within systems of norms 
beliefs and values (Suchman, 1995). Wolff (1998) argues that it is possible 
that one can have power without having actual authority. For example, in 
exercising power, one can use coercion or force on others to obtain 
agreement, but one cannot impose the obligation to comply without proper 
authority.  
According to Christensen and Yesilkagit (2006), there are two dimensions to 
autonomy. The first one is structural autonomy which arises if an 
alternative or competing level of supervision is inserted between the agency 
and the departmental minister and the second is legal autonomy which 
arises when the law authorizes the agency head to make decisions. This is 
also seen to be closely associated with the decision-making competencies 
of an agency (Van Thiel, 2004; Verhoest et al., 2004). Verhoest et al. (2004) 
explain that making an agency more autonomous involves shifting decision-
making competencies from external actors to the agency itself. The key 
element in autonomy is the ability to make decisions and, and according to 
Young and Tavares (2004), autonomy per se is meaningless, requiring 
authority and resources to be utilised. For example, an organisation might 
be autonomous but its authority might be limited to a particular sector and 
area, meaning that it can only make decisions within the allowed scope. 
Autonomy requires resources to be effective, which may take various forms, 
including managerial, technological and financial ones (ibid). In transport 
authorities in many developed cities, powers, autonomy and authority are 
specified in a governmental act, which defines the transport authority’s roles. 
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However, these powers have to be mediated by sufficient resources, 
including skilful leadership, if the authority is to be effective.  
Verhoest et al. (2004) proposed six dimensions of institutional autonomy – 
comprising legal, structural, managerial, financial, policy-making and 
interventional – and these dimensions can be used as guidelines for 
understanding the kind of autonomy that exists within an organisation. 
(Laegreid et al., 2006; Cheema, 2005), on the other hand, have proposed 
three dimensions of institutional autonomy for assessing the powers given to 
an agency: policy autonomy, financial autonomy and personnel autonomy. A 
framework centred on assessing the autonomy held by SPAD and the 
BMLTA was built using the dimensions of autonomy proposed by both 
Verhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006), and is shown in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.4: Dimensions of autonomy 
Autonomy Dimensions 
Personnel  
Strategic Personnel Matters 
- Level of salaries 
- Criteria for promotion 
- Criteria for evaluation 
- Criteria for recruitment and downsizing 
Operational Personnel matters  
- Wage increases for individual employees 
- Promotion of individual employees 
- Evaluation of individual employees 
- Recruiting individual employees 
- Dismissal of individual employees 
Financial  
- Make loans for investment  
- Set tariff/prices for products and services 
- Conclude legal contracts with private actors 
- Generates own revenue 
Policy  Strategic Policy Matters 
- Setting own goals and objectives  
- Setting policies on transport matters 
- Approval on project proposals 
Operational Policy matters  
- Manage day-to-day activities 
Legal autonomy The extent to which the legal status of agency prevents the government 
from altering the allocation of decision-making competencies 
Intervention  The extent to which the agency is free from ‘reporting’ to the government 
Sources: adapted from Verhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. (2006) 
2.5.3.2 Accountability 
Another concept closely associated with authority and autonomy is 
accountability, which requires those vested with powers to be answerable for 
their actions. This is an element that is clearly lacking from governmental 
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organisations in many developing countries, which leads to corruption and 
transparency issues in governance (Cheema, 2005). Reforms promoted by 
international development agencies in developing countries demand an 
effective accountability system to be in place for combatting corruption 
(Kaufman, 2005). Accountability has also been viewed as the central 
motivation for restructuring various types of institutional reform (Jenkins, 
2007), and is regarded as one of the critical factors affecting the outcomes 
of decentralisation, as shown in Table 2.2. 
Accountability can be understood as a relationship of power involving the 
capacity to demand that someone justifies his or her behaviour, and the 
capacity to impose penalties for poor performance (ibid). This relies heavily 
on two elements: explanation and sanction (Bellamy et al., 2011). The first 
element involves those who hold the reins of power in society having an 
obligation to explain and justify their conduct to a forum; the second element 
involves implying sanctions may be made if the explanation is perceived to 
be inadequate to the forum.  
Peters (2007) suggests that there are three forms of accountability. The 
simplest form is the requirement for an administrative organisation to render 
an account of what it has done, and to accordingly document its progress in 
an annual report. The reporting could be in the form of a financial report or it 
may be expressed in terms of service delivery, provided with an assessment 
of achievements of programmes. This form of accountability aims for 
transparency, meaning that reliable, relevant and timely information about 
the government activities is made available to the public (OECD, 2002). The 
second form of accountability conceptualises accountability as a form of 
responsibility, which relies more on the internalised values of public servants 
and their understanding of the law and appropriate behaviour in office. 
However, such personal obligations are often perceived to be inadequate for 
proper accountability and require the presence of  external forces in order to 
enforce responsible behaviour (Peters, 2007). It is worth noting that 
imposing controls to constrain behaviour is a difficult task, and is not always 
successful. Thus, a mixture of responsibility and accountability is 
recommended in order to keep things in check (ibid). The third form of 
accountability can be understood in terms of responsiveness in regard to the 
openness or willingness of civil servants to fulfil the demands of their 
political masters and the public (Peters, 2007; OECD, 2002). A good civil 
servant is one who is willing to take directions from above and who attempts 
to serve the requirements of the public. In some cases, however, this might 
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be difficult, as political leaders may make self-interested demands (Peters, 
2007). 
Conventional accountability is concerned with punishment rather than 
improvement. Hence, little attention has historically been assigned to this 
element as it has been perceived as a game of ‘shame and blame’ (Flinders 
and Moon, 2011). This type of accountability is usually only raised when 
things go wrong – such as when there is a failure in public authority for 
which somebody is expected to be held to account – but it is not given any 
attention so long as everything is running smoothly (Gregory, 2003). Peters 
(2007) suggests that conceiving accountability to be a form of punishment is 
problematic, and that this prevents it from taking its proper central role in the 
process of detecting and correcting errors. He further argues that actors 
involved in this process must acknowledge that finding suboptimal results is 
not necessarily a cause for punishment, and may often instead provide an 
opportunity to learn and find better means for providing services. Hence, 
accountability should be perceived as a platform for improving performance 
and as a means for institutionalising a learning and steering approach to 
good governance.  
2.5.4 Decision-making power 
One of the important factors observed in LTA Singapore and TfL (see 
section 2.4) is the ability to make decisions on strategic matters besides 
having the powers to drive the implementation of those decisions. Devolving 
decision-making power is also the spirit behind decentralisation, as 
explained in section 2.5.1, and critical power for autonomous bodies (see 
section 2.5.3.1).  
Masi (2009) highlights three different planning and control levels for 
transport organisation: the strategic level, tactical level and operational level. 
The strategic level defines the main policy objectives and goals for public 
transport; this task is often performed by the higher authority, such as the 
Ministry of Transport or a central planning body. The second level is the 
tactical level, which addresses the way in which objectives can be 
achieved, such as through service designs and development; this is the level 
of operations for transport authorities. The third level is the operational level 
where prescribed service requirements are put into practice; this is usually 
handled by the transport operators. The transport authority, which acts at 
the tactical level, plays a two-pronged role. On one hand, it supports the 
formulation of policies at the top level, and on the other hand, their specified 
36 
 
requirements affect the decisions at operational levels through planning and 
regulatory functions. In order to act effectively at the tactical level, these 
authorities need certain decision-making powers, and Agarwal and Ribot’s 
(1999) study on decentralisation in Asia and Africa identified four types of 
decision-making power that are essential to transport authorities as 
decentralised authorities. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the 
different levels of planning and control, together with the decision-making 
powers proposed for transport authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: adapted from Masi (2009) and Agarwal and Ribot (1999) 
Figure 2.1: Framework showing planning levels in transport 
organisation and the decision-making powers proposed for transport 
authorities 
In Agrawal and Ribot’s model (1999), the first type of decision-making power 
is the power to create new rules and modify old ones. This is essential in the 
regulation of transport, especially for maintaining operations and service 
standards. The second type is the power to make decisions about how a 
particular resource or opportunity is to be used. This usually goes together 
with funding capability and subsidy control for ensuring that the correct 
infrastructural investments are made to support the delivery of services. This 
is followed by powers to ensure compliance with rules, which gives the 
authority to enforce regulatory requirements. Lastly, is the power to 
adjudicate disputes that arise in the creation of rules and to ensure 
compliance with them. It is important to note that decision-making powers 
must be accompanied by a good system of accountability (both upwards 
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and downwards) in order to prevent abuses of powers (EMTA, 2008a; 
Agrawal and Ribot, 1999).  
Zografos and Tsanos (2007) examined the differences that exist in the 
decision-making processes for transport policy-making within different 
institutional settings in nine European countries. It was found that in a 
centralised institutional setting, such as Greece, decision-making powers lie 
with a few central authorities, and the opinions of other actors and interest 
groups receive little consideration. This was found to facilitate the attainment 
of European and national policy objectives and to minimise local pressures. 
However, it may mean the public’s wants and needs do not get considered 
in policy decisions, which can result in poor transport policy design, which 
negatively affects what is delivered on the ground. In a moderately 
decentralised institutional setting – where policy-making power has been 
devolved to regional or local bodies – better public participation can be 
observed. The United Kingdom was above other moderately decentralised 
countries, such as Germany and Finland, recording very high levels of public 
participation in the policy-making process, which improved the solutions 
developed. However, this was contested by Bickerstaff and Walker (2001) 
who found that motivations for engaging the public in transport planning in 
the United Kingdom have been mainly driven by government's requirements 
for greater local consultation rather than to promote fairness and democratic 
rights. Nevertheless, Emberger et al. (2008) have warned that public 
participation is closely associated with cultural norms and practices, thus 
care must be taken when applied in non-European contexts. 
2.6  The concept of governance  
The term ‘governance’ refers to the process of governing in order to achieve 
goals. This differs from the term ‘government’, which refers to activities 
backed by the formal institutions of the state, such as ministries, 
departments and local authorities (Docherty and Shaw, 2009; Rosenau, 
1992). Governance, thus refers to activities of governments (Rosenau, 
1995) which means that it is a process that involves the relationship 
between a network of actors who may or may not have formal authority in 
the deliverance of public policy (Docherty and Shaw, 2009). Governance 
can be divided into two broad categories.  
The first category consists of the regimes of laws, rules, judicial 
decisions, administrative practices and actors that constrain, prescribe 
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and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services (Lynn et 
al., 2001). This category focuses on the system of rules by which a desirable 
societal state is approached and through which undesirable states are 
avoided (Schneider and Bauer, 2007). There are two types of rules – formal 
and informal. Informal rules consist of values, norms, practices, customs 
and formal rules comprise laws, statutes, constitutional provisions and 
regulations (Williamson, 2000).  Given this, there is a feedback mechanism 
for governance via which powerful actors use institutional devices and 
resources to observe and define undesirable states, in-turn mobilising 
available resources for problem-solving in order to achieve what is perceived 
to be the desired state. In the process, institutional structures can be 
changed or new laws and regulations may be formulated. However, because 
governance is also centred on power relations, more powerful actors are 
also able to utilise the resources for their own benefit. 
The second category of governance places an emphasis on relations 
between organisations, and the networks that exist between actors 
through which policy outcomes are delivered. Rhodes (1997) refers to 
governance as self-organising, inter-organisational networks. The term 
‘network’ describes the involvement of several interdependent actors in 
delivering services and is closely associated with the mechanism to achieve 
coordination (see section 2.5.2) amongst conflicting interest (Wollman, 
2003; Peters, 1998). Rhodes (1997) promotes the idea of ‘governance 
without the government’, and suggests that regulatory mechanisms such as 
public-private partnerships and joint entrepreneurial ventures may function 
effectively despite the fact that they are not endowed with the government’s 
formal authority.  In the same vein, Kooiman (1993) and Luhmann (1982) 
argue that policy outcomes are not the products of central governments 
alone, but the results of interactions between the local government, the 
private sector and the voluntary sector as well. The risk in a network 
partnership is the difficulties in reaching consensual decisions because it 
lacks formal rules, and thus there is a tendency for a superior actor to 
dominate discussions and decisions (Peters, 2010). In an attempt to 
minimise this problem, he highlights some of the instruments that may be 
used to improve network communication, such as formal regulations and 
contracts as this would bind together the actors to various rules and 
standards.  
On the other hand, Nye (2011) points out that in complex networks, there 
are structural holes that prevent direct communication and the party or 
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actors who can bridge or exploit structural holes can use their position as a 
source of power to control others. Sharing similar view with Peters (2010), 
he also believes that networks will be more effective if complemented with 
‘hard power’ - as explained in section 2.5.3. In addition to being bound to 
rules and regulations, networks need knowledgeable and resourceful actors 
to be effective, including strategic leaders to drive the network (Sorenson 
and Torfing, 2009). Moreover, Wollman (2003) highlights the importance of 
cultural aspects in influencing the performance of networks, observing how 
trust-bound rather than rule-bound approaches have prevailed in 
Scandinavian countries, where such approaches are culturally rooted in 
people’s values.  
Docherty and Shaw (2009) describe the way in which transport governance 
has become more complex over time. Policies for transport relate to the 
different modes and spatial scales to which they apply, and this requires 
more collaboration between layers of government and other stakeholders. 
They stress that the government (or the state) still has to be heavily involved 
in transport activities, as it cannot function effectively in a free market, and is 
responsible for ensuring that social policy goals are achieved through the 
provision of transport infrastructure and services. However, changes in 
political philosophy that reduce state-intervention and the pressure for 
budget cuts have led to the deregulation and privatisation of many transport 
services. Nevertheless, the state is said to maintain an upper hand in 
transport management, as it can use contracts and ownership to ensure that 
the required policy outcomes are delivered. Whilst the governance of 
transport has become more complicated and complex, Stough and Rietveld 
(1997) point out that there is pressure from stakeholders to achieve greater 
flexibility so that the ‘co-production’ process can deliver the specified policy 
outcomes and fulfil the increasing demands and expectations of transport 
users. 
2.7   Institutional complexity and reforms 
In a complex institutional environment such as transport, there can be a 
large number of subsystems, such as numerous levels of administration, 
different types of organisations with a variety of functions, and a large 
number of actors that may have different powers, authority, understandings 
and interests. It is difficult to predict and control outcomes in such an 
environment, as they result from the interaction of complex components 
(Mason, 2001). For Healey (1997), institutional complexity is unavoidable 
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and she proposes institutional changes as a mechanism for creating the 
necessary capacity for policy-making and planning, as well as for avoiding 
the inefficient and wasteful use of resources. However, given that these 
institutional changes will occur within the complex environment, the 
outcomes can be unpredictable, and thus such changes may not achieve 
the anticipated goals of reducing complexity.  
Toonen (2003) contends that reform is about making improvements by 
removing faults and errors, or by correcting malpractice. The process is not 
only about changing the structure, but rather requires a change in the 
mental modes, that are induced by agents’ shared beliefs (Srivastava, 2004; 
Aoki, 2001). This implies that structural and cultural reforms must go hand-
in-hand. Section 2.5.3 also suggests that institutional change can be 
conceptualized as parties seeking to exercise their power. Changing the 
institution may not be as simple as one might think: it relies on other factors, 
such as knowing exactly what to change, existing institutional arrangements, 
the willingness of present institutions to accommodate change, and the 
political will to make things happen (Briassoulis, 2004; Beer et al., 1990). 
This perhaps explains why some institutional reforms or changes do not 
result in positive performance. Although structural changes may be 
achieved, the real changes – which are dependent on the willingness of 
actors to change their mental models – may not happen. In any policy 
measure, there will be winners and losers, as Chisholm (2000) argues, and 
this is no different in institutional changes. Understanding who is anticipated 
to win/lose is therefore critical in order to understand why certain reforms 
work or do not work in terms of achieving anticipated outcomes.  
Researchers have tried to visualise how different modes of governance 
respond to institutional complexity and reforms. Duit and Galaz (2008), for 
example, suggest that a centralised government has a high capacity for 
dealing with complexity owing to its ability to monitor and steer unexpected 
developments by controlling problems associated with collective action, 
through being well-placed to promote coordination (Politt and Bauckaert, 
1999). Collective action is claimed to be the fundamental societal problem 
(North, 2005; Ostrom, 2005), and the failure to address collective-action 
problems at various levels is perhaps one reason for the poor integration of 
public transport services and their high delivery costs. 
Whilst centralised governance systems seem to be better at introducing 
more radical and large-scale reforms, studies have shown that large reforms 
often fail, whilst small changes are more acceptable and more likely to show 
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positive results (Stead et al., 2008; Tang and Bloom, 2000). Stead et al.’s 
(2008) study of the German regional transport authority model’s application 
to Riga in Latvia and Wroclaw in Poland found the following important 
lesson behind the limited success of the programme: it is important to adapt 
them to the local context by taking institutional and cultural differences into 
consideration, that large-scale reforms may not be promising when they aim 
to improve performance - especially when resources are limited, the 
importance of key actors for driving reforms, the setting of clear practical 
goals and the production of visible achievements to gain confidence from 
other stakeholders and the public.  
2.7.1 Public management reform  
Public management reform refers to “deliberate changes to the structures 
and processes of public sector organisations with the objective of getting 
them to perform better” (Bauckaert and Politt, 2011:2). Most studies attribute 
the need for reform to either an inadequacy in the existing administrative 
structure or impact of external global best practice reform models (Peters, 
2010; Cheung, 2005). Drivers for reform could also be based in competition, 
getting value for public money, bad institutional design, economic 
growth/decline, or cultural shifts (Macario and Spandou, 2010; Furubotn and 
Ritcher, 2000). Moreover, Cheema (2005) and Cheung (2005) highlight 
other public sector characteristics unique to developing countries that call for 
reform, such as a bloated civil service arising from the pressure to provide 
employment, poor expenditure control, complicated procedures, and poor 
systems of checks and balances that lead to corruption and transparency 
issues.  
There are two popular types of public management reform: non-structural or 
process reform and structural reform. Structural reforms often need to be 
accompanied by process reforms for optimum impact (Toonen, 2003). ‘Non-
structural reform’ or ‘process reform’ refers to transformations to develop 
effective working mechanisms and changes to administrative patterns 
without structural changes (ibid). Examples include improving the knowledge 
and skills of personnel, setting quality and service standards, implementing 
IT initiatives, improving the quality and timeliness of services and products, 
and clarifying agencies’ missions and objectives. 
Structural reforms aim to improve the structure of the government in order 
to improve the coordination and cohesion of various activities within the 
public sector (Peters, 2010). Examples of structural reforms include the 
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creation of new autonomous bodies, merging the functions of existing 
agencies, decentralising power to local authorities, and the enactment of 
new laws and regulations. The new public management spirit that was 
heavily promoted by the World Bank in the 1990s emphasised the idea that 
the central government should improve operational efficiency through 
structural reform by establishing autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies 
and limiting itself to a coordination role (Bouckaert and Politt, 2011; 
Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2003). This was also the approach taken in 
the creation of many transport authorities around the world, such as TfL and 
LTA Singapore.  
The creation of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies is justified on the 
basis that the decisions that need to be made in this area are based on 
economic and performance criteria rather than political considerations 
(Peters, 2010). However, Christensen and Laergreid (2006) argue that the 
creation of such bodies is not proven in terms of efficiency, and is taken for 
granted simply because it is a trend that is followed in many countries. They 
also claim that accountability can be an issue in autonomous and semi-
autonomous bodies when they are exempt from political supervision. 
However, Bache et al.’s (forthcoming) research on the changing interplay 
between central and local government in the UK in relation to transport and 
carbon emission reduction did not find any strong evidence that politicians 
will deploy the problem of ‘too many hands’ in order to dilute their 
responsibility, and may still want to remain in control. However, these 
politicians are not willing to make strict and unpopular decisions to achieve 
policy outcomes, as what they most value is winning votes.  
The situation is even more crucial in developing countries owing to the fact 
that governance integrity, such as transparency and corruption, are pressing 
issues. In the past, autonomous organisations were created in many 
developing countries to focus on economic development; unfortunately, 
however, it was often more political rather than economic criteria that have 
dominated the management of these bodies (Peters, 2010). The creation of 
autonomous bodies with single purpose also poses the danger that it may 
consequently neglect policies and objectives outside the organisation's 
single purpose (Wollman, 2003). This is especially critical for a transport 
authority as transport is a sector that is interlinked with many other policy 
areas and sectors; the importance of integrating the policies has been 
acknowledged (May et al., 2006). 
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2.7.2 Factors influencing public management reforms 
Public management reforms are not straightforward exercises, and because 
they challenge pre-existing institutional orders, they are shaped or 
constrained by what the reforms attempt to control or define (Bauckaert and 
Politt, 2011). Oliver (1992) suggests that there are three sources of pressure 
for reform: functional, political and social. Functional pressures arise from 
perceived problems with the performance levels of existing institutional 
arrangements. Political pressures result from shifts in the interests of 
politicians and other powerful actors together with the underlying power 
distributions that have supported and legitimated the existing institutions. 
Social pressures usually derive from interest groups demanding improved 
services, such as public transport users and transport associations. 
Bauckaert and Pollitt (2011) build on Oliver’s research (1992), proposing a 
management reform model, which helps in understanding the reform 
process, and is shown below in Figure 2.2.  
 
 
    Figure 2.2: Management Reform Model                                          
(adapted from Bauckaert and Politt, 2011) 
 
Elite decision-making is identified as the key in any reform process, but 
three other large groups of elements play a significant role: socioeconomic 
forces, political systems and administrative systems. The key reformers 
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often comprise politicians and senior bureaucrats, as they are able to put the 
reform on the agenda and provide the skill and knowledge to implement it 
(Grindle and Thomas; 1989). Reforms often involve a wide range of actors 
from a variety of organisations including management consultants, who help 
to shape it during the reform process (Bauckaert and Politt, 2011). 
Reformers may design a package that is based on what is desirable and 
feasible in the local context (ibid). Such packages display a considerable 
amount of rhetoric, but what is desirable is often contested. However, during 
the actual implementation of the reforms, the key actors often have to deal 
with a wider network of actors, and can be forced to change the design and 
instruments of the reform at this stage. This may happen as a result of the 
network actors putting up resistance in order to retain their powers, the 
competition for power, financial constraints, or a lack of authority on the 
reformers' side (Grindle and Thomas, 1989). Strong political leadership is 
may help to overcome some resistance but Toonen (2003) argues that such 
leaders can only change the course of policies to the degree that the 
environment permits them to. Although political will is a crucial element for 
reforms, Peters (2010) cautions that politicians have a short attention span 
in reform programmes because they do not produce quick results that can 
be used to win public support.  
The importance of informal institutions also emerges. Both the 
administrative culture and the relationships between civil servants and 
politicians are seen to influence reform management as well (Bauckaert and 
Politt, 2011). Administrative culture helps in identifying what is normal and 
what is acceptable in an organisation, and sets the stage for the reform 
design. For example, in many developing countries, deeply-rooted cultural 
values such as the duty to make sacrifices for the sake of one’s family, 
obedience, respect for authority and consensual decision-making can 
prevail, which subsequently influence the behaviour of civil servants 
(Dwivedi, 2003). The relationship between civil servants and politicians is a 
sensitive matter in India, as highlighted by Dwivedi, who states that ‘the 
power and prestige of civil servants is undermined by politicisation and 
because of this the public service ethics decline drastically [...] This insidious 
subculture does not encourage citizens to attempt seeking what is legally 
due to them and corruption has become a way of life’ (2003:514,520).  
Challenges to the creation of new agencies can also occur when there are 
other vested interests operating within the policy field. Politicians often like 
to mimic established policies and proven practices (Peters, 2010; Toonen, 
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2003), as Van Thiel (2004) found in her study on politicians’ preference for 
semi-autonomous bodies in the Netherlands. She concluded that the 
creation of independent agencies has become a path-dependent trend, with 
politicians following the footsteps of their predecessors as this gives them 
more confidence in the outcomes. This is also seen in the creation of 
transport authorities. These models are held to be successful, and are thus 
mimicked. Foucault (1982) suggests that in order to minimise uncertainties, 
one should reflect on history in an attempt to understand and be aware of 
the social arrangements that create problems as well as those that create 
satisfaction. Doing so aids in understanding oppressive relations of power, 
thus enabling decisions to be made concerning whether to oppose or 
promote certain arrangements (ibid).  
2.7.3 The outcomes of reforms 
Public management reform is a means to an end rather than an end-in-itself, 
which means that it is an ongoing process continually aiming at 
improvement, and is often far from stable (Peters, 2010). To date, there 
remains no accurate way to predict the outcome of reforms, or to show 
which structural changes will lead to what shifts in outputs or final outcomes. 
Moreover, there are few systematic evaluations of past reform exercises, 
and thus little can be learned from the experience of others. This is because 
reforms are often seen as being moments of ‘temporary glory’ (Toonen, 
2003:473). In addition, not clearly specifying the outcomes of reforms could 
also enable accountability to be more easily side-stepped. 
Grindle and Thomas (1989) suggest that the outcomes of reforms are not 
just about whether they have been successful or unsuccessful as there is a 
range of possible short and long-term outcomes that can affect different 
groups of stakeholders. For example, in a privatisation initiative, the 
company involved may raise good revenue within a short period of time and 
thus be regarded as successful, but this does not mean that good services 
have been delivered to passengers within the same time-scale. In order to 
deal with uncertainties about the outcome, Grindle and Thomas (1989) 
propose that a thorough reform plan with clear objectives should be 
prepared prior to implementation. This approach is supported by Bauckaert 
and Politt (2011), who went on to state that in addition to their ultimate 
objectives, reforms may have a number of intermediate ends, including 
strengthening the control of politicians over bureaucracy and freeing public 
officials from bureaucratic constraints that inhibit their opportunities.  
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Reforms can also produce unintended and unforeseen outcomes that 
require tackling (Toonen, 2003). In their study of local government decision-
making on transport in three city regions in the United Kingdom, Marsden 
and May (2006) found that changes in organisations that produce new 
institutional arrangements can negatively affect their ability to deliver new 
policies, and argued that the cost of such disruptions should be fully justified 
by the anticipated benefits of the proposed reform. However, it was noted 
that the benefits of reforms are often not immediately seen, often taking 
years to happen. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the ultimate objective 
of a reform will be achieved, and some reforms may only achieve one or two 
of their objectives or fail altogether.  
Accounting for these limitations, Bauckaert and Politt (2011) attempt to 
distinguish four different areas in relation to which reforms can be assessed 
for progress: 
 operational results 
 the management or decision-making process 
 changes in the overall capacity of the political and administrative 
system 
 the system’s shift towards some desired or ideal state 
In this thesis, the decision-making process is used as a basis for assessing 
the performance of the case study organisations, and assumes that process 
improvements of this type will directly lead to improvements in operational 
results, thus achieving better outputs and outcomes. The limitations of 
studying a reform process at a specific point in time are recognised, in that 
the reforms are relatively recent and transport outcomes can only be seen in 
the much longer-term. 
A lack of social capital – such as trust, understanding and networking - 
between a new network of actors is a critical factor in poor reform outcomes. 
McCarten and Vyasulu (2006) highlight the importance of social capital for 
institutional performance with regards to creating the mutual trust that 
facilitates public activities, such as planning exercises and the 
implementation of programmes. They stress that when there is low social 
capital, reforms can create coordination problems that in-turn require further 
steering and control to resolve. However, it is important to note that actors 
may take time to reaffirm or develop forms of social capital following an 
episode of reorganisation, and this may explain why new institutions often 
take time to begin working effectively. 
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2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has performed two main tasks: it has discussed published 
literature relating to the various themes and concepts arising in this thesis; 
and it has discussed issues associated with structural reforms, focusing on 
how public management can be used to address inadequacies in existing 
structures and thus improve efficiency. It is important to acknowledge that 
most of the available literature focuses on reforms in the Western world, and 
the Asian contexts in this study could have features that mean that some of 
this research is not directly applicable to the chosen case studies. 
Nevertheless, this literature provides theoretical knowledge about ideals, 
constraints on reform exercises, and differences in rhetoric and practice, all 
of which can be used in the analysis of the case studies and be built upon in 
the context of developing Asian countries.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this chapter: 
(a) The benefits of integrated policy in transport seem to be well 
established, and transport authorities that are set up in many 
developed cities are designed to promote integration at various 
levels. However, whether this applies to the context of developing 
countries is unclear.   
(b) Institutional structures are often not well aligned in terms of coping 
with transport challenges, particularly in the context of developing 
countries, in which the increasing complexity of transport governance 
has become an issue. All these factors call for reform (see section 2.2 
and section 2.6).  
(c) In an attempt to deal with institutional weaknesses in developing 
cities, and accordingly achieve better integration of transport services, 
international development agencies have called for the establishment 
of transport authorities based on the widespread use of similar 
models in developed cities even though there is little evidence that 
they are financially sustainable and effective (see section 2.3.1). 
(d) There seems to be no ‘one size fits all’ model when it comes to 
transport authorities. Even within developed cities, their set-ups, 
jurisdictions, functions and powers vary with contextual factors, and 
thus the reasons for these differences need to be understood before 
appropriate models can be selected for cities in developing countries 
(see section 2.4). Whilst such models are heavily promoted by 
international development agencies, it is unclear exactly what is being 
promoted, and whether it can work in developing countries. There is a 
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clear gap in the research in this area, and filling it represents the 
contribution of this thesis to the extant literature. 
(e) Whilst the need for reform might exist, the details of such reforms 
require an in-depth understanding of existing governance structures, 
powers and resources. This study seeks to contribute to the 
substantial current body of literature on governance reforms, powers 
and institutional changes. It makes a specific contribution by using a 
multi-actor perspective to understand the often taken-for-granted 
goals of reform, and seeks to understand how these play out through 
networks over time. 
(f) Reform is a complex process, and it is generally believed that the real 
benefits of reforms will not be seen for several years and until many 
improvements have been made to the original reform package. 
Although it would be useful to have a general set of criteria for 
assessing whether reforms are moving in the right direction and how 
much work they still require, such criteria are lacking - possibly it is in 
not in the interests of those working on reforms to set out such 
criteria, as they could make them accountable for any failures, and 
perhaps because they may lead to reforms that simply need further 
work being prematurely seen as 'failures'. However, what is most 
important for transport authorities is the ability or potential to deliver 
results on the ground over the long-term, and this requires us to look 
most closely at the set-up of such agencies rather than a set of 
achievement-based criteria. 
(g) The transference of appropriate decision-making powers has been 
highlighted as an important element in successful decentralisation 
(see Section 2.5.1), and this is also crucial for transport authorities’ 
abilities to make a difference, especially in terms of delivering policy 
objectives and improving operational integration. 
 
This literature review has given rise to four research questions: 
 
 What were the motivations behind the establishment of the transport 
authorities (SPAD in Malaysia and BMLTA in Bangalore)? 
 What types of autonomy have been given to these transport 
authorities? 
 How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in policy-
making and the selection and implementation of transport projects? 
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 What factors determine the success or failure of these reforms? 
As highlighted in (e), understanding existing governance structures is 
crucial for comprehending reform processes, so the next chapter will 
describe the governance structures that exist at the case study sites. 
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Chapter 3: The Case Study Sites 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the governance arrangements in Malaysia and 
Bangalore that underwrite Land Public Transport Commission’s (SPAD) and 
Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority’s (BMLTA) functioning and 
agendas, starting with the SPAD case study in Malaysia. As SPAD’s 
jurisdiction is limited to West Malaysia, only the governance arrangements 
that are related to the land transport sector in this region are included in the 
discussion. The description of the case study starts with an overview of 
urban transport in Malaysia, focusing on the capital city of Kuala Lumpur 
and outlining the institutional arrangement that existed before SPAD was 
created. Next, the milestones in the creation of SPAD are explained in order 
to highlight the motivations and challenges involved in creating structural 
changes for better governance. A description of SPAD’s constitution and 
set-up is then provided, followed by an overview of the new institutional 
arrangement. The section on SPAD was mainly drafted using documents 
that were collected during data-gathering, including government reports, 
minutes of meetings, and information available on the relevant agencies' 
websites. 
The second part of this chapter describes the BMLTA case study, focusing 
on matters relating to the urban transport governance structure in the 
Bangalore Metropolitan Region (BMR), which forms the jurisdiction of the 
BMLTA. This section starts with an overview of urban transport in Bangalore 
city, followed by a description of the institutional structure prior to the 
creation of the BMLTA and the issues related to the coordination and 
management of urban transport. Next, the proposals and active policies for 
overcoming the institutional barriers that the Central Government and the 
State Government of Karnataka pose to urban transport are explored. An 
outline of the new institutional structure since the BMLTA’s creation is given 
towards the end of this section, including the proposals for further reforms. 
Since the Rights to Information Act (2005) came into force in India, a lot of 
government-related materials are readily available on the internet, including 
government orders, reports, transport plans and minutes of meetings, which 
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were very useful for the BMLTA case study. This chapter ends with a brief 
summary of the similarities and differences between the case studies. 
3.2 Transport in Malaysia 
Malaysia has a federal, constitutional monarchy with 28 million population 
(Department of Statistics, 2010). It is separated into West and East Malaysia 
by the South China Sea, and has thirteen states, with three federal 
territories and a total land-mass of 329,847 km
2
. Malaysia has adopted the 
political system of parliamentary democracy.  
Malaysia has experienced tremendous economic success over the last three 
decades, with spillover effects for its citizens in terms of increased 
disposable income. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown by 6.3% 
per annum between 1970 and 2010, during which the GDP per capita also 
rose from RM6,000 to RM30,000 (£1,000 - £6,000) (SPAD, 2012). 
Researchers have found a positive relationship between income and the 
demand for transportation (Dargay et al., 2007), and this relationship is 
particularly pronounced in Malaysia. Over a period of just twenty years, the 
registration of private motorcycles and motorcars has increased almost 
three-fold, from 4.7 million in 1990 to 18.6 million in 2010 (SPAD, 2012). 
The capital city, Kuala Lumpur, has become one of the most modern and 
prominent cities in South East Asia. The total population was 1.67 million in 
2010 (Department of Statistics, 2010), and has been estimated to reach 2.2 
million by 2020. Around 2.125 million vehicles cross the city during peak 
hours in week-days, causing severe congestion.11 The growth in Kuala 
Lumpur has produced a spillover effect into the suburban areas located in 
Selangor State and the wider Klang Valley region. The region is made up of 
the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya, together with eight 
other local authorities under the State of Selangor, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
  
                                            
11 Draft KL city Plan 2020, accessed via http://klcityplan2020.dbkl.gov.my on 1 December 
2012 
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Source: Ministry of Federal Territory (www.kwpkb.gov.my/greaterklkv/) 
Figure 3.1: Map showing the location of the Klang Valley Region in 
West Malaysia 
The central government has implemented a number of initiatives for 
developing a modern transportation system for Klang Valley, including the 
development of urban rail links, improved road networks, the provision of 
interchange facilities, and the application of an ‘intelligent transport system’. 
Despite various efforts, such as the development of an urban rail system in 
the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the patronage of public transport has continued 
to deteriorate, dropping from 37% in the 1970’s to 33% in the 1980’s, 32% in 
1990, and 16% in 2008 (Binafikir, 2009; Kenworthy and Laube, 2001). 
Barter (2004) blamed the elimination of minibuses in Kuala Lumpur and 
Petaling Jaya during 1995 and 1996 for the drop in the capacity and 
frequency of transport services that drove users away. The bus company 
that was appointed to replace these minibuses failed to match the level of 
service they provided. The increase in affluence also led to an increase in 
private car ownership. 
A variety of hidden factors also contributed to the significant increase in car 
ownership, including the design of the urban fabric. Development was 
scattered and not very well considered, with no real attention given to 
transit-oriented development, public transport, or any non-motorised 
transport (ibid). High intensity development was undertaken, with designs 
oriented towards access by private vehicles, but not suitable for a very high 
rate of car usage (ibid). The road infrastructure project implemented under 
the privatisation scheme in the 90’s primarily involved the construction of 
numerous expressways connecting the city centre with other sub-urban 
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areas. This encouraged city workers to move out of the city to suburban and 
rural areas, where housing was more affordable, thus creating a large 
population of commuters that needed to travel to the city on a daily basis. 
This brought an increased dependency on cars, as public transport did not 
extend to many of the outlying areas (Kasipilllay and Chan, 2008). This 
situation was probably further exacerbated by the government’s strategy of 
promoting its automobile industry with two home-grown car-manufacturing 
companies. In recent years, the central government has made serious 
efforts to improve the efficiency of public transport (especially in the Klang 
Valley region) through two major programmes: the National Economic 
Transformation Programme and the National Key Results Area for urban 
public transport. These are discussed further in section 3.2.1.3  
3.2.1 Transport governance in Malaysia prior to the creation of 
SPAD 
3.2.1.1 Institutional structure 
There are three main tiers of government in Malaysia: the central 
government, the state government and the local authorities. Transport is 
itemised under the Federal List in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia, which means that the central government has the 
legislative power for transport policies in West Malaysia, except those 
involving the Penang Hill railway, which is under the State List (Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia, 1957). Hence, public transport policy is made at 
the central government level, and responsibility for it is spread between 
various agencies and ministries. The agencies deal with nationwide 
transportation plans, policy guidelines and matters covering transport 
administration and planning, with the state government and local authorities 
being limited to the provision of land matters and service delivery at the local 
level. It is important to note that the local authorities are in the State List of 
the Federal Constitution, which means that the state has direct financial 
powers over the local authorities. This also means that the federal 
government cannot interfere directly in the affairs of the local authorities 
even where state withholds federal contributions (Khalid, 2010). Another 
characteristic of local government in Malaysia is that unlike most countries, 
local councils do not have direct accountability to its citizens and the state 
government has the power to appoint the mayor and councillors of the 
respective local authorities (ibid). 
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Malaysia embraces political neutrality of civil service and the Public Service 
Commission has been able to maintain its independence from political 
pressure (Hezri, 2004). According to Puthucheary (1978) the senior civil 
servants and political leaders at the federal level have close rapport and 
trust in each other, and together, they from the elite of the country. She also 
stressed that there has been little evidence of political interference in the 
recruitment process of civil servants and hence the ‘political acceptability’ 
clause might only apply to very few appointments.  
Prior to the creation of SPAD in 2010, a number of agencies had some kind 
of purview over planning, management, operations and the development of 
land public transport services in West Malaysia, but there was no dedicated 
agency that could champion the sector and that had the overall mandate to 
ensure holistic planning and effective regulation (Jemali, 2001). Table 3.1 
shows the plethora of agencies that were involved in managing the key 
functions in land public transport. 
Table 3.1: Key agencies involved in management of land public 
transport in West Malaysia before 2010 
Functions Key Agencies 
Functions related to 
transport  
Transport Modes 
Planning  
Economic Planning 
Unit 
Planning and approval of 
development projects 
Rail, buses, taxis, 
tourism vehicles, hire 
and drive cars, and 
goods vehicles 
Town and Country 
Planning 
Department  
Planning, administrating, 
overseeing progress of 
development and land use 
Rail, buses, taxis, 
tourism vehicles, hire 
and drive cars, and 
goods vehicles 
Ministry of Works 
Planning of road projects 
and expressways 
Buses, taxis, tourism 
vehicles, hire and drive 
cars, and goods 
vehicles 
Ministry of 
Transport/ 
Department of 
railway 
Planning of land transport 
infrastructure development 
and railway 
Rail 
Commercial 
Vehicle Licensing 
Board 
Limited planning for 
commercial transport 
service 
Buses, taxis, goods 
vehicles 
 Local authorities 
Planning on land use 
development and spatial 
matters 
Rail, buses, taxis 
tourism vehicles, hire 
and drive cars, and 
goods vehicles 
 
 
Regulation  
 
Commercial 
Vehicle Licensing 
Board 
Licensing of commercial 
vehicles and setting fares 
Buses, taxis, goods 
vehicles 
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Functions Key Agencies 
Functions related to 
transport  
Transport Modes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulation          
(cont’d) 
Department of 
railway/Ministry of 
Transport  
Licensing, approving, 
opening railways as well as 
technical regulation of 
railway scheme and setting 
fares 
Rail 
Road transport 
Department 
Driver Licensing, regulating 
road worthiness of transport, 
vehicle registration and use 
Buses, taxis, goods 
vehicles 
Ministry of Tourism  
Licensing of tourism vehicles 
and hire and drive cars 
Tourism vehicles, hire 
and drive cars 
Ministry of 
International Trade 
Regulations on conditions of 
freight being transported 
Goods vehicles 
Enforcement  
Road Transport 
Department 
Enforcement of road rules 
and all transport regulations 
Buses, taxis, goods 
vehicles, tourism 
vehicles, hire and drive 
cars 
Commercial 
Vehicle Licensing 
Board 
Limited enforcement on 
licensing conditions  
Buses, taxis and goods 
vehicles 
Department  of 
railway  
Enforcement of technical 
regulations and railway 
operations 
Rail 
Department of 
Environment 
Enforcement of 
environmental standards 
Buses, taxis and goods 
vehicles 
Police 
Safety, security and traffic 
management 
Rail, buses, taxis and 
goods vehicles 
Ministry of tourism 
Licensing conditions of 
tourism vehicles  
Tourism vehicles and 
hire and drive cars 
Development  
Ministry of 
Transport  
Construction of transport 
infrastructure, railway 
projects 
 
Ministry of Works 
Construction of roads, 
expressway 
 
State /local 
authorities 
Provision of transport 
facilities in the local area- 
bus stops, terminals 
 
Operations  
Government link 
companies and 
private entities 
National 
Infrastructure 
Company Limited 
(PRASARANA) 
Malayan Railways 
Limited 
Express Rail Link 
Sdn Bhd 
Taxi companies 
 
Operations of buses, taxis, 
goods vehicles and rail 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Binafikir (2009) 
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Private sector involvement in the provision of the transport infrastructure has 
expanded over the years, from its original role in bus and taxi transport 
operations to toll road construction and the implementation, operation and 
maintenance of commuter, light rapid transit (LRT) and monorail. Table 3.1 
shows that there are more than ten agencies involved in this, many of which 
were under different ministries, reported to different political masters, and 
had different protocols and agendas, making coordination between them 
very difficult. The next table (Table 3.2) shows the key agencies that were 
involved in land public transport and the functions of the ministries in 
general.  
Table 3.2: List of key agencies and ministries involved in management 
of land public transport before 2010 
 
Agency Ministry Key Functions of Ministry 
Commercial 
Vehicle Licensing 
Board 
Ministry of 
Entrepreneur and 
Cooperative 
Development  
 Development of Bumiputera12 in industrial 
and commercial community 
 Promotion of franchise system 
 Development of vendor schemes 
Road Transport 
Department Ministry of 
Transport 
 Formulation, implementation and co-
ordination of policies and strategies for land, 
air and sea transport, including the 
development of ports, air traffic rights and 
research and planning on transportation 
services. 
Department of 
Railway 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of 
Tourism Ministry of Tourism 
 National planning and policies on tourism 
 Development of manpower in the tourist 
industry 
 Development of tourist facilities 
 Regulation and licensing of tourist agencies 
and tourist guides 
 Performs functions and exercises powers 
under the Tourism Industry Act 1992, the 
Malaysian Tourism Promotion Board Act 
1992, and the Tourism Vehicles Licensing 
Act 1999 
 Regulation of the tourism industry 
                                            
12 Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak provided in the Article 153 of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia 
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Agency Ministry Key Functions of Ministry 
Economic 
Planning Unit 
Prime Minister’s 
Department 
 Strategies for socioeconomic development 
 Preparing medium and long-term 
development plans 
 Preparing the budget for development 
programmes and projects 
 Monitoring and evaluating the achievement 
of development programmes and projects 
Ministry of Works Ministry of Works 
 
 Planning, design and construction of 
infrastructure projects such as roads, 
government buildings, airports, ports and 
jetties 
 Regulating privatised highways  
 Operates and maintains roads and 
government buildings 
Source: Ministerial Functions Act 1969, Ministers of the Federal Government (No. 2) Order 2008 
3.2.1.2 Acknowledged institutional issues  
The Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (CVLB) and the Bumiputera 
Agenda 
Prior to the creation of the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (CVLB), the 
body in charge of licensing matters was known as the Road Transport 
Licensing Board, and was part of the Road Transport Department (RTD) – 
an agency under the Ministry of Transport (MOT). In 1984, the Road 
Transport Licensing Board was moved under the control of the Ministry of 
Public Industries, and in 1987 it was given legislative support and became 
known as the CVLB.  
The CVLB’s main function was to develop Bumiputera entrepreneurs in the 
commercial vehicle industry through entrepreneurship training and 
programmes. The concept of the Bumiputera ethnic group in Malaysia was 
coined by the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and it 
recognises the special privileges of Malays and the natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak provided in the Article 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
The Bumiputera agenda was heavily promoted in the National Economic 
Policy (1971–1990), which was a socioeconomic restructuring programme 
aimed at reducing the economic disparities between the Malays and non-
Malays (mainly the Chinese). 
The CVLB Act 1987 defines commercial vehicles as public service vehicles 
and goods vehicles, which includes taxis, buses, trucks, lorries, and trailers. 
CVLB is made responsible for evaluating and approving applications for new 
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licenses, renewals and change of conditions for all classes of commercial 
vehicles, and for enforcing the conditions set for commercial vehicle 
licenses. Unfortunately, the criteria used for issuing permits for bus routes 
and taxis were not based on integrated transport planning principles (Jemali, 
2001). Besides licensing, CVLB also tightly controlled and regulated fares 
for public transport. According to Kiggundu (2009), CVLB failed to develop a 
sound and well-designed subsidy scheme, and bus operators were forced to 
operate in areas where the demand for services was low. Most of the 
operators who were dependent on fare revenues could not survive under the 
CVLB’s stringent control of bus fares, and this damaged the bus industry 
(ibid). 
The Ministry of Public Industries – the parent ministry of CVLB – was 
restructured several times. It was reformed in 1995 as the Ministry of 
Entrepreneur Development, and re-branded again in 2004 as the Ministry of 
Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development (MECD). The Ministry’s mission 
to promote the Bumiputera agenda remained strong over the years. 
However, the Ministry was dissolved after the new Prime Minister took office 
in 2009, and the CVLB was placed under the Prime Minister’s Department 
(PMD) till SPAD was formed in 2010.  
Coordination and enforcement issues 
Binafikir (2009) suggests that the presence of multiple agencies has often 
been associated with an overlap and duplication of functions between the 
various agencies responsible for transport. This has led to suboptimal land 
public transport delivery in multiple areas: planning, regulation, enforcement, 
and integration with spatial development.13 The agencies that had the 
jurisdiction over transport often engaged in feasibility studies, but these were 
usually performed on an ad hoc basis without an active engagement with 
the respective stakeholders (Hezri, 2004). Hence, the outcomes of these 
studies tend to focus on infrastructural development in isolation, as opposed 
to cross-system optimisations of investments (SPAD, 2012). Besides the 
coordination issues, Hezri (2004: 363) suggests that “inter-agency rivalry 
and a lack of trust are prominent features” of the Malaysian government, 
and that they have resulted in a shortage of joint programmes and research, 
especially in terms of data-sharing. 
                                            
13 See Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 2020, accessed on 30 November 2012, 
www.apamedia.com/pskl2020 
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As a consequence of the lack of coordination at the government level, there 
was a lack of integration between the various modes (and within each 
mode) at the ground level (Binafikir, 2009). For example, the multiple bus 
companies were not complementary, but rather competed with each other to 
service the profitable routes whilst neglecting other ones. Transferring 
between the buses was difficult due to the absence of a coordinated service 
between the companies (ibid). Kiggundu (2009) concluded that the urban 
rail system, the LRT and the Monorail were built without serious 
consideration of their roles in the larger transport system, and were not 
accompanied by supportive policies such as park and ride facilities, efficient 
bus feeder systems and parking control. Hence, they could not secure 
sufficient users, and this eventually affected the viability of these projects 
(ibid).  
Fragmentation was also seen to have impacted upon the effectiveness of 
enforcement. For instance, the enforcement personnel in the local 
authorities were not empowered by the CVLB or the Department of Railway 
(DOR) to regulate and enforce policies on land public transport. This meant 
that multiple officers from a variety of authorities and agencies had to be 
present for comprehensive enforcement to be put in place, and this was not 
practical (SPAD, 2012).  
Coordination in transport planning 
The presence of multiple agencies also led to fragmented planning, with 
each agency having its own visions, objectives and transport strategies 
aligned to these goals. Although the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) provided 
the way forward for the transport sector in its five-year development plans, 
there was no national transport policy to provide a direction in which the 
sector could develop in the long-term. This lack was often associated with 
the absence of a dedicated transport agency with the powers for all modes 
of land transport and transport planning that could also factor land-use 
planning and development in other sectors into its plans (Binafikir, 2009; 
Jemali, 2001). 
There was no integration between land-use and transport planning at the 
federal and regional levels until the amendments to the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1976 (Act 172) came in during 2001 (Maidin and Mohamad, 
2011). Up to 2001, land use planning was limited to local authorities and 
exercised through local plans that were supposed to look into transport 
requirements. Unfortunately, the local authorities in Malaysia lacked man-
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power, technical knowledge and funding to create or enforce transport 
services, and were often fully engaged in overseeing the daily urban service 
tasks stipulated in the Local Authorities Act of 1976 (Act 171), such as 
sanitation, road maintenance and solid waste management (Hezri, 2004). 
Serious effort for land use planning at federal and regional level was seen in 
2002 with the preparation of the first National Physical Plan. This plan 
provided the framework for a sustainable and integrated land use planning 
system within West Malaysia by identifying major investments. 
Prior to these changes, the growth in the cities in the 1980’s and 90’s 
(particularly in Kuala Lumpur) was led by the industrial sector and real estate 
development. The Klang Valley region received intensive development, with 
a 440% increase in built-up areas in the ten years between 1988 and 1998 
(Yaakup et al., 2003 cited in Maidin and Mohamad, 2011). Without a proper 
land use transport plan to guide development, the “predict and build 
approach” was used in an attempt to build a sufficient transport 
infrastructure to cope with the demand rather than to manage it (Barter, 
2002:275).  
The international development agencies were actively involved in urban 
transport planning in the 70’s, mainly by providing technical assistance to 
the government in the preparation of transport studies and plans such as the 
Study on Integrated Urban Transportation Strategies for Kuala Lumpur. 
However, their role subsequently faded away as Malaysia transformed from 
lower income to position itself in the higher middle income economy, making 
it no longer eligible for development assistance from such bodies. 
3.2.1.3 Milestones in the creation of SPAD 
The early efforts to create a single transport authority can be traced back to 
the 1970’s and a proposal from the World Bank in one of the transport 
studies prepared for the government and the proposals were repeated and 
considered in a number of forms over the decades that followed. A similar 
proposal was later seen in many transport plans, such as the JICA Report in 
1999, the World Bank report on the Urban Rail Concession Project in Kuala 
Lumpur, Bangkok and Manila in 2004 (see section 1.2), and the Ninth 
Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) released by the EPU in 2006. Figure 3.2 shows 
the milestones in the creation of SPAD. 
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Figure 3.2: Milestones in the creation of SPAD 
Despite these numerous proposals in transport studies over a period of 
decades, no serious effort was made to construct a single transport authority 
until the year 2000, when a special task force was created in the Ministry of 
Finance to monitor the various transport projects undertaken during that 
time. The task force comprised only four hand-picked members from four 
key agencies – EPU, MOT, Kuala Lumpur City Hall and the CVLB. In 2002, 
the task force was given a special assignment to take over the failing urban 
rail projects, the STAR-LRT and Putra-LRT. The task force was later 
dissolved in 2004 and replaced by another coordinating committee called 
the Integration and Restructuring of the Public Transport System in the 
Klang Valley Committee (INSPAK). 
INSPAK was chaired by the Minister of Finance and operated without any 
legislative support. Its main task was to restructure the public transport 
system in the Klang Valley, and as part of this exercise it established two 
government linked companies – Rapid KL and PRASARANA – to operate 
and own the assets of STAR-LRT, Putra-LRT and the feeder bus system. 
The committee also proposed the creation of a single transport authority at 
the national level, which was strongly supported by the EPU. In August 
2004, the Cabinet approved the creation of a National Transport Board with 
legislative support - a national body. To ensure its smooth implementation, 
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the Cabinet lengthened the period of its implementation, with the first phase 
being to create the Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority (KUTA) – a 
regional body. On 10 September 2004, the Prime Minister then announced 
in his annual budget speech that INSPAK would be responsible for the 
creation of KUTA. However, despite INSPAK’s efforts, including the 
preparation of a bill for KUTA in 2005, a single transport authority did not 
materialise. Interestingly, reference to an official document prepared by the 
EPU and INSPAK in 2004 revealed that although all the relevant agencies 
agreed to the proposal to create a single authority for the Klang Valley, none 
of them wanted their existing powers to be taken away. After about a year of 
operation, the INSPAK committee became inactive, although there is no 
evidence that it was officially dissolved. 
The proposal for KUTA was put on the back burner until May 2008, when 
the Cabinet decided that the EPU should study the proposal to create a 
single transport commission and present the findings to them. It is not clear 
what triggered this request, but it could have been the failure of the Monorail 
project in Kuala Lumpur in 2007. The EPU study on the creation of a 
National Land Public Transport Commission was completed in May 2009, 
and their recommendations provided a blueprint for reform. To facilitate the 
study, the EPU created a steering committee that comprised members from 
various agencies and ministries to seek continuous input and assistance in 
the preparation of a new bill for the proposed commission. Early proposals 
on the set-up were presented to the former Prime Minister in August 2008, 
who made the following decisions: 
 That the commission would be known as Land Public Transport 
Commission or Suruhanjaya Pengangkutan Awam Darat (SPAD); 
 That its jurisdiction would only cover land public transport – buses, 
rail and taxis; 
 That the first phase of its implementation would cover only West 
Malaysia/Peninsular Malaysia.  
When Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak took office on 3 April 2009 after the 
general election of 2008, one of his first acts was the re-shuffle of the 
ministries in 2009, including the dissolution of the MECD and the CVLB’s 
absorption into the PMD. He also developed the Government 
Transformation Programme (GTP), which aimed to transform the way the 
government worked in order to propel the nation forward. The GTP focused 
on areas that needed the most attention from the government under seven 
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National Key Result Areas (NKRA), one of which was to improve urban 
public transport in Kuala Lumpur. This task was assigned to the Minister of 
Transport, and had clear targets, a specific time-frame and a reporting 
framework. The NKRA for public transport set ambitious targets, such as 
achieving a modal share of 25% by 2012, increasing the capacity of the 
urban rail, and creating rights of way for buses (Pemandu, 2012). Whilst 
some of these targets have been achieved, attaining the modal share 
remains a tall order since the rising affluence in the city is linked with a rise 
in private cars. 
Once the study on SPAD was completed, the EPU presented the findings to 
the Economic Council in July 2009. The Economic Council, which is chaired 
by the Prime Minister comprises key economic ministers and senior 
government officials. It serves as the consultative body to facilitate cross-
cutting economic policy decisions and focuses on strategic economic issues 
and overcoming bureaucratic delays.14 The council decided that the EPU 
should review the planning and enforcement functions given to SPAD, and 
include freight within its purview as well. Two months later, the EPU re-
presented its findings, and the council approved the creation of SPAD with 
the following features:  
 SPAD to cover land public transport; buses, rail, taxis, tourism 
vehicles and goods vehicles; 
 The functions of SPAD to include planning, regulation and 
enforcement of the land public transport sector; 
 The regulation of vocational licenses (the driving license for 
commercial vehicles) to remain with the RTD; 
 The first phase of implementation to be limited to West Malaysia; 
 SPAD to be supported by two pieces of legislation – the Land Public 
Transport Commission Act (SPAD Act 2010) and the Land Public 
Transport Act (PAD Act 2010); 
 The CVLB and the DOR to be absorbed into SPAD. The powers of 
the Ministry of Tourism in regulating tourism vehicles and hire and 
drive cars to be ceded to SPAD. 
The Cabinet then endorsed the creation of SPAD, forming an interim team 
to work on bills and do the groundwork for SPAD, such as identifying office 
                                            
14 www.epu.gov.my accessed on 29 November 2012 
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space, fixing the service scheme/salary packages, and recruiting qualified 
members.  
SPAD was formally created after the parliament passed both the SPAD and 
the PAD acts in May 2010. It was designed to be an independent 
commission placed directly under the Prime Minister in the PMD, and its 
functions included planning, regulation of land public transport, and 
enforcement. In the SPAD Act (2010), land public transport is defined as 
“transport on land by means of land public passenger transport and land 
public freight transport, and includes land public transport services, 
terminals, facilities, networks, systems, operations and other services 
associated with such transport or land public transport services”.  
Although both SPAD acts were passed in May 2010, only the SPAD Act 
(2010), which sets out the clauses on the functions and powers of the 
commission, was enforced immediately, with the PAD Act (2010) being 
enforced six months later in January 2011. Therefore, during the first six 
months of SPAD’s creation, the CVLB and the DOR continued to exist and 
perform their functions, only being dissolved in January 2011 when their 
functions were finally transferred to SPAD. 
3.2.2 Transport governance after the creation of SPAD  
SPAD was envisaged as a one-stop centre for land transport, as shown in 
Figure 3.3. The blueprint for SPAD sets out its structure and role (Binafikir, 
2009), which is to provide a single interface for the public and private 
sector/operators with regard to all land public transport matters. A dedicated 
public complaints and services division has been designed to handle all the 
public’s queries and act as an avenue for feedback, whilst the private sector 
only deals with SPAD on matters concerning regulations and enforcement 
(and will not have to liaise with multiple agencies, as they did in the previous 
regime). To successfully achieve its mission, SPAD should work hand-in-
hand with the transport operators and relevant government agencies. A 
dispute resolution committee has also been created by SPAD to oversee 
and mediate disputes arising in the land public transport sector.  
SPAD was set up to play the role of the central planner for the land public 
transport sector and to integrate the various plans prepared at the levels of 
the national, state and local authorities. In order to achieve this, SPAD has 
to work with both state offices and local authorities, acquiring approval for 
any plans from the National Physical Planning Council (NPPC) before 
passing them down to state and local authorities. It is also given the 
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responsibility for reviewing and endorsing developers’ proposals on 
transport infrastructure and facilities in new areas, although the ultimate 
approval for development remains with the state government and local 
authorities.  
 
 
Source: Binafikir (2009) 
Figure 3.3: Role of SPAD  
SPAD monitors and regulates standards of performance by licensing the 
operators of land public transport. To enable it to do so required removing 
powers from the CVLB, the DOR and the Ministry of Tourism. As a railway 
regulator, SPAD approves the railway scheme, monitors railway 
construction, issues licences to operators and train drivers, regulate fares, 
and handle accidents and inquiries. Regulation of other modes of transport 
is more restricted, covering the licensing of operators and the formulation of 
a performance-based licensing regime. SPAD is also responsible for regular 
review of fares and striking a balance between affordability of services for 
travellers and their financial viability for operators. It is important to 
understand that SPAD only regulates operating licences for commercial 
vehicles, whilst driving licences for commercial vehicles are regulated by the 
RTD under the MOT.  
SPAD’s powers of enforcement are limited to operating licenses and, due to 
its limited powers in this area it needs to work in concert with the RTD and 
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the Police. The RTD has a larger role than SPAD in the enforcement of land 
transport, dealing with the requirements of both the PAD’s Act 2010 and its 
own Road Transport Act 1987, which covers areas including driving 
licenses, road taxes and vehicle conditions. Figure 3.4 shows the role of 
SPAD vis-à-vis other agencies in enforcement. 
Enforcement
RTD SPAD Police
 has powers to enforce 
SPAD’s permits
 enforces all licences issued by 
RTD 
 road tax
 driving licence
 vocational licence
 vehicle conditions including 
construction and use (de-
registration)
 Only has  powers to 
enforce licensing 
requirements for land 
public transport 
vehicles  
 Safety, security and 
traffic management
 
Figure 3.4:The transport enforcement framework after the creation of 
SPAD 
It is important to note that SPAD is not a developer, thus its role does not 
involve it in the development of the transport infrastructure, except with 
regards to the implementation of transport improvement initiatives such as 
integrated ticketing and scheduling. In order to provide SPAD with the 
financial strength it requires to operate effectively, both the SPAD and PAD 
Acts included means for creating a public transport fund. Sources of this 
fund include licensing fees for operators, fines and penalties from 
commuters and operators, and proceeds from the travel demand 
management mechanism, such as road pricing and parking. 
The creation of SPAD has led to several impacts. It has created a legal 
entity which forms an arm’s length agency of central government to 
specifically look at the planning, coordination and enforcement of land public 
transport. To a certain extent, it has reduced coordination issues by merging 
the various land public transport modes – buses, taxis, tourism vehicles, rail 
and goods vehicles. It has also resulted in the removal of CVLB which was 
associated with mismanagement and corruption. 
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3.3 Urban transport in Bangalore  
Bangalore is the capital of the State of Karnataka, which is the eighth largest 
state in India, covering 191,791km
2
, with a population of 61.13 million 
people. Demographically, it is almost the same size as the United Kingdom, 
and double the size of Malaysia. Bangalore is the fifth largest metropolis in 
India and had a city population of 9.59 million people in 2011, representing 
15.7% of the population of the State.15 The Bangalore Metropolitan Region, 
known as the BMR, covers around 8,000 km
2
 with a population of over 13 
million people. Figure 3.5 shows the BMR in relation to the State of 
Karnataka and the City of Bangalore. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: The State of Karnataka 
                                            
15 www.censusindia.gov.in 
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The City of Bangalore enjoys demographic and economic dominance, has 
developed as the administrative and educational centre of Karnataka, and 
has witnessed tremendous growth as an IT service centre (Mamatha and 
Madhu, 2007). Hubli-Dharwad, the second largest city in Karnataka, has a 
population of less than one million, which shows the large disparity between 
the rate of development in the capital city and other cities in the State. 
Whilst economic development has pulled a lot of investment to Bangalore, it 
also puts pressure on its infrastructure and services, especially with the 
dramatic increase in the number of vehicles there, which totalled 3.7 million 
in March 2011 (comprising 2.6 million motorcycles and 1.1 million cars). 
Notably, the percentage of car growth over the past ten years has been 
approximately 13%, which is much higher than the 9% growth for 
motorcycles.16 Mamatha and Madhu (2007) suggest that several factors 
underpin this growth, including the perception of cars as status symbols, the 
increase in household income, better access to financial institutions with 
reduced interest rates on car loans, and poor public transport. 
Buses and trains are popular modes of travel in Bangalore, which has a 
good bus system in comparison to many other cities in India. They are 
operated by the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC), 
which moved 4.5 million commuters per day in 2012, providing bus services 
to the city and suburban areas of Bangalore within a thirty-seven kilometre 
radius from the city centre.17 In a study that compared bus services in five 
different cities in India (Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Chennai and Bangalore), the 
BMTC was named as the only profitable provider (Menon, 2012). Commuter 
trains provide services between the state’s satellite towns, such as Tumkur, 
Chikballapur, Honsur and Madya. Like many other Metropolitan cities (such 
as Mumbai, Chennai and New Delhi), Bangalore has embarked on a Metro 
project, and the first stretch between Baiyyappanahalli and M.G.Road (7km) 
was opened in October 2011, with the second phase currently under 
construction.18  
                                            
16 http://rto.kar.nic.in/ accessed on 6 Dec 2012 
17 http://www.bmtcinfo.com accessed on 22 October 2012 
18 http://bmrcl.co.in accessed on 7 December 2012 
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3.3.1 Transport governance in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region 
prior to the creation of BMLTA  
3.3.1.1 Institutional structure  
There are three main tiers of government in India: the central government 
based in New Delhi, the state government, and the urban local bodies. It is 
important to note that urban transport is considered to be a state matter in 
India (Agarwal and Chauhan, 2011), although the central government also 
plays a significant role here. At the central level, the Ministry of Urban 
Development is entrusted with the responsibility for planning and 
coordinating the urban transport system. In 2006, the Ministry produced the 
National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP), which outlines policy directions for 
urban transport development. The central government also controls the 
Indian Railway. Another important transport related ministry is the Ministry of 
Surface Transport, which administers the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 that is 
responsible for safety and regulates driver training and licensing, penalties, 
enforcement mechanisms, and vehicle registration and road-worthiness 
certificates. Nevertheless, the act mainly focuses on safety issues rather 
than controlling vehicle use or promoting public transport (Agarwal, 2006). 
This act is supplemented by state-level rules that apply within individual 
state jurisdictions. Most importantly, the central government holds the 
funding muscle for supporting investment in mass transit infrastructure (with 
almost 30% on the ongoing Bangalore Metro project), and for regulating the 
automobile industry (ibid).  
At the state level, the Urban Development Department (UDD), the Transport 
Department, and the Public Works Department are the main agencies that 
manage urban transport matters. The UDD is responsible for the overall 
strategies for urban transport, and leads the Metro project. The Transport 
Department regulates fares and service delivery standards, with the Public 
Works Department having the remit for road construction and maintenance. 
At the city level, the Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation (BBMP), 
which is the local urban body for Bangalore, is responsible for the delivery of 
urban services including the maintenance of road infrastructure and the 
provision of urban transport facilities such as bus stops.  
Administratively, the BMR lies between the jurisdiction of the State 
Government and the City Government, with the majority of the agencies that 
operate in this region being under the purview of the State Government. The 
BMR covers an area of 8,000 km
2
, and is under the administrative 
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jurisdiction of the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority 
(BMRDA), which oversees planning and development in the region. Besides 
the BBMP, there are another eleven urban local bodies operating within the 
BMR.19 It is important to note that the BBMP jurisdiction (popularly known as 
the Corporation Area), and the Bangalore Development Authority’s (BDA) 
jurisdiction (known as the Bangalore Metropolitan Area - BMA) are both 
located within the BMR, as shown in Figure 3.6. 
              
Figure 3.6: Map showing BBMP and BMR areas 
The international development agencies, mainly the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) play an active role in providing loans and 
technical assistance for various infrastructural development programmes in 
the state of Karnataka such as water supply, urban infrastructure 
development and coastal management. In the urban transport sector, the 
ADB has been actively involved in the Metro Project currently being 
                                            
19 http://www.bmrda.kar.nic.in accessed on 7 December 2012 
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undertaken in Bangalore and their assistance is in the form of soft loan, 
worth USD250 million20.  Besides ADB, two other development agencies – 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency and French Development 
Agency are also involved in providing funding assistance for the project. 
World Bank, on the other hand, has initiated the Comprehensive Traffic and 
Transportation Plan in 2003 and prepared the Urban Transport Study for 
Bangalore in 2005. 
Table 3.3 lists the plethora of agencies that were important for urban 
transport matters in the BMR. 
                                            
20 http://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/adb-lends-250-mn-to-namma-metro-
111040200053_1.html 
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Table 3.3: Key agencies operating in Bangalore Metropolitan Region 
Key functions Agencies Overall Functions Functions related to transport Modes 
Central Government 
 
 
 Policy and 
planning 
 Regulation of 
urban rail fare 
Ministry of Urban 
Development  
Formulate policies, support and 
monitor programmes related to 
urban development and 
coordinate activities between the 
various central ministries, State 
Government and other nodal 
authorities 
 Planning and coordination of 
urban transport systems  
 Responsible for town and 
country planning and 
development matter 
 Regulate fares for urban rail 
other than those funded by the 
Indian Railways 
 
All modes of urban transport, 
excluding railway but including 
urban rail 
State of Karnataka 
 
 Policy and 
planning for 
urban 
transport  
 
Urban Development 
Department (UDD) 
 
Responsible for urban 
development matters aiming to 
develop and implement policies 
and schemes for all levels of 
citizens, to empower and support 
the governing statutory bodies 
and to establish effective 
monitoring and review systems in 
cities and towns 
 
 To facilitate and finance the 
infrastructure for metro rail 
services through Bangalore 
Metro Rail Corporation Limited 
(BMRCL) 
 Preparation of City Mobility 
Plans (CMPs) for all urban 
areas in the state  
 technical guidance and capacity 
building for identification and 
implementation of urban 
transport projects 
 
All modes of urban transport, 
excluding railway but including 
urban rail 
73 
 
Key functions Agencies Overall Functions Functions related to transport Modes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Project 
monitoring  
 Manage 
funding 
Karnataka Urban 
Infrastructure 
Development and 
Finance Corporation 
(KUIDFC) 
 Implementation arm of UDD 
for the formulation, appraisal, 
implementation and 
monitoring of urban 
infrastructure development 
projects throughout the State 
 Plays an interfacing role with 
external lending agencies  
 State-level nodal agency 
under JNNURM to assist in 
submissions of proposals for 
approval to the state-level 
steering committee, 
distributing funds and monitor 
the physical and financial 
progress for initiatives 
undertaken under the 
scheme. 
 Preparation of the 
Comprehensive Traffic and 
Transportation Plan for 
Bangalore, completed in 2011. 
  Manage funding for transport 
through JNNURM scheme 
 
No specific mode 
 
 Land use 
planning 
 Coordinated 
planning and 
development 
Bangalore 
Metropolitan Regional 
Development 
Authority (BMRDA) 
 Planning, co-ordinating and 
supervising the proper and 
orderly development of the 
areas within the Bangalore 
Metropolitan Region. 
 Coordinate the planning 
functions of 11 urban local 
bodies inside the Bangalore 
Metropolitan Region. 
 Transport planning forms a 
component of the plans 
No specific mode 
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Key functions Agencies Overall Functions Functions related to transport Modes 
 
 
Planning and 
development of 
real estate 
Bangalore 
Development 
Authority (BDA) 
 Prepare master plans, layout 
planning and development 
schemes  
 Enforce those plans through 
project implementation, land 
use regulation and 
development control 
 Authorised to develop land 
Large road construction projects No specific mode 
 
Project 
implementation  
 
Bangalore Metro Rail 
Corporation Limited 
(BMRCL) 
. 
Planning and implementation of metro project  
Urban rail 
 
 
 
Regulation and 
enforcement 
Transport Department 
 The Transport Department administers the Motor Vehicle Act 
(1988) and is responsible for issuing driving licences, registration of 
motor vehicles, issuing and renewing permits  
 Regulatory and enforcement functions related to transport, such as 
fixing the fare structure for bus systems. 
 Manage the state transport corporations, which run the inter-city 
bus service including the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport 
Corporation, which operates the bus service in the city and the sub-
urban areas of Bangalore 
Buses, taxis, goods vehicles, 
private vehicles 
 
Operation of 
buses  
Karnataka State Road 
Transport Corporation 
(KSRTC) 
KSRTC operates within the central and southern part of Karnataka and 
also provide bus services to other cities, such as Mumbai and Chennai 
Buses  
Operation of 
buses  
Bangalore 
Metropolitan 
Transport Corporation 
(BMTC) 
Provides bus services to the city and sub-urban areas of Bangalore Buses  
75 
 
Key functions Agencies Overall Functions Functions related to transport Modes 
City Government 
 
 
Construction 
and 
maintenance of 
roads 
 
 
Greater Bangalore 
Municipal Corporation 
(BBMP) 
 
 Improve and coordinate 
infrastructure development for 
road and transportation 
network, water supply and 
solid waste management and 
upgrade the quality of urban 
civic services. 
 Responsible for overall 
delivery of services in its area 
Maintenance, rehabilitation and 
widening of local roads, parking 
management 
No specific mode 
 
 
Traffic 
management 
and 
enforcement 
 Traffic Police 
 
 Enforcement of traffic laws, 
regulation on right of ways, 
manning of traffic islands
 
 Road improvement projects, 
such as installing road 
furniture, improving junctions, 
and promoting awareness 
programme 
Traffic management, road 
improvements and enforcement  
Buses, taxis, goods vehicles, 
private vehicles 
         Source: Adapted from Sudhira et al. (2007)
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3.3.1.2 Issues in urban transport governance in Bangalore  
The central issues surrounding the transport governance structure in 
Bangalore that are highlighted in the literature and government documents 
involve the presence of multiple agencies with diffuse responsibilities, the 
weakness of urban local bodies, and the weakness of existing agencies. 
Multiple agencies and diffuse responsibilities 
Urban transport in the BMR is managed by different types of agencies that 
operate at different levels, cover various jurisdictions, and take care of 
different transport modes. This makes the coordination of planning and 
infrastructural development extremely difficult (Sudhira et al., 2007). None of 
the existing agencies had the jurisdiction for the planning and development 
of urban transport in BMR. This raises issues concerning accountability, as 
no agency was responsible for the overall performance of the urban 
transport system (Agarwal and Zimmerman, 2008). The powers for overall 
urban planning were vested with two parastatal agencies – the BDA and the 
BMRDA – but urban transport was only made a secondary responsibility for 
these agencies, and was not given much focus as a result. 
Policies for urban transport are issued by agencies such as the UDD, which 
also takes care of policies and schemes for urban development sectors, 
including the housing, water supply and drainage for the entire State. The 
licensing and regulation of motorised vehicles (including buses) is handled 
by the Transport Department, which is a government agency operating at 
the State level. The operator of bus services in Bangalore city is a parastatal 
agency - BMTC. Non-motorised transport, on the other hand, is regulated by 
local urban bodies in Bangalore city, and is under the purview of the BBMP. 
The City Traffic Police enforces the traffic law, manages the traffic flow, and 
is responsible for traffic improvement projects.  
In short, the modes and functions for transport planning and infrastructure 
were fragmented among various agencies, operating at various levels. This 
raised coordination problems and led to the sub-optimal use of resources, 
which, given the already insufficient funds for this sector, meant that urban 
transport services were seen to be failing to respond to the demand for 
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improved services needed to encourage private vehicle users to use public 
transport.21 
Urban local bodies 
Urban local bodies in Karnataka generally have few powers or resources, 
and this is a problem also experienced by the BBMP – the municipal 
corporation for Bangalore (Kasturirangan Committee Report, 2008). This 
agency has been restructured several times in attempts to improve its 
performance and service delivery. The latest restructuring in 2008 added 
seven City Municipal Councils, one town Municipal Council and one hundred 
and ten villages surrounding Bangalore, and this increased the area of the 
corporation from 226 km
2
 to 800 km
2
 (Mohan and Mercier, 2012). The aim 
was to improve and coordinate the development of infrastructure and the 
enforcement of rules and regulations to optimise expenditure (Government 
of Karnataka, 2006a). 
The BBMP was created under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 
1976, and is run by the City Council, which is made up of one elected 
representative (called a "corporator" or councillor) from each of the wards or 
localities in the city. There are 198 wards in the BBMP area,22 and elections 
to the council are held once every five years, with results been decided by 
popular vote. The Mayor and the deputy Mayor are indirectly elected by the 
councillors for a period of one year, and it is important to note that it is the 
Commissioner and not the Mayor who exercises the executive powers in the 
BBMP (Kasturirangan Committee Report, 2008). This means that the 
channels of accountability are not clear, and led Idiculla (2009) to suggest 
that no local authority is democratically accountable to the people. 
The 74
th
 amendment to the Indian Constitution recognises urban local 
bodies as the third tier of governance, and they are supposed to function as 
institutions of ‘self-government’ at the local level, with a mandate for 
providing local services (Mohan and Mercier, 2012). Although schedule 
twelve, which lists the functions that should be devolved to the urban local 
bodies, does not explicitly mention transport as one of its remits, it does 
mention town planning as one of its priority areas, and transport planning is 
                                            
21 Recommendations of Working Group on Urban Transport for 12th Five Year Plan (2011), 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp12/ accessed on 8 March 
2013 
22 http://bbmpelections.in accessed on 22 Oct 2012 
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a component of this. However, to date, the BBMP and other local urban 
bodies in BMR have not been adequately empowered for planning and 
organising public transport services in their jurisdictions (ibid). Hence, 
managing a fast growing city like Bangalore without sufficient powers was a 
challenge for the BBMP. Sudhira et al. (2007) suggest that the BBMP’s lack 
of planning powers was the reason behind its failure to acknowledge the role 
of land use in generating traffic demand, which led to an over-simplified 
approach for addressing mobility through road widening, underpasses and 
conversions of roads to one-ways. Although the BBMP generates its 
revenue through taxes, it is still dependent on the State Government for 
funding support (Agarwal, 2006). For a corporation that is weak in financial 
terms and actual powers, to coordinate the work of so many agencies is 
challenging. 
Instead of empowering urban local bodies, the State Government has 
passed their responsibilities onto a number of newly created parastatal 
agencies because it felt that the urban local bodies were not able to ensure 
good service delivery (Government of Karnataka, 2009). The parastatals 
were given sector-specific mandates (such as responsibilities for water 
supply, transport or energy) with varying territorial jurisdictions, and this lead 
to complications and confusion in coordinating these different activities 
(Sudhira et al., 2007). Although the parasastals should ideally report to the 
urban local bodies, they are in fact accountable to the State Government 
that created them, and the urban local bodies are thus not in a position to 
question or criticise the performance of the parastatals (Ministry of Urban 
Development, 2011). Examples of prasastatal agencies involved in the 
urban transport sector are the BMRDA, BDA, BMTC, and the Bangalore 
Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL). A brief summary of the functions 
of these agencies is provided in Table 3.3. 
The weaknesses of existing agencies 
The weakness of existing agencies (mainly the BMRDA and the BDA) has 
affected the planning and development within BMR. Planning has 
traditionally been restricted to land use planning, with the responsibility for 
Bangalore’s urban agglomeration being assigned to the BDA, whilst the 
BMRDA deals with the larger peripheral area covering BMR (Sudhira et al., 
2007). 
The BDA was established in 1976 by amalgamating the functions of two 
agencies, and was given the powers to prepare, enforce and develop plans 
as a single agency (Government of Karnataka, 2006b). However, the BDA 
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performed better as a housing and infrastructure development agency than 
as a planning and development control authority (ibid). The lack of 
coordination amongst the various authorities continued with the rapid growth 
of the city, and to deal with this problem the State Government created the 
Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (BMRDA) in 1985 
(ibid). The BMRDA was tasked to plan, co-ordinate and supervise orderly 
development in the BMR – functions that are similar to those that the BDA 
was given when it was created in 1976, but which cover a much larger area. 
In addition, the BMRDA was also made responsible for coordinating the 
activities of the various agencies operating in the BMR. 
Although the BMRDA was officially created to facilitate the coordination 
between various agencies operating in the BMR, as well as to fill the gaps in 
the planning function, in practice, its role is to review and coordinate 
different authorities has had limited success (Kasturirangan Committee 
Report, 2008). For example, in 2005, the BMRDA prepared the structure 
plan for the BMR, and was also responsible for ensuring that its schemes 
were enforced according to its plans. Although equipped with legislative 
backing through section 10 of the BMRDA Act, 1985, which specifically 
mentions that ‘no authority or person can undertake any development prior 
to seeking approval from the agency’, the BMRDA has not been given 
overall regulatory authority over land use, which has meant that other 
financially strong agencies like the BDA have been free to do what they 
think is necessary and required for the area (ibid). 
In 2006, the UDD issued a Government Order which expands the BMRDA’s 
function to include the development of integrated urban settlements in the 
BMR in order to help relieve the increasing pressure on Bangalore and 
facilitate balanced urban growth (Government of Karnataka, 2006c). Since 
then, the BMRDA has been more involved in project implementation, 
especially in the development of new townships within the BMR that are 
outside the BDA’s jurisdiction. Hence, the BMRDA’s original role in 
coordinating planning and development between various urban sectors 
(including transport) exists on paper alone. Interestingly, whilst the BMRDA 
enjoys a strong political management, with the Chief Minister of the state as 
its chairman and the Minister of Urban Developments as its vice-chairman, it 
has nevertheless been unable to perform as expected.  
In the light of pressing institutional issues, the creation of a Unified 
Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA) proposed by the NUTP was thus 
seen as a viable proposition for minimising the coordination problems 
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among agencies and creating an authority with a comprehensive view of the 
planning and development of public transport initiatives in order to cope with 
the drastic growth in Bangalore (Government of Karnataka, 2007a). 
3.3.1.3 Policies supporting institutional reform in the transport sector 
in the State of Karnataka 
In 2006, the NUTP asserted the need for all states and local government 
bodies to pursue comprehensive urban transport planning that takes land 
use matters into consideration. The policy document also pointed to the 
weaknesses in the current governance of the transport sector, noting that 
these institutional structures were put in place before urban transport issues 
became critical, and thus that they may no longer be appropriate. The policy 
document also stressed the absence of an effective coordination 
mechanism, and to overcome this, it recommended that cities with 
populations over one million should set up an UMTA to facilitate the 
coordinated planning and implementation of urban transport programmes. It 
was also proposed that these UMTAs would require legislative backing to be 
successful. 
Besides the creation of the UMTA, which focuses on planning and 
coordination, the NUTP also encouraged the creation of an umbrella body to 
regulate the overall performance of the public transport system in order to 
ensure that each city had a comprehensive and efficient system. The 
umbrella body would require the capacity to make scientific assessments of 
demands on various routes and develop contract services to be monitored. 
Although the NUTP said that draft legislation for UMTA would be produced 
for cities to consider and adopt, there is no evidence that such a document 
has been prepared. 
In addition to the NUTP, strong recommendations for restructuring were also 
proposed by the National Working Group on Urban Transport for the 11
th
 
Plan in 2006. They further defined the characteristics of the UMTA, 
proposing that it should not be involved in any operations, but rather function 
as a coordinator and regulator for operators, responsible for producing 
visions and strategies for improving mobility, and provided with the power to 
drive these strategies by being given the necessary funds to allocate to 
implementing agencies. Moreover, it asserted that in order to ensure that the 
recommendations of this body would receive due consideration, it would 
need to be backed up by legislation and headed by a senior figure.  
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The Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was introduced 
by the central government in December 2005 to encourage cities to achieve 
substantial improvements in their extant urban services. It focussed on two 
areas – urban infrastructure and governance; and the provision of basic 
services to the urban poor. In Karnataka, only the cities of Bangalore and 
Mysore were selected as beneficiaries under this scheme. JNNURM only 
provides funding support if cities fulfil pre-determined criteria, including 
having complete city development plans that give priority to non-motorised 
transport. JNNURM provides 35% of the project cost, with the state 
government contributing 15%, and the rest being covered by the relevant 
urban local body. Two high-powered state-level committees, chaired by the 
Chief Minister and the Chief Secretary respectively, have been set up to 
identify suitable projects and to monitor the implementation of approved 
projects.23 It is important to note that although JNNURM does not directly 
support the creation of the UMTA, it does provide funding support for the 
implementation of NUTP proposals.  
As of September 2012, thirty-eight projects worth Rs 258,411 lakhs (£315 
million) have been approved in Bangalore under the JNNURM scheme, and 
twenty-two projects have been completed. Almost 36% of these projects are 
related to the construction of roads and flyovers, with 23% being dedicated 
to urban transport and the rest to drainage, water supply and sewerage-
related infrastructure.24 
3.3.1.4 The creation of the Directorate of Urban Land Transport and the 
Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority  
Based on the recommendations of the NUTP and the National Working 
Group for the 11
th
 plan, the State Government of Karnataka decided to 
establish the State Directorate of Urban Land Transport (DULT) in 2007 
(Government of Karnataka, 2007a). The DULT, which was championed by 
the UDD, covers seven Municipal Corporations in the State, comprising 
Bangalore, Mysore, Mangalore, Hubli-Dharwad, Belgaum, Gulbarga and 
Bellary. The key objective of the DULT is to ensure the integration and 
coordination of transport and land-use planning, as well as the development 
of transport-related infrastructure in urban areas. However, due to the rapid 
                                            
23 http://www.kuidfc.com/website/webpage.nsf/lookupAllCat/ accessed on 17 March 2013 
24 http://jnnurm.nic.in/state.html accessed on 23 October 2012 
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growth in the BMR, particularly Bangalore city, another dedicated committee 
called the Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) was 
established just a month later.  
The Government Order that sanctioned the creation of the BMLTA 
stipulated an interim arrangement in which the BMLTA be set up as a 
committee of the BMRDA, which would provide its budgetary provision until 
the committee was given legislative backing (Government of Karnataka, 
2007b). The BMLTA, chaired by the Chief Secretary of the state, has 
twenty-one members made up from various transport-related agencies, the 
private sector and transport experts. The functions of the BMLTA spelt out in 
the government order were for it to act as an umbrella organisation to 
coordinate the planning and implementation of urban transport programmes 
and projects. To carry out these functions, the BMLTA created specialised 
sub-committees to deal with various aspects of urban transport, such as 
traffic and transport initiatives, commuter systems, and inter-modal bus 
terminals, and there were eight different sub-committees in 2011.25 These 
sub-committees, which are made up of relevant members from the transport 
industry, meet as and when necessary and report to the main BMLTA 
committee. Although the BMLTA bill was drafted to give it legal backing in 
2008, this has been put on hold pending a final decision by the State 
Government. In 2010, the Ministry of Urban Development in Delhi issued a 
directive urging all state governments to follow the recommendations in the 
6
th
 report of the 2
nd
 Administrative Reforms Commission on Local 
Governance to empower the UMTA with financial support and legislative 
backing, but no action has been taken to do so by the State Government of 
Karnataka (Government of India, 2010). 
3.3.2 Transport governance after the creation of the BMLTA  
The creation of the BMLTA in 2007 does not change the remit of existing 
agencies or the structure of existing institutions. Rather, it is an addition to 
the existing institutional landscape – a dedicated committee created to 
facilitate the planning and coordination of urban transport matters in the 
BMR. The main challenge for the BMLTA is how to coordinate agencies that 
function at the central, state and local governments through its limited 
powers, as it must do so to achieve common transport objectives 
(Kasturirangan Committee Report, 2008). 
                                            
25 http://www.bmlta.org/bmltasubcommittees accessed 30 July 2011 
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In 2008, the State Government commissioned a special study to review the 
administrative structures and legal frameworks within the BMR, and the 
findings of this study were documented in the Kasturirangan Committee 
Report. This explains that debate about future reform continues. The study 
identified two main areas for improvements: firstly, changes to the 
demarcations of the urban area and more coordinated planning through the 
creation of an Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) were suggested, and 
secondly, it was proposed that the region would benefit from having an 
elected mayor. 
In examining the demarcation of the urban area, the study proposed 
changes to ensure that that metropolitan governance structure stayed on top 
of the expansion of built-up areas. Currently, the BBMP’s jurisdiction covers 
the City of Bangalore (an area of 800 km
2
), with the BDA covering the 
metropolitan area (1307 km
2
), and the BMRDA being responsible for the 
entire region (8,022 km
2
).  
To enable comprehensive planning to be undertaken in Bangalore and the 
surrounding areas, which face similar growth pressures, the committee 
proposed that the entire BMR be reclassified as the Bangalore Metropolitan 
Area, meaning that the BDA’s jurisdiction would subsume that of the 
BMRDA’s in order to streamline the planning and development functions at 
the regional level. To avoid creating overlapping functions between the BDA 
and the BMRDA, it was proposed that the BDA be divested of its planning 
and regulatory functions, which would be transferred to the BBMP and the 
BMRDA. This would result in a clear delineation of functions, with the 
BMRDA as a planner and regulator, the BDA as a project implementation 
agency for major schemes, and the BBMP empowered in its planning role. 
To streamline the planning process – and in the spirit of the 74
th
 Amendment 
Act 1993, which advocates the assignment of governance functions to urban 
local bodies – the Kasturirangan Committee proposed that an MPC be 
created for the Bangalore Metropolitan Area with legislative backing. The 
creation of an MPC would allow basic information to be transferred across a 
common geographical unit, and could create a robust city system for 
effective planning (Sudhira et al., 2007). The MPC is envisaged as a high-
level policy and strategy body responsible for both planning and coordinating 
functions (including the preparation of development plans), and with the 
power to enforce its decisions. The BMRDA is proposed to play the 
secretariat role to the MPC, with the BMLTA having statutory powers and 
operating as a wing of the MPC. 
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The Kasturirangan committee also proposed that the BBMP have voter-
elected mayors that serve for a fixed-term of five years and that are vested 
with the executive powers of municipal government. There is strong backing 
behind city leadership and the move towards a directly elected mayoral 
system, as they are seen to increase accountability. In such a system, the 
commissioner would be responsible to the mayor, and serve for a three year 
term compared to the current one to two year term. Unfortunately, the State 
Government has not taken the report or its content seriously, and none of its 
proposals have been implemented (Idiculla, 2009). Instead, the State 
Government issued a government order in December 2009 directing the 
urban development and planning authorities to continue with the preparation 
of master plans until further notice to the contrary (Government of 
Karnataka, 2009).   
Another serious effort to improve the governance of Bangalore came in the 
form of the Bengaluru Governance Bill in 2009, although this also remains 
confined to paper (Idiculla, 2009). This bill was prepared by the Agenda for 
Bangalore Infrastructure Development (ABIDe), a politically constituted task 
force created by the Chief Minister (Mohan and Mercier, 2012). The aim of 
the bill is to create better administration for Bangalore and the BMR by 
creating an institutional structure that is responsive, transparent and directly 
accountable to the urban citizen. One of the major changes proposed in this 
bill is the creation of a Neighbourhood Area Committee with the authority to 
decide on proposed developments for the local area before the BBMP 
proceeds with their implementations. The other major proposal is the direct 
election of the mayor. However, nothing was mentioned in the bill about 
direct changes to urban transport governance.26 
The UMTA was envisaged as a stand-alone organisation in the NUTP 
issued in 2006, but in the recent 12
th
 Five Year Plan for India (2012-2017), 
an MPC constitution for metropolitan cities is strongly recommended 
together with the creation of UMTA under the remit of the MPC.27 It is also 
suggested that the flow of funds for urban transport projects to implementing 
agencies be disbursed through the UMTA in order to empower them to drive 
their plans forward. 
                                            
26 Bengaluru Region Governance Bill, 2009 accessed via 
http://abidebengaluru.in/report/show/8 on 7 December 2012 
27  An approach to 12
th
 Five Year Plan, http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans accessed  on 
18/10/2012 
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3.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has explained the institutional structure in which both the case 
studies are set, describing the settings and explaining the issues that existed 
before the transport authorities were set up, together with the outlook for the 
institutional framework after the creation of the transport authorities. There 
are clear differences between the case study sites, mainly in terms of their 
spatial scales and the jurisdictions and institutional arrangements in their 
respective transport management. Whilst the idea of single coordinating 
transport body is an important one, the realisation of this idea differs 
significantly in these two cases. Hence, the transport authorities that were 
created also differ in terms of their models, functions and the powers that 
they have been given.  
However, some similarities were observed between the two case studies, 
including: the fast growth of both cities28, which has increased the pressure 
on their existing infrastructures; an increase in car ownership and poor 
public transport services that cannot cope with demand; and problems with 
coordination arising from the presence of multiple agencies with gaps in 
their planning functions; and inadequacies in institutional structures, 
including the poor performance of agencies. A ‘transport authority’ was 
thought to be the solution for resolving some of the issues in both cases. In 
Malaysia, it took six years before SPAD was sanctioned, whereas in India, 
the push by the Central Government through the NUTP in 2006 acted as a 
turning point, with the State Government taking almost immediate action to 
create a dedicated coordinating body, the BMLTA. Table 3.4 lists the 
features of the BMLTA and SPAD in terms of their set up, functions and 
powers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
28 the growth of Kuala Lumpur, which is the capital city exerted pressure for the creation for 
a transport authority although eventually SPAD was established at national level  
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Table 3.4: Features of SPAD and BMLTA  
Features SPAD BMLTA 
Title  
Land Public Transport 
Commission 
Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport 
Authority  
Scale  
National level – West 
Malaysia 
Bangalore Metropolitan Region 
Model/set-up 
Other agencies were 
streamlined (dissolved or 
functions changed) 
No changes to existing agencies 
Independent Commission  Coordinating committee 
Autonomy 
Presence of legal support 
Absence of financial 
autonomy 
Absence of legal support 
Absence of financial autonomy 
Leadership  
Has political leadership – 
Chaired by PM 
Absence of political leadership – Chaired by 
Chief Secretary 
Transport 
Modes  
Land public transport: 
buses, taxis, rail, tourism 
vehicles, goods vehicles 
Urban transport: private vehicles (cars and 
motorcycles), auto rickshaws, buses, taxis, 
non-motorised transport, excluding goods 
vehicles and rail 
Functions  
To plan, regulate and 
enforce land public 
transport matters 
Planning and coordination 
Personnel 
capacity 
200 15 
Funding  From federal government 
From state government /shares funding 
resources with DULT 
 
The institutional landscape at both the case study sites presented in this 
chapter, provides a general idea about the institutional issues in transport 
which could have been a contributing factor for the need of a transport 
authority, the process that led to the creation of these transport authorities 
and the powers given on paper (which informs the investigation, particularly 
for research question 1 and 2 – on motivation and autonomy). However, 
certain issues cannot be discerned from the official documents, and can 
only be explored and understood through talking to the people who were 
involved in the creation of these authorities, or else actively involved in the 
transport sector. Among these are the actual motivation for the creation of 
these authorities and why they are set up as they are, the obstacles faced in 
the creation of these authorities, the reasons for their lack of adequate 
empowerment (if any), their performance to-date (including changes on the 
ground for users), the changes (if any) that have resulted in the decision-
making process, the factors that affect their performance, and, lastly, the 
87 
 
key factors for making these authorities successful. The next chapter sets 
out the methodology which explains how this was done. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology  
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 sets the importance of understanding the implementation of 
single transport authority reforms in developing countries and the literature 
suggests that this requires an understanding of power, autonomy and 
governance through networks. There are also not many such reforms to 
study developing countries and for both reasons, this suggests a rich 
qualitative study to be the most suitable approach. 
This chapter describes the methodology undertaken to answer the research 
questions presented in section 1.3. The information needed to answer these 
questions falls into three main categories: theoretical, conceptual and 
empirical (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2009: 69-71). The literature review in 
Chapter 2 provided the theoretical grounding for this research, whilst the 
conceptual and empirical aspects are now outlined and examined in this 
chapter. These involved gathering contextual information about the selected 
transport authorities and obtaining respondents' perceptions about the 
performance of these transport authorities to date as well as the reason(s) 
for their establishment.  
Qualitative research was used to gather information as it allowed for rich 
and detailed descriptions (Geertz, 1973) and interpretations of the events 
and decisions that were taken during and after the creation of these single 
transport authorities. Qualitative research is the best method for 
understanding areas “where little is known, and where previous 
understanding appears inadequate or insufficient to make sense of complex 
situations and shifting phenomena” (Richards and Morse 2007:29). 
Interviews and observations are primary or well established techniques for 
data generation in qualitative research. In this approach, the researchers 
aim to understand the perspectives of those involved in the phenomena 
examined and by using observations and interviews, they construct 
explanations and understandings of events and processes (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985). 
A qualitative method is appropriate for answering the research questions as 
this research focuses on processes in specific contexts and looking for new 
discoveries. A quantitative method would restrict investigation to specific 
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variables and their outcomes (Merriam, 1998). As Chapter 2 showed, the 
motivations and anticipated outcomes in this kind of research are 
themselves contested, and their impacts will take time to fully play out, so 
the variables would be difficult to establish.  
Whilst qualitative research can utilise many approaches such as 
ethnography, narrative inquiry, ethnomethodology, naturalistic inquiry etc., 
this research shall use the case study method, as this can help “to describe, 
understand, and explain a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context” (Yin, 2009:2). The main difference between case studies and other 
qualitative research tools is that the former has the advantages of allowing 
understanding of the explanatory ability of the context and provide a 
comprehensive and rounded view (Hakim, 1987). 
This research explores two case studies; the Land Public Transport 
Commission (SPAD) in Malaysia, and the Bangalore Metropolitan Land 
Transport Authority (BMLTA) in Bangalore, India, which have been 
described in Chapter 3. The main data gathering tool used in this research is 
the semi-structured interview, and the interview participants are comprised 
of stakeholders in the transport sector, including senior civil servants, private 
operators, academics and politicians. Document reviews and discussions 
with participants were used as supplementary tools for triangulation 
purposes, as well as for obtaining an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomena under study. 
This chapter starts with discussions of research paradigms and 
epistemology, followed by the case study approach, data-gathering 
methods, validity and reliability and ends with the limitations of the method.   
4.2 The overall research paradigm and epistemology 
All qualitative research is interpretive in nature as it is guided by a set of 
beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and 
studied (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). There are four interpretative paradigms 
in qualitative research: positivist/post-positivist, constructivist-interpretive, 
critical, and feminist post-structural.  
In interpretative research, it is assumed that the social world is “indivisible 
and complex and that it requires studying in its completeness” rather than 
through a fractured study of variables and this marries well with the case 
study approach used in this research, which also prioritises looking at the 
whole (Thomas, 2011:127). Interpretative approaches rely heavily on 
90 
 
naturalistic methods such as interviewing, observation and the analysis of 
documents – methods that enable adequate dialogue to take place between 
the researcher and respondents (Angen, 2000). The research design that is 
based on this paradigm remains adaptive and flexible, changing with the 
researcher’s developing understanding of the subject and demanding an 
ongoing process of analysis as the inquiry proceeds (Shipman, 1997; Guba 
and Lincoln, 1989).  
The research approach adopted here combines both inductive and 
deductive methods. It is deductive in the sense that it starts with a list of 
research questions and a theoretical framework in order to provide focus to 
the case studies, avoid data overload, and capture any contrasting views 
between the published literature and the participants (Yin, 2009). It is 
inductive in the sense that the research was left open-ended in order to 
capture new concepts and understandings that emerged during data 
analyses with the aim of helping to confirm research hypotheses and to 
bring new insights to the phenomenon under study (Merriam, 1998). 
This research is structured by the constructivist-interpretative paradigm, 
which assumes that there are multiple realities (a pluralist ontology), that 
understanding is constructed by the researcher and the respondent (a 
subjectivist epistemology). Such a research design can explain ‘why’ and 
‘how’ people create the meanings they do about the world (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2005).  
In the constructivist-interpretative paradigm, the researcher takes an 
interpreter role – meaning that she does not just ‘excavate’ the findings but 
also builds her own understanding and tries to make sense of other people’s 
understanding of the world. In the process, the researcher provides 
evidence of different perspectives and uses quotes and themes to support 
her interpretations as well as to construct a single explanation of events 
through evaluating these different perspectives (Silverman, 2001; Rubin and 
Rubin, 2005). Geertz (2000) pointed out that, as interpretative researchers, 
the researcher tells his/her version of subjects’ understandings. Denzin 
(2001) pointed out that researchers often take sides, and that it is 
impossible to conduct value-free interpretative research. To overcome this 
weakness, as much as possible, researchers should state their prior 
interpretations of the phenomena they intend to study. Thus, in this study, 
the transport governance system in which the case studies of this research 
are situated is explored and described in Chapter 3, and this will provide the 
framework for my interpretation. The overall interpretation of the data from 
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the qualitative research is generated from the points-of-view of the people 
experiencing the problems and those of the policy makers, with one of the 
aims being to provide pragmatic recommendations for alleviating the 
identified problems (ibid). 
4.3 The case study approach 
A ‘case’ refers to the unit of analysis that can represent an event, individual, 
organisation, family, city, nation-state, or even the world as a whole 
(Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2009). Although Simons (2009:21) casts a wider net, 
including processes and policies, she still retains “commitment to the 
singularity and uniqueness of the policy and process”. Merriam (1998) 
crystallizes differences between case studies and other forms of qualitative 
research, understanding case studies as intensive descriptions and 
analyses of clearly defined single units or bounded systems (see also 
Gerring, 2007). A case study should be defined in terms of the case, its 
scope, and time (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
In this research, the units of analysis/case are the transport authorities in 
Malaysia and Bangalore – SPAD and BMLTA respectively. These 
organisations comprise the ‘heart’ of the study, and provide suitable units for 
analysis, as the aim is to generate in-depth understanding about the impact 
that creating these authorities could have for transport governance as a 
whole. Although a unit of analysis is said to be a bounded system, it does 
not have to be a closed system. For example, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993) 
argue that the unit is part of the larger social context, and warned that the 
interactions may extend beyond the specified boundary. Analysing a single 
unit is also said to be able to shed light on and provide greater 
understanding about a larger class of similar units (Gerring, 2004). Thus, 
although this research concerns two specific transport authorities, BMLTA 
and SPAD, understanding these authorities will also help in understanding 
other similar transport authorities, and lessons learnt from other transport 
authorities can be brought in during the analysis of BMLTA and SPAD to 
generate a better understanding of these units. Hence, two other transport 
authorities, the Transport for London (TfL) and the Land Transport Authority 
(LTA) in Singapore were reviewed (see section 2.4). 
Bradshaw and Wallace (1991) view case studies as being particularly useful 
within three conditions. The first is when researchers do not have sufficient 
knowledge of a case to place it in a theoretical perspective, or when it does 
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not fit any existing theory. The second is when a case only partially supports 
or deviates from existing theories. The last is when the case represents a 
unique phenomenon and warrants intensive study. The case studies chosen 
for this research are critical cases, as they enable reform process within 
developing countries to be addressed, and the available literature and 
theories in this area are based mainly on studies in developed countries.  
The case study method was chosen over others because its role fits best 
with the aims of this research, which are to explain and interpret how and 
why events happen, document multi-actor perspectives, explore contested 
viewpoints, and to demonstrate the influence of key actors and investigate 
the interactions between them (Simons, 2009; Yin, 2009). For Simons 
(2009), case studies enable the complexity of programmes and policies to 
be investigated, interpreted and experienced in the precise socio-political 
contexts in which policies and programmes are enacted. A case study is 
termed as an interpretation in context (Cronbach, 1975), and in the present 
study this involves focussing on the relevant transport authorities to uncover 
the characteristics of events and the interactions of specific factors in order 
to identify the criteria that influence their performance. The findings of this 
research will not only contribute to understanding of the issues within the 
transport authorities studied, but will also provide insights into the adoption 
of similar models in other Asian cities. 
4.3.1 Criticisms of the case study approach  
The case study method is often criticised for not perfectly representing the 
population and for being non-generalisable (Gerring, 2007; Flick, 2009). 
Other criticisms include researchers’ propensity for selection bias, unknown 
statistical significance and the fact that findings can be shaped by the 
interests and perspectives of the researcher (Hakim, 2000).  
It is important to note that because case studies are concerned with holistic 
and in-depth studies of particular situations (such as events, programmes, 
or organisations), they do not aim to generalise findings, but rather 
concentrate on the way particular groups of people confront specific issues, 
what has been referred to as ‘particularisation’ (Stake, 1995:8). Thus, 
although case studies do not provide statistical generalisations, they can 
provide analytical ones in which previously developed theories are used as 
templates for comparing empirical findings in which the propositions of the 
theories are revised or rejected (Yin, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2001). Moreover, 
Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that the generalisability of case studies can be 
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increased by selecting critical cases that highlight general characteristics of 
the social order in question, thus maximising what can be learned from 
them. Findings from such cases permit logical deductions for similar types. 
Blaxter et al. (2006:72) also reveal that case studies are “ideal for the needs 
and resources of small-scale researchers and are able to make significant 
contributions in under-studied areas”. They also contribute to the 
accumulation of knowledge within a given field (Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
Hence, despite the weaknesses of case study research, the choice of this 
method is appropriate for the current research because its main objective is 
not to develop formal generalisations for policy-making, but to present a rich 
portrayal of the cases, build knowledge about the topic under study and 
identify causal processes (Simons, 2009). In this instance, the broader 
implications of the work was considered through the search for strong and 
common themes which occur in these two different environments of the 
case studies. 
4.3.2 Comparative cases versus single cases 
Comparative case studies are preferred to single cases for a variety of 
reasons. Yin (2009) observes that evidence from comparative case studies 
is more compelling and robust, and analytical generalisation is more 
powerful. In addition, Sudman (1976) notes that confidence in research 
findings increases with the increasing number of sites, and the largest single 
gain occurs when the number of sites is increased from one to two. 
Similarly, confidence in the generalisability of results in a case study also 
improves when the number of cases is increased from one to two. However, 
the claims made by these researchers are perhaps only relevant if the case 
studies operate in the same context, which is not the case in this research. 
Hence, the case studies chosen here are treated as two individual ones with 
limited comparability and generalisability. The focus in this research was to 
provide in-depth descriptions and analyses of these two case studies within 
their contexts. Attempts are only made to identify the similarities and 
differences through cross-case analysis after the individual cases have been 
studied separately.  
A strength of this research is that it takes a cross-national case study 
approach, as this may provide insights and findings about functions of 
transport authorities in different national contexts. Kohn (1989:20-24) argues 
that cross-national comparative research is more fruitful than single case 
studies as it allows the “examination of social phenomena within the context 
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of a few countries”, and can also contribute to theoretical knowledge. Due to 
the limited number of case studies conducted in developing countries, Kohn 
(1989) pushes for more intensive case studies in such regions. 
The selection of appropriate case studies was one of the challenges for this 
research. Initially, the aim was to identify at least two similar case studies 
with typical attributes in relation to set-up, powers and functions, on the 
assumption that this would provide a greater potential for transferability and 
generalisability. However, this was not possible for various reasons. The 
funder of this research wanted the SPAD case study to be included, and this 
uses a national model, which means that conducting two case studies within 
the same nation was not possible. Within the Asian region, the only other 
country to have seriously considered transport authorities is India, and 
during the period of the research there were at least five transport 
authorities established in various cities in India. Each of these transport 
authorities had adopted a different model and set-up, each was unique in its 
context. Given the time and budget limitations and the in-depth nature of 
case studies, it was realised that only one case study could be chosen in 
India, and, after establishing contact through email and telephone 
conversations with the various authorities, only BMLTA agreed to participate 
in this study. 
4.3.3 Answering the research questions  
Four research questions were explored to gather the information needed to 
understand the motivation for creating dedicated transport authorities and 
the impact they have had on transport governance. The information required 
to answer the research questions was determined by the theoretical 
framework, and can classified into three main categories: 
 the literature that formed the theoretical grounding for the research 
 documents on the structure of governance in the transport sector and 
institutional issues at both study areas contextual information about 
the organisational settings, governance issues and set-up of SPAD 
and BMLTA 
 respondents perceptions of the factors that motivated the creation  of 
the single transport authorities, their involvement in the decision-
making process and their interpretations of the factors that affect the 
performance of the authorities  
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Table 4.1 provides an overview of the information required for the analysis in 
this research. This information was collected through two main data 
collection methods; semi-structured interviews and document review. 
Table 4.1: Overview of the information needed 
Research questions Knowledge required Method 
Question 1: What were 
the motivations behind 
the establishment of the 
transport authorities 
(SPAD in Malaysia and 
BMLTA in Bangalore)? 
 
- Previous institutional structure – its 
strength and weakness 
- Public transport issues 
- Influence of international 
development agencies/foreign 
models 
- Need for change 
- Involvement of key personality 
- Rationale for the model 
Document review 
(mainly transport 
studies, policy 
documents, minutes 
of meetings, cabinet 
decisions) 
Semi-structured 
interview 
Question 2: What types 
of autonomy have been 
given to the transport 
authorities? 
 
- Autonomy given to the authorities 
- How powers are exercised by the 
authorities  
- Additional powers which need to be 
acquired  
- Powers in rhetoric and practice 
- Central government control 
- Winners and losers of reform  
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Document review 
(mainly legal 
documents)  
Question 3: How have 
the reforms affected 
decision-making 
processes in policy-
making and the 
selection and 
implementation of 
transport projects? 
- -    Role of the authorities in the decision  
making process 
- Identify the key decision-makers 
- Mechanisms to implement the 
decisions 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Document review, 
(mainly minutes of 
meetings) 
 
Question 4: What 
factors determine the 
success or failure of the 
reforms? 
 
 
- Capacity of the authorities  
- Explore the relevance of key factors 
as identified in the literature – 
political will, funding, technical 
expertise  
- Identify internal and external factors 
which affect the performance of the 
authorities 
- Outcomes to date 
Semi-structured 
interviews  
4.4 Data generation methods  
Mason (2002:51) used the term ‘data generation’ rather than ‘data collection’ 
to reflect the fact that a stock of knowledge is not readily available ‘out there’ 
96 
 
to be collected, but rather has to be generated from data sources and 
interpreted by the researcher. Data sources can take many forms, including 
people, organisations, events, texts, objects and settings (ibid). 
In order to collect the necessary information to answer the research 
questions, two main data sources were used in this study - people and text. 
The semi-structured interview was used as the main method for generating 
data from people as it supports the interpretivist paradigm adopted in this 
study. The findings from the interviews were augmented with the analysis of 
documents. One important feature of this research is its time frame. The 
data was generated between June and November 2011, when specific 
changes were taking place in the spatial dimensions of the case study 
organisation during that time. As discussed in section 2.7.3, reform is an 
ongoing process, and not an end-in-itself. Hence, the findings must be 
understood in relation to the temporal and spatial context. 
This research did not explicitly use participant observation. Denzin (1978) 
argues that participation observation is difficult to apply in organisational 
studies as participants are widely distributed by time and place and it can 
thus only be used to observe a selection of persons, events and times. 
Observation was thus used as a complementary to semi-structured 
interviews. During the interviews, observable signs of body language, 
intonation and changes in emotions such as humour and sarcasm of the 
participants were recorded in the interview notes, although ultimately this 
was not very important.  
4.4.1   Review of documents 
Documents serve as records for activities that researchers cannot observe 
directly, and may provide unexpected clues and findings (Stake, 1995). For 
case studies, documents are important for “corroborating and augmenting 
evidence from other sources” (Yin, 2009:103). However, care must be taken 
in reviewing documents as they may have been written for specific 
audiences and purposes (ibid). In this research, documents such as plans, 
policies, and newspaper articles were reviewed prior to the field work (mainly 
for the BMLTA case study – as this site was located in a foreign country) in 
order to gain a better understanding of the local context and to build 
background knowledge. Most of the documents were sourced from the 
organisations’ websites. 
According to Holstein and Gubrium (1995), interviewers must have a good 
understanding of the local setting in which they work in order to ask 
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questions that enable respondents to describe their views fully and 
appropriately, as well as to interpret the meaning of the answers that are 
provided. Furthermore, developing background knowledge enables the 
researcher to make the study more productive by connecting the 
researcher’s interests to the respondents’ experiences. 
Documents were also used as a supplementary source for triangulation 
purposes in this study, as well as to strengthen the researcher’s 
interpretations of the findings from the interviews. These were mostly formal 
ones that were collected during the field work, comprising minutes of 
meetings, concept papers, written responses from interviews that were 
conducted via e-mail and confidential government reports.  
4.4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
It was essential to capture the events that led to the creation of the transport 
authorities to understand how and why these authorities were created, and 
what the outcomes of their work have been. It was also important to find out 
whether the transport authorities are effective, for whom they are working, 
and how they could be improved. Semi-structured interviews provided the 
best way of finding such information, enabling the researcher to understand 
the experiences of the research participants and to reconstruct events in 
which she did not participate (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Burgess, 1984). In 
addition, this method allows the researcher to explore people’s 
interpretations and perceptions and to develop their knowledge of the 
organisation studied through conversation and dialogue (Mason, 2002; 
Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). It provides a chance for the researcher to 
probe the stories told in the field, and to challenge across interviews when 
there is disagreement. The interview also becomes the preferred method 
when it can produce more or better data at a lower cost (Dexter, 2006). 
Semi-structured interviews provide a greater degree of flexibility to the 
interviewer than structured interviews, enabling interviewers to stay focussed 
whilst allowing participants to add issues and information that they feel is 
pertinent (Burgess, 1984). This structure means that interviews can take 
twists, which can sometimes lead to the emergence of unexpected 
discoveries and themes (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Mason, 2002). However, 
semi-structured interviews are not without their challenges. Interviewers 
need to have enough knowledge about the topic to enable them to frame the 
discussion in advance (Richards and Morse, 2007), and they require the 
interviewer to have the ability to listen well, to handle emotional situations, to 
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break the ice with unknown participants, and to remain patient (Cresswell, 
2007). Interviewers must ask the participants the right questions in order to 
invite detailed explanations (Richard and Morse, 2007), which requires 
rigorous advance planning and an ability to make on-the-spot decisions 
(Mason, 2002). Patton (1990) cautioned that, as interviewers are always 
reporting selective perceptions, it is important that the findings from the 
interviews are triangulated with other methods. 
Another important element in conducting this form of inquiry is to have 
standards that will support the validity of the data obtained, which are 
achieved via thoroughness, accuracy and believability (Rubin and Rubin, 
2005). Hakim (2000) argues that interviewing respondents in great detail 
improves the potential for the researcher to discern whether their accounts 
of their views and experiences are true, complete and believable. For 
example, thoroughness can be achieved through a good sampling strategy 
and by designing questions that cover all the topics. In this research, 
purposeful sampling was used to identify relevant and suitable respondents, 
and the interview questions were designed using Masons’ (2002) framework 
for interview planning (shown in Appendix A). This approach allows the 
interview questions and topics to be mapped clearly against the research 
questions, as well as allowing the identification of a priori codes - codes that 
are developed before examining the gathered data. Accuracy is 
demonstrated by carefully recording and reporting what the interviewer 
heard rather than relying on memory, and requires successfully conveying 
the precise meaning of what the interviewees say (Shipman, 1997). A high 
quality recorder was used for this purpose, together with note-taking and 
preparing interview memos immediately after each interview. Believability 
demands ensuring internal consistency and reading between the lines of the 
information obtained from the interviewees. This was demonstrated by 
cross-checking the accounts given by different respondents and asking for 
further clarification on certain matters whilst withholding the source of the 
information in order to preserve confidentiality (Dexter, 2006).  
One of the main challenges of this research was to conduct interviews with 
the Indian counterparts as this involved a different culture, language and set 
of norms for the researcher. Moreover, trust and rapport needed to be 
developed with the participants in the BMLTA case study as most of them 
were unknown to the researcher. Patton (1990) highlights the fact that, 
whilst the data from interviews is in the form of words, words can have 
different meanings in different cultures, and there is thus a danger of 
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misunderstandings. In the SPAD case study, on the other hand, the majority 
of the informants were already known to the researcher from previous 
working engagements, and the researcher was also more well versed with 
the relevant norms and culture.  
An important ethical requirement for any research with human actors is 
gaining the informed consent of the participants, as this respects the 
autonomy of potential contributors by enabling them to make a voluntary 
decision about their participation given all the relevant information about the 
study and how it may impact upon them (Cohen et al., 2011). All participants 
were briefed about the content of the consent form and the purpose of the 
research, in which it was clearly indicated that the interview would be 
recorded, materials would be used for research and publication purposes 
unless indicated otherwise, no reference would be made to names, and that 
participants had the right to withdraw at any stage. Some participants 
revealed confidential information that they did not want to be published, and 
in such cases this information was not used. Requests to switch off the 
recorder at particular instances were also complied with. The researcher 
could not guarantee complete anonymity due to the limited number of actors 
in the area, but guaranteed that their accounts would not be identified in the 
thesis and that the confidentiality, anonymity and privacy of their 'data' 
(tapes, charts, field notes or transcripts) from third parties would be 
maintained. Two participants in Bangalore refused to sign the consent forms 
and be recorded, although they did indicate a willingness to participate in the 
interview sessions.  
4.4.2.1 Developing the interview questions 
An interview guide was prepared for both case studies prior to the 
commencement of the field work. The interview guide included the list of 
agencies from which the participants would be sought, together with the 
research questions, interview topics, interview questions, follow-up 
questions, probes and a priori codes. Interview guide for SPAD is shown in 
Appendix B. The interview guide was reviewed several times, and changes 
were made to ensure that the interview questions reflected the research 
questions and that all the research topics were covered in a reasonable one-
hour interview. To ensure validity and in search for authentic voice (Kirk and 
Miller, 1986), the questions were formulated in a clear and complete manner 
so that they would be easy for the respondents to understand.  
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It took almost two months to prepare the guide, as the researcher was new 
to qualitative interviewing and wanted to ensure that interview topics were 
thoroughly understood so that relevant information could be attained in the 
field. For training purposes, the researcher was given an opportunity to 
observe and learn from a senior researcher in the Institute for Transport 
Studies, who was at that point conducting interviews for a different study. 
Some of the key points picked up were the art of asking questions, 
confirming the researcher’s understanding, good organisation of interview 
documents for easy retrieval, and the need for good time-management 
skills. 
Once the interview guide was ready in May 2011, it was tested with the first 
pilot respondent in Malaysia via Skype. The respondent was an academic 
member of staff with the Malaysian Institute for Transport.  Several changes 
were made after the pilot study, with some of the main comments being 
about the need to explore the powers of the authorities to drive the transport 
plans, the legislated functions versus the actual functions on the ground, 
and leadership conflicts. There were also suggestions about including 
several key personalities in the transport sector, whose contact details were 
given. The revised guide is shown in Appendix C. However, the schedule 
was maintained flexible to allow themes/topics that emerged from one 
interview be added as prompts to subsequent interviews. 
4.4.2.2 The sampling method  
Rubin and Rubin (2005) argue that in order to accurately capture the 
complexities of reality, the researcher has to ensure that contradictory views 
and understandings are accounted for, and one of the ways of achieving this 
is by using a good sampling strategy. Qualitative research often takes a 
purposeful sampling approach in which the researcher can choose those 
samples that can help to illustrate some feature or process of interest. 
However, it does not give simple approval to the case that we happen to 
choose, but instead demands that the parameters of the population of 
interest are critically examined, given the available time and resources 
(Silverman, 2001).  
Purposeful sampling can be further classified into other types, such as 
snowballing, convenience sampling, maximum variation sampling and 
critical case sampling (Patton, 1990). In this study, purposeful sampling was 
used to identify respondents who could provide multiple perspectives on the 
subject under study. Respondents were identified on the basis of their 
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engagement with transport-related agencies, and through the theoretical 
framework and snowballing. For example, the theoretical framework showed 
that key reformers were important to drive the reform process, and therefore 
efforts were made to include them in the research. It also revealed the 
presence of winners of losers in a reform exercise, and this led to choosing 
respondents who could provide insights to the outcomes of the reform. 
Moreover, snowballing (or the chain approach) was also used to identify the 
respondents that could provide good insights into the case studies, and this 
strategy that was mainly used in the BMLTA case study, where the 
respondents were mostly unknown to the researcher. 
The sampling targeted elite individuals, such as heads of departments, 
influential figures, and senior civil servants with first-hand information about 
the subjects under study. Dexter (2006:18) defines elite people as those “in 
important or exposed positions who require VIP interviewing treatment on 
the topics relate to their importance or exposure”. Marshall and Rossman 
(2006) list the advantages of interviewing elites: they can provide an overall 
view of their organisations or their relationships with other organisations; 
they can give insight and meaning to the interview through specific 
perspectives; and, in some cases, they can provide access to confidential 
documents. The disadvantages to interviewing them are the long waiting 
times usually required to gain an appointment, having to rely on 
recommendations from a third party, and  that interviews with them are more 
demanding, with the interviewer needing to be careful in projecting the right 
questions. Dexter notes that interviews make elite respondents feel more 
special, and that they may be willing to give more information than they 
would under normal circumstances (Dexter, 2006).  
4.4.2.3 The interview process in Malaysia 
The first step in the interview process in Malaysia was to gain formal access 
to the site by gaining approval from the host agency, SPAD. The initial 
correspondence was made via email, and the host agency was happy to 
participate as well as to extend any additional support that was required for 
the research. The next step was to identify the potential respondents based 
on their experience and knowledge about the research problem, with the 
main aim being to engage individuals who could shine light on a variety of 
issues (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).  
In the SPAD case study, most of the key civil servants and transport experts 
were known to the researcher due to her previous employment with the civil 
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service. Therefore, to minimise researcher bias and to increase the validity 
of the information obtained, the potential participants identified were not only 
civil servants, but also ex-civil servants, private sector workers, academics, 
members of transport associations and NGOs. It was easier to get 
appointments with civil servants, however, as most of them responded 
positively after initial contact was made via email. There was no need for a 
‘gate keeper’ here, or approval from heads of departments. Respondents 
outside the civil service were introduced to the researcher through a 
snowballing process.  
The field work in Malaysia was conducted in the second and third week of 
June 2011, and between mid-August and mid-November 2011. The 
researcher aimed to recruit heads of departments as participants in the first 
place, as they are directly involved in the decision-making process. In cases 
where the head of department was unable to allocate time within the time 
period of the field work, and another respondent was proposed as a 
substitute, a quick background check was done to identify the suitability of 
the proposed respondent. A total of twenty-eight interviews were conducted, 
comprising five unrecorded interviews in which the participants felt 
uncomfortable with audio recording, but in which notes were taken. Out of 
the twenty-three recorded interviews, three were conducted in the Malay 
language, as per the request of the respondents. Two out of the five 
unrecorded interview were conducted much later, in August 2012, when the 
researcher went back home for personal reasons, and this data was also 
included in the analysis. Table 4.2 shows the category of respondents and 
the months of the interviews. 
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Table 4.2: Interview schedule for SPAD case study 
No  Participants  Codes Interview period  
1.  
Head of Department – government official/board 
member of SPAD    
G14  June 2011 
2.  Head of section – MOT, government   G5  June 2011 
3.  Ex-civil servant/political advisor/ex-INSPAK G3 June 2011 
4.  Senior civil servant G4  June 2011 
5.  Head of planning – operator/ex-INSPAK O1  August 2011 
6.  Legal advisor – government official G13  August 2011 
7.  Head of section – government official/ ex-DOR G8  August 2011 
8.  Head of department – local authority  G2  August 2011 
9.  Chief Executive Officer – operator 2 O3  September 2011 
10.  Head of section-government official/ex-CVLB G9  September 2011 
11.  Ex-civil servant G18  September 2011 
12.  Politician 2  P2  October 2011 
13.  Senior government official – MOT  G6  October 2011 
14.  Chief Executive Officer- operator 1/ex-SPAD O2  October 2011  
15.  
Head of planning and research section – 
government  official 
G17  October 2011 
16.  PEMANDU G20  October 2011 
17.  Head of department  – government official G10  October 2011 
18.  Senior government official – MOT  G7  October 2011 
19.  President, operator O5  November 2011 
20.  
Senior government official –board member of 
SPAD  
G1 
September and  November 
2011 
21.  Head of section – government G12  November 2011 
22.  Deputy Director General – local authority  G19  November 2011 
23.  Head of section – Government  G16  November 2011 
24.  President, Transport Association O4  November 2011 
25.  Politician 1 P1  November 2011 
26.  Legal advisor – government  G11  August 2012 
27.  Head of section – government/ex-ADB G15  August 2012 
G – Government officials,  P- Politicians, O - Operators 
 
Telephone calls were used for recruiting respondents for interviews during 
the field work phase. The respondents that agreed to an interview were sent 
an introductory email with an information sheet attached that briefly 
explained the purpose, aims and content of the research. When potential 
participants requested to see the interview questions, they were emailed to 
them along with the information sheet and the consent form. Such requests 
were more usual among the elite respondents such as the heads of 
departments and politicians.  
104 
 
After the first two interviews, the researcher realised that a ‘one size fits all’ 
list of interview questions was not ideal, and targeted interview questions 
were drafted for different respondents based on the interview guide 
prepared earlier. This was because each respondent was unique in the 
sense that they had different knowledge and experiences, and were 
involved in different events or stages of the process under study. According 
to Rubin and Rubin (2005:37), “if the interview questions stay close to what 
the interviewees know and are willing to talk about, the resulting report will 
be fresh and credible”. However, some ‘core’ questions were retained in 
every set of interview questions in order to capture different views about 
important themes and areas, as well as to check for accuracy and 
consistency (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). 
Initially, it was planned that all interviews would be performed on a one-to-
one basis. However, some respondents requested that an additional person 
sat in, usually his/her assistant or deputy, and this was agreed to. Four out 
of the twenty-three recorded interviews had two respondents present. In 
some cases, the presence of an additional person was found to be fruitful, 
especially when it came to confirming the details of events. There was no 
major disruption in having an additional person, because all the interview 
questions were directed towards the main respondent, and as a deputy or 
assistant they only talked when asked to contribute by the main respondent. 
Interviews with unknown respondents were started with discussions about 
the respondent’s work history, job responsibilities and educational 
background, and this was found to provide useful information as well as to 
be a good ice-breaker.  
At the start of each interview, the researcher provided a brief explanation 
about the research and the consent form. All the respondents signed the 
consent form, but some were reluctant for the interviews to be recorded. 
Although the researcher explained to them that all information discussed 
would be kept confidential and used solely for academic purposes, some of 
these respondents relayed negative past experiences, especially with the 
media, where their statements had been manipulated. In such cases, notes 
were taken as a record of the interview, and an interview memo was 
prepared on the same day to capture important details.  
Where the respondents consented, interviews were recorded using a digital 
recorder. As most of the respondents in the SPAD case study were senior 
civil servants, the interviews were conducted in their rooms, which were 
comfortable, with minimum background noise. Although the interviews were 
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recorded, the researcher also took notes during the interviews, and wrote 
down the follow-up questions. According to (Blaxter et al., 2006), although 
note-taking can be distracting, it can suggest to interviewees that what they 
are saying is important, and can act as backup in the event that the recorder 
fails.  
Recording made some respondents anxious, and the researcher noticed 
that they were uncomfortable revealing confidential information. In these 
situations, after the interview session had ended and the recorder had been 
switched off, some of the questions were repeated for verification purposes, 
and notes taken where the answers differed. These respondents were 
observed to be more relaxed when they were not being recorded. They 
provided more detailed explanations under these conditions, with some of 
these interviews running on longer than the formal recorded interview 
sessions. The respondents were informed that the information provided 
would be used for the purposes of the research, and they did not seem to 
mind. When dealing with sensitive issues, it was realised that the 
respondents were likely to open up when it was indicated that some parts of 
the information were known to the researcher already (Adler and Adler 
2003). This was found to help in easing respondents’ reluctance to discuss 
certain issues, and care was taken to avoid pushing the respondents too 
much and to provide them with assurances that the information provided 
would remain confidential.  
The researcher interviewed different people in order to produce multiple 
perspectives and, interestingly, people on one side of the argument 
suggested what to ask the other side. This increases the credibility of 
answers provided by the interviewees, because they know that the 
researcher will be obtaining information from all sides (Rubin and Rubin, 
2005). Data-gathering was ended when different points of views had been 
captured, and when no new information was being obtained from new 
respondents (Patton, 1990). 
Interviews were conducted via email for respondents that the researcher 
could not meet in person. One of the respondents was located in Canada, 
and the other was a very senior civil servant who was on a business trip 
overseas for the period of the field work. When the emails were sent out, it 
was clearly mentioned that the communication via email was confidential 
and that all information and responses would only be used for the purpose 
of this study. The advantage of email interviews are that they provide 
extended access to participants, do not require any travelling expenses, and 
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give respondents time to reflect on the questions (Raymond, 2006). The 
disadvantages include delays, long waiting times and the absence of social 
cues (ibid). Another problem encountered in this research was that one 
email that was sent was not read by the intended recipient, who was a very 
senior civil servant. Instead, it was read and responded to by his special 
officer, who handles all the formal emails. Although the email explicitly 
mentioned that all correspondence between the researcher and the 
participant would be confidential, the special officer sent out the interview 
questions to the relevant agencies for feedback. When the response was 
returned via e-mail three weeks later, the email included the information that 
the senior civil servant did not have the time to look at the responses 
provided by the agencies. The information received in the email was 
interesting, as although the heads of departments had clearly indicated their 
dissatisfaction and disputes with each other when interviewed face-to-face, 
the responses received via email suggested that they worked collaboratively 
with each other without issue.  
Email interviews were also used after returning to the United Kingdom from 
field work as telephone interviews would have been too costly with 
international respondents. These were mainly used to seek clarification from 
particular respondents on issues discussed during the interviews or to ask 
for information about specific government procedures from the agencies.  
4.4.2.4 The interview process in Bangalore 
The field work in Bangalore took place between 1 and 25 July 2011. The 
first step was to gain written approval from the host agency, the BMLTA. 
Although the researcher had a telephone conversation with the 
commissioner, who expressed her support and interest in participating in this 
research, written approval took almost two months to arrive, and the host 
agency only granted a one-month research period in Bangalore. 
While the researcher was waiting for the written approval, she undertook 
searches for agencies involved and potential respondents, mainly through 
online research. Gaining access to appropriate respondents was difficult due 
to the combination of the physical distance involved and the fact that email 
contact details were not usually available on the agencies’ websites. In 
some cases, phone calls were made to establish initial contact and obtain 
email addresses. However, responses to emails seeking participants were 
extremely poor. It was not until much later during field work that the 
researcher learnt that the civil servants in Bangalore had limited access to 
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the internet in the office, and that they are not allowed to respond to any 
official emails without prior approval from their heads of departments. Since 
the attempt to contact the respondents directly was not very fruitful, efforts 
were made through links with the host agency and the Indian Institute of 
Science (IISC) in Bangalore. During the data-gathering period, the 
researcher was attached as a short-term student to Dr Ashish Verma, an 
Assistant Professor in the Civil Engineering Department. The following 
international agencies based in India were also approached: the WRI Centre 
for Sustainable Transport (EMBARQ), the Institute for Transportation and 
Development Policy (ITDP), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
The researcher managed to get in touch with some promising respondents 
through an advisor in the ADB, who had good connections with the transport 
related agencies in Bangalore. After arriving in the field on 1 July 2011 
things began to look more positive. A short presentation was given to 
students and researchers in the Centre for Infrastructure, Sustainable 
Transportation, and Urban Planning (CISTUP), IISC, to provide them with an 
overview about the study and to discuss possibilities for assistance in the 
data-gathering process. Suggestions were given for potential respondents 
and how they may best be approached.  
Subsequently, the researcher had an individual session with Dr Ashish 
Verma to test her interview questions, primarily to check on the clarity and 
suitability of the questions for the local context. No changes were made to 
the interview questions after this session. This interview was treated as part 
of the interview data as the respondent answered all the questions, 
providing good insights and background knowledge, as well as sharing his 
experiences from working in the transport sector, which were valuable to this 
study.   
Suitable respondents were identified with the help of the ADB, the BMLTA 
and Dr Ashish Verma of IISC, and their contact details were obtained. They 
were then contacted on their mobile phones and, interestingly, most of them 
expressed a willingness to participate. After a brief explanation about the 
research over the telephone (including the amount of time required), some 
respondents were willing to allocate time for an interview session either the 
same day or the next. The waiting period was slightly longer for the heads of 
departments, as access and appointments had to be obtained through 
personal secretaries, and they also requested that the interview questions 
be sent prior to the interview.  
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The interview topics covered in Bangalore were similar to those in the 
Malaysian in order to allow for comparisons to be made where possible 
(Burgess, 1984). A standard set of interview questions was used for all the 
respondents for the following reasons. Firstly, the researcher had only just 
met the respondents and was uncertain about the kind of information they 
could provide or their expertise. Secondly, time was a constraint, and it was 
best to try to cover all the interview topics with each respondent. Thirdly, 
after the first few interviews, it was learned that the civil servants in 
Bangalore often get transferred and rarely stay in one position for more than 
two years. Hence, some of them could provide broad perspectives on 
transport issues and could see them from the point of view of other 
agencies, especially the ones they had previously been attached to. 
In total, twenty-three interviews were conducted in Bangalore, comprising 
seventeen recorded interviews, and two refusals to sign the consent form. 
All interviews were conducted in English, and most respondents were found 
to be fluent (although they occasionally used some words from the local 
Kannada language). Although the difficulties of conducting interviews in 
different cultures have been highlighted by many researchers (Keats, 2000: 
129; Patton, 1990), the researcher did not experience major obstacles in 
terms of language or culture, and received very good responses. The 
interview schedule is presented in Table 4.3, and the interview guide is 
included in Appendix D. 
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Table 4.3: Interview schedule for BMLTA case study 
No Participants Codes  
1.  Academicians 1 IA1 
2.  Academicians 2 IA2 
3.  Senior planner, government  IG4 
4.  Senior engineer, parastatal IPI 8 
5.  Head of department/IAS, parastatal 1 IPI 6 
6.  Chief engineer, parastatal 1 IPI 3 
7.  Planner, government  IG3 
8.  Chief engineer, local authority  IGI 7 
9.  Head of finance, private company IPI 5 
10.  Senior planner, government  IG6 
11.  Vice president, consultancy firm IC1 
12.  Chief engineer, parasatal 2 IPI 2 
13.  Senior planner, parastatal IPI 7 
14.  Head of department/IAS, government 1 IGI 1 
15.  Chief engineer, government  IG5 
16.  Academicians 3 IA3 
17.  Head of department/IAS, government 2 IGI 2 
18.  Head of department/IAS, parastatal 3 IPI 1 
19.  Consultant/ex-BMLTA IC2 
20.  Head of department/IAS, parastatal 2 IPI 4 
21.  Consultant, ADB* IC3 
22.  Traffic police IGI 8 
All interviews were conducted in July 2011 in Bangalore except * conducted in October        
2011 in Delhi. Key: IA – Indian Academics, IP – Indian Parastatal officials, IG – Indian 
Government Officials, IC – Indian Consultants 
The main problems encountered during the interviews were the regular 
interruptions from subordinates and the presence of other personnel in the 
room who did not form part of the interview. Although these did not seem to 
disturb the interviewee, Dexter (2006) argues that interview situations 
influence informant’s statements and interpretations of findings. Thus, the 
impact of these interruptions was minimised by allowing the interviewee to 
settle any urgent matters, although this meant that the interviews took longer 
and there were disruptions to the recordings of the interviews. In some 
situations, interviews had to be conducted in an open office space with 
background noise, and this affected the quality of the audio recordings. In 
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such cases, the recorder was placed closer to the interviewee and more 
detailed notes were taken as back-ups. 
The structure of the interviews in Bangalore was a little different from those 
in Malaysia. Since all the respondents were new to the researcher, she 
began the interviews with a brief introduction, then outlined the discussion 
topics to come. Efforts were made to build good rapport and gain the 
confidence of the respondents, and where necessary the researcher 
highlighted her civil service background in order to establish personal 
overlaps with the respondents (Adler and Adler, 2003). To create a good 
first impression and blend in, the researcher dressed in local attire, in the 
traditional kurta and chudidar, and aimed to be as polite as possible. These 
strategies proved fruitful, with all the respondents being respectful, 
hospitable, and willing to provide further information on request after the 
interviews. According to Kvale (1996), the ability to develop trust and rapport 
will enhance the validity of data when the respondents have enough 
confidence in the researcher to talk freely about their feelings and 
experiences. 
To enhance background knowledge, the researcher subscribed to a daily 
local newspaper and read it through every morning to locate any transport 
issues that could be discussed during the interview. Most of the respondents 
understood that the researcher was an outsider with limited knowledge 
about local issues, and thus they started the interviews by offering their 
views on the existing problems and how they thought they could be solved. 
Hence, some of the interviews provided a good learning session, and the 
respondents appeared to enjoy the opportunity to tell the researcher about 
issues she was not aware of (Dexter, 2006). However, the researcher was 
careful not to allow the respondents to shift the focus away from the 
objectives of the interview, and all interview topics were covered in as great 
a depth as it was possible to do so in each session. After the interviews, the 
respondents were asked to either introduce the researcher to their head of 
department or to recommend suitable participants in other agencies, and 
most participants were happy to help in one of these ways. In some cases, 
the respondents provided documents that they thought would be helpful for 
understanding the issues better. 
As with the Malaysian case study, some respondents were reluctant to have 
the interviews recorded, and in one recorded interview, the interviewee 
asked for a copy of the audio recording. A copy was provided, and given this 
sign of insecurity, he was also further assured regarding the anonymity and 
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confidentiality of the information provided. In another case, a head of 
department was not willing to sign the consent form or to have the interview 
recorded, although he agreed to answer the interview questions. He 
repeatedly apologised for not allowing it to be recorded, and explained that 
this refusal was required by the confidentiality agreement that civil servants 
are subjected to. Interestingly, this respondent discussed a number of 
confidential issues, as well as giving an in-depth outline of the power 
dynamics between the state and the city government and their impacts on 
the empowerment of BMLTA. 
During the field work in Bangalore, the researcher had an opportunity to 
attend a workshop entitled Sustainable Development for Public Transport, 
which was organised by the International Association for Public Transport 
(UiTP) on 16 July 2011. Many prominent speakers from the transport sector 
(including numerous heads of departments) presented their views and 
highlighted critical issues that they claimed required immediate attention. 
This full day workshop was insightful as it provided a good platform for 
understanding local issues and getting to know the key figures in the 
transport sector. In the following week, the author gained the opportunity to 
interview three heads of departments through the contacts developed during 
this conference. During the final days of the field work in Bangalore, another 
presentation was made to CISTUP, focussing on some research findings 
mainly around the effectiveness of BMLTA and factors that influences its 
performance. A written report was submitted later to fulfil the requirements 
of a short-term research student at CISTUP, IISC.   
4.4.2.5 Data storage  
The original digital recordings and transcripts of person-identifiable 
interviews were stored on the University server only, and the anonymised 
transcripts of interviews, interview notes and materials were saved on the 
author’s laptop and on an external hard drive. Original copies were saved in 
a special folder, and the folder was duplicated and used for analysis 
purposes. Hard copies of the transcripts and interview materials were stored 
together with the recording devices in a locked cabinet, accessible only to 
the project team. The analysis of the data was mainly carried out on the 
University’ M drive, using Nvivo 9 Software, and a daily backup was made 
on the University’s N drive. 
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4.5 Validity and reliability 
Validity is understood in terms of the objectivity of the research, which 
concerns the interpretation of observations and whether or not the 
inferences that the researcher makes are reasonable and supported by data 
(Perakyla, 2011). Researchers highlight various ways of increasing validity, 
including acknowledging one’s own standpoint and biases, the peer-review 
process, and member checks (Merriam, 1998; Mason, 2002). The approach 
taken to increase the validity of the data from the interviews is explained in 
section 4.4.2. The researcher bias produced by the researcher’s previous 
role as a civil servant is acknowledged. This could have had an effect on the 
respondents during interviews, as most of the respondents in the SPAD 
case study knew the researcher. This bias was reduced by explaining to the 
respondents that they were being approached from a research perspective, 
and that all the information that they discussed would be treated 
confidentially.  
Triangulation is a validity procedure in which the researcher looks for 
convergence among multiple and different sources of information in order to 
form themes or categories in a study (Creswell and Miller, 2000). This 
approach was used here to corroborate evidence collected through 
interviews and document reviews in order to locate major and minor themes 
and produce a valid narrative account. As was emphasised in section 4.4.1, 
the document review was used to fill in missing information, to confirm or 
reject respondents’ arguments and claims during interviews, and to enhance 
validity by allowing the researcher to explore the research questions in a 
rounded and multi-faceted way (Mason, 2002). 
During the period in which the data was gathered and analysed, any 
tentative interpretations were checked with the sources of the data to seek 
further clarification where possible, and this was mainly done via e-mail. 
There was ongoing engagement with the supervisors during the data 
collection and analysis period to ensure that the findings, emerging themes 
and concepts made sense, and that they were realistic and accurate. This 
kind of support was useful, as it challenged the researcher’s thinking and 
assumptions about the case studies. The validity of this research has also 
been increased by using two case studies instead of one, which allows the 
results to be applied to a greater range of other situations. Moreover, rich 
descriptions of the settings, concepts and themes are provided in the 
presentation of the findings to enable the reader to make decisions about 
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the applicability of the findings to other settings and similar contexts 
(Cresswell and Miller, 2000). 
Reliability concerns the extent to which the results are consistent with the 
data collected, and to its precision, consistency and stability. In short, the 
researcher should be able to explain how she arrived at her results (Mason, 
2002). Several reliability strategies that have been suggested by 
researchers (Cresswell and Miller, 2000; Mason, 2002; Merriam, 1998) were 
incorporated into the design of this study. The investigator’s position in this 
research was explained in Chapter 2 and section 4.2 (which set out the 
theoretical framework, assumptions and research paradigm for the study). 
The explanation about the open-ended interview questions and how the 
questions were designed and tested for clarity with pilot respondents prior to 
the actual interviews is given in section 4.4.2.1. However, the details within 
the questions to respondents varied based on their positions and 
experience, and this allowed the construction of a more complete picture of 
the subject under study. Next, the grounds for selecting the data-gathering 
tools for answering the research questions were explicated, and the 
selection of respondents justified in section 4.4.2.2. Detailed accounts of the 
interview process for the two case studies were given in sections 4.4.2.3 and 
4.4.2.4. The data collected was given careful and detailed analysis so that a 
reliable picture of the respondents’ views and information could be built up, 
and is presented in the next chapter. It is important to note the analysis of 
qualitative data does not yield definitive truths, but rather a set of plausible 
interpretations based on the available data. 
4.6 The limitations of the methods 
The data-gathering process had a number of restrictions and limitations. The 
sponsor of this research only granted a five-month field work approval to 
gather the data for both of the case studies, and the host agency in 
Bangalore only granted a one-month approval for data-gathering, which was 
fixed for July. The challenge was greater in Bangalore, because the 
research setting was new and the researcher had to make good use of the 
time given to gather the necessary data there. The implications of these 
restrictions were that not all the identified participants could be interviewed, 
especially those that occupied high-ranking positions and those who were 
involved in the reform process, who were not available for interview during 
the one-month set period. Although it would have been beneficial and 
desirable to have had participants from the Ministry of Urban Development 
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in New Delhi (which oversees the policy and drafts the strategies for urban 
transport for the entire country), it was not possible to gain access to or 
support from the ministry although numerous attempts were made to get in 
touch with the relevant authorities.  
There was more time for the field work in Malaysia, which meant more time 
could be spent targeting the most desirable respondents. The heads of 
departments and senior civil servants were targeted and approached. This 
led to longer waiting times. Furthermore, one month of this four-month 
period was Ramadan, the holy month, in which Muslims observe fasting. 
Attempts to arrange interviews during this period were not very fruitful, as 
the respondents preferred sessions after Ramadan. In both the case 
studies, the observation was limited to the interview settings and the 
behaviours of respondents during the interviews.  
4.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed the constructivist paradigm adopted in this 
research, and has established the justification for both the qualitative and 
the inductive and deductive approaches, which make use of case studies for 
data-gathering. The rationale for choosing the case studies were explained 
and the two main research methods have been discussed; the semi-
structured interview and the document review.  The details of the interview 
process, including the ethical issues at both the case study locations have 
been elaborated. The final part of this chapter touched on reliability and 
validity of this research. The next chapter explains the analytical process 
that was undertaken to interpret the raw data.  
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Chapter 5: Approach to Analysis  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explain the analytical steps taken to synthesise the data 
and arrive at the findings for each case study, as well as the steps 
undertaken for the cross-case analysis. As described in Chapter 4, this 
research adopts a case study approach under an interpretative paradigm 
which advocates or challenges the researcher to study the social 
phenomena in its completeness (Thomas, 2011). Case studies can be used 
for confirmatory research and/or explorative studies. The former taking a 
theory and testing it through the deductive approach, the latter promoting 
theory development through an inductive process (Gerring, 2004). The basic 
analytic method of this research is the use of ongoing comparisons, and this 
stands behind every technique in the interpretative paradigm (Thomas, 
2011). This involves repeatedly looking through the data, comparing each 
sentence and paragraph with each other and against the research 
questions. The categories and themes that represent the content of the data 
were identified through this form of in-depth comparison, and these formed 
the building blocks of the analysis. 
Prior to undertaking the field work, a theoretical framework and a priori 
codes were prepared for guiding the data collection and the process of 
analysis. These codes represent a type of ‘thinking tool’, and are temporary 
constructs that take shape for and through empirical work. The coding of the 
transcription and the field notes did not attempt to extract data to fit into the 
a priori codes. Instead, an open coding system approach (which forms the 
basis for the grounded theory approach) was applied in order to capture the 
essence or core elements of the data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Hence, 
the respondents’ accounts will be explicated and explained before the 
researcher provides her interpretation and relates the findings to existing 
theories (see Chapters 6 and 7). Figure 5.1 provides a simple illustration of 
the steps undertaken in the analysis. 
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Figure 5.1: Steps taken in analysis 
5.2 Transcribing the interviews 
The researcher transcribed all of the interviews personally, which although 
time-consuming, enabled familiarity with data to be developed. A five-minute 
interview took approximately forty-five minutes to transcribe using a foot-
pedal transcriber so that both hands could be kept free for the keyboard. 
Express Scribe Software was installed free from the internet and used to 
facilitate the transcribing process as it supports the foot-pedal transcriber, 
includes variable speed playback, and is easy to use. 
A total of twenty-three recorded interviews were made for the Land Public 
Transport Commission (SPAD) case study, and all but one of the interviews 
were transcribed.29 Out of the twenty-two interviews, two were conducted in 
the local Malay language, and transcription was prepared in the local 
language before the appropriate information was extracted and an interview 
report in English drafted. To avoid misinterpretation, the interview report was 
prepared in the same document that contained the original transcription in 
Malay for cross-checking purposes, and this document was later used in the 
coding exercise. 
All seventeen recorded interviews were transcribed for the Bangalore 
Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) case study. All these 
interviews were conducted in English, although some of the recordings of 
these interviews were of poor quality due to the high background noise from 
traffic. Most government offices were located along main roads and not 
equipped with air-conditioning, hence the open windows increased the traffic 
noise.  
Transcribing was a time-consuming process, and given the time constraints 
of the research it was decided that the entire transcription notation would not 
                                            
29 The exception being the respondent who represented the Klang Valley Taxi Association, 
who mainly discussed issues surrounding the taxi industry, only a small portion of which was 
found to be relevant to the research questions. In this case, the relevant information was 
extracted from the interview, and an interview report was prepared.  
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be used as it was not necessary to apply such detail because the emphasis 
was on the actual agreement and meaning of context rather than the social 
structure of the conversation. However, stresses on words, overlaps in 
speech, and gestures such as laughter and sudden changes of emotion 
such as sarcasm were included. This helped to confirm the main points of 
argument and to view how the other person in a conversation might have 
influenced the speech by interrupting.  
5.3 Using NVivo 
The computer assisted qualitative analysis NVivo 9 software was used in 
managing and analysing the interview transcripts and notes. The software 
was useful for organising and keeping track of records for easy retrieval, as 
well as for organising and providing rapid access to codes and the contexts 
from which those codes were derived. In addition, upon completion of each 
transcription, the software was used to assist in developing graphical models 
to map out ideas and concepts in visual form, which helped in developing an 
understanding of the issues pertinent to particular respondents. Two 
separate project files were operated for the two case studies, and this 
allowed each case study to be examined and analysed separately in a 
systematic manner. Cross-comparison between the case studies was 
performed manually as the comparison between the cases was based on 
the overall narrative of each case study, and thus it was felt that NVivo could 
offer little help here. 
Like many other software programmes, NVivo 9 is only a tool and cannot 
compensate for limited interpretative capacity. Although it allows for multiple 
coding of a particular segment of text, researchers observe that there is a 
danger of chopping the data into different segments and losing the overall 
accounts (Bazeley, 2007). To safeguard against this care was taken to 
select and code significant segments of the transcript that discuss particular 
concepts or issues and thus retain the overall meaning. According to 
Silverman (2010), computer-assisted software programmes do not support 
the analysis of the formal structure of narratives, which means that this 
structure has to be assembled manually by the analysts. Therefore, the use 
of NVivo in this research was limited to arranging the relevant text into 
codes, and arranging the codes in a hierarchical manner in the form of tree 
nodes on which further analysis was undertaken utilising a manual 
approach. The main advantage of using this software was that it provided 
the flexibility to modify or eliminate the codes that were found to be 
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irrelevant through the automatic reorganisation of the data segments coded 
under the nodes. 
5.4 The case study analysis 
This research involves two cross-national case studies, and there were two 
stages of analysis involved: within the case and across cases. For the within 
the case analysis, each case was first treated as comprehensive in itself, 
and data was gathered with the aim of learning as much as possible about 
the factors or issues that had bearings on the case. Once this stage was 
completed, the cross-case analysis began. According to Miles and 
Huberman (1994), cross-case analysis helps to increase generalisablity 
mainly by assessing whether the findings make sense beyond the specific 
case study. Similarly, Eckstein (1992 cited in Gerring, 2004) suggests that 
cross-case analysis can increase the reach of causal propositions when 
cases that are representative of the phenomena under study are chosen. 
This form of analysis also strengthens the findings of the case study by 
providing additional cross-case evidence, hence increasing its 
generalisability (Gerring, 2004). This research attempted to build a detail 
explanation from the findings for the research questions of the individual 
case studies, and to then investigate the similarities and differences in the 
processes and outcomes that hold across the cases, providing explanations 
about how they have been influenced by local conditions. This helped to pin 
down the specific conditions that impacted on the findings, and to develop 
an understanding how these conditions might be related.  
5.4.1 Within case analysis 
This section explains the approach taken in extracting and recording the 
findings for each of the case studies. The coding process of the 
transcriptions, field notes and interview memos was undertaken for both 
cases. The coding exercise helped to categorise the data and to identify 
critical issues or issues of interest around each respondent.  
5.4.1.1 Coding: developing free nodes and tree nodes 
The interviews created a vast amount of data that needed to be organised 
through some form of indexing for easy retrieval and for follow-ups on issues 
that needed further analysis and explanation. This is known as ‘coding’ or 
‘categorising’ and is defined as the use of a “word or short phrase that 
symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and or 
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evocative attribute for a portion of language based or visual data” (Saldana, 
2009:3). It is often seen as a transitional process between data analysis and 
more extensive analysis that is not just limited to labelling, but also helps in 
“linking data to the idea and linking the idea to all data pertaining to the idea” 
(Richard and Morse, 2007:137).  
The approach that was taken in coding of the data this research involved a 
hybrid of the grounded theory method and the responsive interviewing 
formal coding scheme. In the grounded theory method, an open coding 
method is used without an initial a priori coding list, and every passage is 
coded to develop concepts and themes from the data. This approach argues 
that coding, recognising concepts and themes and theory development are 
parts of one integrated process (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). On the other 
hand, in the responsive interviewing formal coding scheme (as proposed by 
Rubin and Rubin, 2005), a list of coding is prepared beforehand, the 
concepts are then refined before being marked in the text, and newly 
emerging concepts from the data are also taken into account. In this study, a 
list of a priori codes was identified from the published literature review, the 
preliminary research questions and the analytical framework. A total of 
twenty a priori codes were chosen and mapped to the relevant research 
questions. However, the a priori codes were not used to code the 
transcripts, which were kept aside, with the coding process taking an open 
coding approach. Table 5.2 shows the research questions and the relevant 
a priori codes. 
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Table 5.1: Research questions and the related a priori codes 
 Research question A priori codes 
Research 
question 1 
 
What were the motivations behind the 
establishment of the transport authorities 
(SPAD in Malaysia and BMLTA in 
Bangalore)? 
 
Motivation for creation 
Process of creation 
Multi actor perspective 
Rationale for model 
Key personality 
 
 
Research 
question 2 
 
What types of autonomy have been 
given to the transport authorities? 
 
Types of autonomy 
Source of powers 
Exercising powers 
Influence of central 
government 
Adequacy of existing powers 
Clear line of functions 
Strategy and master plans 
Research 
question 3 
 
How have the reforms affected decision-
making processes in policy-making and 
the selection and implementation of 
transport projects? 
 
Decision-making platform 
Role in decision-making 
Network of actors 
 
Research 
question 4 
 
 
What factors determine the success or 
failure of the reforms? 
 
Transparency 
Politics 
Cultural issues 
Capacity issues 
Performance/outcomes to 
date 
 
The coding exercise was limited to interview transcripts and memos, whilst 
policy documents collected during the field work were used to clarify or 
confirm points raised by the respondents. This latter process involved 
identifying relevant parts of documents, and it was thought that it would not 
be useful to code everything in the documents as this would only increase 
the data load in the software. The documents were used later in the analysis 
when detailed explanation had to be sought. 
The coding process started with re-reading the transcripts and preparing 
reflexive notes, as Corbin and Strauss (2008) propose doing. Preparation of 
reflexive notes helped in “reading through and beyond the data” (Mason, 
1996:109), especially in identifying the relevance of data and the research 
question that a piece of data addresses, as well as the internal consistency 
of respondents’ accounts and their comparisons with the accounts of other 
respondents (which opened up the inquiry and moved it towards the 
interpretation process). An example of a reflexive memo prepared for 
respondent G13 is given below: 
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F: The advantages are a lot, of course, and the PM has the 
clout to influence other agencies, but so far we have not yet 
used that, I believe. 
R: Ok, not used. 
F: Aah, we have not used yet that advantage that we have. 
 
Memo: he feels SPAD has not used the ‘powers’ of the Prime 
Minister to influence other agencies and force them to do what 
is required. However, respondents from X and Y agencies 
pointed out that SPAD always throws the PM’s name in to get 
things done, and they have no right to question, and this seems 
to have negative effect on the relationship (Transcript with 
reflexive notes for respondent G13). 
With the assistance of NVivo for data display, the transcripts were coded, 
and this first-level coding was called ‘free nodes’. The coding process aimed 
at data that was most closely related to the research questions and data that 
was found to be irrelevant at this point was grouped under a node labelled 
‘KIV’, to be revisited later. The codes were assigned names that captured 
the relevant phenomena, events, processes or personalities, and this first 
cycle of coding used the focus coding and descriptive coding techniques. 
The focus coding method uses the most significant or frequent nodes to sift 
through large amounts of data, whereas descriptive coding helps to capture 
what is seen and heard in the data (Saldana, 2009). Links between nodes 
were established upon completion of each transcript with the assistance of 
the ‘model’ feature in NVivo. This enables the initial mapping of dimensions 
and for issues relevant to each respondent to be pulled out, which was 
useful in laying the groundwork for analysis between the respondents. The 
NVivo software allows models to be developed for each respondent based 
on the identified nodes. Figure 5.2 is an example of a model that shows the 
nodes that were of interest to respondent IA2 and the relationships between 
them. 
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Figure 5.2: Model developed on NVIVO for respondent IA2 
The respondents’ views on central issues were later merged and explained 
under each research question in a case analysis report. This report was 
revised from time-to-time as the coding exercise progressed in order to track 
how the understanding on the topic changed over time and to ensure that 
appropriate issues were teased out. The key was to capture the views of the 
different groups of respondents, such as the SPAD and BMLTA employees, 
government officials, operators, academics and politicians.  
As the free node develops, the responses and issues were put together and 
connected under a broader categorisation called tree nodes, which comprise 
the second-level coding. The second level coding used the pattern-matching 
technique favoured by Miles and Huberman (1994) which reduces the large 
number of free nodes into a smaller number of analytical units, allowing 
rules, causes and explanations in the data to be explored and initial themes 
to be captured. These nodes are not fixed, and were discarded, renamed, 
changed and re-sorted when overlaps and redundancy were identified. 
According to Patton (1990:216), the categories should be frequently re-
visited to ensure that they are ‘sensitising’, which means that they are as 
sensitive to the data as possible, and that the meanings of the phenomena 
are captured. The consistency and robustness of coding was checked by 
the researcher using the test for coder consistency in which some of the 
transcripts which have been coded were re-coded again to validate the 
coding scheme and this was done early in the process. Where necessary, 
the description and clarity about the codes were recorded in memos which 
were stored in the NVivo. In addition, all adjustments to the nodes were 
123 
 
recorded in the research journal in order to track and capture changes in the 
researcher’s understanding. 
For the SPAD case study, 17 tree nodes and 124 free nodes were identified 
as being relevant to the research questions. The list of the tree nodes and 
examples of the free nodes are provided in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: List of tree nodes and free nodes for SPAD case study  
Research questions Tree nodes Examples of free nodes 
 
What were the 
motivations behind the 
establishment of SPAD 
in Malaysia? 
 
 Rationale for SPAD 
Gap in planning for public transport, 
justification for model, previous 
regime and agenda licensing, 
benchmarking with advanced cities, 
support for SPAD
 
 Inadequacy of existing 
structure 
Gap in planning, multiple agencies 
coordination issues, fragmentation of 
functions, limited powers of local 
authorities 
 Key personality Chief Secretary, Prime Minister 
 Milestones in creation of 
SPAD 
Task force, INSPAK, feedback from 
stakeholders 
 
What types of 
autonomy have been 
given to the transport 
authority? 
 
 Autonomy 
Commission status, financial 
autonomy, legal backing, planning 
function, gap in existing autonomy
 
 
 Institutional change 
 
Challenges in merging exercise, 
implementation flaws, new agency vs 
established agencies 
 Boundary issues and 
pollution of functions 
Confusions on functions of agencies, 
perceptions on SPAD’s role 
 
How have the reforms 
affected decision-
making processes in 
policy-making and the 
selection and 
implementation of 
transport projects? 
 Decision making 
platform 
Approving authorities, SPAD as check 
point, politician-civil servant 
relationship 
 Public transport 
initiatives 
SPAD’s role in MRT, congestion 
pricing 
  Sensitive to local need 
 
Local champion, public engagement 
 
What factors 
determine the success 
or failure of the 
reforms? 
 
 
 
 
 Capacity and human 
capital 
Institutional memory, too much on the 
plate, insufficient staff, knowledge gap 
 Cultural issues Cultural clash, structural change vs 
cultural change, culture of authorities 
 Institutional structure, 
rules, laws, regulations 
Government policy, bureaucracy, 
central government control 
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Research questions Tree nodes Examples of free nodes 
 
What factors 
determine the success 
or failure of the 
reforms?(cont’d) 
 
 Politics Many hands, political interference, 
political tool, political support 
 Performance/outcomes 
to date 
Correcting CVLB, proving existence, 
re-registration of license, transition 
stage 
 Transparency Mention about corruption, no mention 
about corruption 
 Working relationship 
Communication element, importance 
of personality, name-throwing, SPAD 
vs local authorities 
 
To better illustrate relationship between free nodes and tree nodes, two 
quotes from two free nodes – created for legitimacy and previous licensing 
regime – is provided as an example in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: Relationship between free nodes and a tree node in SPAD 
case study 
Free node 1 – gap in planning 
for public transport 
Free node 2 – previous regime 
and agenda in licensing 
Tree node 
Quote from respondent G14:  
There was a gap in transport 
planning, there was no transport 
policy to start things of, and the 
reason there was no transport 
policy is because there was no 
champion for transport to cover 
all the elements of transport 
 
Quote from respondent O1:  
It is very tough, CVLB was  
giving out licenses, not on what 
you have basis but who you 
know basis, that is why some 
people can end up with 
hundreds of permits and then 
they rent it out and every 
evening they collected fifty 
ringgit per taxi driver  
 
Rationale for SPAD 
 
For the BMLTA case study, 17 tree nodes and 111 free nodes were 
identified as being relevant to the research questions. The list of these tree 
nodes and examples of the free nodes are provided in table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4: List of tree nodes and free nodes for BMLTA case study  
Research questions Tree nodes Free nodes 
 
What are the motivations 
behind the establishment 
of BMLTA in Bangalore? 
 Inadequacy of 
existing structure 
 
Agencies own strategy, fragmentation of 
functions, poor planning and 
compliance, documented function vs 
actual practice 
 Key personality Chief Secretary, Chief Minister’s office
 
 Rationale for 
BMLTA 
Absence of holistic view for city, NUTP, 
coordination issues, failure of 
BMRDA 
 Public transport 
issues 
Bangalore’s rapid growth, need to 
integrate various modes 
 External 
assistance from 
international 
development 
agencies 
Technical and funding support 
 
What types of autonomy 
have been given to 
BMLTA? 
 
 Autonomy 
 
 
Authority vs committee, financial 
autonomy, inadequacy of powers, role of 
BMLTA vs established agencies
 
 BMLTA’s function 
 
Anticipated functions, current functions 
 Legal issues 
BMLTA act, Bengaluru Governance Bill, 
common legislation for UMTA 
How does the 
establishment of a 
dedicated transport 
authority affect decision-
making processes in 
policy-making and the 
selection of transport 
projects? 
 Decision making 
platform 
Decisions by CS, BMLTA’s decisions not 
binding, members in decision making 
loop 
 Performance/ 
outcomes to date 
Better coordination, BRT, nothing at 
strategic level, parking policy 
 
What are the factors that 
determine the success or 
failure of the reforms? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Capacity and 
human capital 
Insufficient capacity, outsourcing, 
technical cell at CISTUP
 
 
 Cultural issues Incompetent officers, administrators 
ignoring cultural issues 
 Institutional 
structure, rules, 
laws, regulation 
74
th
 amendment, bureaucracy, 
implementation gap, elements of 
democracy, limited powers for local 
bodies, short tenure of administration 
 Moving forward 
for BMLTA 
Separate entity from DULT, need to 
strengthen BMLTA 
 Politics 
Political consensus, political backing, 
political interference, civil servants at 
mercy of politics 
 Transparency Corruption as culture, combating 
corruption 
 Working 
relationship 
Handholding approach, buy in from 
agencies 
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To better illustrate relationship between free nodes and tree nodes, two 
quotes from two free nodes – created for legitimacy and previous licensing 
regime – is provided as an example in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5: Relationship between free nodes and a tree node in BMLTA 
case study 
Free node 1                      
- coordination issues  
Free node 2                     
- failure of BMRDA 
Tree node  
Quote from respondent IG3:  
There were so many 
institutions or organizations 
which deal with the 
transportation, we have City 
Corporation, Traffic Police, 
and the Urban Development 
Authority, Road Transport 
Department,  each of them 
have different role in providing 
transport infrastructure, 
without any common platform 
to bring them out together, 
they were working with their 
own objectives and so on 
 
Quote from respondent IC2: 
The planning and coordination  
functions should have been 
done by BMRDA, but the staff 
there were  just sitting on files 
for years, so that was the main 
thing ...BMRDA couldn’t do, so 
they went ahead and formed a 
new agency 
 
 
Rationale for BMLTA 
 
The coding exercise was performed concurrently with memo writing as and 
when necessary in order to clarify the nodes, capture individual case 
synopses, explain particular problems and identify issues that needed 
further clarification, and all memos were labelled with dates and times. 
Memos are “sites of conversation with ourselves about the data” that help in 
understanding the issues and phenomena under study (Clarke, 2005:202). 
The relevant memos were treated as data, and were coded and categorised. 
The coding process was stopped after all the transcripts and memos had 
been coded, the coding structure scrutinised and refined (King, 2012) and 
the researcher had compiled some ideas about the recurring themes in the 
data and what to pursue further. The coding structure was checked by 
supervisors, and they agreed that the nodes made sense in relation to the 
data. 
However, during the coding exercise the researcher realised that the data 
was segregated by a cross-sectional indexing pattern, and it was difficult to 
search for processes and practices that informed the whole data set. For 
example, the reasons for SPAD’s creation were not derivable just from 
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observing the coded data as respondents did not generally talk about it 
explicitly, and only small chunks of text discussed the issue of corruption in 
the previous regime. Such information can only be uncovered through 
interpretative analysis of the whole case study. Thus, to make sure that no 
important data was missed, an analysis of the case study as a whole was 
performed by re-reading the transcripts, interview memos and field notes 
(Mason, 1996). 
5.4.1.2 Identifying emerging themes  
The next step after coding was to identify the emerging themes. The theme 
is a phrase or sentence that “identifies what a unit of data concerns or 
means, and usually consists of ideas such as descriptions of behaviours, 
explanations of why something happens, or statements from participants” 
(Saldana, 2009:139). According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), themes are 
usually developed by combining codes on the same topic and should be 
stated as simply as possible to explain why something happened and what 
something means.  
The codes generated from the data provided the mechanism through which 
further analysis and interpretation were gradually performed. The tree 
nodes, free nodes and coded data were first downloaded and printed from 
the NVivo software, then all the data units under the same node were 
examined and a summary of each node prepared to capture the information 
necessary for answering the research questions. In order to assemble the 
perspectives of the various respondent groups, all the passages under one 
code were sorted for each individual respondent and, where appropriate, 
their arguments were compared using a matrix format. At this point it was 
found that some of the nodes and the coded data were overlapping or not 
workable, so further amendments were made to the list of tree nodes and 
free nodes. Next, the summaries were examined, and the core issues were 
teased out and explained. Themes were developed by grouping the codes, 
re-reading the transcripts and reflecting on their implications. Table 5.6 
shows an example for how two themes were developed for research 
question 1 for SPAD case study. 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
 
Table 5.6: Themes for SPAD case study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research question 1: 
What were the 
motivations behind the 
establishment of SPAD 
in Malaysia? 
   
Sources Themes 
Source 1: codes  
- Transparency – corruption 
- Previous regime and agenda in 
licensing 
- Gap in planning 
All these codes indicate that there were 
inadequacies in the previous institutional 
arrangement 
 
Source 2: quote from interviewee 
Respondent G14:  I think to me CVLB 
was operating below 50% of its potential 
 
Respondent O1: CVLB issues licenses 
blindly, they never do any research, they 
don’t do any studies, 
 
Performance of 
CVLB 
 
Source 1: codes  
- Coordination issues 
- Multiple agencies 
- Absence of overall policy 
 
Source 2: quote from interviewee 
Respondent O5: I think there were too 
many agencies, they have not been well 
coordinated and integrated it should be, 
(sighs)...it should be under one entity 
Respondent G3: the essence of the  
restructuring is the lack of coordination 
between the various modes of 
transportation, we needed first to 
integrate the various modes of 
transportation  
 
Coordination 
issues with 
multiple agencies  
 
 
Other sources for themes included the concepts and themes revealed by 
interviews and the analysis of different interviewees comments about the 
same issues. The research questions were used as the main tool for guiding 
the extraction of theme. The themes formed the headings of the sections in 
Chapters 6 and 7, which present the findings of the two case studies. 
5.4.1.3 Developing the narrative  
The next step involved developing the narrative with the aim of providing 
detailed descriptions of what happened in each case, taking into account the 
specific contextual features involved in each. The findings were written down 
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concurrently with the coding exercise and a matrix was developed for each 
research question. This matrix presented the main interview questions and 
participants’ responses, grouping them under related themes and concepts 
so that it could be used to produce a coherent story of the findings linking 
the respondents with the issues that were most relevant to them, and 
showing how their positions and experiences influenced their thoughts and 
preferences. The different parts of the findings were interpreted and 
integrated. The initial interpretation was then checked for inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies, and constant comparisons were made between different 
respondent groups to capture multi-actor perspectives. Interpretations were 
double-checked when they were found to side with one group over another 
to see if there was sufficient evidence to support them. 
One of the main challenges encountered in producing the findings was how 
to weigh different versions of the same events or separate explanations of 
the same themes or concepts against each other in order to produce a 
single descriptive narrative. In cases where the interviewees had 
contradicting views, the evidence for the different positions was weighed up 
to check how credible each report was. This was done by looking for 
supporting documents, checking for slants or biases in interviewees' 
answers, and assigning greater weight to information that the interviewee 
had direct knowledge of or remembered best.  
The findings for each case study were compared with the existing literature 
presented in Chapter 2 using both the inductive and deductive approaches, 
through bottom-up and top-down exercises. According to Goldthorpe (1997), 
generality can be established when a theory appears to fit the cases to 
which it is applied, and where it fails, a different theory that demonstrates 
sensitivity to the context is required.  
5.4.2 Cross-case analysis 
Although both case studies were different in numerous dimensions, and 
although it is difficult to compare cases by extracting their similarities and 
differences, both of them nevertheless showed some similar findings.  
According to Goldthorpe (1997), it is permissible to abstract certain features 
and attributes from different cases in order to perform theoretical 
comparisons between them provided that the cases always remain 
identifiable rather than being deconstructed into variables. The case-
oriented comparative method proposed by Ragin (1987) was used as a 
guide for performing the cross-case analysis exercise. In this method:  
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Each case is examined as a whole, as a total situation resulting 
from a combination of conditions, and this makes it possible to 
address causal complexes, examine conjunctures in time and 
space…and this requires investigators to suspend assumption 
about the equivalence of the cases and conditions  (Ragin, 
1987:49).  
As mentioned in section 4.3.2, the two case studies have entirely different 
contexts, and the differences between them may overwhelm their 
similarities. Because of this, the cross-case analysis was undertaken using 
both the inductive and deductive approaches. First, the inductive approach 
examines which theoretically relevant similarities and differences are 
operative by examining empirical cases and this is shown in Appendix E. 
Second, underlying similarities between the cases in terms of shared 
outcomes and features (Ragin, 1987) were searched for and shown to be 
relevant to the phenomena under study. Then, after identifying similarities 
between the themes, the researcher used both the deductive and inductive 
approaches to formulate a general explanation that showed how similar 
themes produced same or different results in the two case studies, and this 
is shown in Appendix F. Conditions and criteria that were present in once 
case and absent in another was also teased out to explain the observed 
outcomes. The themes are presented as factors which may explain the 
direction the reforms took and this is presented in Chapter 8. 
5.5 Chapter summary 
The main contribution of this chapter has been to present and justify the 
analytical approach that was utilised for this research. This thesis performs 
two in-depth individual case studies before progressing to a cross-case 
analysis of them, which increases the credibility and to a certain extent, the 
generalisability of the findings. It attempts to strike a balance between the 
inductive and deductive approach, as advocated by the case study method. 
Chapters 6 and 7 present the findings of the individual case studies, and 
each consists of four main sections addressing one of the four research 
questions. Chapter 8 then presents the cross-case analysis, following the 
order of the themes as they emerged from the findings of the previous two 
chapters.  
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Chapter 6: Case Study Analysis for Land Public Transport 
Commission 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings of the Land Public Transport 
Commission (SPAD) case study, which are based on twenty-eight face-to-
face in-depth interviews with government officials, academics, politicians 
and operators. The findings are presented in relation to the four research 
questions (see section 1.3) that were designed to explore this case study. 
The first research question examines the motivations for the creation of 
SPAD, the second explores its autonomy, the third looks at the changes that 
it brings to the decision-making platform and the outcomes achieved, and 
the final one concerns the key factors that may have significant impacts on 
SPAD’s performance. 
The emphasis throughout this chapter is on letting the participants speak for 
themselves, which involved contextualising the interview (reflecting and 
identifying key issues) according to respondent groups and only using 
quotations from interviews when they better reflect the views the participants 
or strengthen the arguments. As Chapter 4 explained, the analytical 
approach that was adopted was categorised using the coding approach to 
isolate key issues and identify relevant themes. When appropriate, 
information from government reports, transport plans and minutes of 
meetings are interwoven with interview data to augment and solidify the 
discussion. Towards at the end of each research question, a reflection is 
presented in relation to published literature in this area. 
6.2  Research Question 1: What were the motivations behind 
the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia? 
The summary of responses from participants is presented in Table 6.1 in a 
matrix form. Respondents were divided into four main groups: government 
officials, SPAD, politicians and operators. Their presentation under these 
categories provides quick references to popular response and outliers, 
besides identifying the responses that are the most significant for a 
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particular group of respondents. The findings are summarized under key 
headings which are expanded in sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.6. 
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Table 6.1: Matrix showing responses to research question 1 
What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia? 
Respondents group Government officials 
SPAD 
(G12, G13, G15) 
Politicians 
(P1, P2) 
Operators 
(O1, O2, O3, O4, O5) 
Response 
MOT 
(G5, G6, G7, G8, G10, 
G11) 
Others 
(G1, G2, G3, G4, G9,  
G14, G16, G17, G18) 
Performance of 
Commercial vehicles 
Licensing Board  
- Bumiputera agenda 
- Poor control over 
licensing and 
enforcement  
 
 
 
G5, G7, G8 
 
 
 
G1, G4, G9, G14  
 
G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, 
G18 
 
 
 
 
 
O1, O2, O3, O5  
 
O1, O2, O3, O4 
Performance of Ministry of 
Transport  
G5, G6, G8 G1, G14 G15    
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What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia? 
Respondents group Government officials 
SPAD 
(G12, G13, G15) 
Politicians 
(P1, P2) 
Operators 
(O1, O2, O3, O4, O5) 
Response 
MOT 
(G5, G6, G7, G8, G10, 
G11) 
Others 
(G1, G2, G3, G4, G9,  
G14, G16, G17, G18) 
Coordination issues  
- Coordination 
between agencies  
- Operational 
coordination 
between modes  
G5, G6, G7, G8 
 
 
G3, G4, G9, G14, G16 
 
 
G3, G4, G16 
 
P1 
 
 
O1, O2, O3, O5 
 
 
O1, O2 
Deteriorating public 
transport services 
 G5, G7, G8 G2, G3, G4, G16  P1 O1, O2, O3, O5 
Push from consultants  
G7, G10 G1, G2, G3, G14   O1 
Proximity of Land 
Transport Authority, 
Singapore 
G5, G6, G7, G8 G1, G3   O1, O3, 05 
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6.2.1 Performance of Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board  
The Bumiputera agenda in the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board 
(CVLB) 
The Bumiputera agenda, which is prevalent in Malaysia, was discussed in 
section 3.2.1.2. A respondent from the Ministry of Transport (MOT) 
succinctly described the influences that shape public transport in Malaysia: 
“The public transport institution today is the creation of the political 
system, because there was a need to give special consideration to 
the Malays, and that is why CVLB was created. The public transport 
system is very much the creation of CVLB” (respondent G7). 
Respondents from the MOT explained that the licensing function was taken 
out of the MOT in the 1980’s, and a new agency – the Commercial Vehicle 
Licensing Board (CVLB) – was created to promote the Bumiputera agenda. 
They acknowledged that the CVLB had its own difficulties, and had to face 
political problems. Since the main aim of this agenda was to create as many 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs as possible, the licensing exercise was 
undertaken at the expense of transport efficiency. These respondents were 
firm in the view that there had been no hope in revamping the CVLB, and 
that it had been necessary to create a new authority: 
“It was a sacred cow, nobody wanted to touch it” (respondent G7). 
Another respondent explained how the Bumiputera agenda was hidden, and 
that the implementation of its policy was not done transparently.  He 
commented: 
“We were not truthful about it, we didn’t put it as criteria to solve 
things, when it is about the agenda of sharing wealth, the outcome is 
as many people gets the share, ... but that is not so true in transport 
strategies, you may dilute the effectiveness because everybody is a 
small player. They don't have the capacity, they don't have the ability 
to ... engage in good management practices” (respondent G14). 
Two respondents from the government sector shared their previous work 
experience at CVLB, one of them asserting that there was little consideration 
for economic viability and social responsibility in designing the delivery of 
public transport services. All approvals for licenses were issued by the CVLB 
board, whose chairman was a politician, and board membership was 
restricted to Malays. The other respondent shared her experience working as 
a junior officer in CVLB in the early nineties. She said there was no 
transparency in the licensing system and that corruption was a problem, with 
licenses being monopolised by Malay politicians and distributed among their 
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constituents. This piece of information was verified by respondents from the 
operators’ group, who reported that the CVLB issued permits on a “who you 
know basis … not a need basis” without a proper supply and demand study. 
It was reported that taxi permits were often given out to politicians who would 
then lease them out to individual taxi drivers for a daily rent of RM50 (£10). 
The quota for licenses was never strictly followed, and the CVLB often had 
to issue more licenses than were actually needed to accommodate requests 
from politicians.   
Respondents were asked about the placement of CVLB, and whether it 
would have been better if licensing had remained a remit of the MOT. An ex-
CVLB respondent (G9) disagreed, saying that it might have been politicised 
for the benefit of the Chinese because the MOT had a Chinese minister and 
that this would have led to decisions based on racial sentiments. The 
Bumiputera agenda shaped the operations of the CVLB, and this respondent 
pointed out that it was too difficult for bureaucrats in the CVLB to make any 
changes to long-established cultures and practices. This respondent also 
hinted that the CVLB was never a priority for the government because hardly 
anything was done to free it from political interference or to improve its 
performance, implying that there was no initiative for such improvements. 
Respondents who were involved in the Integration and Restructuring of the 
Public Transport System in the Klang Valley Committee (INSPAK) (G3 and 
O1) asserted that the Bumiputera agenda was the main obstacle to the 
creation of a single authority at the Klang Valley regional level in 2005 
because of the strong objections from the minister of the CVLB, playing on 
Malay sentiments.  
The CVLB and licensing control: inadequate planning and enforcement  
The CVLB’s lack of licensing control and enforcement was a major concern 
among the operators. Three respondents pointed out loopholes in the 
administration of the public transport sector, comprising poor planning, 
‘loose’ licensing conditions and unfair competition in the bus industry. As a 
result of this, there were nineteen bus operators in the Klang Valley at one 
point, which Respondent O1 felt to be too many for an area of just 3,000 
km
2
. Respondents noted that the CVLB used their powers of enforcement 
very lightly with bus operators, most of whom operated only on profitable 
routes during peak periods, leading to inefficient competition. Hence, it was 
difficult for bigger companies that were serious about providing a good and 
complete service to survive. This is a nationwide issue in Malaysia where 
256 bus operators are currently active. This also makes it difficult to 
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encourage drivers to maintain good service standards, because it is easy for 
suspended drivers to secure work with different companies. Respondents 
blamed the CVLB for creating too many operators and shaping the kind of 
transport system that is in place now. Interestingly, these respondents did 
not just criticise the CVLB for over-licensing, but also for not knowing who 
holds the licenses: 
“CVLB did not maintain an accurate database and no one knows 
exactly the background of the operating companies, the whole thing 
was a Pandora’s box” (respondent O1). 
Similarly, the taxi industry also experienced the effects of too many permit 
holders. Respondent O4 said that there is an oversupply of taxis, and that 
drivers have difficulties earning a decent living as a result. This respondent 
argued that this was due to a lack of policy and planning by the CVLB. The 
taxi operators had no idea about the kind of support available and the 
expectations on them. To make matters worse, old and out-of-date polices 
have not been reviewed. For example, during the recession period (1997-
2001) the CVLB allowed taxis to operate longer than seven years, but when 
the recession was over, the policy remained, resulting in a multitude of old 
taxis. An ex-CVLB respondent (G9) acknowledged that enforcement was 
lacking because of the CVLB’s lack of manpower and thus its reliance on the 
RTD to do the job, noting that the CVLB’s enforcement team focussed on 
auditing the operating companies to maintain its database rather than on 
enforcing the licensing conditions.  
In a similar vein, a senior government officer pointed out that the CVLB did 
not have a strategic cabinet-endorsed plan to use as a guideline for issuing 
licences, and hence that their decisions in this area were arbitrary: 
“CVLB was lacking very much, I would say in terms of enforcement, 
there were are lot of taxi problems, and then the buses, they were not 
looking at the problem, … just issuing the license based on [the] 
application, not based on what should be done. This process was not 
backed by any plans regarding the number of taxis that you need for a 
particular area” (respondent G4). 
Respondent G4 pointed out that the CVLB could not follow through with 
some of its own policies because of political interference. For example, at 
one point the CVLB issued a policy stating that taxi permits would not be 
given to individuals, but then continued to do this due to political pressure. 
He felt that if the CVLB had been able to plan appropriately and integrate the 
various transport modes using the licensing powers that it had, a lot of 
coordination issues in the transport sector could have been resolved. 
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The issue of oversupplying licenses was prominent in both the taxi and bus 
industries, and an ex-CVLB respondent explained that there was a loophole 
in the act which meant that issued permits cannot be revoked unless the 
permit holder has committed a major offence. This respondent did not deny 
that the CVLB had policy and planning powers for commercial vehicles, but 
believed that it could not adequately exercise its functions because of its 
limited strategic capacity in terms of technical knowledge, human resources 
and funding. These limited it to organisational-based planning, with little 
planning for the bus industry, taxis and goods vehicles. Respondent G14 
made a similar observation: 
“I think to me CVLB was operating below 50% of potential to me, by the 
law that they had, by the authority that they had by the people that they 
had, by the power that they had, because they had the permit power, 
and that is very powerful, so to me in all aspects, operations, 
management, safety, they sub-perform, not reaching even 50%, that is 
my verdict” (respondent G14). 
6.2.2 Performance of Ministry of Transport 
The functions of the Transport Minister provided in His Majesty’s 
Government Gazette (2008) are: “to formulate, implement and coordinate 
policies and strategies for land transport, air and maritime which include the 
development of ports, air traffic and research and development on transport 
services”. Whilst the responsibility for the policy and planning of land 
transport appears to fall clearly under the MOT’s role, many respondents 
were not aware of this, believing that the absence of public transport policy 
resulted from the lack of a single champion for public transport. For example, 
two respondents from the government sector believed that there was no 
coordinated approach to the development of public transport due to the 
absence of an overall policy, and because none of the agencies had the 
purview and powers to develop the policy. Other respondents (both from 
inside and outside the MOT) felt that the MOT was under-performing. One 
respondent who was attached to an agency under the MOT (respondent G8) 
expressed his disappointment with the lack of attention that the MOT gives 
to the planning and development of the railway sector and its reliance on the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) to do the job. This respondent recalled the 
World Bank’s proposal in the 1980’s, which recommended frequent 
meetings among transport agencies to facilitate inter-agency coordination to 
be led by the MOT. Unfortunately, the MOT did not react to this proposal. 
Respondent G14 commented that the focus and blame was unfairly directed 
towards the CVLB for failing to play a coordinating role, when the MOT was 
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in a better position to do so. Another respondent criticised the performance 
of MOT officers, commenting that some of them lack the motivation and 
competence to carry out their duties. When it was inquired if the MOT could 
have performed SPAD’s functions now, Respondent G1 replied in the 
negative, pointing out that MOT’s officers are too slow and cannot match the 
performance of those hired by SPAD.   
Respondents from the MOT did not deny that it had the requisite powers to 
develop overall transport policies and plans, but pointed out that it could not 
or did not exercise them because buses and taxis were under the purview of 
the CVLB, and thus it was assumed that the CVLB would take responsibility 
for them. Reference to the CVLB Act 1987 reveals that it was not the CVLB’s 
remit to produce the overall policy for the transport sector, and there was no 
mention of planning in the act, and reference to the CVLB’s old website 
shows that their role in planning was limited to conducting studies on new 
routes before issuing new bus licenses. However, these respondents argued 
that although the MOT had the authority to draft the necessary policies and 
plans, they would interfere with the jurisdiction of CVLB in implementing 
them. In particular, they may not have been in accordance with the 
Bumiputera agenda, so they did not think that interventions were desirable. 
Another agency heavily involved in planning is the Town and Country 
Planning Department (TCPD), which is responsible for land use planning for 
physical, social, economic and environmental development (His Majesty’s 
Government Gazette, 2008). Respondents who were closely associated with 
this department (G16 and G17) said that transport planning was a 
component in both the structural and local plans, but that no dedicated 
public transport plans were made except in relation to one or two local areas. 
Even these latter plans were not properly implemented because the TCPD 
had neither the jurisdiction to make local authorities implement them nor the 
monetary resources to provide ‘sweeteners’ to influence the local authorities. 
6.2.3 Coordination issues with multiple agencies 
The existence of multiple, uncoordinated agencies was cited as one of the 
critical reasons for needing a single transport authority. Almost all the 
respondents highlighted the existence of multiple agencies under different 
ministries with divergent goals as the stumbling block for coordinated work, 
and they had various perspectives and ideas about how to deal with this 
issue. Two areas which require improvement were cited: first, the 
coordination between agencies needed to produce effective outputs, and 
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second, the integration of public transport modes to provide seamless travel 
for commuters.  
Seven respondents from a variety of categories pointed out that there were 
thirteen or fourteen agencies with jurisdiction over land public transport that 
have different functions and interests, and that they work to achieve their 
own objectives with little consideration for what others are trying to achieve. 
Two respondents from the government sector with research backgrounds 
(G2 and G14) said that the absence of an overall policy for transport was an 
obstacle to the development of effective transport initiatives because there 
were no policy statements setting priorities or directions that these agencies 
could use for guidance in planning their strategies and initiatives.    
Stakeholders that have different needs and perceptions of the existing 
problems have thus come to believe that the creation of a transport authority 
may help ameliorate some of their difficulties. The respondents from EPU 
wanted a dedicated planning branch for public transport that could also 
evaluate proposals before forwarding recommendations to them for final 
approval. Although EPU has been involved in planning and coordination 
work for land public transport matters, one of the EPU respondents pointed 
out that this was not an easy process because of the presence of multiple 
agencies under different ministries that were difficult to bring together on a 
common platform. Respondents G3, G4, G16, O1 and O2 asserted that 
there was a lack of overall connectivity between the transport modes and 
that the different modes had to be brought together under one agency.  
On the other hand, the operators wanted a one-stop centre to handle 
licensing and enforcement issues to cut down on the time they had to spend 
dealing with different agencies in handling land transport matters. Similar 
views about the time-consuming nature of interactions with other agencies 
were also expressed by the former INSPAK committee members (G3 and 
O1), who were behind the idea of the Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority 
in 2004. They wanted a single regulator for the newly established 
government-linked transport companies PRASARANA and Rapid KL, so that 
these companies would only need to deal with one body for operational 
matters. It was felt that the single regulator should have all the 
responsibilities and functions for regulating licenses. One INSPAK member 
commented: 
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“Meanwhile, how to make it really work more efficient and effective? Is 
to have this one stop authority because, even while we were doing 
the rail and bus integration, consolidation and operations, we had, we 
knew the problems – we had to go to CVLB for this and that, we had 
to go to DOR for other matters, then we have to go to the local 
authorities City Hall, MPPJ, MPSJ so, so many agencies to work with 
you know, at one point as I said there were twelve or thirteen 
agencies easily” (respondent O1). 
There were two main streams of thought among respondents regarding the 
best way for improving coordination: that the existing institutional structure 
could be strengthened without having to create a new authority, and that 
creating a dedicated body for transport was the only way out.  
Three respondents (G2, G8 and G14) did not support the creation of SPAD, 
and suggested that either developing coordination at the ministerial level or 
reforming the CVLB were the best options for improvement. One of them 
said that coordination issues could be improved by creating a high-level 
permanent committee overseen by the Prime Minister. This respondent 
believed that the single transport authority model that has been successfully 
used in developed cities may not be suitable for Malaysia where it is 
extremely difficult to transfer powers of existing agencies to one umbrella 
body. Respondent G8, representing MOT, rejected the idea of merging 
Department of Railway (DOR) with SPAD, arguing that the problems were 
only with the road transport and not rail, and thus that mergers should only 
focus on agencies dealing with road transport. Respondent G14 cautioned 
that although many parties tend to blame the presence of multiple agencies 
with overlapping jurisdictions for a lack of coordination and view the solution 
to be the creation of a single champion who could bring these agencies 
together, no specific studies had been commissioned to prove this claim. He 
suggested that this was seen as unnecessary because the answers were 
already known and the solutions readily available.  
Those who supported the creation of a dedicated transport authority felt that 
it should be an authority rather than just a coordinating committee.  
Respondents O3 and G16 strongly rejected the idea that a coordinating 
committee would be sufficient, saying that an authority with adequate power 
was necessary to make things happen quickly. A coordinating committee 
model was tried in Malaysia with INSPAK in 2004. According to the ex-
members of INSPAK, this committee’s success was hindered because it did 
not have legislative backing or the formal authority to direct other agencies, 
and so had to rely on strong political backing from the Finance Minister. 
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Although transferring all the transport powers and responsibilities to the MOT 
could solve the coordination issues without the need to create a brand new 
agency, this was not possible under the existing political structure.  An ex-
member of INSPAK explained that it would not be desirable to transfer all 
the responsibilities of these agencies to the MOT because the MOT could 
then become too powerful, leading to political conflicts and power struggles 
for the minister’s post (also see section 6.5.2.1). Hence, creating a new 
agency was seen as the best solution available at that point in time.  
6.2.4 Deteriorating public transport services 
Twelve respondents stressed the deterioration in the public transport 
services and their falling use as an indicator of poor transport planning and 
management. A respondent form a local authority (G2) expressed his 
disappointment with the recent developments in transport, saying that the 
entire administration and management of the public transport system was in 
a mess and needed reform. This respondent attributed the decline in public 
transport use in the capital city to poor governmental decisions including 
eliminating minibuses, not increasing parking levies, and the lack of 
regulation on the number of bus operators. He asserted that the government 
had focused on providing physical infrastructure to the exclusion of ‘soft 
infrastructure’ such as effective regulation, enforcement and efficient 
management of services. Similar concerns were shared by respondents O3, 
O5 and G16.  
One respondent from the MOT pointed out that although the development of 
public transport in Kuala Lumpur had been ahead of that in many other 
neighbouring cities in previous decades, it started to fall behind neighbouring 
cities like Bangkok in the 1990s. Respondent P1 saw that something had 
triggered the drastic drop in public transport usage, but he did not pinpoint a 
particular cause, instead blamed the presence of too many agencies dealing 
with transport and the urgent need for a dedicated authority. He hinted that 
the failure of the government urban rail projects that aimed to revive the 
public transport industry in the 1990’s by privatising it and failure of the 
monorail project which had to be taken over in 2007 were the trigger for a 
single regulator. This point was supported in e-mail correspondence by an 
EPU respondent who was involved in the takeover exercise, and claimed 
that a single regulator was required to ensure the safety and smooth running 
of operations and to prevent operators under financial stress from taking 
shortcuts.  
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6.2.5 Push from consultants  
The proposal for a Malaysian single transport authority was first made in the 
1970s and, according to respondent G2, the idea came from foreign 
consultants who were contracted by the government to help with the 
preparation of transport plans. These consultants based their suggestion on 
the models that had been successful in Singapore and London. According to 
this respondent, the proposal was repeatedly raised in government reports 
over the years, and the government took the proposal seriously because the 
consultants had drawn lessons from successful models. Eventually, a 
transport authority became seen as necessary for saving the public transport 
industry: 
“The government was trapped, and after spending millions on transport 
studies, they were forced into the situation where they had to 
implement the proposal. If the Government didn’t do anything, the harm 
done will be even greater than doing it” (respondent G2).  
The ex-members of the INSPAK committee did not deny that the consultants 
had looked at models that had worked in other developed cities before 
designing one for Malaysia. Therefore, G2’s argument about the influence of 
the consultants in developing transport strategies and initiatives seems to be 
valid. Similarly, four other respondents from the government sector also 
asserted that the genesis of the idea of SPAD came from consultants, and 
blamed the government for acting on the consultants’ recommendations. 
Respondent G14 expressed his scepticism about the value of engaging 
consultants: 
“Sometimes we tend to be guided by the consultants who doesn’t know 
the industry for many years” (respondent G14). 
6.2.6 The proximity of Singapore’s Land Transport Authority  
The creation of SPAD was also influenced by the success of the Land 
Transport Authority (LTA) created in Singapore in 1995. Six respondents 
from government officials (mainly from the MOT) made reference to the LTA, 
all of whom felt that the single transport authority in Malaysia should have 
the same powers as the LTA, which cover planning, operations, regulation, 
infrastructural development and the maintenance of infrastructure and 
systems. The ex-INSPAK interviewees said that although Malaysian policy-
makers took the LTA as their benchmark, they failed to create such a 
powerful body as everyone defended their own turf, and thus SPAD ended 
up as a diluted version of the LTA. In the same vein, respondent G8 made 
the following comments via e-mail:  
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“The formation of LTA was made possible by the sheer political fiat and 
will of the Singapore Government headed by the strongman premier 
Lee Kuan Yew. A similar exercise in Malaysia would have caused a fair 
bit of political opposition. The formation of LTA Singapore was also 
made easier and logical by virtue of the fact that the whole of 
Singapore is actually an almost wholly urbanised city-state serving as 
one whole urban region, making sense to put it under a one Land 
Transport Authority regime. Not so with Malaysia – a far larger country, 
a federation of states that have their own authority and rights, making 
complete integration as per the Singapore scenario nigh well 
impossible” (respondent G8).  
6.2.7 Reflections  
The respondents’ information shows that there was a general dissatisfaction 
with the existing institutional structure in Malaysia. Although coming from 
different perspectives, the main issues were around poor licensing and 
regulation, management of privatised holdings and lack of strategic 
coordination. The problems had been the source of discussion for twenty 
over years but nothing changed. 
Prior to the creation of SPAD, there were multiple agencies involved in the 
planning and management of transport. Agency coordination was a problem 
and it was a problem because it took a long time to get anything done and it 
also affected the running of public transport services. There were other 
pressing problems on the ground to deal with as well. The transport modes 
were not integrated because they were under different agencies, and the 
general understanding was that this mode could be better integrated if the 
planning and regulatory functions of these modes were put under one body. 
For instance, De Velde and Didier (2005) observes that public transport 
could be effectively coordinated through planning and regulatory functions 
and that good coordination could lead to better resource efficiency and 
promote effective infrastructure investment. Bringing the different transport 
modes under one body ensures that power is consolidated for better 
management and control, and Flyvbjerg (2001) suggests that this gives the 
central government better control because it stabilises power relations. Thus, 
one of the reasons why SPAD was created at the national rather than at the 
regional level could be that it enabled the government to strengthen its grip 
under centralised control. 
The distribution of power was uneven and mainly concentrated in the CVLB, 
which had a hidden motive to promote the Bumiputera agenda instead of 
focussing on the efficiency of the public transport delivery system. Hence, 
the CVLB only focused on licensing, which was a lucrative business, with the 
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result that planning and enforcement were neglected. Corruption was a 
problem, with licensing activity being heavily politicised, and whilst the 
Bumiputera agenda aimed to reduce the disparity between Malays and non-
Malays, those who were entrusted with the responsibility for its 
implementation apparently misused this power for their benefit. Nye (2011) 
and Bellamy et al. (2011) have pointed out that power is context-specific – it 
is dependent upon the behaviour of those who exercise it, and can produce 
unintended and harmful consequences in the absence of well-designed 
strategies and a lack of accountability, and this was observed in CVLB. 
Although politicians knew about this corruption and abuse of power, little was 
done to address it as it involved racial sensitivity, and the political will to get 
involved in this was insufficient. As a result, other agencies such as the MOT 
avoided becoming involved in public transport planning, although it was their 
responsibility. Racial sensitivity was used as an excuse, and the MOT, led by 
a non-Malay minister, refused to get involved in the highly politicised 
Bumiputera agenda. This created a chasm in planning for public transport. It 
was within these institutional rules/norms and practices that the public 
transport sector was shaped (Scott, 2001), with bureaucrats acting within 
these constraints to avoid stepping on anyone else’s feet, and this took a toll 
on what was provided for the public. 
There was no common view on the best way to move forward. In addition, 
there was a lack of evidence concerning exactly what the problems were, but 
among the solutions floating around was the creation of a single transport 
authority. This was heavily promoted by management consultants and 
influenced by the success of the LTA Singapore, which was used as a 
benchmark by policy elites in Malaysia. There were other influencing factors, 
such as the policy failures that led to the deterioration of public transport 
services, and the appointment of the new Prime Minister in 2009, who 
provided the ultimate push for the creation of SPAD in 2010. The policy 
changed occurred when the policy window opened with the right combination 
of problems, solutions and political condition as suggested by Kingdon 
(1995). 
The government attempted to create a single transport authority in 2005, but 
it did not materialise as a result of strong resistance from the CVLB, as the 
proposal would have ceded CVLB’s power to the single authority, revealing 
that agencies with power will strive to retain that power and resist change 
which threatens that (Agocs, 1997). Furthermore, the proposal did not 
guarantee that the ethnic Bumiputera would have continued privileges under 
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the new authority’s licensing regime, which implied that some parties could 
lose the advantages they enjoyed, thus creating further resistance to it 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001; Chisholm, 2000). However, the proposal did not threaten 
the survival of the CVLB because the agency would have continued to exist 
as a regulator of goods vehicles, with the proposed authority only focusing 
on public transport. At that point, there was clearly an absence of strong 
political leadership that dared to challenge and implement a controversial 
policy that may have permanently removed the privileges enjoyed for many 
years by the Bumiputera in the transport sector. In a country like Malaysia, 
where racial tensions are always an issue and political leaders have to work 
hard to keep racial conflicts to a minimum, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
such a proposal did not see the light of day. 
However, things began to change in 2008 when the Barisan National – the 
ruling alliance party since independence – failed to secure a two-thirds 
majority in parliament for the first time since 1969. This was an indication 
that the citizens were losing confidence in the ruling government and of the 
general dissatisfaction among non-Malays to the special privileges granted 
to the Bumiputeras. This sentiment was played out by opposition political 
parties to win support, and hence when the new Prime Minister took office in 
2009, his main challenge was to strengthen racial unity, which he did under 
the slogan ‘One Malaysia’, which stresses national unity and ethnic 
tolerance, and one way that it seeks to promote this is by ensuring a fair 
distribution of resources to all Malaysia’s citizens. One of the daring 
initiatives the new Prime Minister took was to abolish the Ministry of 
Entrepreneurship and Cooperative Development (MECD), which had 
promoted the Bumiputera agenda since the 1990’s, and this meant that the 
CVLB, an agency that had been under the MECD, was temporarily based in 
the Prime Minister’s Department. In this case, the presence of strong 
leadership dislocated the ‘path’ as hypothesised by Low and Astle (2009). 
The Prime Minister also designed some ‘quick wins’ for the public through 
the formulation of key result areas and target-setting, and one of the areas 
identified for major improvements was public transport.  
Although the idea for SPAD was not mooted by the Prime Minister, and was 
already in the planning phase when he took office, the proposal 
complemented his strategy to put an end the Bumiputera agenda whilst also 
streamlining and improving the long neglected public transport sector to win 
back public trust. Interestingly, although the proposal for a single transport 
authority had only focused on public transport modes in its history until this 
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point, the Prime Minister decided that it should also take goods vehicles on 
board – a decision which made the CVLB irrelevant. The Prime Minister’s 
strong political leadership thus made this reform possible, and he was 
vested with the authority to make decisions and take the necessary steps to 
gain legitimacy from citizens, which conforms to the findings from the 
literature (Bauckaert and Politt, 2011;  McCourt and Lee, 2007).  
Interestingly, each different group of respondents had their own views of 
what the single transport should look like and what it should do, emphasising 
that it should not take away any of their existing powers, but either 
strengthen them or provide some kind of benefit for them. Even with a 
successful model next door – LTA Singapore, there were arguments about 
what the transport authority in Malaysia should look like. In short, none of the 
groups wanted to be on the losing end and the impacts on the public were 
rarely mentioned. Respondents from the MOT argued that a dedicated 
authority was necessary because there was no hope of revamping the 
CVLB. They held that the transport modes had to be integrated, but wanted 
the new authority to be established under their ministry. Those from the 
operators group wanted a one-stop centre to facilitate licensing and 
enforcement so that they would only have to deal with one agency. 
Respondents representing the EPU wanted an agency that could play a 
coordinating role, fill the gap in planning, and act as a checkpoint to filter 
proposals before they were passed on to the approving authorities. The 
respondents outside these main groups had mixed feelings, some holding 
that the problems could have been resolved by revamping the CVLB or 
creating a strong coordinating body, and others holding that the creation of a 
single transport authority was a clean and easy way out. 
6.3 Research question 2: What types of autonomy have been 
given to the authority? 
This research questions explores the autonomy and authority given to 
SPAD. Table 6.2 provides a summary of the responses received from 
participants in relation to this research question. Although all the 
respondents from across the groups expressed their views, the responses 
received from those who were involved in the creation of SPAD in the 
government sector and participants in SPAD provide greater weight because 
the former were the key reformers who understand the rationale behind the 
functions and powers allocated to SPAD and the latter are involved in 
exercising the powers given. The first column highlights four major features 
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of autonomy that SPAD has – legislative support, planning functions, 
regulatory powers and enforcement powers. The respondents’ views about 
each of these features were sought so that their understanding of SPAD’s 
functions and the challenges it faces could be explored, and their views 
about what role SPAD should ideally play could be solicited.  
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Table 6.2: Matrix showing responses to research question 2  
What types of autonomy have been given to the authority? 
Respondents group Government officials 
SPAD 
(G12, G13, G15) 
Politicians 
(P1, P2) 
Operators 
(O1, O2, O3, O4, O5) 
Response 
MOT 
(G5, G6, G7, G8, 
G10, G11) 
Others 
(G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, 
G16, G17, G18) 
Legal backing  
 Legislative support is crucial 
  
G1, G3, G4 
 
  
O1 
 Legislative support is 
important but must be 
supported with other 
elements 
G5, G6, G10, G11 G2 
G12, G13  
 
P2 
 
O1, O2 
 Legislation support not 
necessary 
 
G2, G9, G14 
 
 
 
Planning  
 SPAD fills the planning gap 
G5, G6, G8 
G1, G4, G9, G14,  G16, 
G17 
G12, G13, G15  O1, O4, O5 
 SPAD has powers to plan 
but no powers to drive the 
plans 
 
 
G1, G2, G17 G12, G13 P2 O1 
 SPAD acts as check point 
for the project approving 
authority  
G5, G7 G1, G4 G12, G13 P1 O2, O5 
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What types of autonomy have been given to the authority? 
Respondents group Government officials 
SPAD 
(G12, G13, G15) 
Politicians 
(P1, P2) 
Operators 
(O1, O2, O3, O4, O5) 
Response 
MOT 
(G5, G6, G7, G8, 
G10, G11) 
Others 
(G1, G2, G3, G4, G9, G14, 
G16, G17, G18) 
Regulation 
 Merged the functions of 
CVLB, DOR and Ministry of 
Tourism  
G8, G10  G12, G13 P2 O1, O2 
 Also looks into regulation of 
transport terminals and 
service standards 
G5   G12, G13   
 SPAD is yet to be a single 
regulator  
  G12, G13, G15   
 SPAD should not be 
involved in project 
implementation  
 G1 G13 P1 O1 
Enforcement 
 Shares enforcement 
function with RTD 
G5, G6, G10, G11 G1, G9 G12,G13  O1, O2 
 Dispute with RTD over 
enforcement for vocational 
license 
G10, G11 G1, G9 G12,G13  O4 
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6.3.1 Legal backing  
There were mixed views about the importance of legal backing for SPAD 
and the importance of legislative support for a regulatory body was 
discussed by four respondents; G1, G3, G4 and O1. The ex-INSPAK 
respondents said that legal backing gives SPAD a permanent structure and 
legal mandate to deal with the other agencies. One of them related their 
previous experience with INSPAK to this issue: 
“INSPAK worked, but at the same time don’t forget that when it 
comes to paperwork, bureaucracy comes in, because if you are 
from the Department of Railway, I can’t take your powers although I 
am INSPAK – it is gazetted under your act, so that's where they still 
hold the power. No teeth. We had the bark but not the teeth” 
(respondent O1). 
This suggested that legal backing was important for providing a mandate 
about the functions of SPAD and the clarity of its role vis-à-vis other 
agencies. Respondent G4 believed that the INSPAK committee was 
ineffective due to the absence of legal backing for them. Furthermore, this 
respondent argued that because SPAD has regulatory powers and 
enforcement powers, it also needs legislative support to discharge these 
roles effectively.  
On the other hand, respondents from SPAD felt that although the Act has 
given SPAD a substantial amount of power as a commission through having 
the Prime Minister as its head, in reality many of these things only exist on 
paper and have not materialised. Six respondents (mainly those from MOT) 
heavily criticised the performance of SPAD and blamed it for not being able 
to fully operationalise the act quickly by putting work procedures and 
consequential amendments in place, but respondents from SPAD argue that 
these are operational matters which takes time to settle in. Two respondents 
outside SPAD (G2 and O1) felt that not having powers over the local 
authorities is a major stumbling block for SPAD as it affects the 
implementation of plans on the ground and the local authorities are not 
obliged to follow guidelines set by SPAD. 
Three respondents outside SPAD considered legal backing for a transport 
body like SPAD to be irrelevant to its performance. Respondent G14 said 
that an ability to build good communications and networks with a wide range 
of stakeholders in the industry, and to use these networks to get things done 
is crucial, but that SPAD has failed to do this. Respondent G9 pointed to the 
effectiveness of other bodies without legal backing, such as the Performance 
152 
 
Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), which is entrusted with the 
responsibility to monitor national transformation projects. This respondent 
observed that PEMANDU has the Prime Minister’s political support and lacks 
legal backing, but that it has nonetheless turned out to be a very powerful 
body. Finally, respondent G2 thought that a high-level committee with 
permanent members could have been a cheaper and more effective 
alternative to SPAD. This respondent felt that the current SPAD model is an 
expensive set-up, and that although it has legal backing, it does not have all 
the required power to operate like a single transport authority, such as power 
over the local authorities or funding capabilities. 
SPAD was envisaged as a commission and was supposed to be given the 
commission status at the start of its operation. Respondent P1 explained 
that ‘commission status’ in Malaysia means that the relevant agency is free 
to set up its own terms and conditions for employment. However, under 
current government procedure, an agency can only be granted commission 
status if it is financially independent. Because SPAD has not proven to be 
able to self-finance, it has not been given this privilege. Respondents from 
SPAD expressed their disappointment with this because they have only 
been given partial separation for remuneration, which means that SPAD is 
allowed to manage its recruitment but must comply to the salary scheme 
determined by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) besides being subjected to the 
financial procedures of the government. They argue that the absence of full 
separation for remuneration prevents SPAD from capacity building, and that 
if SPAD was given the freedom to determine its own salary scale, they could 
make it more competitive to attract more talented employees to reform the 
industry and curb corruption. However, a respondent from EPU argued that 
SPAD has been given a better deal than anybody else because they have 
an approved salary band that gives better pay than the civil servants get. 
Thus, even though this pay is slightly lower than that in the private market, it 
is the first time that a statutory body which is financially dependent on public 
funds has been given such an exemption. 
The absence of commission status means that SPAD has to periodically 
report to the PMD for administrative matters and SPAD is not happy about 
this, as nothing is mentioned in the Act about such reporting. Respondents 
from SPAD commented that it is treated just like any other government 
agency and cannot function effectively due to multiple reporting points. They 
also noted that although the Prime Minister agreed for SPAD to be full 
separate from government agencies for remuneration, the long 
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administrative process has prevented this from happening thus far. 
Correspondence with the officer in charge of the MOF (via telephone) 
revealed that there has not been a directive from the Prime Minister’s Office 
or from any other senior civil servant regarding this matter, and therefore that 
this status is not about to change. An ex-SPAD employee (O2) highlighted 
that the delays in getting this status established could be attributed to the 
poor relationship between SPAD and the senior civil servants that hold the 
authority to approve such matters.  
6.3.2 Transport planning process 
This section highlights the respondents' feedback about the changes to the 
transport planning process prior to and since the creation of SPAD. Table 
6.3 presents a summary of the changes that have occurred. 
        Table 6.3: Transport planning roles before and after the creation of 
SPAD 
Transport planning before 
the creation of SPAD  
Transport planning after the creation of 
SPAD  
 
Gap in planning for public transport: 
- MOT had the powers on paper 
but not in reality 
- EPU did some transport 
planning, but at the national 
level 
- TCPD did some planning at local 
levels, but did not have the 
financial autonomy and authority 
to drive the plans forward 
 
SPAD fills the gap in transport planning: 
- Prepared transport plans – for Greater KL, MRT, 
HSR, tool kit for the states. However, most of 
these plans were prepared in silos, involving 
minimum consultation with the stakeholders  
- SPAD acts as checkpoint for EPU 
- SPAD needs to ensure land use transport 
integration planning  
- SPAD has powers to plan but does not have the 
powers for delivering the plans: 
 
 Lacks financial autonomy to provide 
incentives to implementers  
 Uses the licensing mechanism to 
implement the plans (authority) 
 Uses the national physical planning council 
as the medium for implementation at the 
local level  
 
 
Since its creation, SPAD has had a big focus on its planning role, which, 
according to a respondent from SPAD, has been given priority over its other 
two roles – regulation and enforcement. These two roles were put on hold for 
six months until the CVLB and the DOR were officially dissolved and their 
powers transferred to SPAD in January 2011. This respondent highlighted 
some of the initial planning work that was undertaken, such as the Value 
Management Report for the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) project, the Greater 
Klang Valley Master Plan, the Railway Development Plan and the Feasibility 
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Study for High Speed Rail. Although SPAD is empowered to plan, this 
respondent pointed out that the Act does not empower SPAD to implement 
the plans or require the delivery of the plans. Therefore, it has to work with 
project implementation agencies (such as local authorities and ministries) to 
get the plans implemented.  
During the data collection period of this research, SPAD was heavily 
engaged in developing a toolkit to form the guidelines for local authorities in 
preparing their own master plans. Respondents from the operators group 
acknowledged that SPAD had occasionally engaged with them and 
presumed that they would have consulted other agencies as well. However, 
all the respondents from the government side said that SPAD did not consult 
them or inform them about the study. A respondent form a local authority 
(G2) noted that such a toolkit has been prepared before, and that SPAD 
should have taken stock of existing plans and consulted stakeholders before 
embarking on a brand new plan. This respondent stressed that if the local 
authorities are the target users of the toolkit, they should have been involved 
from the beginning in order for the toolkit to be developed to their 
requirements so that it could be smoothly implemented.  
A respondent from TCPD (G17) pointed out that SPAD should familiarise 
itself with existing plans and ensure that land use and transport are 
integrated. The National Physical Plan developed by TCPD has set some 
broad policies and guidelines that could form the basis for transport plans for 
states and cities. However, according to this respondent, the local authorities 
do not have a dedicated transport plan for their areas, and lack capacity as 
well as an understanding of how the entire transport network functions. This 
respondent, assuming that SPAD was well versed with transport planning, 
proposed a close collaboration between the local authorities and SPAD to 
ensure that planning and development of transport facilities in the local 
areas would best meet local needs. Respondent G1, on the other hand, 
raised what he believed to be serious inadequacies in SPAD. This 
respondent was very concerned that senior managers in SPAD did not 
understand how SPAD’s transport plans fit with the current planning 
framework, and hence thought that they would not be able to pool the 
appropriate resources to exercise their planning role effectively.  
Interestingly, the respondents from SPAD seemed to hold a different 
understanding about their role in ensuring land use and transport integration 
than that suggested by respondent G17. They felt that it was not SPAD’s 
responsibility to integrate transport with land use, but that of the National 
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Physical Planning Council (NPPC), and held that a consultation should be 
undertaken with stakeholders on this point.  
The presence of SPAD seems to benefit the EPU as SPAD acts as a filter 
for new proposals to be cross-examined against their plans and evaluated 
prior to their submission to the EPU for approval. Respondents from the EPU 
pointed out that SPAD’s endorsement does not necessarily mean that the 
EPU will approve proposals because the EPU has to assess the project 
budget and its financial feasibility prior to any decisions. It was also pointed 
out that all new proposals on public transport projects that go directly to the 
EPU are channelled to SPAD for initial evaluation. In addition, SPAD is 
tasked with the preparation of feasibility studies for mega-projects that were 
previously under the purview of the EPU.  One example is the high-speed 
rail feasibility study, which is now conducted by SPAD but commissioned by 
the EPU. 
Seven respondents cited funding capacity as the main element that SPAD 
required to implement its plans and make up for its lack of power over local 
authorities. SPAD does not currently have enough funding for physical 
projects, and is dependent on government grants to run its operations, 
although several SPAD respondents noted that it does have sufficient 
funding to support preparation of studies and master plans. However, 
respondent G17 said that it does not matter that SPAD does not have 
control over the local authorities, but that financial muscle is crucial and 
could be used as an effective tool to encourage local authorities to 
implement their plans. This respondent added that although SPAD does not 
have the capacity to provide funding for projects themselves, a mechanism 
through which money is disbursed through SPAD is sufficient for 
stakeholders to appreciate SPAD’s value and its role in planning.  
Their planning role requires SPAD to be a good coordinator and an authority. 
The coordinating role comes in during the preparation phase, which requires 
extensive engagement with the various stakeholders. This is important for 
ensuring that different perspectives are captured and that plans are well 
integrated both among different modes and between land use and transport. 
Respondent G3 asserted that SPAD cannot work alone because they do not 
have sole authority for land transport, which still lies with a variety of different 
agencies. Respondent G4 highlighted that SPAD must plan for freight and 
public transport simultaneously to achieve the national target for shifting 
freight transport from road to rail, and a lot of coordination is required here.  
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The ‘authority role’ mainly involves taking ownership of the plans and driving 
them forward by playing a leading role. Several SPAD respondents 
discussed how they have devised other mechanisms to use as push their 
plans through without having funding muscle, such as through licensing and 
the NPPC. SPAD is empowered to issue operating licenses for both 
transport operations and terminals, and in cases where the local authorities 
are reluctant to adhere to SPAD’s transport plans in terms of locations or 
specifications, SPAD could have their applications for operating licences 
rejected. Moreover, SPAD can use the NPPC chaired by the Prime Minister 
as a medium for cascading plans to the state and the local levels. The chief 
minister of each state is a member of this council and responsible for 
communicating the plans that are to be implemented to the relevant 
agencies in his state. 
6.3.3 Regulation  
This section highlights the respondents' feedback on the changes to 
transport regulation before and after the creation of SPAD. The table below 
presents a summary of changes that have occurred. In short, the regulatory 
roles of the RTD remained unchanged, but the roles of the CVLB, the 
Ministry of Tourism and the DOR were transferred to SPAD.  
 
Table 6.4: Transport regulation roles before and after the creation of 
SPAD 
Transport regulation before the 
creation of SPAD  
Transport regulation after the 
creation of SPAD  
 
RTD – Driving license, registration of 
vehicles, road tax, vehicle use, road 
worthiness – for all road-based transport 
 
 
RTD – Driving license, registration of vehicles, 
road tax, vehicle use, road worthiness – for all 
road-based transport (unchanged) 
 
CVLB – fare regulation and licensing of 
commercial vehicles (buses, taxis, goods 
vehicles) 
 
Ministry of Tourism – licensing for hire 
and drive cars and tourism vehicles  
 
DOR – licensing for railway  
operations, approval for railway 
schemes, service standards, handling 
accident 
SPAD – merged functions of CVLB, Ministry 
of Tourism and DOR. 
 
 
 
 
Local authorities/MOT  –  licensing for 
transport terminal  
 
Additional functions for SPAD – licensing for 
transport terminal operations, licensing for 
train drivers, regulating service standards, 
safety issues (new functions added to SPAD) 
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Section 3.2.2 explained the changes that the creation of SPAD caused in the 
institutional framework. Respondents from SPAD highlighted that under 
these changes, the regulation of public transport, rail and goods vehicles all 
came under SPAD. SPAD is also responsible for ensuring that the industry is 
developed in a proper manner, fulfilling certain performance standards. To 
do that, it has to develop and attach appropriate service standards to the 
licensing conditions. SPAD also has the capacity to advise both government 
and non-government entities on transport-related matters, and respondent 
G13 stressed that these agencies must take SPAD’s views into 
consideration. SPAD also takes the lead when accidents involving public 
transport occur, playing a coordinating role between the Malaysian Road 
Safety Research Institute and the Police. 
During the planning stage of reform, it was suggested that SPAD be given 
the authority to regulate vocational licensing (driving license issued to public 
transport and goods vehicle drivers), but respondents who were directly 
involved in the creation of SPAD pointed out that there was strong resistance 
to this from the RTD – which oversees the licensing of all the land transport 
vehicle drivers – and thus the plan was abandoned. Respondents from 
SPAD said that giving SPAD this responsibility would have provided it with 
control over the drivers as well as the operating permits, enabling it to 
regulate the sector better. On the other hand, the respondents from the RTD 
argued that the vocational licence is linked to the individual private driving 
licence, and it is not practical to separate the two as this would cause more 
issues during enforcement. This response was contested by respondents 
from SPAD, who countered that more issues arise in enforcement because 
of SPAD’s lack of authority to regulate the vocational licence, which causes 
a fragmentation of its regulation and enforcement roles. They felt that they 
still needed to acquire the necessary powers from the RTD. This shows poor 
inter-agency coordination and an unwillingness to innovate in joint 
enforcement. The legal advisor to the RTD highlighted that the department is 
reluctant to give up any of its existing authority, and suggested that there 
were other mechanisms for empowering SPAD that do not involve making 
changes to the transport acts. For example, the Road Transport Act 1987 
clause 4b, allows the enforcement function of the RTD to be delegated to 
SPAD officers upon approval from the Minister of Transport. Therefore, all 
that SPAD needs to do is request that the RTD delegate enforcement power 
to them, but SPAD has not done so. 
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Respondents from the MOT raised a number of boundary issues. They 
argued that because they no longer manage the DOR (the DOR has been 
absorbed into SPAD), they have lost its authority over the railway, and that 
as a result they should not be responsible for implementing any railway 
projects. Therefore, they thought that the MOT should hand over its existing 
railway projects to SPAD so that it did not get accused of implementing 
projects without legitimate authority. However, the respondents who were 
involved in the creation of SPAD were clear of the role that SPAD should 
play. It was designed to concentrate on planning and regulation, and thus 
should not get involved in project development. Hence, they claimed that the 
MOT’s arguments do not stand, and are grounded in frustrations over losing 
some of their powers.  
6.3.4 Enforcement  
This section highlights respondents' feedback to changes in enforcement 
after the creation of SPAD. At least five respondents, G1, G3, G4, G5 and 
O1 asserted that enforcement was problematic in the previous system, and 
that this function still needs serious attention to strengthen it further. They 
pointed out that corruption was rampant in enforcement, mainly in relation to 
dealing with overloaded heavy vehicles, which enforcement officers used to 
get bribes and payoffs for an additional source of income. 
Respondents from SPAD pointed out that SPAD has taken over the CVLB’s 
enforcement role in checking operating licenses for public transport and 
goods vehicles. In addition, SPAD is entrusted with wider responsibilities, 
including enforcing compliance to the operating conditions of the transport 
terminals and that train drivers hold valid licenses. As in the previous system, 
in which the RTD was given the power to enforce the CVLB Act (1987), the 
Land Public Transport Act (2010) also delegates enforcement power to the 
RTD, which means that the RTD has all the enforcement powers that SPAD 
has. Thus, they share the enforcement role. At the moment, SPAD has 147 
enforcement personnel, whereas RTD has 4,500, and both are supposed to 
be working together in this area.  
However, respondents from the RTD commented that they are not happy 
with two new changes in the enforcement procedure, which they claim to 
have increased the procedural complexity. Firstly, the new procedure does 
not allow RTD enforcement officers to prosecute for breeches of licensing 
and servicing standards under the PAD Act (2010), with only SPAD being 
given this privilege. Secondly, all registered offences must be checked by the 
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public prosecutor prior to prosecution or the issuing of fines, whilst previously 
only non-compoundable offences (i.e. those that require prosecution in 
court) required approval from the public prosecutor.   
These respondents also pointed out that the new enforcement procedure 
leads to more paper work, with enforcement personnel having to prepare 
investigation papers for submission to the public prosecutor. This causes 
delays in prosecuting offenders, who then remain free for longer; and the 
RTD’s enforcement personnel losing interest to enforce the PAD Act (2010) 
due to an absence of prosecution powers. Two respondents outside the 
RTD believed that these problems have meant that the revenue from RTD’s 
enforcement activities dropped dramatically after the new procedure was put 
into place, and this shows that the RTD is doing less enforcement work, 
which could have a direct impact on road safety. 
Respondents had different theories about why the new enforcement 
procedure was designed. A respondent from the Attorney General’s office 
said that its purpose was to reduce corruption in enforcement by placing the 
decision-making power with the public prosecutor rather than with the 
enforcement team on the ground. However, respondents from the RTD 
argued that the new procedure has nothing to do with curbing corruption, 
and may in fact backfire and increase corruption as the enforcement 
personnel may be tempted to accept favours from offenders in return for not 
recording the offence. Another respondent suggested that the changes were 
made so that the Attorney General’s Department could reacquire the powers 
it had previously surrendered to agencies. 
The new enforcement procedure does not seem to please SPAD either. 
Respondents from SPAD explained that they have to prepare investigation 
papers for both compoundable and non-compoundable offences, and they 
also have to seek approval from the public prosecutor prior to taking any 
action against the offender. One of the SPAD respondents expressed 
disappointment because SPAD is expected to execute its duties without 
being properly empowered to do so by the Attorney Generals’ Office. 
However, any change to the work procedure will require amendments to 
Clause 241(2) of PAD Act (2010). It was made known that the Prime Minister 
is aware of the enforcement issues, and has decided that changes to the Act 
cannot be made immediately because SPAD has only just been established. 
Therefore, until the amendments are made, the relevant agencies will have 
to work within these constraints. 
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6.3.5 Financial autonomy  
Both the SPAD Act (2010) and the PAD Act (2010) give SPAD resources to 
create its own transport funds – the SPAD fund for operational purposes and 
the PAD fund for industry. However, the SPAD respondents reported that 
only the SPAD fund is operational, and the PAD fund is not anticipated to be 
active in the near future. The SPAD fund generates revenue from licensing 
fees, administrative fees, and compound fees, and these are all used for 
overhead expenditure, and the PAD fund is expected to use congestion 
pricing for its main source of revenue.  
The respondents from SPAD made it clear that SPAD is an authority and a 
regulator rather than a funder, although in the long-run, if and when they 
start to generate revenue, they may be able to provide some financial 
support for the project implementation agencies. They realised that their lack 
of financial autonomy strongly impacts on their performance, and two 
respondents from the operators group said that all of their proposals and 
ideas are being brushed aside by SPAD on the grounds of financial 
constraints. However, three respondents (G4, G14 and O1) claimed that 
financial autonomy was not crucial for SPAD, reasoning that it is under the 
Prime Minister’s wing, and that the Prime Minister is also in charge of the 
EPU and the MOF, who control funding. These respondents also felt that 
financing is not a major issue, and that SPAD gets funding from the MOF on 
an annual basis as well as receiving revenue from its licensing exercise. 
6.3.6 Reflections 
SPAD has been delegated powers to plan, regulate and enforce the 
licensing conditions for land public transport under the SPAD Act (2010) and 
PAD Act (2010) and it was envisaged to be a commission. However, Radin 
(2003) pointed out that the model of the commission is partially self-
defeating. He stressed that whilst they are often used as mechanisms to 
improve horizontal coordination, commissions often appear to shift power to 
a centralized level, which then makes coordination difficult. This is seen in 
the case of SPAD, which is placed directly under the Prime Minister’s Office, 
and thus higher in the hierarchy than the other actors it is supposed to be 
coordinating, thus making them less approachable. Moreover, agencies that 
lost power or had to share power with SPAD after its creation, such as the 
RTD and the MOT, express less willingness to work collaboratively, are 
highly critical of SPAD, and show signs of self-protection in their behaviours 
because of concerns of losing further powers.  
161 
 
The actual autonomy given to SPAD as a commission is explored using the 
six dimensions of autonomy proposed by Verhoest et al. (2004) and 
Laegreid et al. (2006), as shown below in table 6.5. 
  Table 6.5: SPAD’s autonomy compared to the dimensions of 
autonomy proposed by Varhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. 
(2006) 
Autonomy Dimensions Autonomy given to SPAD 
 
Legal 
autonomy 
 
 
 
The extent to which the legal 
status of an agency prevents 
the government from altering 
the allocation of decision-
making competencies 
Strength  Weaknesses 
Presence of 
legislative support 
Some of its 
provisions have not 
been fully 
operationalised, such 
as its commission 
status  
Personnel  
Strategic Personnel Matters 
Salaries, criteria for 
promotion, evaluation, 
recruitment and downsizing 
 
Operational Personnel 
matters  
Wage increases, promotion, 
evaluation, recruitment and 
dismissal of individual 
employees 
 
SPAD can run its 
day-to-day 
operations and has 
powers for 
operational 
personnel matters.  
 
Free to determine its 
own recruitment, set 
criteria for promotion 
and evaluation 
Has to adhere to 
salary scheme 
determined by the 
MOF 
 
Financial 
 
Make loans for investment  
 
Set tariff/prices for products 
and services 
Conclude legal contracts with 
private actors 
Generates own revenue 
Revenue from 
licensing fees and 
penalties 
 
Can conclude legal 
contracts with private 
actors within 
determined limit 
 
Can set fares and 
licensing fee with 
approval from the 
board and the Prime 
Minister 
Financial 
management is 
subject to 
government 
procurement 
procedures  
 
Dependent on  
government grants 
 
Not allowed to give 
loans 
Policy  
 
Strategic Policy Matters 
Setting own goals and 
objectives, setting policies on 
transport matters and 
approval of project proposals 
Operational Policy matters  
Manage day-to-day activities 
 
Manage day-to-day 
operational policy 
matters 
 
Acts as a check for 
project proposals 
before they are 
submitted to 
approving authorities  
Proposes policies 
and plans to 
approving authorities  
Intervention  
 
The extent to which the 
agency is free from ‘reporting’ 
to the government 
 
 
 
Reports to PMD for 
administrative 
matters. 
 
Reports to the Prime 
Minister’s Office for 
policies and project 
matters 
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SPAD is yet to be the single regulator it was envisaged as. Its regulatory 
powers are incomplete because some of its powers still lie with the RTD and 
look unlikely to be transferred because of the strong resistance that the RTD 
and the MOT put up to this. SPAD has to acquire the authority to regulate 
vocational licensing from the RTD in order to be able to regulate the sector 
as a whole. However, it was pointed out that this presents some difficulties 
as the vocational license is linked to the private license and separating the 
two will raise operational issues. The only way to resolve this would be for 
these agencies to put aside their differences and work together, but there 
were no positive signs that this could be made to happen, with power 
struggles likely to be ongoing. There are also disputes about enforcement 
roles between the Attorney General’s office, the RTD and SPAD. The reform 
was used by the Attorney General’s office to strengthen its prosecution 
power. The former wants the RTD and SPAD to perform the enforcement 
process without devolving its powers, and this conforms to White’s (1991: 
189) thesis that governments often seek ‘power-over’ state agencies, as well 
as a number of other findings in the literature concerning decentralisation, 
which contend that the transfer of responsibility without actual power is the 
most favoured mode of decentralisation in developing countries (Rondinelli, 
1983).  
The provision of legislative support for a single transport authority is strongly 
supported by researchers and international development agencies 
(Naniopoulous et al., 2012; GTZ, 2004; World Bank 2002b).  Legal backing 
can also be perceived as a source of ‘hard power’ in Nye’s (2011) power 
model (see section 2.5.3), as it provides SPAD with the mandate to 
command and to use coercion as a mechanism for achieving its ends. Legal 
backing is perceived to be important for SPAD for numerous other reasons 
particularly to minimise the chances that the agency will be impacted by a 
change in political leadership. However, it emerged that whilst having a clear 
act is important, what is more crucial is operationalising the act and having 
additional powers build-in which could be operationalised when needed. 
One of the important elements of the act that has not been implemented is 
the commission status, which is linked to financial independence. Flinders 
and Buller (2006) and White (1991) have argued that the government often 
seeks to control or influence decision-making and behaviours of its agencies 
and semi-autonomous bodies to achieve government objectives, and this 
phenomena is seen in this case study. If the central government wanted to 
make SPAD financially independent, then they could do so, and a proper 
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line of accountability could be designed to ensure that SPAD was 
answerable for its actions. That is yet to happen. On the other hand, SPAD 
sees financial independence as a way for it to be free from accountability to 
the central government, but Flinders and Buller (2006) has pointed out semi-
autonomous agencies are still subjected to political influence and 
government control.  
Although the Prime Minister has approved SPAD to receive full commission 
status, it still has to deal with procedural issues and seek approval from 
administrators. This fits with the conception of power outlined by Flyvbjerg 
(2001,131-132), who holds that “power is not only something one 
appropriates, but also something one re-appropriates and exercises in a 
constant back-and-forth movement in relations of strength, tactics and 
strategies”. The findings suggest that reforms are often only partially 
complete due to the complexity of existing interactions. In the ongoing 
process of negotiations between the affected parties – mainly SPAD and the 
central government – the outcome will be dependent on the resources, 
behaviours and resistance that exist at particular decision-making times and 
situations (Nye, 2011). This shows how difficult it is to accurately predict 
likely outcomes, and that having legal backing doesn’t ensure that a newly 
established authority will be given all the powers it needs to function well 
immediately, but may also require it to undertake negotiations with cleverly 
designed strategies. 
Funding is critical for SPAD to steer the implementation of its plans and be 
able to control the provision of transport services on the ground by regulating 
the subsidy. The current mechanism which makes use of its licensing 
authority, the NPPC and consultation with stakeholders may not be 
sufficient. Without proper funding, SPAD may end up like the TCPD, which 
produced good plans but implemented few of them. However, giving these 
powers to SPAD will require the EPU and the MOF to give up some of their 
existing powers, and these agencies will not give them up willingly. The 
expectation of the central government that SPAD has to prove to be self-
financing before commission status can be granted is also impractical as 
none of the transport authorities in the developed cities has proven to be 
self-sustaining (GTZ, 2004). According to Peters (2010), the profit goal 
should be secondary to social responsibility, especially in the case of public 
transportation. Hence, the central government, especially the MOF, may 
need to allocate a certain amount of annual funding to SPAD for providing 
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incentives to implementing agencies that comply with its guidelines and 
plans.  
6.4 Research question 3: How have the reforms affected 
decision-making process in policy-making and the 
selection and implementation of transport projects? 
6.4.1 The decision-making platform  
All the respondents seemed to have a good understanding of the changes 
that occurred in the decision-making platform after the creation of SPAD. For 
example, respondent O5 understood that the decision-making authority for 
transport projects varies based on who is financing the project. If the project 
involves public funds, then the EPU has authority, but if it is a private sector 
funded project, the key decision-maker is the Public Private Partnership Unit 
– an agency under the Prime Minister’s Department. Large projects – 
projects which involve funding over RM500 million (£100 million) – require 
approval from the Cabinet or the Economic Council. The Economic Council 
is chaired by the Prime Minister, and made up of key ministers and selected 
senior civil servants, to which the EPU plays a secretariat role. According to 
respondents G1 and G13, SPAD’s current role in the decision-making 
process is limited to checking new proposals, but once the transport master 
plans are in place, SPAD will be in a better position to identify strategically 
important projects and policies. Respondents from EPU and SPAD 
confirmed that SPAD only acts as a checkpoint for the EPU as the approval 
of the EPU is required prior to the implementation of projects dependent on 
federal funds. However, according to respondent G1, there is one exception 
to this rule: if the state or local authorities have sufficient funding, they can 
plan and proceed with the implementation of public transport projects 
(excluding railway ones) without having to refer to the EPU or to SPAD. All 
railway projects must seek approval from SPAD, as the railway regulator. 
Respondents from the EPU agreed that the presence of SPAD reduces their 
workload because they previously evaluated all project proposals for public 
transport.  
In terms of railway projects, G13 said that SPAD has a good level of 
decision-making autonomy. The PAD Act (2010) clause 83 (1), states: “no 
railway shall be constructed without the approval of the Minister, acting on 
the recommendation of the Commission”. SPAD holds the authority for 
approval of railway schemes, which includes the alignment of new railway 
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lines, changes of alignment, purchases of rolling stock, decisions about the 
locations of stations, and the commencement of railway operations. Hence, 
the project proponent for railway schemes has to engage with SPAD during 
the initial stages of any project and take into consideration SPAD’s views 
and feedback. Respondents from SPAD explained that all railway schemes 
have to be approved by the Prime Minister, as he is in charge of SPAD. If 
SPAD approves, the project proponent will then have to secure approval 
from the EPU or the Public Private Partnership Unit for funding, and then 
work together with the relevant agencies during the implementation of the 
project. Thus, there is no difference between SPAD’s road transport role and 
its rail transport role in terms of funding, but there are differences in terms of 
the system for approving projects, because for rail related matters, approval 
from the SPAD/Prime Minister is mandatory. 
The process for decision-making was explored by using the BRT (Bus Rapid 
Transit) system as an example. For a project proposal to construct a BRT in 
Kuala Lumpur, respondents from SPAD said that the proponent of the 
project should refer it to SPAD first, and if it were to be supported by SPAD, 
it would then be passed on to the EPU for endorsement and funding 
approvals. The project proponent would then have to work closely with Kuala 
Lumpur City Hall in the implementation stage, as this is the local authority for 
Kuala Lumpur city area. Once the project is completed, SPAD would then 
issue the license for the operations of the BRT. It was pointed out that there 
are still many hands involved in the process and many veto and negotiation 
points. 
Respondents G12 and G16 strongly believed that the decision-making 
process in Malaysia adopts a top-down approach. In cases where the 
proponents of projects have strong political connections, they have the 
advantage of being able to propose the project directly to the Prime Minister. 
However, even if approval for a project is secured, it will have to be 
rationalised through SPAD and the Economic Council or the EPU, and this 
seems to have happened with the MRT project.  
Almost all the respondents felt that that the decision to implement the MRT 
was purely a political decision, and it was revealed that SPAD was used as a 
scapegoat for rationalising the project at its initial stages. The talks about the 
MRT project occurred before the official creation of SPAD in June 2010, 
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although the official approval was dated December 2010.30 The project is 
handled by a high level committee known as the MRT Exco, which is chaired 
by the Chief Secretary. The committee ensures that the project runs 
smoothly by quickly resolving emerging issues and improving coordination 
among agencies. Numerous decisions regarding the project were made by 
this committee, including what contractors to use. Although SPAD plays the 
secretariat role to this committee, a representative from SPAD argued that 
the MRT Exco is only an administrative body, and that it is interfering with 
the powers that SPAD has for regulating the railways. This respondent 
believed that all the regulative decisions regarding the MRT project should 
be made by SPAD, and not by the MRT Exco. Some respondents outside 
SPAD shared this view, such as respondents G1 and G18, who said that the 
MRT Exco is over-powering SPAD. However, other respondents (such as O5 
and G2) considered the MRT Exco to be effective because of its chairman 
(who is the Chief Secretary), and said that it improves coordination between 
agencies and expedites the implementation of the project on the ground. 
These respondents expressed doubts that SPAD would be as effective. 
Other players have an important role in transport decision-making, such as 
the PEMANDU. PEMANDU was established by the Prime Minister after he 
took office in 2009. It is an administrative body without any legal backing, 
which functions to monitor the achievements of Ministries participating in the 
Government Transformation Programme (GTP) (see section 3.2.1.3). One of 
the GTP’s initiatives is improving public transport services, but respondent 
G2 claimed that PEMANDU is run by people with vested interests. This 
respondent did not deny that PEMANDU has produced some good 
initiatives, such as the Bus Express Transit programme, and that it is staffed 
by dynamic and vibrant personalities from both the government and the 
private sector, but he appeared to be annoyed by how PEMANDU pushes 
government agencies around to achieve its agendas. A representative from 
SPAD claimed that PEMANDU interferes with the jurisdiction of other 
agencies, and similar views were shared by respondents O2 and G1. These 
respondents said that PEMANDU tried to influence the MRT project to the 
extent of preparing a cabinet paper to propose their preferred project 
implementer. PEMANDU is led by a minister, and although it does not have 
any legal backing or funding muscle, it is quite influential as it has the clout 
of the Prime Minister behind it. Respondent G9 compared SPAD and 
                                            
30 See www.spad.gov.my (accessed on 30 January 2013). 
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PEMANDU, commenting that SPAD should emulate PEMANDU, which can 
get things done without any funding power. 
6.4.2 Reflections 
The findings above show that that decision-making authority remains the 
same as it was under the previous institutional arrangement before SPAD’s 
establishment. There is no evidence to support that the reforms have 
speeded up the decision-making process or impacted positively on transport 
outcomes – although too early for the latter. The reform may have reduced 
corruption and improve planning and regulation for land public transport. 
The decision-making power still lies with the agencies that control funding. 
SPAD, which lacks funding autonomy, only acts as a proposal evaluator that 
makes recommendations to the approving authorities. Thus, it appears that 
SPAD can be passed over for political expediency. Decisions related to 
policies and projects are still made by funding agencies, mainly by the EPU 
and Public Private Partnership Unit at the federal level and by local 
authorities at the local level. For large projects, approval has to be sought 
from the Cabinet or the Economic Council. Decision-making autonomy is 
closely related to funding muscle, and without sufficient financial autonomy, 
it is unlikely that SPAD will be anything more than a weak coordinating body. 
That is not to deny its role in planning, regulation and enforcement, but it is 
still a long way away from being able to mirror the achievements of the LTA 
Singapore. Comparison with the decision-making framework for transport 
authorities (as presented in Figure 2.1) also reveal that SPAD has limited 
powers to create/modify rules and make decisions regarding the use of 
resources and opportunity, which also affects its performance. Without the 
decisions-making powers for control over transport budget, it is unlikely that 
SPAD will be able to emulate LTA Singapore or TfL. 
It is also interesting to note that although SPAD is the regulator for the 
railway, holds the decision-making powers for technical issues related to 
railway matters such as alignment, land acquisition and technical standards 
on paper, it does not seem to hold much power here in reality either. 
Decisions regarding the MRT project are mainly made outside SPAD, by a 
higher-level committee – MRT Exco – that has a better capacity to 
coordinate the agencies involved in the project. This shows that that SPAD 
has not removed concerns about effective coordination. 
 It is also interesting to note that committees and bodies such as the MRT 
Exco and PEMANDU in Malaysia do not have any financial backing or legal 
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support, but produce substantial results given their strong political backing by 
Prime Minister, suggesting the need for political champion to make things 
happen on the ground. These bodies do not only enjoy decision-making 
autonomy, but are also able to drive their decisions using the oversight of the 
Prime Minister. However, these bodies are often temporary, and are 
dissolved when a particular programme or project is completed or with shifts 
in political leadership, so they are not directly comparable with SPAD as they 
do not have to play an ongoing coordinating role.  
It is useful to compare SPAD and PEMANDU, however. PEMANDU is 
staffed with dynamic personnel, and has a strong combination of employees 
from both the civil service and the private sector, who thus understand the 
means and dealings of the government and have fewer problems in 
engaging the government network to get things done. Unfortunately, these 
types of staff are not to be found in SPAD. PEMANDU is not an operational 
body like SPAD, hence its funding capacity is perhaps not so crucial. 
PEMANDU also has a specific one-off task with clear strategic plans, 
guidelines, timelines and periodic reporting with outcomes that are of 
ultimate interest to the Prime Minister. However, the existence of PEMANDU 
and MRT Exco and its focus on aspects of public transport may be indicative 
of either a lack of satisfaction/expectation of SPAD or suggest an ulterior 
motive for SPAD being sweeping away the Bumiputera agenda and the 
associated corruption. 
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6.5 Research question 4: What factors determine the success 
or failure of the reforms? 
6.5.1 The planning and implementation roles of SPAD 
The details of SPAD’s creation were presented in section 3.2.1.3. A plurality 
of views continues to exist concerning SPAD’s current and potential roles. 
Those who were involved in the creation of SPAD and the ex-INSPAK 
members paid their tribute to the current Prime Minster for making SPAD a 
reality. 
Respondents who were involved in the creation of SPAD said that they 
wanted to create a single regulator for public transport that could also take 
an active role in planning and enforcement issues. However, these 
respondents said that SPAD could not be entirely as it had originally been 
planned. SPAD was created by dissolving and transferring the powers of the 
CVLB and the DOR and merging them with some of the powers of the 
Ministry of Tourism. It was given legislative support and received political 
backing, but unfortunately it could not be given all the powers required to 
operate as a single regulator and a commission due stakeholders’ views, 
time constraints, political resistance, turf wars among agencies and 
procedural issues. Although, SPAD was only envisaged to handle public 
transport modes, such as buses, urban rail and taxis, goods vehicle were 
later added to their remit to accommodate the view of the majority of 
stakeholders and the preference of the Prime Minister. Table 6.6 
summarises how SPAD was planned to be, and how it actually is, followed 
by the implications of these differences. According to respondents from 
SPAD, they are now making an effort to make SPAD closer to how it had 
originally been intended to be by enhancing the organisation’s capacity and 
working towards acquiring the necessary powers. Although this exercise is 
time-consuming, it is crucial to enable SPAD to operate effectively.  
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Table 6.6: Creation of SPAD: The rhetoric and practice 
During planning 
stage (rhetoric) 
What was implemented?  
What was not 
implemented? 
Why was it not implemented?  Implications 
Powers of DOR, 
CVLB and Ministry of 
Tourism for 
regulation of land 
public transport 
ceded to SPAD  
DOR and CVLB were 
dissolved and powers 
transferred to SPAD  
 
Ministry of Tourism – ceded 
necessary powers to SPAD  
- - 
DOR and CVLB were 
dissolved  
SPAD to be given 
legislation support 
Enactment of PAD Act 2010 
and SPAD Act 2010 
- - SPAD has legislative support 
SPAD to be a 
planner  
SPAD is given planning 
powers under PAD Act 2010 
 
 
Absence of strong 
mechanism to drive the 
implementation plans 
 
SPAD was not envisaged as an 
implementation agency 
 
Land matters fall under the 
jurisdiction of local authorities  
Presence of implementation 
gap 
SPAD as an 
enforcement agency  
SPAD is given enforcement 
powers under PAD act 2010 
 
Lack of enforcement 
officers 
Budget cut policy implemented by 
the government  
SPAD has to rely on RTD 
officers for enforcement  
SPAD to be a single 
regulator 
SPAD has been given 
regulatory powers under PAD 
Act 2010 
SPAD was not given 
powers for regulation for 
vocational licenses 
Strong objections from RTD 
Fragmentation in licensing 
and enforcement functions – 
SPAD has no powers to 
license and enforce drivers 
of public transport vehicles  
 
SPAD has not become a 
single regulator 
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During planning 
stage (rhetoric) 
What was implemented?  
What was not 
implemented? 
Why was it not implemented?  Implications 
SPAD to be a 
commission  
SPAD was only granted partial 
alienation for remuneration – 
salary is determined by 
Ministry of Finance 
 
Commission status still 
pending 
 
SPAD cannot determine 
its own salary package 
Government procedure requires 
SPAD to be financially 
independent   
 
Limited capacity – SPAD 
cannot attract the best talent 
 
Room for corruption 
 
SPAD to report 
directly to the Prime 
Minister  
Prime Minister is the minister 
in charge of SPAD  
 
 
SPAD has to report to 
the Chief Secretary and 
the Prime Minister’s 
Department for 
administrative matters 
SPAD is not financially 
independent, and is dependent on 
government grants  
 
Prime Minister is too busy to take 
an active role in SPAD 
SPAD subjected to 
procurement procedures and 
other relevant government 
circulars 
 
SPAD not represented in the 
cabinet and Prime Minister 
assigns dedicated minister 
which results in presence of 
‘many hands’ 
SPAD to absorb 
most of the CVLB 
and the DOR staff 
Only 40% of the former CVLB 
and DOR staff joined SPAD at 
the start of its operation. Most 
of the senior officers left. 
 
Cultural differences 
 
Absence of attractive offers  for 
the ex-staff of CVLB and DOR 
Clears out poor performance  
 
Absence of institutional 
memory 
 
Higher learning curve for 
SPAD 
The chairman of 
SPAD – respectable 
personality from 
industry 
Chairman of SPAD is a 
politician but not a full minister 
 
Appointment by the Prime 
Minister 
SPAD not represented in the 
cabinet 
Stakeholders contest the 
appointment of a politician as 
SPAD’s chairman 
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Respondents who were directly involved in the creation of SPAD 
acknowledged the flaws in its current incarnation, but said that no significant 
changes could currently be made, and perhaps would only be possible in 
another eight to ten years because any immediate changes to a newly 
established organisation will be criticised by the opposition political parties. It 
was revealed that a number of issues were overlooked during SPAD’s 
implementation. One of the respondents who had been involved in its 
creation said that SPAD managed to solve a lot of structural issues (such as 
uneven distribution of powers and fragmentation of functions) but highlighted 
that doing so might have created new structural issues. This respondent 
stressed that he is still convinced that SPAD is a good idea, but there were 
problems with its implementation involving political intrusion, recruitment, 
leadership, SPAD’s placement and workload at the start of its operation. 
There was also no mention about any long-term reform plans prepared by 
the key reformers for SPAD. Respondent P1 did not think that it was the 
EPU’s responsibility, commenting that: 
“Because our job was to create SPAD, now that we have created, 
'good luck to them, we have other things to do in life (smiles), we go 
on with other things, we were the midwife, we gave birth to SPAD…” 
(Respondent P1). 
6.5.2  Respondents’ perceptions of the SPAD model  
The research participants had different understandings of what constituted 
the real issues (see sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3) and their own perceptions of 
what model the single transport authority should adopt to be effective. Their 
lines of argument were focused mainly around four areas: whether SPAD 
should be placed under the MOT or the PMD; whether it should cover only 
the Klang Valley region or the entire country; the practicality of having a 
Prime Minister as its minister-in-charge; and the rationale for including goods 
vehicles as part of their remit.  
6.5.2.1    Ministry of Transport versus Prime Minister’s Department 
As a transport body, SPAD should have technically been placed under the 
MOT, and there was a common understanding that it was the politics that 
influenced the placement of SPAD under the PMD. Respondents from the 
MOT strongly opposed the current placement of SPAD, arguing that if SPAD 
were to be placed under the MOT, this would mean that all the transport-
related agencies would fall within the purview of one umbrella body. One of 
the MOT respondents argued that placing SPAD under the PMD was not 
technically desirable because SPAD deals with transport regulations, which 
173 
 
are operational matters, whereas PMD mainly handles policy and planning. 
This point was also raised by a respondent from PMD (G1) who said that 
PMD did not have the transport expertise to manage SPAD and would not 
be able to provide the necessary technical support for it. 
All the respondents from the MOT were aware that although the MOT would 
be the natural home for SPAD, it could not be placed under it because of 
racial sensitivities. They proposed the creation of a new Ministry of Land 
Transport as an alternative, under which all the agencies that handle land 
transport matters would be housed. This proposal was opposed by 
respondents outside the MOT, however, who thought that the creation of a 
new ministry would increase political conflicts and be perceived as a plan to 
shrink the powers of the MOT: 
  
“For you to form another one, what will happen to these two things? 
So the next logical thing is to create a higher level at PM's office, 
which is what has been done with SPAD, otherwise there will be a lot 
of [conflict] between the ministries if you create another ministry of the 
same level” (respondent O5). 
 
Ten respondents thought that SPAD should stay under the remit of the PMD 
mainly because SPAD is cross-cutting in terms of its functions, and has to 
have an overarching authority to be able to deal with other agencies.  
Three respondents outside the MOT and SPAD agreed that SPAD’s natural 
home is the MOT, and that it should eventually return to the ministry. 
Respondent O5 said that whilst it may seem impossible now, this could 
change if there was a cabinet re-shuffle after the next election. Another 
respondent from the PMD (G1) highlighted that there is a general 
dissatisfaction about placing SPAD under the PMD, and that this issue is 
often raised in the parliament. He predicted that after a few years SPAD 
would return to its natural home, like other commissions such as the 
Malaysian Institute of Microelectronic Systems (MIMOS), which started out in 
the PMD but later went to its ‘home’ (where it is best placed) in the Ministry 
of Science, Technology and Innovation. This clearly shows that reform is an 
ongoing process and it is difficult to pinpoint or accurately predict changes 
that might happen in the future.  
6.5.2.2 The Prime Minister as the minister-in-charge 
Eight respondents agreed that placing SPAD under the Prime Minister was 
important for reducing the turf wars and tensions between the agencies that 
arose because of the transfer of powers to SPAD. Respondent O1 
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highlighted that its placement under the Prime Minister expedites the 
implementation of programmes and policies, and makes it easier to push 
through controversial policies such as congestion pricing. However, there is 
no evidence that this has happened to-date.  
Whilst the respondents acknowledged that there are advantages to being 
overseen by the Prime Minister, some of the respondents questioned 
whether he was the best person to perform the role, and whether he was an 
unwise choice because of his availability. A respondent from PMD (G4) 
pointed out that the Prime Minister cannot play the role of an ordinary 
minister, and that SPAD needs to eventually be assigned a more suitable 
minister outside the PMD. Respondent G14 explained that the role of the 
Prime Minister as the minister-in-charge meant that SPAD was not 
represented in the cabinet, and required another minister to be appointed to 
represent the Prime Minister. Respondents from SPAD were mainly 
concerned about his availability. Respondent G10 questioned the rationale 
for the appointment of the Prime Minister as the minister in-charge, 
commenting: 
 
“PMD is all about policy, they are the policy makers, it is a central 
agency, PM department, EPU, Treasury, these are not operational 
department, so why should an operational body like SPAD being 
placed under PM’s office, directly under the PM, isn’t it ridiculous? For 
us, if you place an operational department under PM, what will PM 
decide? He can only decide on policy matters.  Can he answer 
operational matters in the parliament? He can’t, because he has to 
know the operational details. So the framework of SPAD is not right to 
me” (respondent G10). 
 
According to respondents from the MOT, there were instances when SPAD 
was assigned additional responsibilities outside its jurisdiction, such as with 
the MRT project. Respondents from SPAD confirmed that the project was 
handed over to them immediately after SPAD’s establishment, although it 
was not supposed to get involved in project implementation. They admitted 
that they could not resist the directives from the top at that point in time, 
although SPAD is no longer involved with this project now. 
6.5.2.3 The National model versus the Klang Valley model 
Another argument centres on the issue of whether SPAD should have been 
established at the Klang Valley regional level instead of the national level. 
Respondent G14 thought that SPAD needed to be set-up at the local level 
on the grounds that the local authorities better understand local needs and 
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can design public transport systems to fulfil local demand. A similar view was 
expressed by respondent G17, who strongly articulated the view that SPAD 
needed to be decentralised to be effective. However, these respondents felt 
that SPAD should also exist at the national level to play a coordinating role 
for distributing funds. On the other hand, Respondent G16 – who was 
attached to a local authority in his previous posting – did not think that 
decentralisation would work well in the Malaysian context. He argued that 
the local authorities in Malaysia are under-powered and lack the capacity to 
plan and manage the public transport system in their areas, and thus even if 
their powers were devolved, the local authorities could well be unable to 
carry out their assigned functions. 
Ex-INSPAK respondents pointed out that in 2005, there was a great deal of 
focus on creating the Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority due to the 
pressing need to improve the public transport services in Kuala Lumpur, but 
that a national model was found to be more viable and strategic because of 
certain legal issues. Respondent G4 mentioned that Malaysia adopts 
common law and as a result it is extremely difficult to carve out the law only 
for the Klang Valley regional area, which was the main stumbling block for 
the creation of Klang Valley Urban Transport Authority. Furthermore, this 
respondent argued that adopting a regional model would create a regulatory 
barrier because the areas outside the Klang Valley region would then be 
neglected, making it difficult to control the public transport services outside 
the region. The national model was mainly favoured because of the legal 
issues and the types of powers that had been given to SPAD.  
6.5.2.4 Public transport vehicle versus goods vehicle 
There were mixed views among the respondents regarding whether SPAD’s 
scope should include goods vehicles. Respondents from the MOT strongly 
believed that it should in order to minimise the fragmentation of roles and 
functions between agencies because, if goods vehicle were not 
incorporated, then the CVLB and the DOR would continue to exist. One of 
them commented that the only good thing to come out of SPAD has been 
the closing down of the CVLB. This respondent also argued that it is 
impossible to separate the railway scheme for passengers and freight as 
they share the same facilities (control rooms, signalling systems and rail 
track) and therefore it is more practical to be responsible for the entire 
railway system. Two other respondents outside MOT (G4 and G9) also 
supported the inclusion of goods vehicles into SPAD’s remit, and provided 
three main reasons: firstly, to ensure that there is minimum overlap and 
176 
 
fragmentation in the sector; secondly, to promote holistic planning by taking 
both the public transport and the freight sector into consideration in any set 
of plans; and thirdly, to better regulate the freight sector, which has not been 
given enough attention in the past.   
However, four respondents outside the MOT (G1, G17, O1 and O2) felt that 
goods vehicles should not have been included in SPAD’s remit because of 
their lack of manpower for managing this sector. They pointed out that goods 
vehicles represent a very large workload, including inland depots, 
warehouses, freight terminals, licensing, and enforcement and SPAD lacks 
the knowledge and expertise to manage the freight sector. An ex-INSPAK 
respondent (O1) also observed that goods vehicles were not part of SPAD’s 
original responsibilities, even when the idea of a Klang Valley Urban 
Transport Authority was under discussion in 2005, and that giving SPAD this 
role has put it under tremendous pressure because goods vehicles have not 
been well regulated and penalties for them were not well enforced in the 
past. Respondent O2 said that another commission should have been 
created to handle freight, whilst Respondent G1 hinted that goods vehicles 
could be the source of the bad blood between the RTD and SPAD given the 
link between the enforcement of heavy vehicles penalties and corruption.   
6.5.3 Factors affecting the performance of SPAD  
Structural changes were made in the process of creating SPAD, including 
the dissolution of the CVLB and the DOR, and streamlining the roles of the 
Ministry of Tourism, the MOT and the RTD. The challenges and problems 
that arose in the course of making these structural changes were only 
partially dealt with, as explained in section 6.5.1, and to add to these 
problems there have been further obstacles to SPAD effective performance, 
mainly concerning working relationships. There are problems here both inter-
organisationally and intra-organisationally. Inter-organisational issues mainly 
concern the working relationship between SPAD and other well-established 
agencies, and involve how to give the impression that SPAD exists to 
complement these agencies rather than to threaten or overpower them. The 
intra-organisational issues in SPAD are related to human resource capacity 
(manpower), institutional memory and leadership. Table 6.7 summarizes the 
views of the respondents on these issues. 
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Table 6.7: Views of respondents on factors affecting the performance of SPAD  
                  Respondents 
group 
Response 
Government offcials 
SPAD 
(G12, G13, G15) 
Politicians 
(P1, P2) 
Operators 
(O1, O2, O3, O4, O5) MOT 
(G5, G6, G7, G8, G10, 
G11) 
Others 
(G1, G2, G3, G4, G9,  
G14, G16, G17, G18) 
Inter-organisational issues 
 
 
 
   
 
- Poor network  
Higher salary 
 
G5, G8 
    
Ego issues G5, G8, G10 G1, G14, G17 G12  O1 
Communication issues  G5  G13  O2, O3, O4 
- Cultural clash  G5, G6, G8 G1, G4, G17 G12, G13 P2  
Intra-organisational issues      
- Human resource and 
capacity issues  
G5 G10 G1, G9, G14, G17 G12, G13 P1, P2 O1, O3, O4 
- Institutional memory  G5, G8 G9, G4, G1 G12, G13 P2 O1, O2, O4, O5 
- SPAD’s leadership      
Personality of CEO G8, G5 G1, G14, G4 G12, G13  O1, O2 O3 
Personality of chairman G5 G1, G4 G12, G13  O1, O2, O3, O4, O5 
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6.5.3.1 Inter-organisational issues   
Building networks 
SPAD has been unable to engage other stakeholders in the industry (such 
as civil servants and operators) effectively, and respondents offered the 
following reasons for this: (i) jealousy among civil servants because SPAD 
enjoys a higher salary band; (ii) SPAD’s ego as an authority; and (iii) 
expectations that SPAD has to make the first move to build rapport. 
Two respondents from the government sector raised the issue of the higher 
salary enjoyed by SPAD members, most of whom are recruited from the 
private sector. They believed that that the higher salary scale is probably 
one of the reasons why SPAD’s employees think so highly of themselves, 
and hence other agencies are reluctant to help SPAD out because there is a 
perception that it should be able to perform better with the higher paid ‘more 
skilled’ employees it has. Eight respondents were of the view that SPAD is 
arrogant and authoritative as well as being uninterested in involving the 
relevant stakeholders in any of its assignments or the preparations of its 
plans. Respondent O1 did not deny that SPAD has a lot of authority in terms 
of land transport compared to any other transport agencies in the current 
institutional structure; however he warned that SPAD has to be tamed to 
complement other agencies.  
Respondent G17 and G10 said that because SPAD is a new agency it has 
to take the initial steps to build a rapport with the already established 
agencies like the RTD instead of expecting other agencies to make the first 
move, and this shows that the government agencies are not keen on SPAD 
either. A respondent from RTD asserted:  
 
‘SPAD has to work with RTD instead of RTD working with SPAD’ 
(respondent G10). 
     
Respondent G5 questioned the willingness of other government agencies to 
help SPAD, expressing her concerns about the behaviour of some of these 
agencies in defending their turf and not sharing their resources or working 
with SPAD. This respondent observed that the relationship between SPAD 
and the RTD is very strained and that this affects the enforcement work on 
the ground. It was pointed out that SPAD’s senior management prefers to 
deal only with the senior officials in the government department, and that all 
communication is carried out formally in writing. 
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Respondent O3 suggested that communication between the three main 
stakeholders – the public, the operators and the government – has been 
lacking in the past, and he did not think that SPAD had been able to make 
any progress in bridging this gap. He recalls how the suggestions he made 
in writing to SPAD never received any response or acknowledgement. This 
respondent’s strong message was that the operators want to be involved in 
the policy making and planning that directly affects them, but that SPAD has 
frustratingly issued new policies regarding toll hikes and speed limits on 
highways without really understanding the constraints and the dilemmas of 
the operators. He added that this had been made worse by SPAD’s issuing 
new guidelines without making any effort to explain their rationale to 
stakeholders or how they would be implemented. Interestingly, one of the 
respondents from SPAD admitted that communication is an issue, and that 
SPAD has not been able to fully engage with the stakeholders.  
Cultural clashes  
Respondent G1 said that the majority of SPAD’s employees were from the 
private sector, and that the civil servants who remained in SPAD were 
mostly junior officers who may not be very familiar with the government 
working culture and procedures. This leads to a cultural clash between 
SPAD and other government agencies, making it difficult for SPAD to build a 
good network with other actors and to complement the existing institutional 
framework. Respondents P2 and G1 proposed that SPAD takes on some 
experienced civil servants to bridge this gap. Respondent G5 thought that 
the cultural clash could have been reduced if the central government had 
provided guidelines for recruitment so that SPAD could have employed the 
right people, and if it had also provided sufficient support until SPAD was 
capable of operating on its own.  
Respondent G6 said that she has once proposed that SPAD take on board 
good officers from the RTD to strengthen the enforcement team, but she 
claims that her proposal was not given serious attention. Some of the 
possible reasons behind this were highlighted by respondents G5, G8 and 
G17. Respondent G5 thought that SPAD was not interested in recruiting 
RTD officers because they were associated with corruption, and SPAD 
wanted a clean break from this. Respondents G8 and G17 believed that 
SPAD thinks that civil servants are inefficient and incompetent, which is why 
few civil servants were recruited besides those who were absorbed from the 
CVLB and the DOR. Finally, Respondent G8 thought that SPAD was 
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probably unaware of the fact that the priority for civil servants is to get the 
process right rather than on the individual outcomes. 
6.5.3.2 Intra-organisational issues 
Human resources and capacity issues  
Six respondents see SPAD’s size and manpower as the main stumbling 
block for preventing it from operating effectively. They mainly cited the 
limited number of personnel in the enforcement team as being its most 
problematic manpower shortfall. Respondent G13 commented: 
 
“Now we are operating and at the same time building our capacity, 
even structurally, we are just building our house. So, that's the 
challenge – if you ask me, that's the biggest challenge that the 
commission is facing now. I think ultimately we are focusing on 
capacity building, we have not yet made our presence felt” 
(respondent G13). 
 
Recruits for SPAD were mainly sourced from the local transport industry, 
and Respondent G14 claimed that there was a lot of job-hopping between 
SPAD and transport operators at the initial stages of its operations. 
Respondents G5, G9 and O3 all raised concerns on this matter, worrying 
that SPAD had not done enough background checks on their new recruits. It 
was pointed out that one of the senior managers in SPAD was associated 
with mismanagement in his previous engagement with a bus company, and 
that such events affect the image of SPAD. 
Besides concerns about the number of personnel, there were also worries 
raised about the expertise of SPAD employees, mainly from respondents 
outside SPAD. Respondent G17 argued that SPAD must recruit 
experienced people, but not necessarily from the government. She felt that 
the failure to recruit the right talent may result in wasting resources. In the 
same vein, respondent O1 mentioned that the learning curve becomes 
expensive with fresh, inexperienced employees leading SPAD. Respondent 
G8 was of view that technical expertise are crucial for the top management 
in SPAD to facilitate the decision-making process and assess proposals 
submitted by the stakeholders without having to rely too much on 
consultants. This respondent believed that the current senior managers and 
the members of the commission do not have strong enough transport 
backgrounds.  
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SPAD’s lack of knowledge about the transport industry was raised as an 
important issue by transport operators. Respondent O3 said that SPAD has 
recruited a lot of inexperienced people and that they have been working in 
isolation without engaging with the transport operators. In addition, 
respondent O4 claimed that SPAD’s lack of understanding concerning the 
history of the industry made them difficult to communicate with, and 
prevents SPAD from being able to adequately respond to the suggestions 
made by transport operators. This causes frustration among the industry 
players – a situation that is made worse when SPAD does not engage with 
this group of stakeholders on its formulation of policy.  
According to SPAD respondents, its limitations in terms of its shortage in 
technical expertise and lack of personnel mean that it is heavily dependent 
on consultants, and is considering outsourcing its enforcement role to a 
private company as a result. They claimed that the LTA Singapore follows a 
similar model, and that it has proven successful. On the other hand, 
Respondent G1 said that SPAD has to depend on consultants not only 
because of its capacity issues, but also due the fact that they are not able to 
work effectively with the other actors in their sector. According to this 
respondent, SPAD has been unable to focus on goods vehicles because of 
its capacity issues, even though it has the necessary powers to do so. He 
added that to remedy these problems, SPAD is creating an advisory 
committee consisting of experts from the transport industry to provide it with 
technical advice.  
Some respondents who were directly involved in the creation of SPAD 
(mainly those from the EPU) felt that SPAD’s capacity problems are a 
teething issue that will get resolved over time. They held that the main issue 
with SPAD’s human resources management is its limited autonomy in 
recruitment (due to its dependence on government grants and the 
government’s new recruitment policy for addressing the budget crisis).  
Institutional memory  
According to one respondent from SPAD, less than 40% of the former CVLB 
and DOR staff chose to join SPAD, with most of these being junior officers 
who have a limited understanding of the industry. Respondents from the 
DOR and the CVLB provided a number of reasons for not wanting to join 
SPAD. Respondent G8 said that SPAD did not try to accommodate the 
senior officers from the CVLB and the DOR. They were not offered senior 
management positions, and hence joining SPAD was seen as a demotion 
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rather than an advance in their careers. Respondent G5 said that many ex-
DOR and CVLB staff did not join SPAD because it failed to make them 
attractive offers with clear service schemes, and that there were differences 
in the pay scheme offered to private sector recruits and civil servants. 
Respondent G8 shared details of his short engagement with SPAD. This 
respondent was made to report to someone who was very much junior to 
him, something which rarely happens in the civil service, where age, wisdom 
and experience are generally given the priority for promotions and senior 
positions according to Respondent O1. Similarly, Respondent G9 felt that 
she was not needed and decided not to join SPAD because it started 
making disparaging remarks about the CVLB without actually understanding 
the constraints that they faced in the previous regime. She said that if she 
had joined SPAD, she would have been blamed for all the wrongdoing in the 
past. Respondent G8 confirmed G9’s claims:   
 
“As a new organisation, if hoping to make changes, you should not 
disparage what’s been done by people in the past, it looks as though 
they are not efficient. CVLB did not work effectively, but they have 
reasons why they couldn’t do, CVLB was under a lot of political 
pressure” (respondent G8). 
 
On the other hand, respondents O1 and G4 observed that as many of the 
senior officers in CVLB had close links with the transport operators and were 
thus associated with corruption, they probably refrained from joining SPAD 
out of fear of being accused of or questioned about past wrongdoing. 
However, all these factors have resulted in SPAD lacking institutional 
memory. 
There are mixed views about the importance of institutional memory for 
SPAD. All respondents (except G1) who talked about institutional memory of 
the DOR thought that it was important because numerous technical issues 
are involved in the management of the railway, and the former staff of the 
DOR have the technical expertise that SPAD requires. However, respondent 
G1 thought that SPAD needed to start afresh, and that the required 
technical railway knowledge and skills could be learned. 
On the other hand, five out of the eleven respondents that talked about the 
institutional memory of the CVLB felt that SPAD did not need its institutional 
memory, and thought that it was best for it to start afresh. These 
respondents mainly talked about issues surrounding the Bumiputera 
agenda, political interference with the CVLB, and corruption within it. They 
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asserted that a complete ‘cut off’ from the previous licensing regime was 
crucial. Respondent G1 said that the institutional memory of the CVLB was 
not important as it performed poorly, and because the new licensing 
mechanism under SPAD is entirely different to that under the CVLB. Instead 
of licensing individual vehicles, as the CVLB did, SPAD issues licenses to 
the operators. Respondents P2 and G13 also noted that with the new 
licensing mechanism, SPAD requires CVLB’s previous licensing data, but 
not any information about its practices.  
However, nearly all of the respondents felt that the complete absence of 
institutional memory was dangerous for SPAD, as without this there is 
nothing to prevent them from repeating previous mistakes and no reference 
points. Respondent O2 commented: 
 
“Institutional memory is very important. You know why? Because in 
order for you to move forward, to make the change, you have to know 
the history, the processes and what not, as well as the skills and 
knowledge of the people in LPKP. If you don’t know the history, you 
cannot tap the brains of these people [and] how you are going to 
move forward, how you are going to benchmark yourself? 
(respondent O2). 
SPAD’s leadership 
All the respondents stressed that SPAD should be free from political 
intervention, and ten respondents questioned the rationale of appointing a 
chairman who is a politician but not a cabinet minister, as well as his 
appropriateness in terms of transport experience. An ex-employee of SPAD 
highlighted the difficulties of working under a chairman who wants to be in 
control of the operational matters. The chairman interprets the act in a 
slightly different manner, and is of the view that he is an executive chairman 
who has to be directly involved in the daily management of SPAD. However, 
discussion with one of the officers in the Attorney General’s office reveals 
that the chairman of SPAD is a non-executive chairman and that the day-to-
day operation is to be handled by the CEO. Respondents from SPAD 
pointed out that differences in perceptions about the chairman’s role also 
create interpersonal conflicts between the CEO and the chairman, and 
hence they are not able to work collaboratively. Respondent G1 
commented: 
“The chairman feels that it is his responsibility to ensure that SPAD is 
operating smoothly, but the CEO thinks that the chairman is 
meddling” (respondent G1). 
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The strained relationship between the key actors in SPAD led the SPAD 
respondents to hold posit a communication breakdown in the organisation, 
and they reported that one of SPAD’s main challenges has been to move 
everyone towards the same agenda. It was also pointed out that the CEO 
has been extremely busy with the MRT project, and has thus had limited 
time for other matters, such as building networks with the other stakeholders 
including the civil servants. 
The personality of the CEO was also criticised by the respondents who have 
had worked with him. A board member of SPAD said that the CEO had 
hinted that he does not want the board members of SPAD to get involved in 
operational matters. This respondent highlighted the importance of 
personality in leaders, especially in a newly established agency like SPAD, 
and said that although SPAD needs help, the CEO is too egotistical to seek 
it. 
An ex-SPAD employee revealed more about the personality of the CEO. He 
said that the CEO, with his consultancy background is a strategist and 
carries himself well, but he is not a grounded person, and this is his first 
experience as a CEO. This respondent blamed the poor leadership in SPAD 
for its failure to manage the merger of the DOR and the CVLB into SPAD 
smoothly. Respondent O1 and G8 were more concerned with the technical 
expertise, pointing out that the CEO does not have the appropriate technical 
knowledge in transport to lead an important organisation like SPAD.  
6.5.4  Reflections  
With the creation of SPAD, a dedicated transport body has been produced 
to champion the land public transport sector through amalgamating the 
powers from three agencies. This body has reduced the coordination and 
fragmentation issues that existed in the previous institutional framework to 
some degree and put an end to the CVLB regime, which was associated 
with mismanagement, corruption and politicisation.  
One of the aims of this research was also to identify the winners and losers 
of this reform. Flyvbjerg (2001) and Chisholm (2000) argue that in any 
institutional reform, there will be a relationship between powers and 
outcomes which entail that somebody will gain and somebody will lose. The 
creation of SPAD clearly benefits the EPU. In the previous institutional 
arrangement, when there was an absence of dedicated authority for land 
public transport, the EPU had to play a substantial role to fill this gap. 
However, being a central agency, its role was limited to the federal level. 
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With the creation of SPAD, these functions have now been delegated, and 
besides reducing the administrative burden on the EPU, SPAD is also in a 
better position to facilitate planning and manage land public transport at the 
local level, with its planning and licensing powers providing an effective tool 
for streamlining and integrating services provided on the ground. The other 
winners are the operators and the public. SPAD acts as a one-stop centre 
for operators to sort out licensing issues, and the public has a dedicated 
platform for their feedback and disputes. The main loser in this reform is the 
MOT, which has lost its powers for railway regulation to SPAD with the 
cessation of the DOR. In addition, the RTD, which is an agency under the 
MOT, has to share its enforcement powers for land transport with SPAD. 
The Ministry of Tourism has also lost its powers for regulating tourism 
vehicles and hire and drive cars to SPAD. Interestingly, those who did not 
lose powers to SPAD did not show any signs of feeling threatened or being 
jealous, and they provided more balanced and positive responses to working 
with SPAD. 
The Prime Minister is probably too busy to look into an operational body like 
SPAD, as one of the respondents notes, and it could be that he has lost 
interest in it, as some researchers have speculated (Politt and Bauckaert, 
2011; Peters, 2010), pointing out that politicians have short-term interests in 
some reform programmes either because they do not fit with their personal 
agendas and priorities or because they do not produce quick wins, as they 
can take many years before actual results can be seen. However, in SPAD’s 
case, the Prime Minister has probably achieved his agenda and hence he 
finds that his further deep involvement no longer an interest to him. This 
shows that reforms occur in a window of opportunity. They play out over a 
period of time and it is important to understand how it plays out because of 
the fuzziness of boundaries and the imperfect reform process which requires 
good governance through network. 
There were also concerns about the Prime Minister’s time and availability for 
SPAD and his direct political control over it. The result of this has been the 
creation of a situation called the pollution of remit, in which an organisation 
is forced to function outside its original jurisdiction due to political directives, 
as has also been seen with the MRT. Besides the Prime Minister, SPAD has 
another political master as its chairman who is not a full minister, and this 
complicates the structure and effectiveness of SPAD’s leadership further – 
because the ultimate powers still vested with the Prime Minister. 
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SPAD experienced a number of difficulties when it became operational. The 
managerial autonomy it enjoys as a semi-autonomous body has been used 
to recruit heavily from the private sector, and this has disturbed its 
functioning as a public service. Moreover, this private sector recruitment is 
one reason why SPAD has not been successful in building a good network 
with other stakeholders, as there is a cultural clash between SPAD and civil 
servants due to differences in practices and working ethics. Other transport 
agencies often try to maintain their own turf and show off their ‘authority’, 
which acts as a barrier to building good working relationships. Moreover, the 
social capital, which involves building trust, networks and understanding, 
has not been built between SPAD and other stakeholders in the sector. As 
McCarten and Vyasulu (2006) point out, this process takes time, especially 
after a major reorganisation. The new networks that have been created by 
the reforms have not yet been stabilised, with those from the government 
sector thinking that SPAD is not interested in engaging with them, although 
this shows that they are not keen on engaging with SPAD either. 
Governance has to be established through these networks, and it is worth 
noting that one of the possible factors in the success of the TfL and the LTA 
Singapore has been their ability to engage with all the important 
stakeholders in an effective manner. 
Although SPAD is a new organisation, it was established by merging two old 
organisations – the CVLB and the DOR – which have existed for 23 and 19 
years respectively. During SPAD’s planning, it was envisaged that the 
majority of the CVLB and DOR staff would be absorbed into SPAD, and thus 
that SPAD would be able to operate smoothly with the existing background 
knowledge or ‘institutional memory’ of the DOR and the CVLB to hand. 
However, this did not happen as SPAD chose to start afresh with new 
recruits to disassociate it from the corruption of the previous licensing and 
management regime. This left it in the dark, without sufficient knowledge 
and not knowing history of the industry, and thereby liable to repeat past 
mistakes. This shows that breaking path dependence comes at a cost. 
SPAD has struggled to improve its capacity both in terms of manpower and 
technical knowledge. SPAD’s management needs to strike a balance, and 
decide if they want to do the things themselves – which would require them 
to access many more resources – or to use the available networks instead. 
Klijn et al. (2010) used the policy network to show how different actors have 
different resources and to demonstrate that no one organisation can 
generate all the resources it needs. This shortcoming was seen in the SPAD 
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case study. Although there is a plethora of resources and expertise available 
within the government that SPAD could tap into, its failure to build networks 
with government actors and utilise their resources has left them isolated and 
thus struggling with poor capacity. SPAD seems to have ignored civil 
servants and recruited personnel from the private sector who are dynamic 
and competent but lack the experience and expertise of the local transport 
industry, and this has backfired on them.  
Most of the respondents held there to be a number of problems concerning 
the way SPAD had been set up, and had a variety of suggestions about how 
it could be better improved. Those who were involved in the creation of 
SPAD admitted that certain issues were overlooked due to time constraints, 
and a lot of issues only arose after SPAD had come into existence. Hall and 
Taylor (1996) argued that most institutional reforms do not achieve their 
stated goal because of hidden agendas, such as improving the public 
perceptions of institutions rather than increasing their efficiency. In SPAD’s 
case, the critical aim focus was on cleaning up the sector and creating a 
dedicated body to champion the land public transport sector instead of 
creating an effective single transport authority vested with all the requisite 
powers. Hence, SPAD is still struggling to justify its role, and different 
agencies have different views over what it should do. This is made all the 
more difficult by the fact that decisions can often not be reversed in 
government-driven reforms when they have proven ineffective because this 
would amount to the government admitting failure. 
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Chapter 7: Case Study Analysis for Bangalore 
Metropolitan Land Transport Authority  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings of the Bangalore Metropolitan Land 
Transport Authority (BMLTA) case study. It is based on seventeen face-to-
face recorded interviews and six unrecorded interviews conducted in July 
2011. Respondents were drawn from government and parastatal agencies, 
transport operators and academic institutions. The findings are presented in 
relation to the order of the research questions. The aim of first research 
question is to attempt to understand the motivation and impetus for the 
creation of the BMLTA. The second research question explores how reforms 
were implemented, and looks at the autonomy that was given to the BMLTA. 
The third research question then focuses on the outcomes of establishing 
the BMLTA, and the last one examines the key factors that have affected its 
performance. The focus of this chapter is to highlight the perspectives and 
views of different groups of respondents to show how they engage with the 
issues that emerge from each research question. 
The emphasis throughout this chapter, like Chapter 6, is on letting 
participants speak for themselves, which is done by contextualizing the 
interviews according to respondent groups and only using quotations from 
interview transcripts when necessary. The twenty-two respondents were 
grouped into five main categories according to the agencies that they 
represent, as shown in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1: Categories of respondents 
Categories  Respondents  Number of respondents 
IAS officers IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, IP6 5 
Government agencies  IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, IG8 6 
Parastatal agencies  IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, IP8 5 
Academics  IA1, IA2, IA3 3 
Professionals  IC1, IC2, IC3 3 
Total number of respondents 22 
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It was felt that was important to present the views of the Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS) officers separately from other groups of 
respondents. The IAS officers who head the government or parastatal 
agencies have a wider experience and better understanding of the critical 
issues, and are able to explain why certain measures are workable or not in 
detail. There were three respondents from the BMLTA (IG1, IG3 and IG4), 
and all of these were grouped under the ‘government agencies’ category. 
Where appropriate, information from written documents (mainly government 
reports and minutes of meeting) is woven together with interview data to 
augment, challenge and solidify the discussion. Towards the end of each 
research question, a reflection is presented in relation to the published 
literature in this area.  
7.2 Research question 1: What were the motivations behind 
the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore? 
The aim of this research question was to understand the motivations behind 
the creation of the BMLTA. This included identifying key events, public 
transport issues, inadequacies in the existing institutional set-up, push 
factors (such as policies), and the presence of key personalities. A good 
understanding of both the main issues and key actors will help to explain 
how the structure of the BMLTA came into being and to assess this model’s 
appropriateness for addressing urban transport problems in Bangalore. 
Table 7.2 summarises the participants’ responses to the first research 
question, and a detailed explanation of these is then provided in the 
subsections that follow. 
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Table 7.2: Matrix showing responses to research question 1 
What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore? 
 
Heads of 
departments/IAS 
officers 
(IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, 
IP6) 
Government agencies 
(IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, 
IG8) 
Parastatal 
agencies 
(IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, 
IP8) 
Academics 
(IA1, IA2, IA3) 
Consultants 
(IC1, IC2, IC3) 
National Urban Transport 
Policy (NUTP) 
IG1 IG1, IG4, IG5 IP3 IA1, IA3 IC1 
Pushed by State 
Government through key 
personalities 
IG1, IG2 IG4, IG6 
IP8 IA1 IC1 
Fragmentation in the 
planning function for urban 
transport 
 Fragmentation in urban 
transport planning 
 Lack of ownership for 
plans 
 
IG1, IG2, IP6 
 
IG4, IG6, IG7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IC1 
 No land use – transport 
integration 
IP6 IG6 IP8 
IA2, IA3 IC1 
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What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore? 
 
Heads of 
departments/IAS 
officers 
(IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, 
IP6) 
Government agencies 
(IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, 
IG8) 
Parastatal 
agencies 
(IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, 
IP8) 
Academics 
(IA1, IA2, IA3) 
Consultants 
(IC1, IC2, IC3) 
Coordination was an issue 
among agencies and 
among the modes, as a 
result development was 
happening in piecemeal 
IG1, IG2, IP4 
 
IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, IG7, 
IG8 
IP7, IP8 
 
IA1, IA3 
 
IC1, IC2 
 
Existing agencies were not 
empowered 
BMRDA was under 
performing 
 
 
IG1, IP1, IP6 
 
IG6 
 
 
IP3 IA3 IC2, IC1 
BMP had limited 
powers  
IP4 IG5, IG7  IA2 IC1 
Growth of Bangalore 
city – mobility 
became an issue 
 
IG1, IG2, IP4, IP6   IA1 IC1, IC3 
                **IG1, IG3 and IG4 are from the BMLTA 
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7.2.1 The National Urban Transport Policy/74th Constitutional 
Amendment   
A total of eight respondents pointed to the National Urban Transport Policy 
(NUTP) in 2006 and the push from the central government to implement this 
policy as the turning point for the creation of the BMLTA in Bangalore. The 
academics observed that discussions regarding the need for a strategic 
transport authority were largely confined to academic circles prior to the 
publication of the NUTP. However, serious efforts to establish a single 
transport authority were only made after the NUTP mandated the creation of 
the Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA) for cities with a 
population of more than one million. Respondent IA3 explained that the 
central government did not set stringent guidelines on the model that the 
UMTA should adopt, thus leaving individual states to choose ones that are 
suitable to their local contexts. 
Most of the respondents could not accurately recall where the original 
arguments for the need for a coordinating authority had come from. 
Respondent IA1 was confident that the transport studies prepared by 
international development agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank had recommended a coordinating authority as one of 
their main proposals, but he could not recall such proposals appearing in the 
local transport plans. Respondent IG1 strongly linked the national Jawaharlal 
Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) commissioned in 2005 with the 
proposal for the UMTA. She said that the creation of an UMTA was 
mandatory for cities that are listed as eligible to receive support from the 
JNNURM under this scheme. This includes Bangalore, and she said that this 
was the impetus for Bangalore to create the Directorate of Urban Land 
Transport (DULT) and the BMLTA in 2007. However, the JNNURM 
document published on the Ministry of Urban Development’s website does 
not directly mention the creation of a UMTA, as respondent IG1 claimed, 
although the mandatory reforms listed included the implementation of 
decentralisation measures as envisaged in the 74
th
 Constitutional 
Amendment. This states that all the states should ensure meaningful 
association and engagement of urban local bodies in planning as well as the 
delivery of services to the citizens31.  
 
                                            
31 http://jnnurm.nic.in accessed on 28 October 2012 
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7.2.2 The push from the State Government  
Four respondents representing government agencies said that the Urban 
Development Department (UDD) has a good team of administrators who 
pushed for the UMTA to be created following the central government’s 
release of the NUTP. These administrators had the full support of the Chief 
Minister’s Office and the Chief Secretary of the State. The proposal for the 
UMTA was also supported by a wide range of stakeholders, and respondent 
IG4 pointed out that he is not aware of anyone who was against the idea as 
everyone thought that a better coordination mechanism was needed. Only 
respondent IP3, who represented a parastatal agency, argued against the 
need for a UMTA in Bangalore. He stressed that a UMTA should operate 
outside Bangalore where more critical technical support and coordination 
efforts were needed.  
7.2.3 Fragmentation in the planning roles for urban transport  
There were many different reactions to the fragmentation in the planning 
roles that agencies and institutions held, and this was seen as a critical issue 
by respondents from the government sector in particular. The main concerns 
among respondents were the fragmentation in urban transport planning, the 
lack of integration between land use and urban transport planning, the 
ownership of plans, and skills shortages.  
Prior to the creation of the BMLTA, one of the IAS respondents (IG2) 
explained that transport planning was part of urban planning and that there 
were many agencies involved in urban transport planning, as explained in 
section 3.3.1.1. Another IAS (IG1) pointed out that an overarching policy for 
transport that could be used as a reference point by these agencies was 
lacking, and hence these plans were prepared in isolation. Thus, these 
respondents believed that there was a critical need for a dedicated single 
agency that could look at the transport strategies prepared by the various 
agencies and coordinate their functions so that urban transport could be 
developed in an integrated manner.  
A total of six respondents – mainly those outside the government agencies – 
commented on the lack of land use transport integration and the resulting 
development of infrastructure that gave too little consideration for the need 
of transport facilities to support mobility. Only two respondents from the 
government sector with planning backgrounds appreciated the need for 
integrated land use transport planning. They explained that each agency 
was individually doing some urban planning, and that made things difficult 
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because land use transport integration was not given due consideration. 
Although urban planning for Bangalore was mainly the responsibility of the 
Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), respondent IP6 – who is also an 
IAS officer – said that the BDA’s focus was more on developing layouts for 
new housing schemes. This respondent stressed that an empowered 
authority had thus been urgently needed to ensure that urban transport 
planning was carried out in a more integrated manner, and that this authority 
had needed strong statutory backing so that it could plan holistically, 
coordinate major stakeholders, and make important decisions.  
Respondents provided two proposals for bridging the gap in urban transport 
planning process. Respondent IC1 and IP6 said that an empowered UMTA 
must be created, whereas respondent IG4, IG6 and IA2 felt that the creation 
of the Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) was an alternative solution 
for providing holistic planning through integrating land use with all the other 
sectors, including transport. The latter highlighted that agencies have been 
doing their work in isolation from each other for a long time, and that they 
see the MPC as the medium through which stakeholders can get together 
and plan at the regional level.  
A wide range of urban plans were prepared by the parastatal agencies in 
Bangalore, and respondent IC1 pointed out that although the relevant plans 
were in place, no one had taken ownership of them to ensure that they are 
implemented. This respondent felt that to do this, it was necessary to create 
an authority that could take ownership of existing plans and have the 
authority to implement them.  
7.2.4 Coordination issues 
The weaknesses in coordination were felt most strongly by the respondents 
from the government sector, all of whom asserted that this was a pressing 
issue that required immediate attention. A similar view was also shared by 
more than half the respondents from other categories. They recognised that 
the coordination issue affects work relations between the agencies involved 
in implementing transport strategies and, as a result, leads to piecemeal 
development and poor integration of transport services on the ground. The 
reasons given ranged from the agencies being under different rules, and 
having different visions and objectives to the attitudes and beliefs that 
underlie different agencies’ approaches to their work.  
Three respondents from the government sector (IG3, IG5 and IG7) strongly 
believed that the coordination issues were mainly caused by the existence of 
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different rules governing the agencies involved in the provision of transport 
infrastructure and services. The agencies are obliged to comply with their 
own rules and regulations, and pay little attention to what other agencies are 
doing and how their work affects others. For example, the Greater Bangalore 
Municipal Corporation (BBMP) is responsible for putting up the bus stops 
and the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) runs the bus 
operations, so without proper communication between the two, the BBMP 
might end up constructing poorly positioned bus stops. Respondents from 
the local corporation (IG7) explained that the BBMP is not wrong, as their 
regulations allow them to determine suitable locations, and they may not be 
aware that such actions affect the overall efficiency of bus operations. It was 
pointed out that this problem is aggravated by the absence of a common 
platform for the agencies to meet and discuss their proposals and plans, and 
felt that there was a need to create one to bring the agencies together. 
Respondent IG5 had a contrasting proposal for facilitating coordination. This 
respondent felt that all the agencies involved in transport needed to be 
placed under one umbrella body and one set of legislation, which means 
amending and merging existing rules and regulations. Although this sounds 
like a ‘big-bang’ reform, this respondent was confident that it would be 
possible with strong political will. 
Three respondents outside the government (IP8, IC1 and IA3) reported that 
agencies had a tendency to work towards their own visions and objectives. 
They felt that agencies involved in the delivery of infrastructure services are 
often under the impression that they are providing the optimum service, and 
do not realise that their efforts are sometimes conflicting with other agencies. 
It was pointed out that these agencies were constantly under political and 
public pressure to deliver something, and that they cannot wait to coordinate 
with other agencies plans because this process is too time-consuming. 
However, they realised that better coordination was required for the efficient 
use of the limited resources available, especially with regard to funding. 
Respondent IA3 described the problem in more detail – yearly budgets for 
development are limited, which causes everyone to struggle for scarce 
resources, and often a large number of projects are started at the same time 
without any assurance that continuous funding will be available. Thus, this 
respondent felt that someone had to step forward to plan, coordinate, and 
decide on which projects to implement and to ensure that at least one year’s 
works is carried out efficiently within the allocated budget. For this 
respondent, a coordinating body with funding muscle was urgently required. 
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A different perspective to this was held by two respondents outside the 
government, however. IC2 and IP8 said that the attitudes of the agencies 
were part of the reason for the coordination problems, and accused the 
parastatal and government agencies of being too arrogant, self-centred and 
reluctant to share resources, especially in the implementation of large 
infrastructure projects. It was also pointed out that no one agency had the 
ultimate authority to bring the relevant agencies together for discussions 
before decisions were made, and no one agency had the power to control 
other agencies involved in the implementation of such projects.  Respondent 
IP8 illustrated the issue as follows: 
“If my duty is to supply water, I will only supply water. In doing so, if I 
have to dig all the roads, I take it as a given, you know –, it is part of the 
job. In the meantime, if the road maintenance guy comes to do some 
work and he observes that I am in the process of laying my pipes, he 
will not change his programme, he will repair the road when my work is 
not finished” (respondent IP8). 
7.2.5 Existing agencies were not empowered 
Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority was under-
performing 
The role of the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority 
(BMRDA) was described in section 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2. Three out of five of 
the IAS respondents observed that the BMRDA did not develop and function 
as it had been expected to, especially in relation to improving coordination 
between agencies and regulating development in the Bangalore Metropolitan 
Region (BMR) through its planning role. Four other respondents outside the 
government category also raised this as an issue. Discussions focussed 
around its poor streamlining of the institutional framework, its lack of financial 
autonomy and the attitudes of the officers attached to the agency. A 
respondent from the BMLTA said that the BMRDA had not functioned as 
well as expected, and now the BMLTA is expected to fill the gap by 
performing the planning and coordination role in urban transport for the area 
that had been under the jurisdiction of the BMRDA. The same view was put 
forward by respondent IP1, who said that the agency did not develop like 
other development authorities in other cities, such as Chennai and Mumbai, 
where the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority have become powerful in the 
regional area. Respondent IG6 explained that when the regional authorities 
were set up in Chennai and Mumbai, the city development authorities were 
abolished and their powers consolidated under the regional authorities, 
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which has enabled them to be successful in improving coordination among 
agencies. However, when the BMRDA was created in Bangalore in 1986, the 
BDA was maintained to function alongside with BMRDA with overlapping 
functions and jurisdiction. Reference to the Draft Urban Development Policy 
(2009) for the Karnataka State reveals proposals to abolish all the urban 
development authorities (including the BDA) and local planning authorities 
and to transfer their powers to the urban local bodies as advocated in the 
74
th
 Constitutional Amendment. However, this policy has yet to be approved 
by the State Government.  
The BMRDA’s lack of financial autonomy was also cited as a factor in its 
ineffectiveness. Respondent IA3 said that the BMRDA could not carry out its 
functions because it was dependent on government grants to run its 
operations, and thus that money was its main constraint:  
“The BMRDA is more of an advisory-cum-planning body – they have a 
certain amount of legislative control in terms of conversion of land and 
other things, but funding, NO, funding comes from somewhere else, 
and finally everything boils down to the dollars and cents, the money 
has to come… (respondent IA3). 
Because of its financial limitations, the BMRDA could not facilitate the 
coordination of other agencies or effectively drive its plans forward. 
Respondent IP3 claimed that this led the BMRDA to concentrate on other 
functions, such as handling approvals for development, which are not 
financially burdensome. Coordination had to be facilitated by the UDD, but 
the department had other workloads, so a dedicated body was required. On 
the other hand, respondent IC2 did not see the absence of financial muscle 
as an issue, blaming the poor attitude of officers in the BMRDA for its 
ineffectiveness, saying that they are ‘laid back’ and unproductive.  
The limited powers of the Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation 
(BBMP) 
Four respondents who have had close working relationships with the BBMP 
claimed that the agency does not have adequate powers for planning and 
controlling the development that happens inside its area, and that it is 
struggling under capacity and bureaucracy issues. Although the BBMP 
should ideally be a powerful urban local body for the city of Bangalore, 
respondents IC1 and IG7 pointed out that it is not empowered to control 
other agencies that provide infrastructure and services in its area, or to take 
action against agencies that violate rules and regulations. Respondent IG7 
said that, as a local body, the BBMP should be empowered to plan, but is 
unable to because power has not been devolved to it by the State 
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Government, and thus the planning for BBMP’s area was performed by the 
BDA instead. It was also pointed out that the BBMP receives a grant from 
the State Government to run its operations. 
The lack of traffic professionals and the absence of powers to look at the 
entire traffic system in Bangalore were raised as an issue by respondents 
IG5 and IC1. Respondent IG5, who was previously employed by the BBMP 
agreed that the BBMP does not have the overall authority to manage the 
traffic system in the city, and that the purview lies with the Bangalore Traffic 
Police. This respondent revealed that its officers are unable to focus on their 
desk jobs because they are continually distracted by councillors who expect 
these officers to accompany them for site visits and meetings. This is made 
worse when the officers are overloaded and lack training for their daily 
routines. The working culture in the BBMP was also heavily criticised by 
respondent IC2, who pointed out that the BBMP operates like a typical 
government agency, filled with complex procedures and long approval 
processes, and all correspondence with the agency has to be done in 
writing. Because of this, respondent IC2 claimed that the BBMP could not 
play a coordinating role inside its own jurisdiction, and a respondent from the 
local authority felt that there was a need to create a dedicated body to 
facilitate planning and coordination efforts at the BBMP level. 
Short mayoral tenure  
At least four respondents, IA2, IP4, IG7 and IG5 viewed the lack of power 
given to the mayor and his short tenure negatively. The mayor and the 
deputy mayor only hold office for one year, after which they are re-elected by 
the councillors. Respondent IG5 said that although the Mayor is the head of 
the council, he is powerless, and it is the commissioner that enforces the 
Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act (1976) and plays the executive role. 
These respondents also pointed out that a mayor has no power to command 
in his own area, whilst having to manage various groups, especially the 
councillors that elected him. All of these respondents felt that having an 
elected mayor would make a big difference because he would be 
accountable to the local citizens, and funds would then be managed more 
wisely for the benefit of the people.  
7.2.6 The growth of Bangalore  
The rapid growth of Bangalore in recent years seemed to be a major 
concern to all the respondents from the IAS groups that head the transport 
departments in Bangalore, and they all felt that the creation of the BMLTA 
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would help to alleviate some of the issues. Respondent IG2 highlighted the 
importance of transport in driving Bangalore’s economy, mainly in terms of 
providing access to new growth areas. This respondent also pointed out that 
mobility improvements were urgently needed in Bangalore because its 
growth attracted migrants and a sharp increase in its population. Multimodal 
transport was developed, with new transport modes such as the METRO 
and taxis being introduced beside traditional modes such as auto rickshaws, 
buses and trains. This led to the need to integrate the different modes of 
transport and improve connectivity, but these modes have been under the 
purviews of different agencies, and therefore a special body was felt 
necessary for coordination purposes. Although initiatives were taken to 
improve the traffic conditions in the city, they were not coordinated efforts, 
with each agency developing their own traffic interventions and 
communicating little with each other about them, thus producing sub-
optimum results. IP4 commented: 
“Resources might have been invested by one agency, again another 
agency will just do something else in opposite direction, that's why I 
feel, there is an urgent need to have a unified agency in the city, 
which can have a comprehensive view, and then direct the relevant 
agencies” (respondent IP4). 
Respondent G1 said that the state administrators looked at successful 
models in other developed cities in an attempt to address these problems, 
and seeing how successfully the dedicated transport authorities in Singapore 
and London were operating and they thought that a similar model could also 
work in Bangalore. However, it is not clear how comprehensively the 
administrators looked at these models. 
The absence of a comprehensive view for Bangalore  
The rapid growth in Bangalore was made worse by the absence of a 
comprehensive view on how the city should be developed, and this was 
picked up as an issue by heads of departments and professionals 
(academics and consultants). It seems to be common for cities around India 
to not have a clear vision, and to not know exactly what has to be done or 
how to do it. This is compounded by the absence of effective mechanisms to 
enforce agencies to deliver. Several respondents pointed out that agencies 
which are involved in urban planning and development prepare their own 
plans and programmes based on what they think is desirable rather than by 
referring to a common policy to set the direction. Respondent IC1 
commented: 
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“Nobody knows what should be done in Bangalore, how it should be 
done which project has to come where and how it fits” (respondent 
IC1). 
A respondent from the BMLTA asserted that a vision for the city needs to be 
developed to address these problems, and that all the transport initiatives 
undertaken must tie into the overall objectives for transport, which must also 
cohere with the development of other sectors guided by this vision. A similar 
view was shared by an academic (IA1), who said that an overall view of the 
city is desperately needed, together with an understanding of how projects in 
another sectors will impact upon transport.  
7.2.7 Reflections 
Multiple factors led to the creation of the BMLTA. The central government 
made a strong push for it by issuing the NUTP in 2006, to which the State 
Government of Karnataka quickly responded by creating the DULT and 
BMLTA in 2007. The national initiative only encourages the formation of a 
single transport agency, but it was an important criterion for creating access 
to funds. This suggests that access to resources and power was clearly a 
factor in this reform. The presence of key reformers consisting of senior 
administrators and politicians in the State Government was also a key factor 
in its creation (Bauckaert and Pollitt, 2011). The stakeholders supported the 
initial idea of creating the BMLTA, although at that point they were not aware 
what was changing and what they were actually supporting. 
Coordination was a pressing issue, and a dedicated authority was seen to be 
necessary for Bangalore to improve coordination among agencies and to 
overcome poor integration of planning for urban transport. This means that 
there was an understanding that integration/coordination was crucial for 
transport regulation (see May et al., 2006) and that transport authorities 
could provide the solution (as proposed by ADB and World Bank). The 
reasons for poor coordination seem to centre on the fact that each agency 
had its own laws, objectives and functions and were competing for scarce 
funding. There were a large number of semi-autonomous bodies operating in 
Bangalore, and these agencies were unconnected. No one agency had the 
coordinating power to bring the agencies together for coordinated effort. 
They were mostly concerned about fulfilling their own objectives using the 
available resources rather than collaborating with other agencies to produce 
unitary outputs. Inter-agency rivalry was also prevalent, as Thakur (1995) 
observed. Christensen and Laegreid (2006) argue that the presence of too 
many semi-autonomous agencies increases coordination and accountability 
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issues, and this applies to Bangalore. Planning was carried out in a 
fragmented manner by all the agencies that had some role to play in urban 
development, and in the absence of a comprehensive view of the city and a 
single or a dedicated body to look at urban transport planning, an overall set 
of policy objective to guide urban transport development was missing, as 
was observed in many developed cities (see section 2.4). This disorganised 
structure existed for many years before the decision to create the BMLTA 
was made, with the eventual motivation for change being strongly driven by 
the NUTP and the growth of Bangalore city. 
Other factors that have contributed to the need for a transport authority 
arose from the failure of agencies such as the BMRDA and the BBMP to 
perform as anticipated, which created a large gulf between their functions on 
paper and their actual practices.  The reasons that were cited for these 
shortcomings were the agencies’ lack of financial strength and powers. It 
also seemed that there was more desire to create new agencies rather than 
to streamline existing ones and dissolving irrelevant ones. For example, the 
existing institutional landscape was not cleaned up before the BMRDA was 
created, with the functions and jurisdictions of many agencies remaining the 
same, leading to overcrowding and the overlaps between these agencies. 
Pangbourne (2010) describes this phenomenon as ‘over-stuffing’, which 
conveys both the absence of tidying up existing institutions and cramming 
the institutional space. This weakened the role of the BMRDA and, 
combined with its lack of funding powers, made it ineffective even though it 
had the oversight of the chief minister and legislative support. This suggests 
the importance of funding capacity for coordinating agencies.   
The BBMP was a weak city corporation, like many other local authorities in 
developing countries that Gwilliam (1997) points to. It was empowered 
neither in terms of authority nor capacity, and hence failed to plan and 
develop the city or to take control of the agencies operating in its area. This 
reflects the reluctance of the State Government to devolve powers for urban 
planning to local bodies as the 74
th
 amendment of the Constitution 
advocated. City leadership was missing, as the mayoral role was deliberately 
made weak through a short tenure and no accountability to the citizens. The 
failure of the BMRDA and the BBBMP also points towards the poor system 
of accountability, with actors from the agencies failing to take responsibility 
for performing their agencies’ stipulated functions – a situation that was 
enabled by the lack of sanctions for non-performance, which may also 
explain the high level of corruption (Cheema, 2005).  
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Whilst empowering these bodies could have largely solved the problems, 
this was not an easy task as it would have involved major reforms and 
amendments to acts that may not have been very politically desirable as 
they would have involved significant risks to the enactors. Big reforms were 
certainly not favoured, and powerful parastatal agencies appear to resist any 
ceding of power to others as argued by Grindle and Thomas (1989) and 
Down (1967). Furthermore, the State Government was reluctant to devolve 
any powers to the city government. Hence, creating a new set-up with similar 
functions to BMRDA, address some of the issues without too much 
disturbance to the existing equilibrium of the institutional set-up was the 
easiest escape route for policy elites. However, without tackling basic issues 
such as empowerment and accountability, it is unlikely that the creation of 
BMLTA will bring about the anticipated changes. 
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7.3 Research question 2: What types of autonomy have been 
given to the authority? 
Given the rhetoric behind the reform that led to creating the BMLTA, this research 
question aims to explore the extent to which the reform has become a reality. 
Table 7.3 shows the summary of findings for this research question. The first 
section explains the creation of the BMLTA as a committee and the powers given 
to the authority in terms of legislative support and funding. The second part 
touches on the capacity of the body in terms of its leadership and human resource 
capacity. This is followed by an explanation of its working mechanism and how it 
works within its boundary and power constraints.  
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Table 7.3: Matrix showing responses to research question 2 
What types of autonomy have been given to the authority ? 
 
Head of 
departments/IAS 
officers 
(IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, 
IP6) 
Government 
agencies 
(IG3, IG4, IG5, 
IG6, IG7, IG8) 
Parastatal 
agencies 
(IP2, IP3, IP5, 
IP7, IP8) 
Academics 
(IA1, IA2, IA3) 
Professionals 
(IC1, IC2, IC3) 
Powers that have been delegated: 
 Planning function, but no 
powers to drive the plans 
IG1, IG2, IP1 
IG4, IG6, IG7 
 
IA3 IC1 
 Coordination function IP1, IP4, IG1, IG2  
IG3, IG4, IG6, IG7 
 
IA1, IA3 IC1  
 Dispute resolution IP1 
IG3, IG4 
IP3 
 IC1 
 No powers over other 
agencies  
IG1, IP4 
IG3, IG4 
IP8 
IA3 IC1, IC2 
How are powers exercised? 
 Through BMLTA committee 
and sub-committee meetings 
IG1, IP1  
 
IG3, IG4, IG7, 
 
   
 Assistance / preparation of 
studies and plan IG1 
 IG3, IG4, IG7    
Working mechanism  
 
 Hand-holding, participatory 
method  
 
IG1 IG3, IG6, IG7  IA1  
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What types of autonomy have been given to the authority ? 
 
Head of 
departments/IAS 
officers 
(IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, 
IP6) 
Government 
agencies 
(IG3, IG4, IG5, 
IG6, IG7, IG8) 
Parastatal 
agencies 
(IP2, IP3, IP5, 
IP7, IP8) 
Academics 
(IA1, IA2, IA3) 
Professionals 
(IC1, IC2, IC3) 
Working mechanism (cont’d) 
 Through discussion 
IG1, IP1 
IG3, IG4, IG6, 
IG7, 
   
 
 Provide technical advice 
IG1  IG3, IG4   IC2 
Funding mechanism 
 Funding from JNNURM 
IG1  IP8 IA1 IC1 
 
 No funding muscle 
 
IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4 
 
IG3, IG4, IG7 
 
IP3, IP8 
 
IA2 
 
IC1 
Obstacles to pass BMLTA Bill  
Absence of consensus from relevant 
agencies  
IG1 IG3, IG4 IP2 IA1, IA2  
 
Insufficient  push from State 
Government 
 
IG1, IP1, IP4 
  
 
IA2  
 
IC2 
 
Proposal for MPC 
IG1, IG2 IG4, IG6 IP3 IA2  
 
Proposal for BGB 
IG1  IG4, IG5   IC2 
               **IG1, IG3 and IG4 are from BMLTA   
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7.3.1 The BMLTA as a committee 
According to the BMLTA respondents, the BMLTA was created through a 
Government Order in 2007 to operate at the BMR level where the BMRDA 
also operates. It was set-up under the DULT – a wing under the UDD. There 
was no consultation held with stakeholders on the model and functions it 
would adopt prior to its creation, with the decisions being made by the State 
Government alone. It was felt that a consultation process was not necessary 
because the members of the committee were to be representatives from all 
the agencies involved in urban transport planning and development. 
Respondents from the BMLTA see themselves as the UMTA for Bangalore, 
providing a new platform for agencies to meet and discuss urban transport 
issues. It was stressed that the BMLTA is only a committee and not an 
authority, as the name suggest. The committee was tasked with planning 
and coordination roles, which were explained in section 3.3.1.4. The 
BMLTA’s function is limited to buses, taxis, para-transit and non-motorised 
transport, and has no remit over rail and goods vehicles. It also has no 
responsibility for traffic management or safety issues. 
The majority of the respondents understood the BMLTA’s role to be as a 
coordinator and planner, but they argued about the effectiveness of the set-
up, given the model and powers it holds. Respondent IC1 saw the BMLTA 
as a committee that only meets as and when necessary and not a proper 
organisation, which is a long way away from the actual function of a 
transport authority, which has to operate on a daily basis. He commented: 
“The BMLTA is a committee, it is not a day-to-day operational body and 
it cannot be the kind of agent for funding… They meet once in a month, 
they will not be able to do every day. Ultimately we need another 
transport authority” (respondent IC1). 
7.3.2 The powers given to BMLTA 
Respondents from the BMLTA noted that the Government Order which 
sanctioned its creation does not give it the authority to exercise powers over 
other agencies and that there is an absence of legal support which 
formalises its roles and functions. The creation of the BMLTA does not affect 
the powers and functions of other agencies, all of which continue to exist and 
function as they did before. 
It was revealed that the BMLTA was set up as a committee and not as an 
authority because the agencies which were supposed to surrender their 
powers and functions were reluctant to do so. Empowering the BMLTA was 
207 
 
not a straightforward issue, as respondent IG1 pointed out, because it 
cannot be empowered without curtailing the powers of other agencies, 
mainly the BDA and the BMRDA. Half of the respondents said that the 
planning functions it has are not effective as it does not have the power to 
implement plans due to a lack of funding powers. Respondents from the 
BMLTA claimed that it is impossible for them to coordinate without powers to 
dictate and issue directives to other agencies.  
Respondent IA2 thought that the BMTLA was created for legitimate 
purposes to gain funding support from the central government. It is staffed 
with junior officers and is too weak to require any other agencies to attend 
meetings or issue any directives. Although the BMLTA bill was prepared in 
2008, it has yet to be enacted, and because of its lack of legitimate authority 
the respondents referred to it by various other names, including a 
‘recommending body’, and saying that it performed ‘coordination without 
teeth’. Respondents IP1, IP3, IG3 and IG4 felt that BMLTA’s only significant 
role could be to act as a dispute resolution body rather than a planner and a 
coordinator. Even though the BMLTA’s powers and structure were held to be 
insufficient by most respondents, respondent IA3 said that the model it has 
adopted is appropriate in the context of Bangalore, although it may still be 
operating at a suboptimal level. This respondent felt that the creation of a 
strong coordinating authority is not practical in the context of India.  
7.3.3 The BMLTA bill 
Respondents provided many different reasons to explain why the BMLTA bill 
prepared in 2008 has not yet been passed. Besides the long process that is 
involved in enacting any piece of legislation, respondents pointed to the 
absence of collective consensus, an insufficient push by the State 
Government, proposals for a MPC, and the Bengaluru Governance Bill as 
factors. 
Five respondents from different agencies said that attaining collective 
consensus from agencies affected by the BMLTA bill was critical before the 
bill could be passed in parliament. The BMLTA bill requires some of the 
existing agencies to give up their powers, which they are unwilling to do, and 
if they could be made to agree on this, amendments would then have to be 
made to the existing rules of these agencies. Whilst respondents from the 
BMLTA thought that consensus from the agencies was needed before the 
bill could be passed, respondent IG2 asserted that it was more important to 
pass the BMLTA bill first and then to get the relevant agencies to make 
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changes to their acts later on. But respondents from the BMLTA pointed out 
that it not just passing the Act that matters, but what content the Act has – 
i.e. what powers it assigns to the BMLTA and its role vis-à-vis other 
agencies.  
An ex-employee of the BMLTA (IC2) was of view that that the BMLTA bill 
has been difficult to push through because it is not supported by senior civil 
servants in the State Government and lacks political backing. This view was 
supported by four other respondents, with one IAS (IP1) pointing out that the 
State Government is probably reluctant because to pass it because it will 
reduce their power to make decisions for the fast growing capital city. He 
commented:  
“State Government is there for their own survival, they will not take any 
decisions that will reduce the importance of the State Government. The 
mayor and commissioners are given [a] short tenure deliberately, to 
make them weak” (respondent IP1). 
Another respondent, IA2, expressed his scepticism about the actual intention 
of the State Government. This respondent believed that even if the BMLTA 
were to be given legislative backing, the State Government would still not 
provide them with resources such as manpower to enable them to operate 
effectively, and thus legislative support would be meaningless. 
Respondents from the government sector highlighted other reasons for the 
BMLTA’s lack of empowerment, including the alternative proposals to reform 
the institutional structure in Bangalore (such as the creation of MPC) and the 
enactment of the Bengaluru Governance Bill. Respondent IG5 and IG6 
highlighted the issue of the change in ruling parties at the state-level, which 
has led to a lack of continuity in policy implementation, with the new party 
having different priorities and visions for development. However, two other 
respondents, IG1 and IC1 thought that this was not a major issue as the new 
party also promotes development. 
Creation of MPC and proposal for Bengaluru Governance Bill 
Respondent IA2 said that the proposed MPC – a regional planning body for 
Bangalore – is part of the 74
th
 amendment’s initiative to ensure that planning 
for the metropolitan area is done in an integrated way across the 
departments, not in silos within departments. This was supported by a 
respondent from the BMLTA (IG1), who said that the 74
th
 amendment 
requires the creation of an organisation like the MPC – a one-stop centre 
where all the planning is done and transport is regulated. The proposal for 
the MPC is very strong as it is supported by the constitution, but the State 
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Government is still contemplating its creation. Respondent IG1 revealed that 
the proposal for the MPC is one of the reasons why the BMLTA bill has not 
been enacted, because if the MPC is created with legislative backing, then 
the BMLTA will be part of the MPC, and thus the BMLTA Act will no longer 
be needed. This respondent believed that the BMLTA should be placed 
under the MPC because a dedicated body will be needed to look at transport 
planning at the city level to ensure that it is done in an appropriate manner. 
However, a respondent from the BMLTA thought that the central government 
was creating conflicting directives by recommending both the creation of the 
MPC and the UMTA, which have overlapping functions. This respondent 
thought that the BMLTA is not necessary, and that its functions should be 
performed by the MPC instead. An IAS officer (IG2) argued that the BMLTA 
and the MPC cannot both exist independently because this would fragment 
planning roles and dilute the powers of the MPC, and thus the BMLTA 
should either be dissolved or absorbed as a unit under the MPC.  
Respondent IG6 described the model envisioned for the MPC in more detail. 
He contended that when the MPC materialises, the BMLTA will have to be 
either dissolved or absorbed, but that DULT could continue to exist because 
its jurisdiction covers the state. It was pointed out that as the BMRDA is 
envisaged to become the MPC, the BDA will have to be divested of its 
planning role when it is created, and then solely focus on project 
development. The MPC promises to provide a good platform for integrating 
transport and land use, which has been neglected. Respondent IA2 was 
confident that the MPC would eventually be created, but was unsure if it 
would be properly empowered, suggesting that this would depend on the 
personality behind its creation. 
Although the proposal for the MPC has existed for almost twenty years, it 
has still not materialised for various reasons. Respondents IG6 and IP3 
attributed it to power issues, as its creation requires powers and roles of 
existing agencies to be streamlined, which means changes to governing acts 
and laws. It was also revealed that there are power struggles over who 
should lead the MPC. Thus, its creation will require numerous changes, but 
nobody seems sure about the kinds of changes that will have to be made for 
it to be effective, and hence there has been extended silence about this 
proposal.  
Another proposal in the pipeline is the Bengaluru Governance Bill. 
Respondent IC2 said that some politically influential individuals are pushing 
for this for personal fame. This bill should ideally absorb the BMLTA bill, but 
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it was highlighted that the bill says nothing about transport. Respondents 
from the BMLTA confirmed that they were asked to put the BMLTA bill on 
hold because of the Bengaluru Governance Bill, and to wait until decisions 
were made.  
7.3.4 Funding capacity 
Respondents from the BMLTA said that they shared financial resources with 
the DULT and that they have a limited dedicated fund to carry out their own 
initiatives. One of these respondents pointed out that the BMLTA’s status as 
a committee does not enable it to source its own funds, and that it is 
therefore dependent on the State Government for funding support, adding 
that if the BMLTA were transformed into a statutory body, then it would have 
a better chance of gaining financial autonomy. This respondent explained 
that the State Government has allocated Rs10 Crores (£240,000) under the 
city transport fund as a one-off budget, and that half of this has been 
pledged to the cycling project in Madiwala. Most of the agencies in 
Bangalore are currently required to implement the BMLTA’s proposals and 
plans using their own funding, and this is why the BMLTA cannot be forceful 
in driving its plans – they are dependent on the budgets of other agencies.  
Five respondents from a variety of groups noted the power of money in 
India, and felt that the BMLTA would be able to make a lot of things happen 
with strong financial autonomy. Two IAS officers proposed funding models 
for the BMLTA. IP4 explained that it would not be necessary for the BMLTA 
to provide the full funding cost for projects as a 30% share of project cost is 
adequate to provide the push. Alternatively, the BMLTA could be designed 
as the fund distributor for the various transport initiatives undertaken in the 
BMR, or it could be transformed into a nodal agency that distributed funds 
for implemented projects with assistance from international development 
agencies.  
Financial assistance for urban transport projects undertaken in Bangalore 
from the JNNURM seemed to offer some relief to the pressure on the 
BMLTA to provide funding support for these projects. Respondents IG1 and 
IP8 pointed to some of the transport initiatives implemented under the 
JNNURM programme, such as the Vajra premium bus programme, which 
includes a service to the airport and the construction of transit and traffic 
management centres around the city. Respondent IA1 explained how the 
funding mechanism has changed since the arrival of the JNNURM. 
Procedures and guidelines have been streamlined, and there is a systematic 
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procedure in place for states and cities to apply for funding from central 
government instead of in the ad hoc manner seen in the past. Respondent 
IC1 pointed out that JNNURM’s power and control comes through money 
and that the BMLTA would play a more meaningful role if it could do the 
same. 
7.3.5 Capacity issues 
Respondents from the BMLTA highlighted that the BMLTA is not a separate 
entity, but part of DULT - it is the same organisation under different names. 
Unfortunately, DULT’s capacity in terms of manpower, technical expertise 
and funding is also limited. The government order which sanctioned the 
creation of DULT specifies its staffing criteria. Only three permanent posts 
were approved, and the rest of the staff was engaged on a contractual basis. 
The contract staff lacked commitment, however, tending to leave for better 
career opportunities. To bridge this gap, the BMLTA came to work through 
sub-committees, as explained in section 3.3.1.4. 
Respondents from DULT admitted that they are not able to give full attention 
to the BMLTA because DULT has to deal with areas outside Bangalore, 
which are large and involve a substantial amount of time and work including 
a large amount of long distance travelling. These respondents also 
acknowledged that it is not easy to deal with other strong, established 
agencies inside Bangalore without sufficient powers and capacities. Hence 
most of these respondents said that the BMLTA needed to be a separate 
entity from DULT, with sufficient powers, resources and personnel to operate 
as a dedicated body, although one (IG4) criticised the arguments for 
increasing its capacity on the grounds that this alone would never be 
enough, and that the BMLTA has to choose between the ability to do things 
on their own or the ability to get things done (through coordination and good 
network), and if it is the latter, then it has a high enough capacity to do so 
with its existing resources. 
Some respondents noted that the BMLTA has been granted approval by the 
State Government to use the Centre for infrastructure, Sustainable 
Transportation and Urban Planning (CISTUP) in the Indian Institute of 
Science (IISC) in order to build its technical capabilities. A respondent from 
the BMLTA said that this technical cell should be able to help stakeholders 
look at their plans from a wider perspective so that all the infrastructure 
projects could be planned and implemented taking the requirements and 
demands for public transport facilities into consideration. In addition, the 
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technical cell is also expected to review the various plans prepared by 
agencies and to integrate transport elements. This cell should ideally have 
the capability for assessing the technical aspects of new project proposals, 
for giving feedback for improvements and for providing alternatives. This 
respondent was confident that once this cell was fully operational, it will be 
able to provide the necessary platform for enabling everyone to look in the 
same direction, as well as inculcating awareness about the importance of 
public transport among local administrators who are still focused on road 
construction.  
The BMLTA has been granted approval to increase its recruitment, but 
details of this were not revealed by the respondents. A respondent from the 
BMLTA highlighted the difficulties that exist for hiring the right talent due to 
the limited number of experts in urban transport planning. Two other 
respondents agreed that a lack of urban transport expertise is a drawback 
for Bangalore, and respondent IG6 claimed that to bridge this gap transport 
agencies there often seek assistance from international development 
agencies such as ADB for technical support.  
7.3.6 Leadership issues 
7.3.6.1 The Chief Secretary’s role as the chairman of the BMLTA   
Respondents from the BMLTA shared the view that having the Chief 
Secretary as its chairman gives its decisions a lot of strength, and claimed 
that stakeholders must go by what the committee decides. However, four 
respondents argued that although the Chief Secretary has great decision-
making capacity, the decisions made by the BMLTA itself are not binding 
because the committee is powerless. Respondent IP8 commented: 
“When the Chief Secretary … is deciding in his capacity as the Chief 
Secretary, they will follow his decisions, but the Chief Secretary as 
somebody of the BMLTA means there’ll be little authority. These 
agencies do not want their authority to be taken by someone else, all 
these while these agencies had the powers to make their own 
decisions” (respondent IP8). 
Although the decisions made by the BMLTA may not be binding, 
Respondents IG2 and IC1 said that the appointment of the Chief Secretary 
as the chairman helps to cool the turf wars among agencies, resolve the 
differences between them and provide the opportunity for them to present 
their cases so that some decisions can be taken. This might be true in 
meetings, where the members might go with the decisions made by the 
Chief Secretary as a show of respect, but the reality on the ground appears 
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to be different. Respondent IA1 said that problems often occur during the 
execution of projects on the ground, when the agencies involved are 
reluctant to give up their powers and share their resources. Hence, projects 
are delayed and excuses are made to postpone their implementation.  
Respondents from the BMLTA highlighted the disadvantages of operating 
under the oversight of the Chief Secretary. They said that because the Chief 
Secretary is very busy, it is difficult to find a time when he can chair the 
meetings. They felt that the BMLTA needed a full-time chairman who could 
look into operational matters on a daily basis, and they understand that this 
could only happen if the BMTLA receives a legal mandate. 
7.3.6.2 The Commissioner’s role 
The BMLTA is led by a senior IAS officer, designated as a Commissioner. 
Six respondents expressed their views of the merits of the BMLTA’s existing 
leadership, with none of the respondents expressing any criticism. 
Respondent IG6 said that the commissioner had undertaken proactive 
initiatives and received good support from the stakeholders, but that she 
faced difficulties because the BMLTA lacks empowerment. Respondent IA2 
expressed his view that the commissioner was appointed to fill the post as 
she is a high-flyer whose career development her seniors want to curtail by 
giving her a position in a powerless body like DULT/BMLTA, where she 
cannot do very much to progress. This respondent claimed that good IAS 
officers in India get stationed in the ‘parking lots’ where they cannot exercise 
their powers, or are given multiple positions in the government so that they 
cannot pay full attention to one particular agency. It is worth noting that the 
Commissioner was also given additional responsibilities as the 
Commissioner for the Survey and Settlement Department in 2011, before 
being transferred to the Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Department in 
January 2012, and the secretary of the Youth Services Department in 
September that year.32  
7.3.7 Working mechanism 
All of the respondents agreed that the BMLTA lacks the requisite powers to 
carry out its planning and coordination roles effectively. Because of this, the 
BMLTA has adopted a softer working approach with other stakeholders. 
According to respondents from the BMLTA, the steps it has taken include 
                                            
32 http://persmin.nic.in/ersheet/MultipleERS, accessed on 6th November 2012 
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hand-holding in preparation of technical studies, and providing consultations 
and recommendations about appropriate strategies for improving the 
conditions of the urban transport system. The main aim of these approaches 
is to convince the relevant agencies to implement the decisions made by the 
committee or the recommendations proposed in the plans. The 
achievements of the BMLTA in securing its intended outcomes is presented 
in section 7.4.2. 
7.3.8 Reflections  
The actual autonomy given to BMLTA as a transport authority is explored 
using the six dimensions of autonomy proposed by Verhoest et al. (2004) 
and Laegreid et al. (2006), as shown in table 7.4. BMLTA does not seem to 
enjoy any formal autonomy as a transport authority. Although some of the 
respondents claim that they have looked at LTA Singapore, it appears as 
though they have only copied the name rather than focussing on roles and 
powers.  
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Table 7.4: BMLTA’s autonomy compared to the dimensions of 
autonomy proposed by Varhoest et al. (2004) and Laegreid et al. 
(2006) 
Autonomy Dimensions Autonomy given to SPAD 
 
Legal 
autonomy 
 
 
 
The extent to which the legal 
status of an agency prevents 
the government from altering 
the allocation of decision-
making competencies 
Strength  Weaknesses 
 
Absence of legislative 
support 
Personnel  
Strategic Personnel Matters 
Salaries, criteria for promotion, 
evaluation, recruitment and 
downsizing 
 
Operational Personnel 
matters  
Wage increases, promotion, 
evaluation, recruitment and 
dismissal of individual 
employees 
 
 
Shares personnel with 
DULT – absence of 
dedicated personnel for 
BMLTA 
 
Financial 
 
Make loans for investment  
Set tariff/prices for products and 
services 
Conclude legal contracts with 
private actors 
Generates own revenue 
 
Shares financial 
resources with DULT- 
fully dependent on 
government grant 
Policy  
 
Strategic Policy Matters 
Setting own goals and 
objectives, setting policies on 
transport matters and approval 
of project proposals 
Operational Policy matters  
Manage day-to-day activities 
Building its niche in 
uncontested, failed 
policy areas  
 
 
 
Intervention  
 
The extent to which the agency 
is free from ‘reporting’ to the 
government 
 
Reports to the Chief 
Secretary and 
Department of Urban 
Development 
 
Although the Karnataka State Government was enthusiastic when it set up 
the BMLTA in 2007 on the heels of the release of the NUTP in 2006, they 
have not made a corresponding effort in empowering it. The BMLTA has 
been assigned with planning and coordination roles, but has only been set-
up as a high-powered committee, not as the agency it would need to be to 
successfully undertake such roles. It was probably set-up in this way as this 
represented the cheapest form, requiring no dedicated resources and fitting 
the existing cultural norms. Committees are infrequently involved in day-to-
day operations, only meeting as and when required, and the BMLTA is no 
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exception to this rule. Although a coordinating committee can also be a form 
transport authority, as per the World Bank definition in the Cities on the 
Move Report (2002) – see also section 2.3.1- whether this model is sufficient 
in the context of Bangalore is another matter. Its committee status also 
means that its existence is fragile – it could be dissolved if and when 
necessary. Egeberg (2003) observed that the impact of a committee is less 
profound because its participants are engaged on a part-time basis and 
remain primarily attached to other organisations. The credibility of the 
BMLTA committee as a form of transport authority can be further questioned 
because it has been set up without legislative backing or financial autonomy, 
which are crucial for driving its coordination and planning roles. Transport 
authorities’ need for legislative backing and funding support has been 
highlighted as being crucial by ADB, GTZ and the World Bank (see section 
2.3.1), and is observed in many transport authorities in developed cities.  
Hence, the State Government’s intention for the BMLTA can be questioned. 
It could be that the BMLTA was created for the State to gain legitimate 
access to the JNNURM funds provided by the central government by 
complying with the NUTP. The absence of a strong political champion with 
the adequate authority and power could have also been a reason. Or 
perhaps senior administrators realised that although an effective 
coordinating authority was crucial in Bangalore, they might have been too 
scared to implement bold reforms, attempting not to rock the boat too much 
for fear of being transferred as a punishment due to the strong politician-civil 
servants fusion highlighted by Dwivedi (2003). This unwillingness is probably 
increased by uncertainties regarding reforms whose outcomes are not 
guaranteed, as pointed out by researchers (Jones and Kettl, 2003; Toonen, 
2003).  
The creation of the BMLTA as a committee under the UDD indicates the 
reluctance of the State Government to devolve any powers for championing 
the BMLTA to the city authority. The State Government may be seeking to 
retain its control in Bangalore, which has experienced tremendous growth in 
recent years and is the source Karnataka state’s wealth. This conforms to 
other researchers’ findings that central or state governments want to retain 
their powers, with decentralisation (if happens) often being limited to 
devolving administrative responsibilities without any real powers (see Larson 
and Ribot, 2004; Azfar et al., 2001; Tang and Bloom, 2000). However, 
despite strong push for decentralisation in the State, the creation of the 
BMLTA cannot be considered as a form of decentralisation, as it has not 
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fulfilled the necessary criteria of transferring political, fiscal or administrative 
powers, as explained in section 2.5.1.  
Many reasons were offered to explain why the BMLTA has still not been 
formalised five years after its creation. The strongest ones appear to be the 
existence of strong, embedded agencies that have no desire to relinquish 
any of their powers as suggested by Down (1967), the State Government's 
unwillingness to loosen its grip, and uncertainty concerning the best 
transport regulation model. In addition, the access to JNNURM funds was 
assured, and there has been no sanction from central government for the 
creation of an ineffective BMLTA. The enactment of the BMLTA bill requires 
consensus from stakeholders and changes to governing acts in order to 
create a clear line of responsibility and accountability. There were also 
political changes after the state election in May 2008, in which the Bharatiya 
Janata Party took control from the previous coalition government. It is 
possible that the new policy elites in the State Government were not keen to 
continue what the previous government had started, or that political interest 
in the reform programme has faded, as Peters (2010) has suggested. 
The empowerment of the BMLTA is also dependent on other reforms 
awaiting State Government decisions, such as the MPC and the Bengaluru 
Governance Bill. This would fit with Toonen’s (2003) description of the 
reform process as an ongoing process in which reform at one level can 
trigger or inhibit reforms at another, creating issues and problems that need 
to be resolved before further reform can take place. However, at this point 
the State Government does not seem to be keen to create the MPC. It is a 
clear sign that they are not ready to devolve any powers to the city-level or to 
make any major structural changes, indicating that they want to retain 
control.  
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7.4 Research question 3: How have the reforms affected 
decision-making process in policy-making and the 
selection and implementation of transport projects? 
This research question was designed to explore the BMLTA’s achievements 
in relation to the powers it has received and the range of actors who have 
been involved. It also explores the types of issues and matters discussed at 
the committee meetings, including the concerns of stakeholders involved in 
the decision-making loop. The extent to which these decisions were 
implemented was also explored, and the reasons for non-compliance 
sought. To understand the extent to which the BMLTA committee has been 
effective, and its achievements to-date, the views of respondents on this 
issue were explored. Table 7.5 presents the summary  of responses. 
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Table 7.5: Matrix showing responses to research question 3 
How have the reforms affected decision-making process in policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport 
projects? 
 
Heads of 
departments/IAS 
officers 
(IG1, IG2, IP1, IP4, IP6) 
Government 
agencies 
(IG3, IG4, IG5, IG6, 
IG7, IG8) 
Parastatal agencies 
(IP2, IP3, IP5, IP7, IP8) 
Academics 
(IA1, IA2, IA3) 
Consultancy 
(IC1, IC2, IC3) 
 
There is a platform to bring the 
stakeholders together under 
the chairmanship of the Chief 
Secretary 
IG1  
 
IG3, IG4, IG6, IG7 
 
 IA1 IC1 
BMLTA’s decision is not 
binding, only advisor 
IG1, IG2, IP1, IP6 IG3, IG5, IG7 IP2, IP3, IP8 IA1, IA3  
 Achievements : 
- Better planning 
IG1 IG4, IG6, IG7 
  
IC2 
- Better coordination  IG1, IG2, IP1 IG3, IG4, IG6 IP2, IP3, IP5, IP8 IA1 
IC1 
- NMT initiatives IG1 IG7   
IC1 
- BRT project  IG1 IG3, IG6 IP8 IA1 
 
Failures 
- Enforcing guidelines 
IG1  
  
 
- Parking and 
Pedestrian Policy  
IG1 IG3, IG4 
  
 
               **IG1, IG3 and IG4 are from BMLTA 
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7.4.1 The decision-making platform 
Respondents from the BMLTA expressed satisfaction in relation to their 
success in drawing all the stakeholders involved in planning and managing 
urban transport in the BMR to a common table to discuss issues and make 
collaborative decisions under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary. 
However, whilst the respondents from the BMLTA were content with their 
success in bringing all the stakeholders together, the performance of the 
committee was heavily criticised by one member of the committee: 
“The BMLTA is not functioning. I have attended four meetings of that 
coordination body, but it has nothing to do – they don’t set deadlines 
for completion, and after three months the same item is discussed in 
the meeting again. They site some reason or another why they don’t 
have the authority to enforce it” (respondent IA3). 
As mentioned in section 3.3.1.4, there were at least twenty-one members in 
the BMLTA committee, and respondent IG7 said that the existence of too 
many committee members posed its own challenges, with each member 
having his own ideas and wanting to get things done his way, making it 
difficult to gain consensus and arrive at a common decision. Seeking 
consensus from the majority is important in the context of India, which is a 
liberal democracy. Respondents IA2, IG4, IP2 and IP1 pointed out that 
there is no ‘one man rule’ in India, so all decisions must be collectively 
agreed upon. Whilst this is sometimes seen as a stumbling block in 
decision-making because it causes delays, respondents IA2 and IG4 said 
that consensus decisions are more stable and help to expedite 
implementation on the ground. 
One of the IAS officers pointed out that the decision-making set-up varies 
at each level of government. Councillors are powerful at the local level, 
where their writ prevails, and hence decisions by the BMLTA that are 
supposed to be driven by the BBMP will only be implemented if councillors 
give them the go-ahead. If the proposals made by the BMLTA require 
seeking a higher mandate from the State Government (such as the in the 
proposal for the parking policy), approvals have to first be sought from 
legislators, before the proposal moves on to the Cabinet and the Chief 
Minister. This means that the BMLTA does not have an ultimate say, with 
its decisions being dependent on approvals by other authorities.  
A respondent from the BMLTA pointed out that there are pressure points in 
the decision-making platform and that agencies still continue to do what 
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they want despite objections from the BMLTA. Two respondents from the 
BMLTA reported that working with the strongest parastatal agencies is a 
real challenge, especially with their limited powers. They pointed out that a 
majority of these agencies have large numbers of employees and are very 
strong in terms of both their manpower and financial autonomy compared 
to the BMLTA, which has less than fifteen permanent employees. 
Interestingly, most of the parastatal agencies were perceived to be arrogant 
and egotistical by a majority of the respondents, even those representing 
these agencies. For example, respondent IP8 said that his agency and 
many other parastatals have enjoyed decision-making autonomy for a very 
long time because they have financial strength, which means that they are 
free to do what they think is right. Respondent IP3 proudly said that his 
agency is financially independent and can do whatever it wants using its 
own resources, with no need to follow the decisions made by the BMLTA. 
This respondent was also of opinion that the BDA could take over the 
coordination work because it had all the requisite powers and just needed 
to be given the mandate. Respondent IC2 explained that the parastatal 
agencies would not like being told what to do, and if they had to refer to the 
BMLTA for approval on their decisions, or were bound to the decisions 
made by the BMLTA, they would fight back.  
Against his background, respondents from the BMLTA said that it was 
much easier to perform their coordinating role outside Bangalore, where 
the urban local bodies are in desperate need of support for developing an 
urban transport infrastructure in their areas, and appreciated the assistance 
and advice that is extended to them. This was cited as one of the reasons 
why the personnel of DULT/BMLTA prefer to work under the wing of DULT 
rather than that of the BMLTA. Respondent IG2 was confident that the only 
way for the BMLTA to deal with these agencies would be through the power 
extended by financial strength. 
7.4.2 The BMLTA’s achievements 
As explained in section 3.3.1.4, the main official role of the BMLTA is to act 
as an umbrella organisation for coordinating, planning and implementing 
urban transport programmes and projects. There were mixed responses 
about the BMLTA’s achievements to-date, with the majority of respondents 
holding that the BMLTA has been unable to do anything significant with its 
limited powers, and expecting more out of it as a coordinating authority. 
However, the respondents did not deny that there have been some 
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changes in policy since the BMLTA came into existence, and that there 
have been improvements in coordination amongst agencies, as described 
in the sections below. 
7.4.2.1 Better coordination  
Respondents from the BMLTA claimed to have been successful in bringing 
transport agencies together for discussion before they make decisions, 
mainly for issues relating to planning, the evaluation of new proposals, and 
resolving conflicts among during project implementation. The agenda of the 
meetings is mainly to discuss problems, resolve disputes and seek 
consensus among the agencies. Respondent IG7 said that the BMLTA 
exercises its planning role well by providing an opportunity for all the 
stakeholders to express their views and opinions in the committee 
meetings. Respondents from the BMLTA claim that through the planning 
exercises that have been undertaken, they now have a better 
understanding of the travelling patterns and transport requirements in 
Bangalore. 
Respondent IG2 said that the BMLTA has been successful in facilitating 
coordination among the parastatal agencies, and between the parastatal 
and government agencies. A respondent from one of the parastatal 
agencies explained that a parastatal agency has a different status to a full 
government agency, and does not have the powers to direct other agencies 
or call them for meetings for coordination purposes, and hence that they 
depend on a dedicated body like the BMLTA to perform the task. This 
respondent felt that there have been significant improvements in working 
relationship between the BMTC and the Karnataka State Road Transport 
Corporation (KSRTC) in providing the bus service as a result of the 
BMLTA’s coordination role. It was also pointed out that there is better 
coordination now between the Metro developer - Bangalore Metro Rail 
Corporation Limited (BMRCL) - and the bus company – BMTC - with the 
BMTC planning for the provision of a feeder bus system for the Metro. 
Respondents from the BMLTA seemed to be content with their role in 
facilitating the project on connectivity improvements to the airport through 
one of its sub-committees. Other achievements involve the BMLTA’s 
coordinating role in the introduction of the integrated ticketing system. 
223 
 
7.4.2.2 Priorities for non-motorised transport and the BRT 
There has been success in new policy areas involving non-motorised 
transport such as walking and cycling and the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). 
Respondent G7 seems to appreciate the detailed project report for urban 
transport initiatives prepared for the BBMP by the BMLTA, such as the 
Bicycle Friendly Street Network in Jayanagar. Moreover, the BMLTA has 
provided funding support of about Rs5 crores (£120,000) for pedestrian 
and cycling facilities in Madiwala. This respondent admitted that the BBMP 
does not have sufficient knowledge of urban transport planning or what has 
to be done in the city area, and the presence of the BMLTA helps to fill this 
gap. On the other hand, a respondent from the BMLTA expressed 
frustration in being unable to make the BBMP follow its suggestions.  
Another fruitful initiative was the BRT project that was revived after being 
shelved five years previously. The BMLTA took the initiative to conduct a 
series of workshops and revised the detailed project report, which it handed 
over to the BDA for implementation.  
The BMLTA has developed a close working relationship with the NGOs 
such as Citizen Matters, PRAJA, Rider Cycle Foundation and Bangalore 
City Connect Foundation, with some of these bodies providing assistance 
in the preparation of transport studies. For example, the Bangalore City 
Connect Foundation has initiated the Bangalore Traffic and Transport 
Initiative (BTTI) project, which provides proposals on improving road 
connectives to relieve congestion, and a special sub-committee was then 
established under the BMLTA to review and implement these proposals. 
The BMLTA has also done some work in collaboration with the Rider Cycle 
Foundation – a special body which promotes cycling in Bangalore – 
resulting in a dedicated bicycle lane at Jayanagar. Some respondents still 
see these achievements as displaying the BMLTA’s underperformance, 
however, with respondent IC2 highlighting the fact that the BMLTA should 
be encouraging public participation through providing a platform for the 
public to voice their opinions and concerns.  
7.4.2.3 Other initiatives 
Respondents from the BMLTA did not deny that they have had limited 
success at the strategic level. The BMLTA has prepared the draft parking 
policy and the pedestrian policy for Bangalore, but to-date both these 
policies have not been endorsed by the State Government. Respondent 
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IG1 expressed frustration about the draft parking policy, which has gone 
through numerous rounds of revisions but has yet to be approved by the 
Cabinet. The main difficulty has been in gaining agreement and consensus 
from the various stakeholders operating in Bangalore – mainly from the 
BBMP, who will be operating the policy in the city. The BMLTA has also 
prepared the guidelines for the construction of new traffic management 
centres in Bangalore, but like many other initiatives, this is only a 
recommendation, and it is entirely up to the BMTC whether or not they 
choose to follow it. 
7.4.3 Reflection 
The importance of decision-making powers for transport authorities was 
discussed in Section 2.5.4, with Figure 2.1 illustrating the position of 
transport authorities in the planning and development framework and the 
critical decision-making powers that they need to perform their roles 
effectively. It appears as though there is no significant changes to the 
decision-making arrangement in urban transport after the existence of 
BMLTA. Although BMLTA committee meetings are chaired by the Chief 
Secretary and has a credible Commissioner, the decisions made are not 
effective because the reform itself is weak – strengthening Nye’s (2011) 
argument about the need to combine soft and hard power in order to 
produce effective strategies. Furthermore, the Chief Secretary is too busy 
with other commitments and BMLTA may not be a priority for him. A lot of 
decisions on transport matters are made without the BMLTA, and it is kept 
outside the loop, not knowing what the latest developments are unless it is 
informed, making it difficult for it to play an effective coordinating role. 
The BMLTA had to work within its constraints, with the absence of statutory 
powers, and with few resources. It tries to engage on governance through 
network to improve coordination. For example, in addition to the main 
BMLTA committee, various sub-committees have been created to look at 
specific transport areas. The BMLTA actively adopts a handholding and 
participatory approach, providing technical advice, consultation and helping 
agencies to prepare studies and detailed project reports. It tries to exert its 
influence on the process of other agencies by providing them with what 
they are lacking (such as urban transport expertise) with the aim of 
changing their perceptions and addressing problems over the long-term.  
However, such arrangements would still require certain changes to be 
effective, such as the establishment of mutual trust among agencies, clear 
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delineations of roles and responsibilities, appropriate monitoring, sufficient 
capacity, and procedures to deal with non-performance. These are all still 
lacking in the BMLTA. There is no evidence that BMLTA has included the 
public in its decision-making process or any intention to include them and 
this strengthens Sohail et al.’s (2006) argument about the lack of public 
participation in public transport planning and development in developing 
countries. 
It was noted that although the BMLTA has not been granted any decision-
making mandate or powers to drive its decisions, it has nevertheless 
achieved a certain amount of success, particularly in new, uncontested 
policy areas or failed policy spaces such as non-motorised transport and 
with the BRT. However, outside these win-win and neutral spaces it has 
had little impact. Its attempts to push through the parking policy – which 
threatens the survival of the BBMP by requiring a much higher parking levy 
and makes demands on agencies to change their legislation and work 
procedures – have failed. 
Financial autonomy was raised as an important criterion for the BMLTA’s 
success by the majority of respondents and this has also been highlighted 
as an important criterion by the international development agencies (see 
ADB, 2009; World Bank, 2005). As a large number of agencies in 
Bangalore are parastatals which enjoy financial independence, the BMLTA 
is unlikely to be effective in the absence of any financial muscle, and 
respondents from the BMLTA highlighted their preference to transform it 
into a statutory body with legislative backing so that it could source its own 
funding. The BMRDA and the BDA were once created as parastatal 
agencies to tackle coordination issues, but they were unsuccessful, and 
were thus transformed into project development agencies. It was pointed 
out that the role of a coordinating agency cannot be played by a parastatal 
agency, and must be undertaken by a government agency, which means 
BMLTA may have to remain as a government entity to be able to play a 
coordinating role.  
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7.5 Research question 4: What factors determine the 
success or failure of the reform? 
This research question was designed to explore participants’ views 
concerning the factors that determine the success and failure of the BMLTA. 
Based on the outcomes revealed through considering the third research 
question, the factors that influenced these outcomes were pursued further in 
this section. There are two main groups of factors that influence the impacts 
of the BMLTA – intra-organisational issues and external factors. As many of 
the intra-organisational issues have been elaborated before, section 7.5.1 
will simply provide a brief summary of these issues. This will be followed by 
an exploration of the external factors in section 7.5.2, which will focus on the 
cultural issues, political influences and government procedures that 
indirectly affect the performance of the BMLTA.  
7.5.1 Intra-organisational issues in the BMLTA 
Respondents' views were sought regarding the factors that are important in 
for the BMLTA to operate effectively. The responses received were mainly 
focused around four factors: financial muscle, legal backing, political backing 
and technical capacity. These respondents had their own ideas about what 
each of these elements should contribute, and Table 7.6 shows the weight 
attributed to each of these criteria based on the respondents’ comments. 
Out of these four factors, legal backing was perceived to be the most 
important, followed by financial autonomy, technical capacity and political 
backing. Respondents pointed out that these factors do not exist 
independently and are interrelated. 
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Table 7.6: Criteria which affect the performance of BMLTA 
Respondents Financial Legal backing 
Political 
backing 
Technical 
capacity 
IA1  Very strong   
IA2 Very strong    
IA3 Very strong Strong   
IC1 Very strong Strong   
IC2  Strong  Very strong 
IG1 Strong Strong  Very strong 
IG2 Very strong Strong   
IG3  Strong   
IG4    Very strong 
IG5  Very strong Strong  
IG6  Very strong   
IG7 Strong Strong  Very strong 
IP1 Very strong  Strong  
IP2 Very strong Strong  Strong 
IP3  Very strong  Very strong 
IP4 Very strong Very strong Very strong  
IP8  Very strong Strong  
 
Respondents from the BMLTA said that legislative backing was required to 
strengthen the structure, model and roles of the BMLTA, but that it would 
not be sufficient to transform the BMLTA into an authority unless it gave 
them explicit powers over other agencies and increased their capacity both 
in terms of human resources and technical competence. It was also pointed 
out that the BMLTA would have to take the form of a statutory body to 
enable it to source funds, but however, this might then transform it into 
another profit-oriented parastatal body.  
Some respondents, mainly those representing the parastatal agencies, 
showed signs of fear that the BMLTA would overpower them if it were to 
acquire legal backing. For example, respondent IP8 did not deny that legal 
support was important for the BMLTA to be able to direct other agencies, but 
he felt that the coordinating body must be empowered is such a way that it 
complements rather than threatens, and that it should be able to find a win-
win situation for all involved parties. Respondent IP3 viewed the BMLTA as 
being fine as it is, and argued that it does not need further empowerment. 
Whilst all these respondents discussed a dedicated piece of legislation 
concerning the BMLTA, respondent IC1 expected more streamlining will 
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happen if the central government issued general legislation for all UMTA’s in 
India. This would ensure that all the UMTA’s in India were given legislative 
backing automatically, and that they would have similar characteristics and 
powers. 
Several respondents argued that financial autonomy is the most important 
element that the BMLTA needs to be successful. There were three 
interesting proposals made by respondents to turn the BMLTA into a nodal 
agency for distributing funds, that it contributes 30% of project costs, or that 
it be given the authority to approve projects above certain costs without 
providing actual funding. However, all these proposals would require a lot of 
support, and the State Government’s will to devolve some of its powers to 
the BMLTA. 
Although the BMLTA is led by the Chief Secretary of the State, many 
respondents saw his presence alone as being insufficient to drive the 
BMLTA, and felt that strong political backing would be required to back up 
the decisions made by the BMLTA at the cabinet level. Respondents IP1, 
IP5, IP8 and IA3 pointed to the success factors of the Metro project, which 
they strongly linked to the presence of strong political support at all levels. 
References were also made to other cities in India that have developed 
good bus rapid transit networks, such as Ahamadebad in Gujarat, which 
enjoys strong political support from the chief minister and strong municipal 
corporation. There was a general feeling among the IAS officers that city 
leadership was clearly lacking in the BMLTA and that it could be more 
effective if it was led by an empowered mayor. 
7.5.2 External factors 
In addition to the four main factors listed above, respondents also raised 
several other issues concerning the institutional setting that influence the 
performance of the BMLTA, including cumbersome procedures and delays 
in decision-making, a strong nexus between politicians and civil servants, 
and the impact of various cultural issues. These will be discussed in turn. 
7.5.2.1 Cumbersome government procedures and delays in decision-
making 
Five respondents highlighted the fact that implementing agencies are often 
caught up in and slowed down by complex procedures, long approval 
processes and poor fund flows. This is worse for projects that involve land 
acquisition, as the process here is very complicated and takes a 
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considerable amount of time, sometimes as long as two years to complete. 
This results in projects not commencing on time, delays, and increases in 
project costs due to increases in the price of raw materials. Respondent IG7 
shared his experiences in seeking approval for the tender process from the 
State Government for a project by the BBMP, which was costed at just Rs5 
crores (£120,000). Although the source of funds came from the BBMP, the 
approval process itself took almost a year as it had to pass through so many 
administrative levels. This respondent pointed out that political influence has 
to be used in such cases to cut down on the bureaucratic processes. This 
scenario probably explains why many policy decisions are not implemented 
on the ground. Without a strong push and good incentives, agencies are 
unlikely to get involved in the complex implementation process. Hence, it not 
just the absence of a mandate for the BMLTA to drive its decisions that is 
responsible for the low amounts of projects that it has successfully 
implemented, but also an overall administrative that is not conducive to 
implementing policies on the ground.  
7.5.2.2 The strong nexus between politicians and civil servants 
There is a strong relationship between civil servants and politicians in 
Bangalore, with politicians interfering in the implementation of projects and 
transferring civil servants, mainly IAS officers. Respondents IG5 and IG7 
shared their experiences of the difficulties in implementing infrastructure 
projects in the Bangalore corporation area due to the political sentiment 
played on by councillors. Councillors have to be consulted for every change 
that happens at the project level in Bangalore, which leads to unwanted 
delays. Moreover, IG5 and IG7 also pointed out that the councillors are self-
centric, being keen to draw development into their areas without much 
concern for other deprived areas. Councillors can also exert a strong 
influence on the mayor, and respondent P4 shared information about how a 
group of councillors were able to convince the mayor to divert Rs20 crores 
(£480,000) from funds allocated for creating footpaths to the Metro project 
and to other road projects, which were not priorities at that time. 
Two academic respondents pointed to the strong control that politicians 
exert over civil servants, describing how they dictate who should be awarded 
what project, and claimed that there is hardly any transparency in the 
decision-making process. Civil servants are often obliged to follow politicians 
because any resistance or non-compliance means that they will be out of a 
job. Eight respondents across various groups pointed out that the short 
tenures for civil servants is a serious problem, and that there is a strong 
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relationship between politicians and the senior IAS officers that head the 
departments. These officers are re-shuffled as and when needed, and this is 
more likely to happen when new political executives are appointed. For 
example, the BMLTA has had three commissioners in the first five years of 
its operations, and the BDA had three different commissioners in 2012 
alone. When the new Chief Minister for Karnataka assumed office in July 
2012, he reshuffled the positions of nineteen IAS officers in the State within 
two months of the start of his tenure.33 One of the IAS officers forcefully 
asserted that the strong link between politicians and civil servants must be 
broken to enable civil servants to work without fear and to curb corruption, 
expressing her point by saying that IAS officers must be stopped being 
treated as ‘musical chairs’ and given a fixed tenure of at least three years to 
ensure that there is some continuity in policy implementation.  
Respondent IA2 pointed out that coordination has mainly been achieved in 
Bangalore through the use of political mediums. Specialised bodies such as 
the Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure and Development Task Force 
(ABIDE) are tasked with such responsibilities. Their members are influential 
personalities in the State, and they are handpicked by the chief minister to 
drive the agenda of the State Government forward for them so that they 
need not get themselves entangled in the complex bureaucratic processes. 
Respondent G6 thought that the role of ABIDE overlaps with the 
coordinating role that the BMLTA is supposed to play, and that this further 
weakens BMLTA’s role.  
7.5.2.3 Cultural issues  
Respondent IA2 gave his personal view about the relevant cultural aspects 
of life in India: 
“India is a collection of different cultures. Each one allows the other to 
live, and that means I don’t come to you and tell you that you should 
live like this, as in western countries. Western countries have gone 
through the culture of one dominant ethnic group or dominant 
religious structure saying this is the way you live; we don’t have that” 
(respondent IA2). 
Respondent IC3 pointed out that if something is found to be an issue that 
needs attention in India, it does not mean that something has to be done 
about it. Actions will be taken by civil servants if they are pushed or 
                                            
33 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-27 accessed on 6th November 
2012 
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pressured, but the actions they do take often involve doing the bare 
minimum, and hence one does not see significant impacts. There is also a 
tendency against being proactive on an issue unless it is brought to 
attention. This laid back, unproductive attitude affects the overall efficiency 
of the civil service. 
Respondent IA2 described the reality of policy-making in India as he saw it, 
claiming that most IAS officers belong to the elite group and are directly 
involved in policy-making although they do not understand the local cultures 
where they work because they are frequently posted to different cities and 
states, far from their places of origin. Hence, numerous policies and plans 
are designed by administrators based on what they think is right rather than 
on what really is applicable on the ground. No effort is taken to engage the 
local community in policy-making decisions, and public participation is 
limited. This situation is exacerbated by the absence of a figure-head to 
champion the need of citizens.  
A similar view was expressed by respondent IP1 in describing the nature of 
decision-making in India in the context of transport regulation:  
“Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong, are 'ruler control' countries, so it is 
easier to decide things. But in India, the political situation is different. 
If the chief minister or any other political leaders were given full 
autonomy to decide on all transport projects and planning, things 
would be easier. In India, it is difficult to pinpoint one person and say 
that he has more autonomy to make decisions” (respondent P1). 
Corruption seems to be a pressing problem in India, with five respondents 
(IG5, IG7, IA1, IA2 and IC3) agreeing that corruption is part of Indian culture 
– not limited to small petty transactions, but also present in contract 
agreements, recruitment and the transfers of IAS officers. The focus on 
corruption was stronger amongst the academic respondents, who seemed 
to view corruption as an infectious disease requiring eradication. 
Interestingly, two respondents from government agencies did not see 
corruption as a major problem because they claimed that work still gets 
done when corruption is present. An ex-civil servant (respondent IA1) 
believed that most civil servants are complicit in some form of corruption, 
and that it is difficult to disassociate oneself from the practice. He 
commented: 
“You have to be like them otherwise it is difficult to survive – they 
won’t let you survive, because then you are breaking the chain. 
There's a whole chain, and if you try to be clean, you will be an odd 
man in the chain and they will see you as the problem, so they will 
simply cut you out from there and re-fix the chain” (respondent IA1). 
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On the other hand, one of the IAS officers denied that corruption is part of 
the Indian administrative culture, but confirmed that it exists widely and that 
it is a serious problem. This respondent revealed that the existing 
procedures do not allow immediate and forceful actions to be taken against 
offenders, and that despite various research performed by the government 
on the issues of combatting corruption, hardly any of the recommendations 
that these studies proposed are being implemented. However, there has 
been strong public pressure in recent years for the government to be more 
transparent. Some of the recent developments have been the proposed 
Lokpal Bill (2011), and the enactment of the Rights to Information Act 
(2005), which provide the basis for a regime securing rights to information 
for citizens (Rights to Information Act, 2005).  
7.5.3 Reflections 
The State Government appreciated the need and had the actual intention to 
create a planning and coordinating authority for transport. However, the 
State Government ultimately created what was the cheapest and most 
convenient form of ‘authority’, which provided them better access to federal 
funds without requiring them to make many alterations to existing 
organisations or to devolve any powers. These outcomes conform to 
findings from numerous other bodies of research that find that policy elites 
are inclined to shape reforms based on their own desires and ends, but at 
the same time fit cultural norms (Bacukaert and Politt, 2011; Grindle and 
Thomas, 1989, Down, 1967). There is no proof to suggest that this is an 
evidence-based reform exercise, which means there is an absence of 
reliable knowledge about what will work and what needs to be changed. The 
creation of the BMLTA involved very little consultation with stakeholders, 
including other government agencies, let alone the public. Moreover, the 
reform was not acknowledged as an ongoing process, as many researchers 
have argued to be a common feature of policy reforms (see Politt and 
Bauckaert, 2011; Peters, 2010; Dacin et al., 2000). Hence, only the creation 
of the BMLTA mattered to them, not the results of the reform or the 
assessment of what it was set out to do. Without a political champion, a 
good reform strategy and sufficient empowerment, the BMLTA has been 
unable to prove its existence. 
The BMLTA forms an additional layer, based on a coalition of willing actors, 
in the already crowded institutional settings. It does not enjoy any formal 
autonomy and its presence does not sanction or change the functions of any 
existing agencies, hence the BMLTA holds no accountability for urban 
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transport matters. At the moment, the BMLTA’s remit is unclear, especially 
with regard to how its role complements or contradicts with the existing 
agencies. Hence, the BMLTA is not perceived as a coordinating authority, 
but rather as an advisory or dispute resolution body whose functions are 
limited to giving suggestions and advise but not to drive any major decisions. 
The functions assigned to the BMLTA as a planner and coordinator for the 
BMR seems to be too heavy for a ‘committee’ to undertake. The 
stakeholders are still contemplating on the roles that the BMLTA should 
have and the scale that it should operate on to be effective. Whilst these 
decisions are being debated, the State Government has not shown any 
positive intention to empower the BMLTA, to provide it with adequate 
resources, or to increase its capacity. They have shown a clear resistance to 
devolving powers, not only with regard to the BMLTA, but also through not 
empowering the BBMP or creating an MPC. The existing agencies are 
recalcitrant about giving up any powers to the BMLTA to enable the BMLTA 
Bill to be legislated. Their clear message was that the BMLTA “must 
complement and not threaten”. The threat of further changes to the 
governance with proposals for MPC and Bengaluru Governance Bill also 
paralyse improvements to BMLTA. Given these constraints, the BMLTA 
continues to exist in a form that is acceptable to the majority of stakeholders 
rather than the form that it was originally intended to have for being 
effective. Empowering the BMLTA is a complicated issue, and there is some 
indication that a brand new coordinating authority vested with the necessary 
powers is needed, but this would still require structural reforms and 
willingness for agencies to transfer their powers, and thus it is hard to see 
why this route would be likely to prove any more successful.  
It is also important to understand the larger administrative culture and values 
that the BMLTA is located in, for example the strong fusion between 
politicians and civil servants, the red tape and cumbersome government 
procedures it must navigate, the job security that results in a bloated, 
inefficient and ineffective civil service (Dwivedi, 2003). Thakur (1995:175) 
pointed out that the strong connection between politicians and civil servants 
originated from the ‘committed bureaucracy’ enforced by the central 
government in the 1960’s, which required civil servants to be loyal to 
politicians or face punishment. Civil servants responded to this political 
encroachment in two ways: either they associated themselves with 
politicians for personal gain, or they created more rules and regulations to 
save themselves from being punished by showing that proper procedure 
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had been followed, thus protecting themselves from disciplinary action, and 
this explains the corruption and cumbersome procedures observed in this 
case study.  There are other deeply rooted cultures in India, such as the 
close-knit family, respect for authority, and religious practices and beliefs, 
which all have an influence on governance and must be given attention 
when further reforms to the BMLTA are pursued. Hence, creating an 
effective coordinating authority in Bangalore is not just about reform and 
empowerment, but must also engage with the wider political, social and 
cultural practices that the authority will be embedded within. 
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Chapter 8: Cross-Case Analysis  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to achieve three objectives. The first two objectives are 
addressed in section 8.2 which is centred around answering research 
question four - which attempts to determine the success or failure of reforms 
– and the third objective is covered in section 8.3. Section 8.2 draws out key 
determinants of the reforms by bringing together common factors from both 
the case studies as presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Whilst the contexts as 
well the contents of the reforms are clearly different, there were strong 
underlying themes that may explain the direction the reforms took, and may 
also be of broader relevance beyond the specific case study sites. This 
section also provides lessons for policy-makers and foreign aid advisors in 
developing Asian countries who wish to embark on or promote the creation 
of transport authorities. This is done by highlighting features that are 
responsible for transport authorities functioning well and badly. Section 8.3 
presents several specific recommendations to the participating agencies – 
the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) and the Bangalore 
Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA).  
8.2 Key determinants of reforms 
Five factors have been identified, and the similarities and differences in the 
case studies surrounding these factors will be highlighted in this section, with 
relevant examples drawn from key events, actors, processes and activities to 
illustrate them more clearly. 
8.2.1 Objectives, key drivers and the outcomes of reforms 
The two case studies shared several features in the conditions that drove the 
creation of the transport authorities. In both cases there were coordination 
problems between the agencies that affected the way the public transport 
services were delivered on the ground. There were also inadequacies in the 
existing institutional structure that most parties identified (see section 6.2 for 
SPAD and 7.2 for BMLTA). In both cases, administrators cited models of 
single transport authorities in other countries as solutions, yet, whilst they 
were aware of successful single transport authorities elsewhere, there was 
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no evidence that they looked into them in detail to draw appropriate lessons. 
Thus, LTA Singapore, for example, appears to have provided a merely 
symbolic aspiration.  There was also no evidence to suggest that a proper 
assessment was undertaken in Bangalore or Malaysia to identify the detail of 
the problems in their existing institutional arrangements, or to identify the 
available options for resolving these issues. The problems and potential 
solution were known for many years and these issues remained in the 
background until a larger triggering factor occurred with the right political 
conditions, the coming together of streams as proposed by Kingdom (1995). 
Political pressure and central government pushes for reform were found to 
be the main drivers for change in both case studies. In Malaysia, the Prime 
Minister made the reform possible in 2010 (see section 3.2.1.3 and 6.2.7), 
with the first attempt for reform in 2005 failing due to strong resistance from 
agencies, motives to maintain the Bumiputera agenda and a lack of political 
will (see section 3.2.1.3 and 6.2.1). In India, the National Urban Transport 
Policy (NUTP) provided the ultimate push for the State to create a transport 
authority (see section 7.2.1), largely because of the funding incentives 
associated with it. Whilst transport authorities were described as having 
been created to resolve wider transport issues (as mentioned above), 
evidence from both the case studies suggests that the key reformers had a 
set of objectives they wished to see achieved, which did not centre just on 
resolving integration issues (see section 6.2.3 for SPAD and 7.3.2 for 
BMLTA). The key reformers determined what went into the reform plans as 
they had an upper hand (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Bauckaert and Politt, 
2011). The immediate outputs were skewed to benefit the reformers rather 
than the wider stakeholders or the general public (see section 6.4.1 for 
relevant discussion of this issue with regard to SPAD and 7.3.1 with regard 
to the BMLTA). Interestingly, in both case studies, creating a new agency 
was seen to be an easier option than trying to reorganise or improve existing 
agencies. 
Whilst political pressure is acknowledged to be essential for triggering 
reforms (Oliver, 1992), it played a different role in both the case studies. It 
acted as the main driver in Malaysia, but was one of the factors that 
suppressed the development of the BMLTA. However, it is worth noting that 
although it played a crucial role in making the reform possible in Malaysia, it 
also came with time constraints and politically sensitive agendas that had an 
impact on the outcome of the reform. The planning and implementation of 
the authority in Malaysia was rushed, as the key reformers acknowledged 
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(see section 6.5.1). This led to several unintended consequences, as 
Toonen (2003) speculated as outcomes of reforms, such as problems in 
SPAD’s regulatory and enforcement functions, which could not be tackled 
immediately because the government couldn’t let itself be seen as getting 
things wrong straight away. Politically sensitive issues, departmental turf 
wars and racial sensitivity led to SPAD being strangely configured – placed 
under the Prime Minister’s Department (PMD) with the Prime Minister as the 
minister-in-charge (see section 6.5.2.2). In India, on the other hand, a 
change in the elected ruling political party occurred just a year after the 
BMLTA was formed. The new government appears to have lacked much 
interest in the BMLTA, which perhaps explains why the reform has stalled, 
and why it was thus left as an informal coordinating agency (7.3.3). 
The gap between those driving the reforms and those implementing them 
seems to have been an issue in both cases. In Malaysia, the central 
government proposed SPAD’s implementation at the national level, and it 
was created quickly because this was done through a national-national 
programme. The task was entrusted to the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) – 
a central agency that had the authority and resources to drive the reform 
with full support from the Prime Minister (see section 3.2.1.3). Things 
happened very differently in Bangalore, where reform was initiated by the 
central government in Delhi through the NUTP, and the State was then 
under pressure to comply with it. In this case, it was a national-state 
programme rather than a national-national one, and hence little enthusiasm 
was shown in making sure the reform produced a workable authority. The 
main reason to carry out the reform may have been to appease central 
government rather than to resolve the coordination issues, and the Urban 
Development Department (UDD) in Bangalore would likely not have had the 
political backing, authority and capacity that the EPU had in Malaysia. This 
impacted significantly on the strength of the reforms. 
An interesting observation was made in both case studies regarding the 
support provided by the stakeholders in the creation of the transport 
authorities. There was no evidence of active participation from the public in 
either case, and this could mean that either the public were not engaged or 
that they were more interested in the outcomes than in participating in the 
reform process. Peters (2010) speculated that the public assumes that 
public sector reforms are largely cosmetic rather than genuine 
transformations to improve service delivery, and that could have been the 
case here. It was obvious that there was a general consensus among the 
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other agencies and industry players that a coordination body or an authority 
was needed, although each actor had their own perceptions about what the 
transport authority should look like and what it should do. Unfortunately, this 
strong support for reform only lasted until the reform plan was unveiled. In 
Malaysia, agencies that stood to lose power showed strong resistance from 
the very first day, and this continued even after the creation of SPAD, with 
agencies showing an unwillingness to work or share resources with it (see 
section 6.5.3.1). This conforms to Down’s (1967:274) hypothesis that civil 
servants tend to oppose change that  “cause net reduction in amount of 
resources under their control and reduces social functions entrusted to them” 
and concords with previous work of Kim’s (2005) and Cheung’s (2005) that 
resistance from civil servants opposing change can make reforms difficult. In 
Bangalore, none of the empowerment plans for the BMLTA could be 
implemented due to the strong resistance from agencies to give up any of 
their powers or change the existing structure (see section 7.3.2), implying 
strong institutional inertia (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) coupled with civil 
servants’ seeking to maintain the status quo for personal job security 
(Nakamura, 2005). In addition, there was no political champion here to 
resolve the differences and drive the reform like there was in the Malaysian 
case. 
Several lessons may be learned here and applied to other contexts. There 
are multiple reasons for reforms and these are all not shared. Governing 
through networks with lowest common denominator politics is ineffective – 
as seen in the BMLTA case study. The transport authority needs to have 
power through legal mandate and or resources which allow it to bring other 
agencies together for better coordination, as there are winners and losers of 
the reform and some with no interest in seeing success. Although political 
leadership is crucial, it is noted that political focus is short-lived and so the 
agency needs empowering.  
8.2.2 Reform as a process  
Reform was not conceived as a process in either case study, and although 
these reforms are still unfolding, further changes would probably require 
radical moves that are unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future.  
Reform takes time to unfold, and the full outcome may only be visible after 
several years, as a number of researchers have noted (Bauckaert and Pollitt, 
2011; Peters, 2010; Marsden and May, 2006). However, it seems that the 
actors in neither of the case studies recognised or accounted for this fact. If 
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these reforms had been treated as being part of a process, then they would 
have been more long-term focussed, with dedicated committees comprising 
permanent members to closely monitor the implementation and evaluation of 
the reform process and adjust future plans. But this was not the case in 
either of the authorities. Although some planning was undertaken in the 
creation of SPAD through the preparation of the blueprint (see section 
3.2.1.3), not all the recommendations in the blueprint could be implemented 
as a result of political barriers and strong resistance from actors. Moreover, 
in the BMLTA case study, there was no clear reform plan, and only brief 
objectives and functions for the BMLTA were included in the Government 
Order (see section 3.3.1.4).  
There was a time-scale attached to the creation of these authorities, but this 
interpreted the reforms as a project that had a beginning, middle and end, 
and was considered to be complete once the agencies were established. In 
Malaysia, the key reformers from EPU (the agency which championed the 
creation of SPAD) did not think that it was their responsibility to ensure that 
SPAD was able to function in an orderly manner, and that the EPU’s task 
was accomplished once SPAD had been created (see section 6.5.1, 
comment by respondent P1). In Bangalore, the UDD – which issued the 
Government Order for the creation of the BMLTA – formed its committee 
quickly. Even though the Government Order briefly outlines the BMLTA’s 
functions and empowerment plan, none of these plans were seriously 
implemented on the ground, and this created a vast chasm between the 
policy that appeared on paper and what was actually put into practice (see 
section 3.3.1.4 for implementation plan and section 7.3.2 for the powers to 
be given to the BMLTA).  
One notable similarity between the two authorities is that SPAD and the 
BMLTA were both expected to survive on their own from the very first day of 
their establishment, with little support from the top. Thus, inadequate 
attention was paid to resourcing either organisation. 
As has already been noted, reform is a process, and the ultimate outcome 
may only be achieved after several improvements and amendments have 
been made, but the SPAD case study clearly shows that continued structural 
reforms may not be politically feasible as they will be seen as evidence of 
governmental failure. Thus, the government refrains from making such 
improvements or amendments for fear that this could be used as a political 
tool by the opposition parties (see section 6.5.1). This was also seen in their 
reluctance to make changes to the PAD Act even though there were serious 
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flaws with SPAD’s enforcement powers (see section 6.3.4). Again, such 
amendments were perceived to represent an unacceptable risk to the image 
of the government. The general view was that any structural reforms could 
only be made a couple of years down the line. In Bangalore, on the other 
hand, further reforms were said not to be feasible to the BMLTA (not even 
the passing of the BMLTA bill) until the State Government decided on the 
course of other governance reforms in the pipeline, such as the Metropolitan 
Planning Committee (MPC) and the Bengaluru Governance Bill (see section 
7.3.3). This implies that other reform initiatives in the overall governance 
system could influence or change the reforms needed at any point of time. In 
Bangalore, the politics of urban development appear to envelop those of 
transport. 
There are several key lessons that can be learned here. It is important to 
acknowledge that reform is a process and must be conceived as a long-term 
initiative with timeline and a roadmap/reform plan for successful working. 
The reform has to also take into account the changes and ongoing reforms 
in the wider governance structure.  Whilst having a good reform plan is 
important – with some clear goals and indicators for success, these case 
studies have also shown that people have different objectives and 
perceptions about what the reform should involve and deliver. Hence, 
thinking that a utopian solution can be achieved may often be naïve, as 
actors and agencies involved will continue to fight for their own interests and 
preferences. One way to overcome these problems is to build flexibility into 
the reforms. For example, the SPAD case study showed how it can be 
viewed as politically damaging to have to go back and amend the Act to add 
or modify existing powers, Hence, it is vital that acts that legislate for 
transport authorities build-in the provision for additional powers to be 
operationalised if it is anticipated that they could be required or used later. 
This would reduce the need for re-legislation and provide an incentive for 
collaboration.  
8.2.3 Powers to act  
The effectiveness levels of the BMLTA and SPAD were found to be strongly 
related to their powers to act, as international development agencies and 
researchers alike have pointed out with respect to transport authorities in 
general (Naniopoulos et al., 2012; ADB, 2009; GTZ, 2004). Although the 
LTA Singapore and TfL London were used as benchmarks, the BMLTA and 
SPAD far from mirror these authorities, and even the coordination roles they 
appear to have copied are largely symbolic. The role of SPAD as a 
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coordinator is strengthened through legislative backing with powers over 
planning and regulatory functions. Although these regulatory functions are 
reinforced by giving SPAD a purview to license operators, who can in turn be 
used to implement their plans, their lack of funding autonomy hinders the 
effectiveness of their capacity to ensure that these plans are in fact 
implemented (see section 6.3.2 and 6.3.5). The BMLTA, on the other hand, 
is much weaker than SPAD, as it is just a committee without any dedicated 
resources or legislative backing (see section 7.3.2 and 7.3.4). It coordinates 
through its planning role, but this is not adequate as it does have any tools to 
implement its plans. The SPAD case study shows that having legislative 
support is not enough to be effective – the content of the act must also be 
clear, and the authority and autonomy given to the transport agency has to 
be fully operationalised and exercised to be effective, as Young and Tavares 
(2004) contend. For this to happen, transport authorities need to be given 
the necessary strategic capacities (McKinnon et al., 2008). 
Despite the apparent necessity for better strategic coordination, neither 
transport authority was granted full powers to make transport planning and 
development decisions at the tactical level, as Masi (2009) and Agarwal and 
Ribot (1999) suggest is necessary for such agencies to be effective (see 
figure 2.1). Decision-making autonomy is required for a transport authority to 
function well (see May, 2003; Leach and Wilson, 2004 for discussion), and 
this is also the motive that stands behind decentralisation. The decision-
making capacities of the two case-study agencies vary, even though both 
lack decision-making autonomy. Whilst SPAD acts as a checkpoint for 
evaluating transport projects for EPU, which means it has the power to 
support or reject proposals but not to approve or implement them, the 
BMLTA committee only has an advisory status, which means that there is no 
compulsion for anyone to refer to BMLTA for feedback on new proposals, 
and thus its decisions are not binding (see section 7.4.1).  
It is evident in both the case studies that decision-making power is vested 
with the agencies that hold the resources – the EPU in Malaysia and multiple 
sources in Bangalore, but mainly the State Government and the various 
parastatal agencies. Financial resources have been cited as one of the main 
factors for determining the success of transport authorities and 
decentralisation in general by international development agencies (see 
World Bank 2002, ADB, 2009; GTZ, 2004). However, in both the case 
studies, strong reluctance of the central and state government has prevented 
any financial powers from being devolved (see section 6.3.1 and 7.3.4), and 
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it seems that this will continue during the economic downturn, where budget 
control is perceived to be essential. It is recognised that funding is a critical 
resource for mediating conflicts between different agencies with their 
conflicting objectives, and thus vital for playing an effective coordinating role, 
especially in the case of Bangalore. Without financial resources, the BMTLA 
and SPAD have little control over the transport budget, and thus have to 
exercise their influence in different ways, which limits changes. SPAD 
focuses on controlling regulatory functions whilst the BMLTA focuses on 
making improvements in uncontested areas, such as for non-motorised 
transport and the provision of technical support. 
Several lessons can be drawn here. Money and manpower are key 
resources and therefore sources of power. If the transport authorities are to 
be effective, both these elements must be addressed. Besides that, strong 
legislative provision is crucial to support their functions, and other laws that 
have an effect on transport authority acts must be addressed so that a clear 
line of responsibility is created. Besides providing a permanent structure and 
protecting it from easy alteration through changes in political leadership, a 
good piece of legislation should clarify the role of the transport authorities 
vis-à-vis other agencies, and this is especially important if the transport 
authority is given regulatory and enforcement functions like SPAD. If 
legislative support cannot be secured, then a transport authority can build its 
strength in uncontested policy areas, as the BMLTA has shown. Whilst it 
appears that financial resources are critical for success, these case studies 
do not provide sufficient evidence to make this a certainty. What is clear, 
however, is that the absence of financial resources limits the effectiveness of 
the reforms. Although it is highly recommended that transport authorities be 
accorded financial autonomy, it has to be acknowledged that this is unlikely 
to happen in developing countries, where funding is scarce and there is a 
strong tendency for the central government to retain its control of budgets. In 
such contexts, the transport authority can be designed to act as a 
‘checkpoint’, as SPAD does, or to act as a nodal agency for distributing 
funds to transport projects. 
8.2.4 Accountability and responsibility  
Accountability was an issue in both the case studies prior to the reforms. 
This was seen through the poor performance of the existing agencies, and 
directly raised the need for a transport authority. There were multiple 
reasons for their poor performance. It appears as though the relevant 
agencies had powers on paper, but could not exercise them because of a 
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lack of financial resources (as in the case of the BMRDA in Bangalore, see 
section 7.2.5), or else had powers and resources, but could not perform their 
functions due to political sensitivities (as in the case of MOT, see section 
6.2.2) or because sufficient powers had not been provided (as in the case of 
BBMP in Bangalore, see section 7.2.5). Once such a position has developed 
over time, it appears difficult to undo it. There was also a weak system of 
accountability in place here for providing the checks and balances needed to 
improve performance, and this was made worse by the lack of responsibility 
taken by the civil service.  
There was evidence of poor performance from civil servants in both case 
studies. They were labelled as ‘laid back’ and ‘inefficient’ (see section 6.2.2, 
6.5.3.1 and 7.5.2.3), and these findings are plausible and supported by other 
research findings in the field (see Dwivedi, 2003; Cheema 2005 for 
discussion). Their performance was also found to be strongly linked to the 
administrative culture. In Bangalore, it was pointed out that civil servants who 
are caught for corruption or the misuse of power cannot be punished 
immediately due to cumbersome procedures (e.g. firing requires approval 
from central government), and there is also an element of job security 
involved (see section 7.5.2.3). Problems of corruption are largely accepted 
as well as established but it is noted that the creation of the BMLTA has 
nothing to do with efforts to fight corruption. In the Malaysian case, 
corruption and the misuse of power were acknowledged to be problems in 
the previous regime, but SPAD’s establishment was intended to address 
them (see section 6.2.1). The problem of poor civil servant performance was 
to be tackled by giving SPAD a corporate culture, but this backfired 
somewhat as it triggered a cultural clash between SPAD and the civil 
servants (see section 6.5.3.1). 
After the creation of the authorities, accountability can be seen as a factor 
that explains why the reforms were structured as they were. The literature on 
decentralisation has overstated the inclusion of the public considerably (see 
section 2.5.1). In the Malaysian case, SPAD was found to be accountable 
upwards, towards the central government that created it, thus strengthening 
the central government through stronger control. Horizontal accountability 
towards other agencies and transport bodies was found to be lacking, as 
there was no evidence that these actors had been actively engaged in the 
planning exercise (see section 6.3.2). There was also an absence of clear 
public accountability or evidence that such accountability was being 
practised at all. This can be attributed to SPAD’s position as a national body 
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rather than a local-level one. On the other hand, the BMLTA is not 
accountable for urban transport matters as it has not been given any formal 
authority and autonomy to function as a proper transport authority (see 
section 7.3.2 and the discussion on the relationship between power and 
accountability in section 2.5.3.2).  
The important lesson that can be drawn here is that reforms can be a tactic 
of sweeping away corrupt organisational cultures. However, it is worth noting 
that this requires new staff which could amount to some loss of institutional 
memory. 
8.2.5 The degree of championing 
The importance of using influential people with experience of championing 
this kind of change has been highlighted in the literature (Nakamura, 2005; 
Leach and Wilson, 2004; Cervero, 1998; Down, 1967) and this could provide 
an explanation for the different outcomes observed in the two case studies. 
The champion impacts on the effectiveness of the reform. However, if the 
champion is only there for implementation and the reform itself is weak, then 
it makes less impact, as was seen in the BMLTA case study. 
The BMLTA was created by a group of elites in the State Government, but 
they did not continue their input to ensure that the committee was running 
effectively and perhaps did not want it to. There was an absence of a 
political champion here. The Chief Secretary of the State was appointed as 
the committee’s chair, but even he has not been able to drive a powerless 
body like the BMLTA, hence few of the decisions that the committee has 
made have been implemented (see section 7.4.1, comment by respondent 
IA3). Furthermore, the Chief Secretary has been heavily engaged with other 
duties, and has thus had limited time to perform his role as the chair of the 
BMLTA. In the SPAD case study, it was acknowledged that reform would not 
have been possible without strong support from the Prime Minister. His 
leadership was important to overcome resistance of agencies, but he did not 
follow-through on his initial commitments, such as empowering SPAD and 
transforming it into a commission. As in Bangalore, the time that the Prime 
Minister could devote to an operations-based body like SPAD seemed to be 
very limited (see section 6.5.2.2, comment by respondent G10). It is 
desirable for SPAD to have the sort of strong political oversight that the 
Prime Minister affords, but in reality it seems to be impractical for a person 
occupying this position to perform such a role. 
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In addition to a political champion, the importance of good leadership is also 
highlighted in the literature, and it is noted that leadership is a resource that 
is needed to transform powers into desirable outcomes (see section 2.5.3). 
Although SPAD has some legitimate power and resources, it does not have 
the strong and skilful leadership necessary for engaging the network and 
using the resources it has to justify its existence (see section 6.5.3.2 on 
SPAD’s leadership). On the other hand, the BMLTA was left in the hands of 
a very competent and experienced senior administrator, but there was 
nothing much that she could do, as the BMLTA was not given a legal 
mandate or sufficient resources to drive its planning and coordinating roles. 
Interestingly, it was made known that the Commissioner was deliberately 
given other positions to divert attention away from the BMLTA. A lack of 
continuity in leadership is a common issue in Bangalore (see section 7.3.6.2 
and 7.5.2.2). Hence, both political champion and good organisational 
leadership is needed to make the reform effective. 
There are several lessons to be learned about the need and use of a 
champion. Political leadership is important to initiate and implement a 
successful reform, provided the reform is designed to be a strong one. 
Whilst continued high level support is desirable, it may not be practicable, so 
it is essential to ensure that the transport authority is empowered adequately 
to carry out its functions. Although having the oversight of a Prime Minister or 
Chief Secretary is desirable for drawing wider support and producing quick 
wins, it may not be practical for them and beneficial for the authority in the 
long-run, thus it may be best to transfer accountability to other suitable 
candidates who can give their full commitment. These two case studies 
show that it is not enough to have a champion high up, but that transport 
authorities also need powers to make changes themselves. Reforms involve 
an interwoven net of actors using the powers and resources available to 
them to try and steer the outcomes where they want. But transport 
authorities must be given strategic capacities, such as skilful leaders with 
specific tenures, as well as the financial resources to control transport 
budgets and make changes.  
8.3 Recommendations for SPAD and BMLTA case studies 
Before proceeding to the specific recommendations for SPAD and BMLTA, it 
is perhaps useful to step back and compare the similarities and differences 
of these two agencies compared to two popular models – TfL and LTA 
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Singapore – as presented in Table 8.1, as this will provide an insight into 
what SPAD and BMLTA lack but require to make these agencies work. 
Table 8.1: Characteristics of LTA Singapore, TfL, SPAD and BMLTA  
Key factors LTA Singapore TfL SPAD BMLTA 
Land use planning × × × × 
Functions: 
Planning 
√ × √ √ 
Regulation √ ** √ √ × 
Enforcement √ × √ × 
Project 
implementation 
√ √ × × 
Traffic management √ √ × × 
Transport 
Operations 
× √ × × 
       Contract with      
service  providers 
√ √ × × 
Transport budget √ √ × × 
Legislative backing 
 
√ √ √ × 
Decision making powers 
for strategies and 
projects 
√ √ × × 
Powers to drive 
decisions 
√ √ 
 (through 
regulations 
mechanism) 
× 
Strong champion √ √ √ × 
Accountability √ √  upwards × 
Public participation √ √ × × 
**Public transport council sets the fares, service levels and operating licence for buses 
√ - present, × - absent,   
The table above highlights some key characteristics that both LTA 
Singapore, and TfL share. They appear to have some key powers, such as 
control over transport budget; a wide range of functions, which include 
project implementation and traffic management; legislative backing; strong 
champion; powers to make and drive those decisions; clear line of 
accountability and good public participation. Most of the characteristics are 
also highlighted as best practices by the World Bank, GTZ and ADB – 
except the functions for transport operations, which, according to the World 
Bank (2002), have to be separated from the planning and regulatory 
functions. 
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Recommendations for SPAD case study 
Comparing SPAD to LTA Singapore and TfL reveals that SPAD shares 
some of the operational functions that these transport authorities have, such 
as planning, regulation and enforcement, which is backed up by legislation. 
However, SPAD clearly lacks the strategic powers, such as powers to control 
budget and powers to make and drive its decisions, which appear critical for 
a transport authority to be effective.  
A resolution needs to be found to the issue of financial independence for 
SPAD. It has been observed in the discussion with the respondents that 
there were different views about what SPAD should or should not be. If 
SPAD is going to be run as a government agency, then this should be 
allowed to happen. Contrastingly, if it is going to be run as a self-financing 
independent structure, then it should be made to happen now so that this is 
not part of the ongoing debate about what SPAD is or is not. However, the 
balance of evidence suggests that SPAD should be allowed to operate as an 
independent body or commission to enable it to have financial and 
managerial autonomy in order to transform the sector. 
The need to have access to transport funds and the powers to control the 
transport budget is essential for a transport authority to be effective, as 
observed in many transport authorities in developed cities. Hence, for SPAD 
to work, it appears essential that SPAD is given the powers to control the 
land public transport budget for transport projects/strategies, including the 
subsidisation of public transport services. This would allow SPAD to enforce 
its plans and impose its service standards and regulations. It is 
acknowledged that SPAD is not designed to play the role of a project 
implementer, and, in this case, it could distribute the funds and 
coordinate/monitor implementation. However, it is noted that this proposal is 
controversial, as it would require the EPU to willingly devolve some of its 
funding powers to SPAD. 
The importance of a political champion to take forward transport authorities 
has also been identified as an important criterion (as strongly observed in 
TfL and LTA Singapore). Although the presence of a strong political 
leadership was observed during the reform process, unfortunately, this 
seems to have faded away. It is now proving to be impractical as the Prime 
Minister is heavily engaged in other matters and has very limited time to 
perform his role as the head of SPAD. Hence, an alternative would be for the 
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Prime Minister to select another minister in the Prime Minister’s Department 
to be the minister-in-charge of SPAD or to delegate some of his powers to 
the chairman of SPAD. 
SPAD have not yet fully engaged with key stakeholders. Greater recognition 
of the need to engage the whole network of actors to deliver as more 
inclusive governance seems to be important to improving outcomes. 
Recommendations for BMLTA case study 
Funding power is critically required by the BMLTA, especially for enabling it 
to enforce its plans and enact its coordinating capabilities. As a committee 
under the UDD, the BMLTA’s ability to source its own funds will be limited, 
and it will be dependent on funding from the State. The financial position of 
the BMLTA could be strengthened if it could play the nodal agency role for 
urban transport projects undertaken in Bangalore, which means that all 
urban transport project funds from the Central Government, the State 
Government or international development agencies would be distributed 
through the BMLTA. This would require streamlining various functions 
between the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance 
Corporation (KUIDFC) and the BMLTA. 
The current position of BMLTA seems to be far from the stated goal of what 
a single transport authority should look like. As shown in table 8.1, it only has 
the planning function and even this is not a legislated function. The BMLTA 
is currently proving to be ineffective and is embroiled in other arguments 
about governance structure; mainly the proposal for a Metropolitan Planning 
Committee (MPC) and the Bengaluru Governance Bill. The current status of 
BMLTA as a committee with secretariat support by DULT, does not provide 
much room for it to be transformed into a full-fledged transport authority. A 
strong political champion could probably make a difference to take the 
reform forward. Accordingly, it is envisaged that a new reform process is 
required, which means a new Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority 
(UMTA) may have to be created by legislation and given the necessary 
authority, leadership capacity and resources. If MPC is created, then the 
new UMTA should be placed under MPC. This would ensure that transport 
planning is integrated with land use and other urban sectors, which would 
enable effective strategic planning and coordination, thereby contributing to 
better metropolitan governance.  
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8.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed five key factors that the analysis of the case 
studies revealed to be important determinants in shaping the outcome of the 
reform process, and which explain why the authorities have ended up as 
they are. These factors involve combinations of powers, actors, resources, 
rules and procedures and culture, which are all embedded in institutional 
arrangements. The key determinants provide several important factors and 
insights that policy-makers and foreign aid advisors who are actively involved 
in reform programmes for developing Asian cities need to consider when 
designing a transport authority. This chapter also provides policy 
recommendations for the BMLTA and SPAD. The next chapter focuses on 
summarizing the findings of this research, presents its contributions and 
limitations, highlight prospects for further research and ends with some 
general reflection. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter summarises the major findings of the current study 
in relation to its research aims and questions, as well as discussing the 
contributions and implications that this work has for transport governance 
research in developing countries, and its methodological contributions. The 
limitations of the study are identified, and suggestions for further research in 
this area are made. The thesis concludes with a presentation of the 
researcher’s personal reflections on this study.  
9.2 Addressing the research questions 
This section draws the findings from Chapters 6, 7 and 8 together in relation 
to the research questions. 
Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of the 
transport authorities? 
Using the information gained from the literature review regarding the 
creation of other transport authorities, it was anticipated that the motivations 
for the creation of the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD) and the 
Bangalore Metropolitan Land Transport Authority (BMLTA) would be about 
enhancing coordination between agencies in order to improve the service 
delivery of public transport in Malaysia and Bangalore (ADB, 2009; World 
Bank, 2005a).  
However, it was found that although coordination provided part of the reason 
for their establishment, there were also several other motivations for their 
establishment in each case. Indeed, the more central motivations comprised 
altering power structures, satisfying powers that already existed, and 
producing better access to resources. This put greater importance on the 
need to understand power relations in such contexts – something that 
Flyvbjerg (2001) and Grindle and Thomas (1989) also stress to be 
important.  
In Malaysia, the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board’s (CVLB) 
mismanagement, corruption and hidden objective to promote the 
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Bumiputera agenda has had a significant and negative impact on the 
delivery of transport services on the ground. However, the Malaysian 
Government considered the project of reforming the CVLB to be too difficult 
and too politically undesirable. Thus, it was decided that the best option 
would be to create a new agency to replace the CVLB, which could then 
tackle some of the wider transport issues by bridging the gap in the planning 
process and integrating different transport modes. Placing SPAD under the 
Prime Minister’s Department also meant concentrating power in the central 
government – a clear move to centralise control, which Rondinelli (1983) 
suggested would be a likely outcome in reforms despite calls for effective 
governance through decentralisation. 
In Bangalore, the central government’s National Urban Transport Policy 
(NUTP) provided the ultimate push for the State Government of Karnataka 
to create a transport authority. Although the national initiative only 
encourages the formation of a transport authority (without any stringent 
guidelines for compliance), its creation was a necessary criterion for 
accessing funds. In response to the policy, the state government created an 
informal coordinating body that complements the existing institutional 
landscape of Bangalore without changing its power structure. 
These findings provide in-depth information about the real motivations for 
institutional reform in Bangalore and Malaysia. Although they could be 
attributed to addressing the inadequacy of previous institutional 
arrangements (such as coordination among agencies), as some researchers 
have argued (Peters, 2010; Cheema, 2005; Grindle and Thomas, 1989), it is 
evident from this research that a stronger motivation derived from different 
needs and goals. In the Malaysian case, this was the government’s need to 
alter embedded and politically sensitive government policies, promote good 
governance and gain legitimacy from the public; whereas in Bangalore, it 
was the goal to increase the legitimacy from the central government which 
provided access to funds. 
 
Question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the transport 
authorities? 
Bauckaert and Pollitt (2011) suggest that greater autonomy for agencies 
leads to improvements in their use of financial resources, in their 
productivity, and in their user-responsiveness. Other researchers and 
international development agencies have also stressed that in order for 
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transport authorities to be effective, they must be decentralised, provided 
with legislative support, have control over the transport budget and have the 
ability to drive their decisions into practice (Naniopoulous, 2012; ADB, 2009; 
World Bank, 2005b; GTZ, 2004), all of which involve some form of transfer 
of powers. However, previous studies have shown that existing power-
holders resist change, especially when their existing roles or powers are 
threatened (Cheung, 2005; Nakamura, 2005; Down 1967). All of these 
considerations suggest that transport authorities need to be given sufficient 
powers and resources to make them autonomous and enable them to deal 
with other agencies so that they can deliver good transport services on the 
ground and that such reforms will not be easy to push through.  
These difficulties are witnessed in the shortcomings in the empowerment of 
both the transport authorities studied here. SPAD has received some 
operational mandate to perform its planning, regulation and enforcement 
roles, but it is a long distance away from resembling LTA Singapore, TfL 
London or the ‘single transport authority’ model it was envisioned under. 
Whilst it is clear that having a legal mandate helps SPAD by making 
achievements on the ground easier for it, it also requires better interactions 
with other actors in the network, more resources, and better leadership if it is 
to be fully functioning. In contrast, the BMLTA – which has not received legal 
backing – appears to have no accountability for transport management, and 
has hence ended up as no more than a weak coordinating body. Because 
both SPAD and the BMLTA lack financial autonomy or control over a 
transport budget, this makes it difficult for them to implement their plans or 
control the levels of transport services delivered by operators, thus 
undermining their ability to perform the central role for which transport 
authorities are designed – to improve coordination and service delivery. 
The outcome of the clash between power and resistance during the reform 
processes that created these agencies clearly affected their formations 
negatively in each case, though to varying degrees. The models for the 
structures and powers of the agencies that were eventually used to create 
them were those that satisfied the preferences of the majority of the 
stakeholders and what was politically acceptable rather than those that 
would lead to effective authorities. In Bangalore, the consequence of this 
was that there was no change in the existing power structures, which meant 
no tidying up of the existing institutional landscape, and accordingly the 
BMLTA’s creation simply further overcrowded the existing institutional space 
(Pangbourne, 2010). In Malaysia, some structural changes were made, but 
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they were insufficient to enable SPAD to perform its coordination role 
effectively, and thus the fragmentation of roles in the transport sector 
remains. Although governance through networks could provide some relief 
to these problems, and the BMLTA has made significant efforts to establish 
a good network, its lack of a proper mandate has meant that the 
effectiveness of this network has been limited. SPAD, on the other hand, 
has the necessary mandate, but is unable to effectively interact with the 
other actors in its network as a result of continuous resistance from actors 
that lost powers, together with cultural clashes between actors from private 
sector versus public sector backgrounds.  
These findings provide a deeper understanding about how the relationship 
between power and resistance that Foucault (1982) expounds applies to 
reforms. Resistance from power-holders within existing institutions who lose 
out (or stand to lose out) through reforms increases the complexity of 
existing interactions and prevents reforms from achieving their full goals. 
This research thus contends that understanding the power relations 
between various actors in a reform exercise requires far more attention in 
future research. The importance of governance through networks appears to 
be crucial for transport authorities, especially in situations where resources 
are not unitised. There is a significant body of literature on the topic of 
whether governance networks are capable of delivering good results. 
However, it was found that they do not deliver without providing changes in 
power structures and the use of resources, because in such cases the 
required incentives to cooperate are negligible. The BMLTA case study in 
particular, also showed that governing through networks with lowest 
common denominator of politics is ineffective. 
The findings of this research support the conclusion that transport 
authorities need legislative backing, as international development agencies 
have argued. However, this research has also found that operationalising 
reform acts requires governance to be used through networks, and that it is 
vital that the acts build-in provisions for additional powers to be added to 
transport authorities later on in order to reduce the need for altering existing 
legislation. 
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Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision-making processes in 
policy-making and the selection and implementation of transport projects? 
The decision-making power needed for policy-making and the selection and 
implementation of transport projects is an important attribute of transport 
authorities, and requires them to have control over transport budget (Masi, 
2009; ADB, 2009; GTZ, 2004; World Bank, 2002a). This enables them to 
strengthen their coordination capabilities, and to acquire more control over 
the development of infrastructure and service designs.  It is noted that both 
TfL and LTA Singapore have operational and strategic remits over transport. 
It was anticipated that the reforms in Malaysia – which involved the creation 
of a semi-autonomous transport authority – would have involved transferring 
the relevant decision-making competencies to SPAD, along with the 
authority and resources to make it effective. However, SPAD was not given 
these attributes and, as a result, it was found to be struggling to exercise its 
powers and build its capacity. 
This research has found that neither SPAD nor the BMLTA have control 
over their transport budgets, and hence they can both be bypassed in the 
decision-making process. The decision-making platform has thus changed 
little from how it was before the creation of these two authorities, and there 
is no evidence to support the idea that the reforms have speeded up the 
decision-making process or impacted positively on transport outcomes 
(although it is too early to reach definitive conclusions on the latter issue). 
SPAD acts as a proposal evaluator that makes recommendations to the 
approving authorities in Malaysia, and these authorities have thus been the 
main winners from these reforms. The approving authority for decision-
making lies with the funding agencies, mainly represented by central 
government agencies such as the Economic Planning Unit and the Ministry 
of Finance. In Bangalore, decision-making powers lie with the State 
Government and parastatal agencies, both of whom have funding 
capacities, which means that the significant decisions here are made 
outside the BMLTA. Although the BMLTA committee appears to be making 
a lot of decisions under the oversight of the Chief Secretary, none of these 
are binding, as the BMLTA lacks a legal mandate.  
Neither of these authorities has a significant input on strategic matters 
regarding transport, with the BMLTA having less than SPAD. Nevertheless, 
the BMLTA has achieved some positive results in uncontested and failed 
policy areas. On the other hand, SPAD, through its operational functions, 
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has been able to fill some gaps in planning, and has shown some good 
efforts in its attempts to streamline land public transport regulations.  
The findings of the research in these areas supports the arguments of the 
ADB (2009), Walter (1998) and Williams (1998) that transport authorities 
must be given the powers to make and implement their decisions in order to 
be effective. However, this is acknowledged to be a controversial issue, as 
the findings also support the evidence that central government is seeking to 
retain and strengthen its control over critical resources such as funding 
(Gwilliam, 2003, White, 1991). This research also helps to explain the 
inefficiency of semi-autonomous bodies (Christensen and Laegreid, 2006) in 
terms of the power struggles that exist between the central government and 
the devolved bodies, which also relate to the tendency of the former to 
tighten its grip.  
 
Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms? 
Chapter 8 (section 8.2) examined the key determinants that influence the 
reforms in the case studies, and this section will summarise the significance 
of those findings.  
In both the case studies, it was evident that nobody (even the reformers) 
had identified the criterion for success of the reforms and there was no 
shared understanding about what success constitutes. Maybe it is in not in 
the interests of those working on reforms to set out such criteria, as they 
could make them accountable for any failures, and perhaps because they 
may lead to reforms that simply need further work being prematurely seen 
as failures.  
The importance of a political champion has been highlighted in the literature 
as being crucial to driving the reform process (Low and Astle, 2009; 
Cervero, 1998; Down, 1967), and these two case studies have provided 
further insights in this area. In Malaysia, the involvement of the Prime 
Minister was the main driver for reform, and his leadership was necessary 
for overcoming the resistance that some actors raised to the reforms, as well 
as for cooling the turf wars at the nascent stage of SPAD’s existence. 
Nevertheless, it has proven impractical to have a political champion that is 
so high up the political ladder as such actors are unable to devote the 
required time and resources to such posts, and power thus needs to be 
devolved to other suitable candidates who can give their full commitments to 
championing and directing SPAD. The Prime Minister’s attention to the 
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reform also appeared to be short term as suggested by Peters (2010) and 
perhaps it could be hypothesised that political champions cannot afford to 
spend too much of time on reforms as it could be taken as signs of failure. 
 In Bangalore, there was no political champion to drive the reform, and 
although the committee functioned under the chairmanship of the Chief 
Secretary, he had little impact because the reform itself was weak. This 
suggests that strong political leadership must be coupled with strong reforms 
to make a significant impact. 
Another significant theoretical contribution of this research is that it has 
provided new insights regarding the relevance of distance between 
reformers and implementers.  The findings from these case studies suggest 
that it may be the case that the closer together the two are – as in Malaysia, 
where both are national-level sets of actors – the more likely that the reform 
will be seriously adopted and positive results produced.  
Researchers have argued for the importance of path dependence in reforms 
(Low and Astle, 2009; Van Thiel, 2004; Toonen 2003), and the findings from 
the SPAD case study have shown that the ‘path’ has to be dislocated or 
broken to create the necessary changes, although this can come at a cost – 
as seen in the loss of SPAD’s institutional memory. 
Politt and Backaert (2011) have pointed to the importance of administrative 
culture in reforms, and these case studies have provided a deeper 
understanding of this element in the context of developing countries. In both 
case studies, but in Bangalore in particular, the reformers undertook 
politically feasible strategies that did not threaten their own positions, and 
this negatively impacted on their effectiveness. In Bangalore, the strong 
fusion between politicians and civil servants that resulted in frequent 
changes in the BMLTA’s leadership also took a toll on the outcomes of the 
reforms there, suggesting that continuous leadership is important to sustain 
reforms. 
The importance of treating reforms as a process that several researchers 
have argued for (e.g. Peters, 2010; Dacin, 2000) is further supported by the 
case study findings in this research. Reforms are not short-term projects 
with definite outputs and outcomes that can be quickly declared as being 
either successes or failures. Rather, they are complex, ongoing processes, 
and the course of the outcomes changes with time depending on the 
improvements that have been made. However, this does not mean that 
planning processes can be ignored because of uncertainties regarding 
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reform outcomes. Indeed, the SPAD case study shows the importance of 
making the correct reform decisions at the start, as such decisions cannot 
be reversed in government-driven reforms because this is perceived as the 
government admitting to failure. The BMLTA case study has also shown that 
reforms can be greatly affected by other reform initiatives that happen within 
the same institutional environment, and that uncertainties in their outcomes 
can be reduced by having good reform plans and a general set of criteria for 
assessing whether they are moving in the right direction. 
9.3 The contributions of this research and its policy 
implications  
The primary contribution of this research is empirical, providing an in-depth 
case study on the reform process involved in enacting SPAD and the 
BMLTA and a detailed account for other researchers and policy-makers to 
utilise. It shows how the creation and empowerment of SPAD and BMLTA is 
influenced by contextual factors and constraints that arise during 
implementation, and provides insights into factors that determine the 
performance of these authorities. To the best knowledge of the researcher, 
this is the first empirical study on single transport authorities in the context of 
developing countries. This is also the first time that an empirical study has 
been conducted on the reform process in Malaysia’s transport sector, 
besides being the only research on the BMLTA to draw on the experience 
and knowledge of actors and policy-makers in Bangalore. 
The original contribution of this research is centred around the following key 
areas: enhancement of political legitimacy and good governance as the 
outcome of reform processes, understanding about the relationship between 
power and resistance in reform exercise and policy transfer from developed 
to developing countries. 
Enhancement of political legitimacy and good governance 
In both the case studies, it was found that although the narrative of reform 
was about improving coordination, the real motivation was to tackle 
legitimacy. Hence, the reformers designed reforms which fulfilled these 
motives and once these were achieved, the motivation for further reform 
disappeared. In Malaysia, it was driven by the need to gain political 
legitimacy and fight corruption which supports Cheung’s (2005), Cheema’s 
(2005) and Hall and Taylor’s (1996) argument about correcting malpractice 
and strengthening legitimacy as key motivations for institutional reforms. 
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Whereas in Bangalore, it was the need to gain legitimacy from the federal 
government in Delhi in order to have access to funds.  
Hence, the extent of the reforms that were implemented did not completely 
fulfil the aspiration of a transport authority which is to facilitate coordination 
and integration of transport services on the ground. To achieve these 
objectives, more reforms are required but it appears as though the reformers 
in both the case studies are unlikely to take any radical moves. In Malaysia, 
any further structural changes is seen to be politically detrimental to the 
image of the government (an acknowledgement they got some things 
wrong), whereas in Bangalore, the strong embedded agencies and close 
relationship between the politicians and the civil servants clearly do not 
favour any further changes. Certainly if the raison d’être of the agencies is to 
improve coordination, further reform would be required. However, if the 
motivations were to tackle corruption (in Malaysia) and gaining access to 
funds (in Bangalore) which have been met, then political imperative for 
change is lacking.  Hence, whilst the reformers could be content with the 
outcome of the reform to date, other stakeholders who have multitude of 
objectives and hold different positions – mainly the losers of the reforms - 
argue that positive outcomes of the reforms are not evident and continue to 
fight for their own interests and preferences. 
 
Relationship between power and resistance 
Foucault (1982) has propounded the co-existence of power and resistance, 
and this research has provided further insights into this matter. The outcome 
of the clash between power and resistance during the reform process that 
created these agencies clearly affected their formations negatively in each 
case. Agencies which stood to lose powers, showed significant resistance 
not only during the formation of the transport authorities but also during 
post-creation which affected how the reform unfolded over time. Hence, to 
varying degrees what was implemented reflected the power and influence of 
the majority (e.g in Malaysia the Ministry of Transport was weak and led by a 
Chinese Minister) and in Bangalore, the parasastals were too strong, so 
there was no real reform. 
In Malaysia, SPAD could not be established as a single regulator which 
means that coordination issues still continue, whereas in Bangalore, BMLTA 
which was created based on lowest common denominator of politics was 
proven to be ineffective. There also seem to be strong preference in 
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Bangalore to maintain the status quo of institutional arrangements, as it is 
closely related to job security and corruption chain as speculated by Dwivedi 
(2003).  
The presence of political champion – the Prime Minister in the Malaysian 
case- did help to overcome the resistance to a certain degree. The presence 
of the Prime Minister has enabled the path to be dislocated to create the 
punctuated equilibria as contented by Hall (1993) to allow for necessary 
changes to take place – with the closing down of CVLB which was 
associated with corruption and this seems to conform to hypothesis by Low 
and Astle (2009). However, as Bennister (2012) contended, the Prime 
Minister had his own ‘desires’ and limitations in terms of the extent of the 
changes that he could make. This implies that whilst the presence of a 
champion might be essential to drive structural reforms, the extent of 
changes that he can make may be bound by existing institutional framework 
and constraints that exist, and hence the rest of the intended outcomes will 
have to be achieved through the network of actors.  Nevertheless, both case 
studies have shown that resistance from power holders within existing 
institutions who have lost out or stand to lose out through reforms increases 
the complexity of existing interactions and prevents reforms from achieving 
full goals, as they are likely to resist any further changes which affect them. 
This suggests that transport authorities need to have tools to overcome 
resistance – both in terms of hard and soft power as proposed by Nye 
(2011). The source of hard power can be in the form of funding and 
legislative backing, whereas soft power requires good negotiation and 
communication skills to get things done through the network. It is important 
to note that none of the so called global best practice dedicated transport 
authorities operate solely on soft power – these authorities are given 
legislative and funding support. 
It is interesting to note that resistance was not only shown by agencies of 
the similar working level with the transport authorities, but also by the higher 
authority which were supposed to empower the transport authorities. This 
was more apparent in devolving the funding powers, in which both the case 
studies have shown that the federal and the state government prefer to hold 
their grip on funding (where budget control is perceived to be essential) and 
decision-making powers appear to rest with agencies that hold funding 
power. Literature shows that this is a common scenario in decentralization 
(see Yamamoto, 2006; McCarten and Vyasulu, 2006; Tang and Bloom, 
2000; Rondinelli, 1983). However, due to this situation, stakeholders see the 
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transport authorities as being powerless and ineffective as they lack control 
over transport budget. It is envisaged that without the appropriate funding 
and decision-making powers, transport authorities are unlikely to be 
effective in facilitating coordination among agencies and make significant 
changes on the ground. 
 
Policy transfer from developed to developing countries 
Researchers such as Mark Evans (2009 ) and Marsden and Stead (2011) 
have pointed out that there has been insufficient study about transferring 
best practices from developed to developing countries and that that search 
for ideas fails to take advantage of lessons from developing countries 
perspectives. The international development agencies on the other hand are 
strongly promoting best practices model which have worked in developed 
countries to be adopted in developing countries. However, the danger is that 
these agencies may offer recommendations that are a projection of their 
own culture, which might fail if taken out of context (Rose 2005). 
This thesis provides empirical evidence about contextual factors which have 
had an influence on transferring one such policy – the dedicated transport 
authorities – to two developing Asian countries. It was found that although 
the reformers were able to refer to the best practices models, what they 
appear to have copied is largely symbolic, without having a clear idea of 
what exactly has to be changed. Therefore, it was found that in both the 
case studies, what was implemented on the ground was strongly influenced 
by local factors such as political condition, administrative culture and lack of 
accountability and transparency issues, leading to reforms only being 
partially successful, although much less in BMLTA case study. 
This is largely due to the fact that the international development agencies 
only promote the ultimate outlook of what the transport authorities should 
look like and neglect the reform process itself. It is more crucial for the 
international development agencies to provide guidelines on the reforms that 
have to be undertaken mainly the critical changes that have to be made to 
the existing institutional arrangements to enable the creation of effective 
transport authorities. Hence, whilst emulating lessons in policy transfer might 
be important as stressed by Rose (2005), what was found to be more 
important is good insights to the reform process itself – mainly 
comprehensive understanding about what is there to build on and how one 
should progress from the existing to the desired state. 
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Hence, in copying best practices, a clear understanding is required of 
existing conditions/context in both developed and developing countries, 
which include looking at the structures beyond transport, such as 
administrative culture, transparency issues, ethnic sensitivity, political 
structure and stability. Upon doing this, changes that are appropriate to the 
context have to be devised or, less likely, preceded by major cultural reform. 
The real challenge is in trying to fit the new management ideas (which 
demand good governance practices, expertise and funding capability) 
advocated by the international development agencies into the administrative 
structures of the developing countries which may have different priorities 
and capabilities. 
The key criteria that was found to be crucial for both the case studies is 
funding autonomy for the transport authorities so that they are able to 
influence public transport service delivery on the ground and as a 
tool/incentive to facilitate coordination among agencies. However, funding is 
a scarce resource and there is a tendency for the federal and the state 
government not to devolve funding powers to agencies in order to maintain 
control. Nevertheless, both case studies have shown that weak 
accountability, poor responsibility on civil servants’ side and lack of 
transparency are pressing issues in the public administration of both the 
case studies and without these factors properly set in place, it is unlikely that 
devolvement of funding powers to the transport authorities would make any 
big impact. Bangalore in particular, has shown that the strong relationship 
between the politicians and the civil servants had a negative impact on 
leadership stability which subsequently influenced the outcomes of the 
reform.  
 
Big-bang versus incremental reforms 
Researchers such as Stead et. al (2008), Tang and Bloom (2000) and Wei 
(1997) generally promote incremental reforms as they are said to be more 
feasible, politically acceptable, less likely to be blocked by majority and more 
likely to show positive results. However, the danger is that this form of 
reform may not achieve the desired benefits as implementation is based on 
agreement on the need rather than acceptance of their outcomes. In 
contrast, other researchers (see Roland and Verdier, 1994; Krueger 1993) 
promote big-bang reforms on the basis that it increases credibility of 
reforms, time-saving and brings benefits more quickly. 
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The findings from these two case studies have indicated that big-bang 
reforms might be the only way out if significant changes are to be seen in 
the context of developing Asian countries, provided they are supported by 
sufficient political will to make them happen and willingness of present 
institutions to accommodate change. The Malaysian case study has also 
supported arguments by Duit and Galaz (2008) that centralised government 
has a higher capacity to promote bigger reforms and drive necessary 
changes, but nevertheless it was also evident that the outcomes of the 
reforms were also strongly influenced by the complex interaction between 
the winners and losers of the reform, with the key reformers having an upper 
hand to achieve what they desire. Whereas in Bangalore, a less centralized 
government, where political consensus in decision-making is a key criteria, 
what was implemented was the lowest common political denominator, which 
hardly changed anything on the ground but nevertheless the key reformers 
did achieve their motives to gain access to funds. 
It is interesting to note the differences in the reaction of the stakeholders in 
both the case studies after the initial reforms have been implemented. In 
Malaysia – where significant changes have been made to previous 
institutional arrangements to accommodate SPAD - the stakeholders no 
longer question the relevance or existence of SPAD but rather their 
arguments were focussed around the steps and initiatives that have to be 
taken to make SPAD perform better. The changes that originated here at a 
specific historical moment when constraints are weakened, which is known 
as critical juncture (Soifer, 2012) was observed to have long-term and 
transformative impact. On the other hand, in Bangalore, the stakeholders 
continue to argue about the existence of a weak BMLTA, with majority 
proposing that it should be either replaced or abolished, suggesting that 
weak reforms may not hold over a long period of time. 
9.4 Limitations of this research  
The present study has provided a valuable account of the relevance and 
functioning of SPAD and BMLTA. However, this study has its limitations, as 
presented in section 4.6. Whilst some of these limitations were tackled 
through good research design, others remained unresolved, and are 
highlighted below:     
 The two transport authorities that were chosen for this research are 
very different in nature, as are the environments that they are 
embedded in, and hence it is not possible to make direct 
 263  
comparisons between them. One most notable difference is that it 
was a national-national reform programme in Malaysia and national-
state reform programme in Bangalore. 
 The key reformers in the BMLTA case study could not be interviewed 
as most of them no longer held the same positions and had moved 
elsewhere. Hence, their insights and experiences could not be 
captured. Tracking and arranging interviews with them was not 
possible within the one-month time limit assigned for data-gathering 
by the host agency in Bangalore. 
 The views of the general public and NGOs were not included in these 
case studies. Respondents were limited to the main actors involved in 
the management and development of transport sector. Given that 
transport is a public domain, it would have been interesting to have 
heard the opinions of the general public concerning government 
reform to change the way transport services are delivered. 
 The performance of SPAD and the BMLTA were only assessed in 
terms of changes in the decision-making process and changes 
referenced by respondents during the interviews. A detailed account 
of the specific changes and initiatives that have been implemented by 
these transport authorities was not collected. In addition, reform 
which is a process and does not have an end, whereas the outcomes 
in transport could be assessed at certain intervals by evaluating 
improvements in integration and changes in the service delivery on 
the ground. 
 This research was limited to examining changes in the governance of 
the transport sector within the spatial jurisdictions of SPAD and the 
BMLTA. Minimum consideration was given to the changes and 
reforms that happened outside the scope of these transport 
authorities, which might have had an impact on their establishment 
and performance. A comprehensive review of the policy changes in 
the wider governance system could have provided deeper insights for 
understanding why the transport authorities turned out as they have. 
9.5 Suggestions for further research  
Based on the overall findings of this research, further work may be carried 
out in a number of areas. It is acknowledged that research on institutional 
reform is about the process and not about outcomes, which can only be 
studied in a brief moment in time. As such, it is very difficult to understand 
the relationship between the institutional change and outcomes as they tend 
to happen further down the line. Although it is believed that there are short, 
intermediate and long-term outcomes (Bauckaert and Pollitt, 2011; Jones 
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and Kettl, 2003), there are no clear guidelines how one determines whether 
it is a success or failure. There are no definite criteria or indication as to how 
long such results or a particular outcome will endure, which is a significant 
challenge. One way would be to develop a general set of criteria for 
assessing whether reforms are moving in the right direction and how much 
work they still require – examples for criteria could be autonomy, legislative 
backing and staffing – however the challenge is that these concepts have to 
be clearly defined so that they can also be used in comparative studies. On 
the other hand, it is understood that outcomes in transport are often only 
seen in the long term and it will be useful to develop a set of indicators (an 
example could be modal share) to evaluate the outcomes of transport 
related reforms in the long-term. However, in a developing region, where 
transport data is not transparently available, operationalizing this poses 
another challenge. 
This study also showed that administrative structure and culture is an 
important element, which also influences the reform process. Many of the 
reforms promoted by the international development agencies, such as single 
transport authorities and decentralization, use new approaches and 
techniques, which require certain pre-requisite criteria to be set in place, 
such as a good accountability system, competent civil servants, ‘clean’ 
government, empowered local authorities, which are lacking in many 
developing countries. Hence, further research is required to provide insights 
into the administrative structures and cultures in developing countries (to 
understand what is there to build on) and how these would match or 
respond to the new initiatives proposed by the international development 
agencies. In addition, this would provide an understanding of what kind of 
changes can or cannot be adopted, and address the issue of which part of 
the structure and process has to be changed in order to adopt the proposed 
reform. 
The international development agencies have actively promoted transport 
authority models which resemble LTA Singapore and TfL which are vested 
with strategic and operational powers. It is not quite clear if transport 
authorities are to have all these powers to be effective or if a ‘half-way 
house’ model will work. The international development agencies have 
produced a wide range or criterion that these transport authorities should 
have and perhaps a set of success characteristics should be developed to 
identify what the transport authorities should achieve. 
 265  
It would be interesting to undertake other case studies on transport 
authorities in a variety of developing Asian countries that are (or have been) 
heavily driven by the World Bank. Dhaka would provide a good case study 
on why the reform exercise failed, and Hanoi in Vietnam (an ongoing 
exercise) could highlight the strengths and constraints of involving a donor 
agency in the reform process. Other cities in the Asian region that have not 
adopted transport authorities, but have developed good transport systems 
(such as Ahmedabad and Chandigarh in India, Hong Kong, Jakarta in 
Indonesia) could provide interesting insights and lessons concerning how 
coordination and integration among agencies and between modes can be 
achieved. 
9.6 Concluding remarks  
This thesis has presented and evaluated the motivation for creating 
transport authorities and the outcomes of doing so using two case studies – 
SPAD and the BMLTA. The opening chapter discussed the support for a 
single transport authority model, which has been strongly advocated by 
international development agencies based on its success in developed 
cities, together with the arguments that some researchers have made 
against copying models that have proven successful in developed cities on 
the basis that they may not be applicable in developing cities because of 
contextual differences. 
The findings from this research have demonstrated that the creation of 
SPAD and the BMLTA, which aimed to change the way urban transport was 
governed in their respective contexts, has only achieved a partial degree of 
success. In these two case studies, the reform exercise has created the 
need for more reforms. It is interesting to note that in both cases, the 
creation of a new agency was preferred – or it was the easier way out rather 
than strengthening or re-organizing any existing agencies. While what has 
been created seems appropriate for the local context, it is evident that what 
is deemed appropriate may not be what is effective. Although this has been 
successful in Malaysia to a certain extent, as it has the operational mandate 
– planning, regulation and enforcement functions – further reform is 
necessary to strengthen its role. However, in Bangalore, it appears as 
though a complete new reform is required to create a transport authority as 
BMLTA lacks mandate and clarity on its roles and functions. Their 
shortcomings can be attributed to institutional barriers, lack of funding, the 
absence of reliable knowledge, political constraints, state-resistance to 
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devolving or giving up existing powers, and a variety of culture-specific 
issues.  
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Appendix A: Interview guide 
  Interview topic Interview questions Themes/concepts Respondents 
A. What are the motivations 
behind establishment of SPAD  in 
Malaysia and BMLTA in 
Bangalore? 
A1.  Who started? 
 
 
A1.1 Do you remember how the idea of SPAD came 
about? When did that happen? 
A1.1.1 Do you happen to know that there was some 
efforts earlier in 2003 to establish SPAD, but it didn’t 
happen then, what did you hear? 
- The idea re-emerged after the new PM took office in 
2008? There were some efforts earlier in 2003 but 
did not materialise, political reasons?! 
- The current PM  was the chair of the Cabinet 
Committee for Public Transport when he was DPM 
- Policy transfer- emulating 
developed countries 
- Political leadership 
- Legitimacy vs efficiency  
- International agencies 
A1.1 All 
A1.2 Siti Hadzar and 
Naimah 
 
A2.  Who supported and 
those against? 
Why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A2.1 As far as you know, how was the idea for SPAD 
received, was there a wide range of support? 
- Civil servants/agencies 
- Politicians 
- NGO’s, associations  
- Operators 
- Public 
Why do you say that/why do you feel that way? 
A2.1.1 Were there any hints about personal individual 
or organization who were particularly for and those not 
in favour SPAD? 
EPU  JPJ DoR  PM 
MOF LPKP  DBKL Minister 
in EPU 
MOT Motour    
How do you happen to know that? 
 
- Response from agencies 
- Network of key actors 
 
- Multi actor perspective 
 
  Rationale 
for STA 
Success/ 
perception 
of actors 
Actor 1   
Actor 2   
Actor 3   
 
 
A2.1 All 
 
 
 
 
A2.2 All and 
particularly Siti 
Hadzar and 
EPU/MOF officers 
ii 
 
 
  Interview topic Interview questions Themes/concepts Respondents 
 
 
A3.  The rationale 
 
A3.1 We were facing quite a number of urban transport issues 
particularly in Kuala Lumpur, in your opinion is there any 
particular issue that SPAD was hoped to resolve? 
A3.1.1 As far as you are concerned, could the issue be 
resolved through other ways? 
- Respondents to highlight one main issue and how 
SPAD is to resolve the issue. Alternatives to SPAD 
is to be highlighted 
 
- Legitimacy vs efficiency  
- Alternatives considered? 
A3.1 All particularly Dr 
Leong in DBKL/EPU 
 
 
A3.2 All particularly 
those who opposed to 
the idea of SPAD 
(linked to Question 
2.2) 
 
A4.   Is the adopted model 
right way forward? 
 
A4.1 SPAD has quite a unique model, in a sense that it is 
established at national, compared to many other developed 
cities which adopted STA’s at city or regional level, in your 
view, is this an advantage or constraint for Malaysia? 
- There are views that SPAD should be established 
for Klang Valley  (regional body), this was the 
original proposal 
 
A4.2 The Prime Minister is directly responsible for SPAD, can 
you tell me how does this benefit the urban transport 
sector/SPAD? Any drawbacks? 
 
- Adaptation to local scenario 
- Politically acceptable 
 
 
 
 
 
- Political leadership 
- PM’s delivery arm 
 
All particularly SPAD 
B. What types of autonomy have 
been given to the authorities? 
B1. Legislation support 
 
 
B1.1 The Land Public Transport Act, 2010 gives SPAD the 
power to plan and regulate, is there any other legislative power 
that is pending and need to be acquired by SPAD? 
- Has spad been given all the legislative powers? 
Sufficient  legal backing 
 
SPAD 
B2. Clear line of 
responsibility 
 
B2.1 Besides SPAD there are various other transport related 
agencies, does the current regulatory framework sets a clear 
guideline on the roles and responsibilities of the agencies? 
Any grey areas? 
- Main reason for adoption of SPAD is to streamline 
the transport sector, reduce fragmentation 
Clear regulatory framework  All  
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  Interview topic Interview questions Themes/concepts Respondents 
 
B3. Support and 
intervention from central 
agency 
 
 
 
B3.1 What are your thoughts on the kind of support that you 
receive from the central Government? 
- Funding,technical 
- Sufficient/insufficient – too much of intervention  
How does the central government know what you need, 
is there some sort of periodic reporting to them? 
- Probe for what is reported, how often…to determine 
central Government control 
B3.2 Is there any particular authority/autonomy that is crucial 
for SPAD at this point of time? 
- Funding, independence? 
- Management autonomy, policy making autonomy, 
legal  & structure autonomy 
 
B3.3 You’ve been fully operational for about 6months now, if 
you were given an opportunity to amend the Act,  is there any 
particular thing that you would like to improve? 
- If the respondents view act as an important medium  
to gain ‘power’, or if it is just rhetoric 
 
Real power 
Hierarchical control 
Central government control 
Rhetoric and practice 
 
SPAD 
C. How have the reforms affected 
decision making processes in 
policy making and the selection 
and implementation of transport 
transport projects? 
C1. Project focus – 
small/medium scale 
versus mega projects 
 
 
 
C1.1 What is your immediate target (for the next one to two 
years)?  
- Look out for transport plans and policies 
C.1.2 Do you have an idea of the policies/projects that you 
need to implement to achieve these targets? 
Do you have sufficient resources? 
Clear targets and strategies SPAD 
 C2. Decision making 
process 
C2.1 Suppose that I’m a project proponent submitting a 
project proposal for ….which cost about RM10 million? 
Could you maybe step me through the decision-making  
process? 
- Probe for who is involved and how long it takes 
Would there be any difference if the project cost is above 
Policy community 
Policy elites 
Public participation  
 
 
SPAD  
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  Interview topic Interview questions Themes/concepts Respondents 
RM500 million? 
Are there any other alternatives? 
- Check for presence of clear guidelines for DM 
C2.2 What are the similarities and differences in the way the 
decisions are made now than how it was done before SPAD? 
 
 
 
 
Path dependence 
C3. Justifications for new 
projects and policies 
C3.1 How do go about selecting projects in the absence of a 
transport plan?  
  - Transport master plan is currently being prepared, to be 
completed in September. There are existing plans such as 
Kuala Lumpur city plan which could be used as guide, but 
not being adopted. Reference to 10
th
 MP. 
C3.2 Could you tell me how the idea of MRT project came 
about?  
“Opposition questions the effectiveness of SPAD when 
projects can be kicked off without its input and initiative”, how 
would you respond to that kind of argument? 
Who made the ultimate decision? Who was involved? 
What is spad’s role? Is that something that is specified in the 
Act? 
What are the main challenges that you are facing? 
Rationality vs power 
PM’s delivery arm 
SPAD  
C4. Funding and technical 
capabilities 
 
C4.1 You mentioned that you need to implement projects 
(such as mentioned in C1.2), are there any major constraints 
that you are facing at the moment?  
 How could that be improved? 
 
Power to drive decisions 
Insufficient capacity 
SPAD  
D. How have the reforms affected 
decision making processes in 
policy making and the selection 
and implementation of transport 
transport projects? 
D1. Understanding 
SPAD’s role 
 
 
 
D1.1. What is your perception/understanding of SPAD’s role in 
selection of transport projects/ drafting new policies? 
Why do you say that? 
- Different actors may have different understanding of 
SPAD’s actual role 
Different perceptions 
 
 
 
 
Other agencies  
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  Interview topic Interview questions Themes/concepts Respondents 
 
D2. Project focus – 
small/medium scale 
versus mega projects 
 
 
 
 
 
D2.1. Based on your observation, do you think SPAD has 
clear targets and strategic measures to achieve those targets? 
D2.2 Do you see any significant pattern in the types of 
projects being approved? 
- More mega projects 
 
Clear targets and strategies 
 
 
D3. Decision making 
process 
D3.1 Before the establishment of SPAD, do you happen to 
know how transport projects or new policies were approved? 
D3.2 Do you think there’s any difference now? 
- Look out for new actors, policy elites, public 
participation 
D3.3 Besides SPAD, are there any new actors in the picture? 
What’s their role? 
D3.4 Has your role changed?  
- At this point, perhaps introduce the MRT project and 
ask, What criticism have you heard about the MRT 
project? 
 
Policy community 
Policy elites 
Public participation  
Who was 
involved 
before? 
Who was 
involved 
now? 
Who is 
not 
involved 
now? 
   
   
 
Other agencies 
D4. Justifications for new 
projects and policies 
D4.1 In the scale of between 1 to 10, how would you rate the 
justifications or rationality for new projects? 
D4.2 In the same scale, how would you rate the level of 
interference from the political masters in the selection of new 
projects? 
- If the respondents feel there is more politics, probe 
for evidence 
 
Rationality vs power 
PM’s delivery arm 
 
Other agencies 
D5. Funding and technical 
capabilities 
 
D5.1 In your opinion, do you think SPAD has the right capacity 
and capabilities to drive the decisions that were made? 
Is there any particular improvements you would like to see in 
Power to drive decisions 
Insufficient capacity 
Other agencies 
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  Interview topic Interview questions Themes/concepts Respondents 
SPAD? 
D5.2 Can you think of any examples where SPAD has been 
particularly successful or unsuccessful? 
- What do you think was done right?/What do you 
think went wrong? 
 
E. What are the factors that 
determine the success or failure 
of the reform? 
E1. Strengths and 
constraints 
 
 
 
E.1.1 How would you describe your success so far? 
     - What were the contributing factors? 
E1.2 How would you describe your working relationship with 
other transport agencies?  Have you encountered any 
significant issue/problems?   
 
E1.3 What is your perception of SPAD? Have they been able 
to achieve what they were set out to do? 
- Probe for evidence 
 
E1.4 How would you imagine an ideal SPAD? 
 
Structural change vs mental 
modes 
Resistance to change  
Social capital (trust) 
Inter-organizational relationship 
SPAD 
 
SPAD and other 
agencies 
 
 
Other agencies 
 
SPAD and other 
agencies 
 
Question C – for SPAD 
Question D – for other agencies
vii 
 
 
Appendix B: Interview Guide for SPAD 
Questions and prompts Key concepts Comments given by pilot respondent 
Research Question 1: What were the motivations 
behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia? 
  
1. Do you remember how the idea of a 
coordinating authority came about?  
When did that happen? 
Was there any key personality involved? 
For all 
- Developed cities 
- World Bank 
- Legitimacy vs. efficiency 
- Political will 
- Key personality 
 
 
She talked about PT in 70, 80’s and 90’s and how the 
changes in public transport landscape (especially the ban of 
mini buses and LRT services) and failure to coordinate the 
network raise the need for a single transport authority.      
WB suggested mini bus service to increase employment. 
 
She did not mention specific key personality, but mentioned 
about the key person who influenced the PM to ban mini 
buses...which led to drastic drop in PT usage. 
2. Why was it set up the way it was? 
[Was there an alternative model?] 
[What was the process adopted?] 
- Any refurbishment to the existing authorities? 
[Was it to solve any particular issue?] 
             Discussion to focus around transport issues: 
congestion, poor service 
          For all 
 
- Prime Minister as the head 
- At national level 
- Institutional 
weaknesses/inadequacy of 
existing structure 
- Coordination issues 
- Bureaucracy  
  
 
 
Although SPAD is a national body, it only focuses on Klang 
Valley, nothing is done on national scale. 
 
She suggested that I also speak to the agencies absorbed 
into SPAD – particularly the Director  
General of Railway as he is ‘neglected’ although he is an 
expert in his field as SPAD has its own group of people. 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Comments given by pilot respondent 
 
3. Did your organization support the establishment 
of the authority? 
[If so, what are the reasons?/How do you benefit 
from the authority?] 
[If no, were there other alternatives?] 
Other than the authority 
 
- Alternative models 
- Streamline the sector 
- Single champion 
- Coordinated decision making 
- Policy integration without 
institutional integration 
 
Her response was: “Yes, we were for SPAD, mainly for 
coordinated network planning, which nobody was doing”. 
 
 
 
4. How does this fit the perspectives of other 
organizations?  
[Who and what were their views?] 
[Who supported and who were against?] 
 
              Other than the authority 
- Multi actor perspective 
- Response from agencies 
She thinks that CVLB and the LRT operators were against 
SPAD because they think they have been doing a good job. 
The local authorities were not favourable because they were 
not clear of the functions of SPAD. 
Overall, she thinks this question is not clear and similar to (3) 
Research Question 2: What types of autonomy have 
been given to the authority? 
  
5. What powers have been delegated to you under 
the new structure?  
[Are the powers adequate to carry out the 
assigned functions?] 
For the authority  
- Legal backing 
- political backing 
- Functions (rhetoric vs. 
practice) 
Actual functions compared to 
documentation  
- authority vs. autonomy 
 
 
She said that this question is relevant to respondents from 
SPAD 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Comments given by pilot respondent 
6. How are these powers exercised? Chairman 
and ceo, how you interprete  
What might be improved? 
[Is there any reporting mechanism back to the 
central government?] 
[Who has the final say?] 
[How do you get buy in from other agencies?] 
[What mechanism do you have to ensure that 
decisions are implemented on the ground?] 
For the authority 
- Real power transfer 
- Hierarchical control 
- Centralization 
- Politicians vs. bureaucrats  
- support of citizens (public 
mass) 
- authority to drive the decisions 
- consensus with other agencies 
 
 
It would be useful to find out how the Chairman and the 
CEO interpret the power they have – For this she 
suggested that I interview both the Chairman and the 
CEO. 
 
She thinks that the CEO may not tell the ‘truth’, so I may 
need to find someone else in SPAD. 
 
These questions are good but she felt that I need to find 
the right people who can answer this. 
7. Have the funding mechanisms changed and in 
what ways? 
[What kind of support do you receive from 
central government?] 
For all 
 
- Central government control 
- Financial autonomy/self- 
financing power 
- PPP/privatisation 
- Financial constraint 
 
 
She mentioned about absence of strategic plan not only 
for Klang valley but for the whole country. And there is no 
basis for SPAD to select feasible projects. 
SPAD work closely with the consultants, and in a way it 
benefits the consultants because they then get the 
opportunity for further work in projects, issue of 
transparency... 
She raised the issue of SPAD not having the authority 
to direct the local authorities and no financial autonomy. 
Funding comes from the Ministry of Finance and EPU. 
 
     She then suggested the following questions: 
How do you plan to implement your public transport 
plan when you don’t have the financial autonomy?  
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Comments given by pilot respondent 
(Funding before planning or planning before funding) 
You do not have the authority to direct the local 
authorities, in such case what mechanisms do you 
have to implement the plans you have made? (power 
to drive decisions). 
8. If you were given an opportunity to amend the 
Act, is there any particular thing that you would 
like to improve? 
[How will that make a difference?] 
[What is stopping you from acquiring those 
powers?] 
Extension of act at local level 
 
For the authority/others? 
- Streamline the sector 
- Political resistance 
- Too much bureaucracy 
- Absence of strong political will 
- Power to drive implementation 
-       
- She said that this is only relevant to respondents from SPAD  
Research Question 3: How have the reforms 
affected decision making processes in policy 
making and the selection and implementation of 
transport transport projects?  
(projects/policies identified by respondents or found to 
be unique will be used to discuss these questions) 
 
  
8. Has there been any difference in the 
project/policy focus under the new structure? 
[Have the recent economic 
circumstances/changes in the central 
government policy influenced your priorities?] 
- Master plans 
- Strategic plans 
- Policy community 
- Policy elites 
- Public participation/response 
to local needs 
- Clear decision making 
 
She said that she does not observe any differences  
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Comments given by pilot respondent 
For all 
procedure 
- Policy discourse 
- Strategy vs project level 
9. What is your/organization’s role in the decision 
making process? 
[Who makes the ultimate decision?] 
For all 
- Passive/active role 
- Policy elites 
 
She raised that there is less room for participation than 
before, during when EPU was in charge of coordinating. 
She also sensed that SPAD preferred using consultants 
than working with existing agencies  
10. How is the decision making process different 
now than before? 
[Is there a clear guideline for decision making?] 
- Use example of a recent project approved under 
the new structure  
 
For all 
 
- Corporate social responsibility 
- Transparency  
- Rationality vs. power 
- Path dependence 
- Master plans/development 
plans 
- Public participation 
- Role of NGO’s 
- Web sites  
 
 
She raised the issue of transparency in decision making 
and said that there is less transparency now than before. 
She felt that a lot of decisions made within a group of 
policy elites and she is not sure who they are. 
 
She suggested that I try to probe for corruption and 
suggested that I ask questions related to glitches in the 
decision making process 
Research Question 4: What factors determine 
the success or failure of the reforms? 
 
 
 
11.  What have the main achievements been? 
[Has there been any difference on the ground, 
for the people?] 
[What do you think is your strength?] 
[How would you imagine an ideal SPAD?] 
For all 
- improvements in connectivity- 
intra- city, regional 
- freight services 
- improvements in transport 
services 
- Less air pollution 
- scale issue: city vs. regional  
 
She said her ideal SPAD resembles Singapore, LTA with 
good land use transport integration 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Comments given by pilot respondent 
 
12. Why have these been possible now and not 
under the previous system? 
[What have you benefited from the reform?] 
For all 
- Coordinated actions 
- Power to drive decisions 
- More capacity 
- Winners and losers 
 
 
She felt that it was difficult to answer the first question and 
the probe was clearer 
13. What are the impediments to further progress? 
 
 
 
For all 
Internal factors 
- corruption 
- Financial  
- Technical capacity 
- Legal backing 
- Structural change vs. mental 
modes 
External factors 
- Inter-organizational 
relationship 
- Social trust/consensus from 
other agencies 
- Rules/regulation 
- Political pressure 
- Poor urban governance 
- support from public  
 
 
She thinks the main issue with SPAD is capacity, funding and 
their inability to deal with freight sector. 
 
She said that SPAD has CEO-Chairman conflict and 
suggested that I investigate that further as it affects the 
overall performance of the authority 
14. Do you have any plans to seek assistance from 
the international development agencies? 
- check for procedures 
For the authority 
- Technical/funding support She felt that this question is not so relevant, she 
thinks that Malaysia may not be eligible for assistance 
but asked me to check 
She suggested 6 respondents whom she thinks can contribute to this research 
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Appendix C: Revised interview guide for SPAD 
Questions and prompts Key concepts Interview topic 
Research Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia? 
1. Do you remember how the idea of a coordinating authority 
came about?  
When did that happen? 
Was there any key personality involved? 
For all 
- Developed cities 
- World Bank 
- Legitimacy vs. efficiency 
- Political will 
- Key personality 
 
Who started? 
 
2. Why was it set up the way it was? 
[Was there an alternative model?] 
[What was the process adopted?] 
- Any refurbishment to the existing authorities? 
[Was it to solve any particular issue?] 
             Discussion to focus around transport issues: congestion, 
poor service 
          For all 
- Prime Minister as the head 
- At national level 
- Institutional weaknesses/inadequacy of existing 
structure 
- Coordination issues 
- Bureaucracy  
  
 
The rationale 
 
Is the model right way forward? 
3. Did your organization support the establishment of the 
authority? 
[If so, what are the reasons?/How do you benefit from the 
authority?] 
[If no, were there other alternatives?] 
Other than the authority 
 
- Alternative models 
- Streamline the sector 
- Single champion 
- Coordinated decision making 
- Policy integration without institutional integration 
 
 
Who supported and who were against? 
 
 
Research Question 2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority? 
4. What powers have been delegated to you under the new 
structure?  
[Are the powers adequate to carry out the assigned functions?] 
For the authority  
- Legal backing 
- political backing 
- Functions (rhetoric vs. practice) 
Actual functions compared to documentation  
- authority vs. autonomy 
 
Legislation support 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Interview topic 
 
5. How are these powers exercised?  
What might be improved? 
[Is there any reporting mechanism back to the central 
government?] 
[Who has the final say?] 
[How do you get buy in from other agencies?] 
[What mechanism do you have to ensure that decisions are 
implemented on the ground?] 
 
For the authority 
- Real power transfer 
- Hierarchical control 
- Centralization 
- Politicians vs. bureaucrats  
- support of citizens (public mass) 
- authority to drive the decisions 
- consensus with other agencies 
 
 
Autonomy and authority 
 
Autonomy – powers acquired/to make 
decisions 
Authority – to influence other agencies 
Check definition 
6. Have the funding mechanisms changed and in what ways? 
[What kind of support do you receive from central government?] 
 
What mechanism do you have to implement the plans? 
 
For the authority 
- Central government control 
- Financial autonomy/self- financing power 
- PPP/privatisation 
- Financial constraint 
 
 
Support from central agency 
 
7. If you were given an opportunity to amend the Act, is there any 
particular thing that you would like to improve? 
[How will that make a difference?] 
[What is stopping you from acquiring those powers?] 
Extension of act at local level 
 
    For the authority/others? 
- Streamline the sector 
- Political resistance 
- Too much bureaucracy 
- Absence of strong political will 
- Power to drive implementation 
-      Adequacy of existing powers 
 
8. SPAD has been placed directly under the PM. What is you 
view? 
    What are the advantages?   What are the disadvantages? 
-  -  
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Interview topic 
  For all 
Research Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport 
transport projects? (projects/policies identified by respondents or found to be unique will be used to discuss these questions) 
 
9 Has there been any difference in the project/policy focus 
under the new structure? 
[Have the recent economic circumstances/changes in the central 
government policy influenced your priorities?] 
For all 
- Master plans 
- Strategic plans 
- Policy community 
- Policy elites 
- Public participation/response to local needs 
- Clear decision making procedure 
- Policy discourse 
- Strategy vs project level 
 
 
     Strategy and project focus 
10. What is your/organization’s role in the decision making 
process? 
[Who makes the ultimate decision?] 
For all 
- Passive/active role 
- Policy elites 
 
Role in decision making process 
11. How is the decision making process different now than 
before? 
[Is there a clear guideline for decision making?] 
- Use example of a recent project approved under the new 
structure  
In your observation, is there any glitches in the new decision 
making process? 
For all 
 
- Corporate social responsibility 
- Transparency  
- Rationality vs. power 
- Path dependence 
- Master plans/development plans 
- Public participation 
- Role of NGO’s 
- Websites  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clear line of responsibility 
 
Improvements in coordination 
 
Research Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms? 
12.  What have the main achievements been? 
[Has there been any difference on the ground, for the people?] 
[What do you think is your strength?] 
[How would you imagine an ideal SPAD?] 
For all 
- Improvements in connectivity- intra- city, 
regional 
- freight services 
- improvements in transport services 
- Less air pollution 
- Scale issue: city vs. regional  
Outcomes of reform 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Interview topic 
 
13. [What have you benefited from the reform?] 
For all 
- Coordinated actions 
- Power to drive decisions 
- More capacity 
- Winners and losers 
 
 
Strengths and constraints 
Identity winners and losers of reform 
14. What are the impediments to further progress? 
 
 
 
For all 
 
Internal factors 
- corruption 
- Financial  
- Technical capacity 
- Legal backing 
- Structural change vs. mental modes 
 
External factors 
- Inter-organizational relationship 
- Social trust/consensus from other agencies 
- Rules/regulation 
- Political pressure 
- Poor urban governance 
- Support from public  
 
-  
15. How is the relationship between the top management and 
staff in SPAD? 
Are there any leadership that issues you observe? 
- Leadership issues  
16. Do you have any plans to seek assistance from the 
international development agencies? 
- check for procedures 
For the authority 
 
- Technical/funding support  
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Appendix D: Interview guide for BMLTA case study 
Questions and prompts Key concepts Background  
Research Question 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore? 
1. Do you remember how the idea of a coordinating 
authority came about?  
When did that happen? 
[You were the first to establish UMTA in the country, any 
particular motivation?] 
For all 
- Developed cities 
- World Bank 
- Legitimacy vs. efficiency 
- Political will 
- Key personality 
- National Urban Transport Policy 
- 74
th
 constitutional amendment act (1993) 
calls for decentralization 
In 2006, NUTP was established for India and one of the 
recommendations is to set up UMTA, with legislation 
support and it gave flexibility the State Gov. to choose 
suitable model. Bangalore was the first to establish a 
coordinating agency. There was a study done by WB in 
2005, and similar recommendation was made.  
 
 
2. Why was it set up the way it was? 
[Was it to solve any particular issue?] 
[What was the process adopted?] 
- Any refurbishment to the existing authorities? 
          Discussion to focus around transport issues: 
congestion, air pollution 
         For all 
 
 
 
- National policy/directive from central 
Government 
- Decentralization-transfer of decision 
making authority 
- Institutional weaknesses/inadequacy of 
existing structure 
- Coordination issues 
- Bureaucracy  
- Job security 
- Issue of scale  
The State Government established Directorate Urban 
Land Transport at state level and then established 
Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Authority (for 
Bangalore Metropolitan). Both are government bodies 
under Urban Development Department. Bangalore has 
severe congestion and air pollution problems. The 
institutional framework for transport is fragmented with 
out-dated with legislations which need amendments. 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Background  
3. Did your organization support the establishment of the 
authority? 
[If so, what are the reasons?/How do you benefit from 
the authority?] 
[If no, were there other alternatives?] 
Other than the authority 
 
- Alternative models 
- Streamline the sector 
- Single champion 
- Coordinated decision making 
- Policy integration without institutional 
integration 
 
There are different views about the ideal model 
 Whether UMTA should be established at State or 
city level 
 The existing municipal corporation can play role 
as UMTA without creating a new body 
 A committee with regular meetings 
From the literature review, it seems like everyone was 
for UMTA 
Main agency is Urban Development Department of 
Karnataka 
Research Question 2: What types of autonomy are given to the authority? 
4. What powers have been delegated to you under the new 
structure?  
[Are the powers adequate to carry out the assigned 
functions?] 
- [Do you have the same powers as DULT?][What is the 
source of power for DULT?] 
For the authority  
- Legal backing 
- Political backing 
- Functions (rhetoric vs. practice) 
Actual functions compared to 
documentation  
- Authority vs. autonomy 
 
No legislation support has been provided yet but the 
draft Act has been prepared. BMLTA is a coordinating 
and planning agency, and also oversees project 
implementation. From the review of minutes of 
meeting, BMLTA seems to be deciding on projects for 
implementation, evaluates and approves completed 
studies, commissions new studies, gives directives to 
other agencies for project implementation. But it 
doesn’t seem to have power to decide on project sites. 
5. How are these powers exercised? 
 What might be improved? 
[Is there any reporting mechanism back to the 
state/central government?] 
[Who has the final say?] 
[How do you get buy in from other agencies?] 
[What mechanism do you have to ensure that decisions 
are implemented on the ground?] 
For the authority 
- Real power transfer 
- Hierarchical control 
- Centralization 
- Politicians vs. bureaucrats  
- Support of citizens (public mass) 
- Authority to drive the decisions 
- Consensus with other agencies 
- BMLTA meets a few times a year but it has established 
sub-committees to tackle relevant issues and report 
back to the main committee. 
- BMLTA is chaired by the State’s Chief Secretary which 
gives the authority a lot of strength. 
- Good decisions are made at the meetings but actions 
are slow…why??(refer meeting minutes) 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Background  
6. Have the funding mechanisms changed and in what 
ways? 
[What kind of support do you receive from central 
government?] 
For all 
- Central government control 
- Financial autonomy/self- financing power 
- PPP/privatisation 
- Financial constraint 
- Donor agencies 
- Under the NUTP, the central government has 
established JNNURM fund, but it is said to be rigid and 
provides only partial funding. 
- There have been discussions to apply for WB’s 
assistance 
7. The draft BMLTA Act has been prepared in 2008, but 
hasn’t been passed, could you explain the reasons? 
[What is the effect of Bangalore Governance Act 2009 
on BMLTA when it comes into force?] 
For the authority/others? 
- Streamline the sector 
- Political resistance 
- Too much bureaucracy 
- Absence of strong political will 
- Proposals in the Kasturirangan Committee 
Report 
- -   Not only BMLTA act, but amending any other existing 
legislation or creating a new piece of legislation is 
difficult in the State. 
- -    Draft Governance Act for Bangalore 2009 is proposed 
to strengthen urban governance and streamline the 
functions/jurisdictions of agencies, plus giving more 
powers to urban local bodies. It has not been passed in 
the Parliament, not quite sure why is it taking so long. 
Research Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and implementation of transport transport 
projects? (Projects/policies identified by respondents or found to be unique will be used to discuss these questions) 
Consider parking policy and METRO project 
8. Has there been any difference in the project/policy focus 
under the new structure? 
[Have the recent economic circumstances/changes in 
the central government policy influenced your priorities?] 
For all 
- Policy community 
- Policy elites 
- Public participation/response to local 
needs 
- Clear decision making procedure 
- Policy discourse 
- Strategy level vs project level 
- Review of BMLTA’s minutes of the meeting show that 
more attention is given to improving basic facilities, 
such as bus terminals, scheduling for bus, parking 
facilities. There are proposals for commuter and 
monorail. Funding is a constraint. Seeking for funding 
from JNNURM, alternatively WB. 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Background  
9. What is your/organization’s role in the decision making 
process? 
[Who makes the ultimate decision?] 
For all 
- Passive/active role 
- Policy elites 
 
- The Chief Secretary of the State makes strong, bold 
decisions during meetings (this is the way the minutes 
are recorded). No evidence of other dominant decision 
maker e.g. Chief Minister, Commissioner, Mayor 
10. How is the decision making process different now than 
before? 
[Is there a clear guideline for decision making?] 
- Use example of a recent project approved under the 
new structure  
 
For all 
 
- Corporate social responsibility 
- Transparency  
- Rationality vs. power 
- Path dependence 
- Master plans/development plans 
- Public participation 
- Role of NGO’s 
- Websites  
- With, there is a platform for all relevant agencies to 
come together to discuss and make the correct 
decisions. Not clear if reference is made to master 
plans/development plans. There seems to be active 
participation from transport experts, NGO’s, general 
public via PRAJA’s website. However, there seems to 
be delays in implementing the decisions. 
Research Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms? 
11. What have the main achievements been? 
[Has there been any difference on the ground, for the 
people?] 
[What do you think is  BMLTA’s strength?] 
[How would you imagine an ideal BLMTA?] 
For all 
- Improvements in connectivity- intra- city, 
regional 
- Freight services 
- Improvements in transport services 
- Less air pollution 
- Scale issue: city vs. regional vs. state 
- Based on the review of the minutes of meeting, there 
have been a lot of talks on increasing automobile tax, 
using cleaner fuel, promote walking and cycling as well 
as overcoming the parking woes, but not sure of the 
achievements on the ground 
 
12. Why have these been possible now and not under the 
previous system? 
[What have you benefited from the reform?] 
For all 
- Coordinated actions 
- Power to drive decisions 
- More capacity 
- Winners and losers 
- There are proposals to transfer BMLTA to Bangalore 
Metropolitan Development Authority for better 
coordination and planning. 
- There is strong move towards regional coordination 
and planning, at Bangalore Metropolitan level. 
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Questions and prompts Key concepts Background  
13. What are the impediments to further progress? 
 
For all 
Internal factors 
- Corruption 
- Financial  
- Technical capacity 
- Legal backing 
- Structural change vs. mental modes 
 
External factors 
- Inter-organizational relationship 
- Social trust/consensus from other 
agencies 
- Rules/regulation 
- Political pressure 
- Poor urban governance 
- Support from the public  
 
- The existing urban governance structure needs to be 
strengthened and old legislations needs amendments 
- BMLTA has to be given statutory Act 
- Funding and politics are said to be big issues 
- The need for city leadership. Fully elected mayor is 
strongly proposed, so that leaders are more 
accountable to public (main proposal in the 
Bangalore Governance Act 2009). 
- Absence of coordinated regional planning. Proposals 
for Metropolitan Planning Corporation. 
14. What kind of assistance did you receive from 
International Development Agencies such as the WB or 
ADB? 
 [Can you apply for assistance directly without going 
through the central agencies?] 
[Besides ADB and WB are there any other donor 
agencies involved in Bangalore?] 
For the authority 
- Technical/funding support 
- WB organized UMTA workshop in June 2009 in 
Bangalore 
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Appendix E: Findings of SPAD and BMLTA 
RQ 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of SPAD in Malaysia? 
Findings  from the SPAD case study for RQ1 Details Interpretation/conclusion 
 
Top down push  
 
- Strong political leadership – PM 
 
- Aimed to gain political legitimacy by abolishing the 
Bumiputera agenda 
 
- Attempted to create quick wins upon assuming 
office in 2009 – main areas identified were public 
transport and anti corruption 
 
- Supported the creation of SPAD although it wasn’t 
his idea – the proposal complemented PM’s agenda 
to achieve the objectives above 
 
 
 
The Front Coalition, the ruling party lost the usual 2/3 
majority in 2008 election. 
 
The PM was vested with the authority to make and drive 
decisions. 
 
The PM continued policy implementation for creating 
SPAD but he twisted the model to enable CVLB to be 
dissolved. SPAD turned out to be in charge of both PT and 
goods vehicles although it was never in the original plan 
accomodate goods vehicles. 
 
 
Presence of strong political champions who 
dared to make changes 
 
Reform was undertaken to gain political 
legitimacy 
 
Policy window 
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Findings  from the SPAD case study for RQ1 Details Interpretation/conclusion 
 
Inadequacy in the existing structure 
 
CVLB 
- Implementation of the Bumiputera Agenda was 
politicised -  Misuse of power  and corruption in 
CVLB 
- CVLB was under-performing due to insufficient 
resources and politicization – the industry was poorly 
regulated – poor planning, poor regulation and poor 
enforcement 
 
MOT 
- MOT could not exercise its powers due to racial 
sensitivity and reluctance to meddle in Bumiputera 
agenda. Respondents also highlighted poor quality 
officers. 
 
- POOR PLANNING - Fragmentation in the planning 
function, no overarching transport policy  
 
- POOR COORDINATION – presence of multiple 
agencies, leading to poor integration among modes 
on the ground   
 
 
 
There was no clear line of accountability of proper check 
and balance system in place 
The agenda was to create as many Malay entrepreneurs 
as possible at  the expense of transport efficiency- CVLB 
did not maintain good database –actual license holders not 
known 
MOT was in a better position to plan and coordinate for 
public transport but they neglected the function – 
accountability issue again 
Available options 
Option 1: Restructure CVLB 
Option 2: Create new authority  
Second option was easier and desirable as it would include 
rail as well. Besides overcoming the corruption issues, this 
option would allow for better integration  
It was also easier to create a semi-atonomous body rather 
than a government agency – so the reformers opted for 
that 
 
 
 
There was a need for change to be better 
- Improve accountability 
- Fight corruption 
- Improve planning function 
coordination among agencies 
 
Power on paper vs power in reality  
- MOT could not do what it was 
supposed  to do for planning 
 
Creating a new agency was found to be easier 
that revamping/improving old ones 
 
Reformers tend to create a model known best 
to them/easy which fit their purpose 
Push from consultants  
 
Involvement since 70’s, their proposals for a transport 
authority  appeared in many gov documents – it became a 
belief although there was no strong research evidence 
indicating requirement  
 
Ideas disseminated by management 
consultants based on successful models 
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Findings  from the SPAD case study for RQ1 Details Interpretation/conclusion 
 
Proximity of Singapore LTA 
- Senior administrators benchmarking with model that 
they perceived to be successful 
 
Malaysia tried to emulate Singapore LTA model, but it was 
too difficult – different context 
 
Benchmarking with successful cities – but 
what was created was far from mirroring this 
agency 
 
Deteriorating public transport services 
-  public not happy, congestion was a problem, 
operators complained having to liaise with many 
agencies 
 
Privatisation urban rail projects failed  
 
Powers needed to be consolidated – single 
regulator had to  be created 
The public transport system had to be 
improved 
 
RQ 1: What were the motivations behind the establishment of BMLTA in Bangalore? 
Findings  from the BMLTA case study for  
RQ1 
Details Interpretation/conclusion 
 
Top down push and bottom up push 
 
 
 
Top down push 
- National urban transport policy, strongly pushed by the central 
government  
- Decentralization under 74
th
 amendment but actual decentralization did 
not happen, the State Government was not keen 
- Push by State Government – had good political support + stakeholders 
agree that there was a need, but they only created a coordinating 
committee – and a set-up which did not involve devolving powers to the 
local bodies or grabbing powers from any existing agencies 
   Bottom up 
- Stakeholder agreed on the idea until there was a proposal for power 
transfer,  then everybody ‘hated’ the idea 
- Proposals from academics 
 
Reform was done to gain access to central 
government funds  
Reform had minimum disruption to the 
existing institutional settings – small reform 
– which was more acceptable in the ‘Indian 
context’ 
 
 
Inadequacy in the existing structure 
 
- Poor planning - Fragmentation in the planning function, no land use 
transport integration, absence of holistic vision for city,  lack of experts, 
 
Need for a powerful coordinator and 
dedicated planner - need for change to be 
xxv 
 
 
Findings  from the BMLTA case study for  
RQ1 
Details Interpretation/conclusion 
- Poor planning and coordination 
 
 
 
 
no one takes ownership of plans   
 
- Poor coordination – presence of multiple agencies at various levels 
governed by different poorly integrated law.  
 
- Agencies governed by own objectives and matters made worse by the 
absence of platform to integrate the functions of these agencies. Made 
worse by presence of powerful parastatals with own funding muscle, who 
went on to what they thought was right rather than what is really require 
better 
 
There was poor social trust among agencies 
– they were competing for the scarce funding 
resources 
 
 
Existing agencies not empowered  
- But what is created to replace is also 
an underpowered agency, worse still, 
it is only a committee  
 
- BMRDA not performing according to expectations (failed to play an 
effective coordinator and planner role)  
- BBMP is under powered with poor administration and frequent change of 
leadership  
- One the factors pointed out is that these agencies are not financially 
independent like many other agencies in Bangalore, and dependent on 
government grant 
- Poor accountability system in place which provided the check and 
balance on non-performing agencies 
 
The absence of actual decentralization- 
power concentrated in the state 
Powers on paper vs power in reality  
Poor city leadership  
It is easier to create a new body than trying 
to reorganize or reform existing agencies 
 
Growth of Bangalore city  
 
 
- Private vehicles increasing, existing infrastructure cannot cope, poor 
integration among modes (because the modes were under different 
agencies ) 
 
- No overall vision for the city  
 
 
There was a need to integrate various modes 
to improve mobility 
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RQ2: What types of autonomy have been given to the authority (SPAD)? 
Findings  from the SPAD case study for RQ2 Details Interpretation/conclusion  
SPAD has not acquired all the powers – yet to 
be a single regulator 
 
SPAD was a treated as a project without a 
long term reform plan 
SPAD is not  a single regulator yet, the ultimate model / 
objective is yet to be achieved 
Not all powers could be transferred as planned – RTD 
refused to give up the powers for vocational licensing and 
this produced unintended consequences such 
fragmentation in the enforcement function 
The powers that could be transferred to SPAD was limited 
to what CVLB, ministry of tourism and DOR had, plans to 
take more power e.g. from RTD/MOT did not succeed. 
Gap between planning and implementation of reform 
due to power and resistance issues 
Further reform is needed to empower SPAD  
 
Failure to acknowledge that reform is an ongoing 
process 
SPAD is given legislative backing but not fully 
operationalised 
Respondents argued that SPAD has not fully 
operationalized the Act and this affects the working 
mechanism especially enforcement function 
There are some dispute regarding the enforcement 
functions but this cannot be resolved unless amendment is 
made to the acts 
Legislative support has to be flexible, with inbuilt 
powers – so that frequent amendments not needed 
Subsequent big reforms are not desirable (eg. amending 
the acts) as it is politically damaging 
Legal act provides the ‘hard power’ but it has to be 
operationalized with good resource capacity 
Commission status pending 
Central government is reluctant to grant financial autonomy 
to SPAD - which also affects commission status – hence 
SPAD is operating like another government agency. 
SPAD has to be empowered and made accountable at the 
same time. Currently SPAD believe that with commission 
status, there will be less central government control 
SPAD claim that absence of commission status affects its 
capacity building. 
Central government control  
Empowerment must be followed with accountability 
SPAD is entrusted with planning function but 
there is an absence of clear requirements for 
SPAD to implement the plans – plan 
implementation is not clear and SPAD is not 
given the incentives (funding) to drive the 
SPAD fills the gap in planning which existed in the 
previous institutional framework 
There is danger that the plans will not be implemented  
Implementation of plans – dependent on relationship with 
other stakeholders, NPPC council and use of licensing tool 
Funding capacity is important to drive the coordinating 
and planning functions. SPAD should at least be made 
as fund distributor 
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Findings  from the SPAD case study for RQ2 Details Interpretation/conclusion  
plans None of the transport authority in the developed cities has 
proven to be self financing  
SPAD and RTD are expected to carry out the 
enforcement functions without proper 
empowerment  
Longer procedures in enforcement than before. All 
prosecutions require the approval of the Public Prosecutor 
– entails more paper work, longer period, raising more 
safety issues on the ground  
Execution without empowerment 
More central government control  
 
Research Question 2:  What types of autonomy have been given to the authority (BMLTA)? 
Findings  from the BMLTA case study for  RQ2 Details Interpretation/conclusion 
 
High powered committee with no political and 
legislative backing 
 
Absence of dedicated resources and personnel 
 
Definition of ‘committee’ implies’ that this body is ‘fluid’ – with no dedicated 
resources – members are attached to original department – less 
commitment 
Committee does not operate on a day to day basis 
A committee may not be sufficient in the context of Bangalore where 
coordination is really a problem 
BMLTA relying on sub-committees and consultants  
 
Change for the sake of changing – 
without proper target and objectives  
Legislation backing is still pending although the 
act has been prepared 
On paper – there are indication of plans to empower BMLTA – with 
legislation backing – but in reality that did not happen 
Without legislation backing – BMLTA has no mandate to direct other 
agencies  
Functions, structure, resources – not clear 
The administrators who created BMLTA have all left – no continuity in the 
reform initiative  
Affected parties not giving consensus to the bill -  
Other conflicting initiatives – BGB bill and proposals for MPC 
State Government is not serious in 
empowering BMLTA  
Empowerment of BMLTA is dependent 
on other reform proposals which are in 
the pipeline 
Strong resistance of agencies to give 
up any existing powers 
(they want ‘change’ without changing 
anything) 
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Findings  from the BMLTA case study for  RQ2 Details Interpretation/conclusion 
BMLTA themselves not sure of their role, model 
and functions, different actors have different 
view of what it should be 
 
Respondents have different views of what BMLTA really does (without legal 
backing) 
- some say it is a dispute resolution 
- coordinator without teeth – because it has no funding capacity 
- planning body 
 
Actors are contesting about the right 
model and powers to be given to 
BMLTA  
There is a need to transform the coordinating 
body (BMLTA)  into an authority  
 
Respondents have not indicated desires to see BMLTA change the 
institutional structure- most importantly they have stated clearly that it should 
not touch their powers and provide win-win situation 
Commissioner of BMLTA pointed out that BMLTA cannot be empowered 
without reducing the powers of other agencies  
It was made known that the current status of BMLTA as an authority does 
not allow transformation into an authority – a brand new authority has to be 
created 
But it was also pointed out the ‘coordinating role’ can only be played 
effectively by a government body and not by a parastatal agency – so 
BMLTA still has to take a ‘government’ form 
 
 
A brand new reform is needed 
 
Funding is critical in the context of Bangalore, 
especially for a coordinating body like BMLTA  
Funding is crucial – to deal with the parastatal agencies  
Poor funding capacity- one of the reasons why BMRDA and BBMP did not 
develop well 
Funding has to be used as ‘carrot’ to implement plans 
At least BMLTA has to be designed as funding distribution centre 
Scenario in Bangalore – many plans exist, but poor implementation due to 
funding and political interference 
 
 
Funding is crucial to drive 
implementation of plans and to 
coordinate the agencies 
Leadership issues 
BMLTA has Chief Secretary as chairman – it is argued that he is powerless 
when he heads a powerless body like BMLTA 
So decisions made by the CS in BMLTA committee is not binding  
Chief Secretary is also too busy, often changes 
Commissioner constantly changed and hold many other positions at the 
same time 
 
Not practical to have the CS as the 
chairman 
Absence of continuity in leadership 
Absence of political champion 
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Research Question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and 
implementation of transport projects? - SPAD 
Findings  from the SPAD case study for RQ3 Details Interpretation/Conclusion 
 
SPAD acts as the checkpoint for EPU 
- there is no compulsion for one to go to 
SPAD with new proposals, ideally that is 
what it should be. Highly political 
projects skips this  
 
The previous decisions making arrangements remain, 
SPAD only forms an additional layer prior to the approval 
process 
SPAD checks proposals, provides evaluation and feedback 
to EPU. EPU holds the ultimate decision making authority 
because it holds the funding power. 
It appears as though the decision making powers is 
strongly related on funding capacity, unless SPAD is given 
some financial strength, it is unlikely that it will be able to 
make any decisions at the strategic level or play an 
effective coordinating role 
Decisions are made powers not devolved, the central 
government still holds the grip 
Decision making power is strongly dependent on 
funding capacity 
Decision making for railway – rhetoric vs 
practice 
SPAD is given more powers in terms of railway regulation, 
but in reality a lot of decisions regarding railway are made 
outside SPAD  - for example, by the MRT Exco 
Actual powers on paper versus actual practice 
Winners and losers of the reform 
Winners 
- EPU, operators, public 
Losers  
- MOT, RTD 
Winners are happy and want more – such as the operators 
want to be directly involved  in planning  policy matters, 
EPU wants SPAD to have good engagement with 
stakeholders.  
The losers – criticizes SPAD, and does not show any 
willingness to cooperate. They seem to be more protective 
and feeling threatened. 
Those who did not lose any powers seem to be more 
willing to work with SPAD  
Actors who lost powers are unhappy will the new 
distribution of power – arguing for a better model 
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Research question 3: How have the reforms affected decision making processes in policy making and the selection and 
implementation of transport projects? - BMLTA 
Findings  from the BMLTA case study for RQ3 Details Interpretation/Conclusion 
 
BMLTA’s decisions only advisory and not 
binding  
 
A lot of decisions regarding transport still 
made outside BMLTA 
 
Agencies have to implement projects using their own funding  
Agencies have final say of whether or not to implement BMLTA’s 
suggestions 
 
BMLTA wants to have final say in projects – difficult without legislative 
support 
 
Absence of legal mandate to make and 
enforce decisions (absence of legitimate 
authority) 
Absence of powers to drive decisions – 
mainly funding 
Holds no accountability for transport 
matters 
 
Limited outcomes – mainly around 
preparation of studies and guidelines and 
dispute resolution, and reviving old projects 
 
Nothing at strategic level – parking policy 
failed  
 
- better NMT initiatives 
- BRT project revisited 
- guidelines for transit management centres prepared but cannot be 
enforced 
- dispute resolution among agencies involved in MRT project 
- good engagement with NGO’s 
 
Without proper mandate not able to 
influence policies at strategic level 
Working relationship – 
participatory/handholding instead of 
‘directives’ 
BMLTA builds its niche in uncontested 
policy areas 
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Research Question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?  - SPAD 
Findings  from the SPAD case study for RQ4 Details Interpretation/Conclusion 
Prime Minister as the Minister in charge of 
SPAD  
 
Although SPAD is under PM and ideally he can direct that 
SPAD is granted financial autonomy and commission 
status – he did not do that – perhaps he did want to 
meddle with the administrative process and leave that to 
the bureaucrats to handle 
SPAD has to negotiate with the administrators using good 
strategies to acquire the full ‘commission status’ 
Possibility for pollution of remit in SPAD – PM’s can direct 
SPAD to do what he thinks should be done – as in the 
case of MRT project 
Not practical to have a political champion too high up – 
power has to be devolved  
Short term political interest  
Agencies which lost powers to SPAD still 
show signs of resistance and less willing to 
cooperate 
- The ‘losers’ are still threatened 
 
RTD still feels threatened and fear that SPAD will take the 
power for vocational licensing- respondents clearly 
indicated resistance 
But on the other hand – PM has directed SPAD to work 
within the constraints and big changes (those which 
involve amendments to act) cannot be made immediately –
the government will be criticised for poor policy 
implementation  
Bad blood between losers of the reform and SPAD 
continues 
SPAD preferred to recruit private sector  
Perhaps the agenda would have been to bring in private 
sector culture into government – to increase efficiency but 
unfortunately – this created a culture clash – unable to 
engage each other effectively 
Cultural clash between SPAD and government agencies. 
SPAD does not understand the administrative culture. 
Social capital/mutual trust has to be established before 
the new network can be stabilised again 
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Findings  from the SPAD case study for RQ4 Details Interpretation/Conclusion 
SPAD lacks capacity – human resource, 
technical knowledge, institutional memory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leadership issues 
Some say  that capacity issue is teething problem which is 
temporary 
SPAD can overcome this by leveraging on the capacity of 
the network – but to do this strong leadership is required 
who establishes good rapport with the network members. 
Current CEO is a strategist, but not a ‘ground’ person 
Although SPAD is an ‘authority’, it still has to get work 
done through the network 
 
Chairman CEO conflict – managers left for direction 
Good network can to a certain extent overcome the 
capacity issues 
Institutional memory – complete cut-off might be 
necessary to start fresh 
 
 
 
 
Good leadership is important to be able to exercise the 
powers given to SPAD  
 
Research question 4: What factors determine the success or failure of the reforms?  - BMLTA 
Findings  from the BMLTA case study for RQ4 Details Interpretation/Conclusion 
 
Fuzzy reform without clear objectives and 
good implementation design 
Absence of interest to evaluate outcomes of 
reform or it could be ‘short term interest in 
reforms’. 
 
There was a need for a coordinating body but it is not clear what 
BMLTA was created to do 
It is basically a coalition of willing without changing or 
sanctioning functions of any agencies – adds another layer 
Key reformers no longer hold the same position, perhaps the 
change in the political party in 2008 disrupted the reform 
 
It was the reform (the creation) that mattered and not 
the outcome – hence it only contributed to 
overstuffing  
Failure to acknowledge that reform is an ongoing 
process 
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Findings  from the BMLTA case study for RQ4 Details Interpretation/Conclusion 
Cultural issues  
- Strong bureaucrat-political relationship  
- Laid back/not proactive civil servants 
- Corruption  
- Absence of ‘figure head’ who can control 
- Policies drafted without understanding 
local culture  
Constant transfers of senior civil servants - Affects policy 
implementation 
- Major reshuffling with change in political executive 
- Head of departments holding many post at the same 
time 
- Politicians interfering both at policy and project level 
 
Other cultural issues – respect for authority, job security, family 
ties 
Lack of leadership stability affects policy 
implementation  
 
Strong nexus between politicians and bureaucrats 
 
Too much cumbersome procedures and long 
approval process – lack of  transparency in 
decision making  
Lack of accountability – agencies and 
individuals get away with their actions 
 
Corruption is a problem and being accepted as a culture 
 
Poor accountability and transparency in governance  
 
Poor urban transport knowledge and 
expertise – dependence on development 
agencies  
 
Urban transport – new sector in India – lack of expertise  - 
BMLTA could leverage on this and act as technical wing for 
urban transport  
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Appendix F:Similarities and differences between SPAD and 
BMLTA 
 
SPAD  BMLTA 
Objectives and key drivers of reform determined the set-up 
 Top down push and external factors 
 One of the objective – gain 
legitimacy and fight corruption – 
once that was established, PM  lost 
interest?? 
 Political pressure triggered the 
reform 
 Poor performance of existing 
agencies  
 Benchmarked with LTA 
Singapore/London 
 Coordination issues – need to 
improve 
 Driven by national government, 
implementation at national level 
 Transport issues on the ground 
 Top down push and external factors 
 Access to funds – NUTP 
 Poor performance of existing 
agencies  
 Benchmarked with LTA 
Singapore/London 
 Coordination issues 
 Driven by national government, 
implementation at state level 
 Growth of Bangalore city – led to 
transport issues on the ground 
 
Failure to acknowledge that reform is an ongoing process 
 Absence of a long term reform 
design  
 Gap between planning and 
implementation of reform exercise 
 Short term interest – only until it was 
created, then EPU thought it was not 
their responsibility any more 
 Poor monitoring on the outcome, 
lack of initiative to strengthen SPAD 
– SPAD was left to survive on its 
own from day 1 
 
 
 Absence of a long term reform 
design  
 The focus was only the creation, 
although there were empowerment 
plans stated on paper, none of this 
took place 
 After 5 years of creation, it still 
maintains the same structure with 
limited increase in human resource 
capacity- there were signs of power 
curtailing by giving the commissioner 
additional post in other departments  
 There are other reforms in the pipe 
line which affects the empowerment 
of BMLTA 
 One of the objective of reform is to 
gain legitimacy from the central 
government in Delhi 
 
Powers to act 
 SPAD has the authority (necessary 
power) – but has a weak leadership 
which  can successfully transform 
 BMLTA has weak authority – has to 
work within the limitations, by 
engaging the network to produce 
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SPAD  BMLTA 
the powers into outcomes, weak 
ability to engage the existing network 
 
 Power for managing land transport is 
more consolidated within SPAD 
although some fragmentation still 
exists. Creation of SPAD 
strengthens the power of the central 
government (EPU, MOF) and PM– 
as they have  an overall say on most 
matters related to land transport. 
SPAD  acts as check point for 
filtering projects. 
 Has powers to plan, regulate and 
enforce land public transport – but 
does not have conctractual 
obligation with the transport 
operators – to enable to control the 
quality of service 
 Absence of funding capability  
outcomes – outcomes are not at 
strategic levels 
 
 Absence of decision making powers 
 
 Creation of BMLTA does not 
structurally change the distribution of 
power. BMLTA is just an addition to 
the already crowded institutional 
settings 
 
 Has limited planning function 
 
 
 
 
 Absence of legislative backing and 
funding capability  
The degree of championing 
 Championed by the Prime Minister 
 
 Prime Minister is vested with a lot of 
authority and resources– which 
made the reform possible- he 
managed to transform the resources 
with his leadership skills in order to 
gain legitimacy from the citizens  
 
 Prime Minister had short term 
interest – impractical in the long 
term 
 Absence of political champion but 
has good leadership 
 
 Consensus decision making practice 
which made big reforms impossible 
Lack of accountability and transparency  
 Accountability system is in place to 
some extent, but no sanctions for 
poor performance  
 Decisions making process not 
transparent 
 Corruption is a problem, it is 
acknowledged and actions are taken 
to combat corruption including as 
one of targets under NKRA 
 Limited public participation in 
 Poor accountability system in place 
– politicians and bureaucrats get 
away with their actions, no sanctions 
for poor performance 
 Decisions making process not 
transparent 
 Corruption is a problem/culture, it is 
acknowledged, but nothing much is 
done about it  
 Limited public participation in 
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SPAD  BMLTA 
decision making decision making 
Cultural environment determines the kind of administrative behaviour that exists 
 Religious belief and values 
 Job security rather than efficiency 
 Respect for authority  
 Promotions based on seniority and 
experience  
 Priority for Malay ethnic  
 Cultural clash between SPAD and 
other government actors 
 
 
 Strong fusion between politicians 
and bureaucrats – constant transfers 
affect leadership continuity 
 Job security rather than efficiency 
 Respect for authority  
 Promotions based on seniority and 
experience  
 Corruption is a culture 
 Personal contacts – most effective 
way to get things done 
 
Reluctance of central government/state government to devolve actual power 
(decision-making and financial power) 
 Reluctance of central government to 
devolve funding power to SPAD  
 Execution without empowerment – in 
the case of enforcement for SPAD  
 Cumbersome procedures –too many 
levels of approval, too detailed and 
repetitive – stemming from ‘fear to 
make decisions’ /political 
interference and the ‘control-
oriented’ government  
 Resistance from agencies – 
especially those who were to give up 
existing powers 
 Reluctance of State Government to 
devolve actual powers to city 
corporation as per the 74
th
 
amendment 
 BMLTA created at State level 
without city leadership 
 Reluctance to devolve any actual 
powers to BMTLA – such as legal 
mandate, decision making and 
financial power 
 Resistance from agencies to give up 
any existing powers 
 Cumbersome procedures - too many 
levels of approval, too detailed and 
repetitive – stemming from ‘fear to 
make decisions’ /political 
interference 
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